THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS
OF
THE BIJAPUR KINGDOM (1489-1686 A.D.)

(A Study in Diplomatic History)

A thesis Submitted
for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in History
to the University of Poona

By M. A. NAYEEM

Supervisor

Dr. A. R. KULKARNI

Professor and Head, Department of History, University of Poona.

1973

POONA

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

To Dr. A.R. KULKARNI, my Research Guide, I owe a deep debt of gratitude, which words fail to express. But for his great help it would have been impossible for me to take up Ph.D. without his sympathetic guidance, it would have been well-neigh impossible for me to complete the work successfully. At every stage of research and writing of this thesis he extended me valuable advice, and took keen interest in the progress of my studies. He was ever obliging and kind. I am beholden to him.

It was due to the keen interest taken by Dr. P.M. JOSHI that I was able to take up Ph.D. I am very grateful to him. He was kind enough to place at my disposal all his works on the various aspects of Bijapur's history. His erudite publications were of immense help to me. I am grateful to him for his kind advice and enlightening erudite discussions, especially on the source material. He was ever obliging and kind to me.

Prof. H.K. SHERWANI, originally suggested me to work on an aspect of Bijapur's history and specially on "Bijapur's Foreign Policy". And the present thesis is the modification of that suggestion. Though well advanced in age he was kind enough to read some of the chapters and made valuable suggestions. I was greatly encouraged by his appreciation.

Dr. Sarojini Regani, Director, State Archives, Hyderabad was kind enough to allow me to use the archival material and release photos of some documents.

I am obliged to Mr. Ernest Anderson and Mr. P. Warwick the British Museum, London for kindly supplying me photostat

copies of manuscripts.

Thanks are due to Mr. Sen, Keeper of the Archaeological Museum, Bijapur for kindly helping me in the study of manuscripts.

I am thankful to Dr. Gune, Director, Goa Archives, Panjim, for his help in tracing and studying the Portuguese record. On my visits to Goa, he went out of the way to help me.

Thanks are due to Mr. Gajanand Gantakar of Goa Archives and Mr. Teotino D. Souza of St. Britto's High School, Goa, for their great help to me in translating the Portuguese records.

My sincere thanks are due to Dr. Lotika Varadarajan of Sophia College, University of Bombay for kindly allowing me to use her unpublished translation of the Francos Martins' Memoires. She was kind enough to translate for me from other French sources also.

I am thankful to Dr. M.A. Mu'īd Khan, Professor of Arabic, Osmania University for kindly allowing me to use his translation (from his unpublished work) of al-Fathul-Mubīn - an unpublished manuscript in India Office Library, London.

Thanks are due to Mr. Nizamuddin Maghribi of Osmania University, for kindly loaning me excerpts from the manuscripts at Istanbul, Turkey. He kindly translated the excerpts from Turkish.

Thanks are due to Director, National Archives of India, New Delhi, for kindly supplying Microfilms of documents.

Sincere thanks are due to Dr. P. Kanhalary, Secretary, Iranian Cultural Foundation, Tehran, for very kindly sending me their publication of Indo-Persian Relations.

Thanks are due to Mr. Khwaja Muhammad Ahmad, Director, Maulana Azad Oriental Research Institute, Hyderabad, for kindly loaning me photos of some epigraphs of Bijapur.

I am thankful to the authorities of the following libraries who have extended all possible help to me in getting books:

Library of Deccan College, Poona; Library of Poona University; Library of Bombay University; Library of Goa Archives; Goa; Library of Bharata Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala, Poona; From Hyderabad: Library Salar Jung Museum, Asafia (State Central Library); Library of State Archives, Oriental Manuscript Library; Library of Andhra Pradesh Central Secretariat; Library of Osmania University; Library of Islamic Culture; Library of Maulana Azad Oriental Research Institute and Library of Andhra Pradesh State Archaeological Department.

Thanks are due to Mr. Ahmad, Cartographer, Department of Geography, Osmania University for taking pains in preparing the maps basing on the sketches composed by me.

C O N T E N T S

Acknowledgments

Transliteration and Dates

Abbreviation

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

PART 1

SEC. I: Scope of the Thesis

SEC. II: Evaluation of the Sources

PART 2

The Evolution, Rise and Fall of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom of Bijapur.

SEC. I: Political Background: Disintegration of the Bahmanī Kingdom.

SEC.II: Rise and Fall of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom (1489-1686)

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan (895-916/1489-1510) -- Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan (916-41/1510-34) -- Mallū 'Ādil Khan (941/1534) -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I (941-65/1534-57) -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I (965-88/1557-80) -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (988-1037/1580-1627) -- Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah (1037-67/1627-56) -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1067-83/1656-72) -- Sikandar 'Ādil Shah (1083-97/1672-86).

page... (21-65)

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY OF BIJAPUR

SEC. I: Formulation of the External Policy

(A) Background
The Character of the Bijapur Kingdom
Organization for the External Affairs

(B) Basic Determinants in Policy Formulation

Political Interests and Objectives -- Physical Geography -- Economic Geography -- Demography -- Belligerent Power -- Ideology -- The Environment -- Domestic Affairs.

SEC. II: The Structure of the Diplomatic Practices

The Instruments of the External Policy

Diplomacy -- Diplomatic Communications -- Diplomatic Sanctions -- Treaties, Contracts and Agreements -- Persuation, Compromise and Diplomatic Pressure -- Duplicity Bluff and Coercion -- Espionage -- Use of threat of force in the Background of Negotiations -- Good Offices and Mediation -- Conquests and Condominiums -- Economic Actions -- Armed Forces -- Matrimonial Alliances.-

(C) Diplomatic Usage

Ordinary Missions -- Regular Missions -- Special Missions -- Political Missions -- Secret Missions.

page... (66-90)

CHAPTER III

THE 'ĀDIL SHAHS AND THE BAHMANĪS (1489-1536)

Relations During the Evolution of the Bijapur Kingdom

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan, Maḥmūd Gāwān and Sultan Muḥammad III -- Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan - Vassal of the Bahmanī Sultan -- Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan and Sultan Maḥmūd -- Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan, Aḥmad Shah, Walīyullāh and Kalīmullāh -- Mallū 'Ādil Khan, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Khan and Kalīmullāh Bahmanī.

page...(91-104)

CHAPTER IV

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD

PART I

BIJAPUR-IRAN RELATIONS

SEC. I: FACTORS DETERMINING THE RELATIONS

Anthropological Relations and Āfāqī Demography -- Cultural Affinity -- Commercial Factors.

SEC. II: POLITICAL RELATIONS

'Ādil Shahs and the Ṣafawīs -- The Vital Link - Shī'ah Ideology.

SEC. III: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Diplomatic Missions: Exchange of Ambassadors and Envoys -- Role of Shah 'Abbās I in the Mughal - Bijapur Conflict -- Intrigue of 'Ādil Shah in Perso-Mughal Qandhār Affair -- Shah Ṣafī and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah -- Perso-Bijapur Intrigues against the Mughals.

SEC. IV: PERSIAN IMPACT ON BIJAPUR

Persianization of 'Ādil Shahs -- Persian Element in 'Ādil Shahi Administration -- The Role of Persian Nobility in Bijapur -- Patronage of Persian Scholars and Literature by 'Ādil Shahs -- Persian Art and Architecture at Bijapur.

PART 2

RELATIONS WITH OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

(Turkey, Egypt and Arab States)

Religio-Political Relations with Ottoman Turkey -- Bijapur-Egypt Alliance against the Portuguese -- Religio-Political Relations with Egypt -- Relations with Arab States.

page...(105-147)

CHAPTER V

PART I

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUCCESSION SULTANATES OF BAHMANI KINGDOM AND OTHER SOUTH INDIAN STATES

Inter-statal Relationship

SEC. I: AHMADNAGAR-BIJAPUR RELATIONS

Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and Aḥmad Niẓām Shah -- Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Burhān Niẓām Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Burhān Niẓām Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah I -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah I -- Confederacy against Vijayanagar -- The Break-up of the Confederacy -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah I -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah II -- Ibrāhim 'Ādil Shah II and Burhān Niẓām Shah II -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Ibrāhīm Niẓām Shah -- Bijapur-Ahmadnagar Coalition against the Mughals -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Malik 'Ambar -- Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah II and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah III.

SEC. II: BIJAPUR-GOLKONDA RELATIONS

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Qulī Quṭb Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Qulī Qutb Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Jamshīd Quṭb Shah -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Muḥammad Quṭb Shah -- Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah -- Treaty for the Partition of Karnatak -- Race for the conquest of Ginji and Mīr Jumlā's diplomacy -- Cordial Relations to Counter Mughal Invasion -- 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II and 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah -- Sikandar 'Ādil Shah and

Abul-Ḥasan Quṭb Shah -- Quṭb Shah intervenes in the Internal Affairs of Bijapur -- Alliance against the Mughals.

SEC. III: BIJAPUR-BIDAR RELATIONS

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Amīr 'Alī Barīd.

SEC. IV: BIJAPUR-BERAR RELATIONS

PART 2

BIJAPUR-VIJAYANAGAR RELATIONS (1489-1672)

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1489-1565) -- BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE SALUVA AND THE TULUVA DYNASTIES

'Alī 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj -- The Battle of Krishna -- League of the Four Sultans.

SEC. II: SECOND PHASE (1565-1672) -- BIJAPUR AND THE ĀRAVĪḌU DYNASTY

'Alī 'Ādil Shah, Tirumala and Srī Ranga -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Vankaṭa Rāya II -- Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and Srī Ranga.

PART 3

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUCCESSION STATES OF THE VIJAYANAGAR

Kanara Region -- Karnatak Region -- The Coromandel Region: Relations with the Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura -- Bijapur-Madura Alliance against Mysore.

page...(148-269)

CHAPTER VI

MUGHAL-BIJAPUR RELATIONS (1535-1686)

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1526-35)

Period of oblivion and Passing Contact

SECOND PHASE (1535-72)

Period of no Contacts

SEC. II: THIRD PHASE (1572-1635)

Period of Verbal Strategy and Diplomacy

Akbar and Bijapur (1572-1605) -- Establishment of Diplomatic Relations under Akbar -- Akbar and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I (1573-80) -- Akbar and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1580-1605) -- Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah - the Spiritual Disciple of Akbar -- Jahāngīr and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1605-26) -- 'Ādil Shah's Dual Diplomacy and Dillusion of the Mughals -- 'Ādil Shah - Farzand of Jahāngīr -- Bijapur-Mughal Alliance.

Shāh Jahān and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah (1628-56)

Shāh Jahān mediates peace in Bijapur - Ahmadnagar conflict -- Anti-Mughal Bijapur-Ahmadnagar Alliance -- Shāh Jahān orders Invasion of Bijapur -- Negotiations for Peace -- Khawāṣ Khan tries to placate Shāh Jahān -- Shah Jahān demands recognition of Mughal Suzerainty -- Anti-Mughal Policy of 'Ādil Shah -- Treaty of 1636 - 'Arḍdāsht of 'Ādil Shah and Farman of Shāh Jahān -- Political Implications and Consequences of the Treaty.

SEC. III: FOURTH PHASE (1636-56)

Period of Peaceful Political Relations

Caliphal Relations.

SEC. IV: FIFTH PHASE (1656-80)

Period of Perturbed Political Relations and Military Strategy -- Shāh Jahān and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1656-58)

Aurangzeb's plot to invade Bijapur -- Breach of the Treaty by Shāh Jahān -- Military Operations - 1657 -- Aurangzeb and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1658-72) -- Jai Singh's Strategy and Intrigues -- Jai Singh's Campaign.

Aurangzeb and Sikandar 'Ādil Shah (1672-86)

Aurangzeb's Strategy -- Mughal-Bijapur Alliance against Golkonda -- Treaty of 1677 and breach by Bijapur - its consequences -- Mughal invasion renewed - 1679.

SEC. V: SIXTH PHASE (1680-86)

Period of Vassalage

Mughal Suzerainty of Bijapur -- Anti-Mughal Policy of Bijapur -- Languid Campaign and the End of Bijapur (1682-85)

SEC. VI: RECOGNITION OF 'ĀDIL SHAH'S STATUS BY THE MUGHALS

SEC. VII: THE MUGHAL POLICY TOWARDS BIJAPUR

page ...(270-345)

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS OF THE 'ĀDIL SHAHS OF BIJAPUR WITH THE MARATHAS

SEC. I: BACKGROUND

Bijapur's Early Relations with the Family of Shivaji

SEC. II: BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH SHIVAJI (1642-80)

First Phase: Shivaji as a Moqasadar and Jagirdar of Bijapur -- Transfer of Mokassa (Mooasa) -- Evolution of Shivaji's Chiefdom and Bijapur's policy -- Confirmation of conquests and Mughal - Maratha Alliance -- Factors leading to further conquests by Shivaji -- Bijapur's Policy of Compromise fails -- Bijapur takes action - further conquests of Shivaji - Truce and Peace -- Grant of Tal-Konkan as Jagir to Shivaji.

Second Phase: Shivaji as a de facto Independent King (1662-65) -- Peace Treaty of 1662 and

Recognition of Independence -- Conquest of South Konkan and Kanara.

Third Phase: Shivaji as Mughal Mansabdār and Rājā (1665-74) -- Treaty of Purandar -- Shivaji Helps the Mughals in the Invasion of Bijapur -- Interrugnum and Partial Peace -- Renewal of Hostilities in 1672.

Fourth Phase: Shivaji as Chhatrapati (1674-80) -- Languid wars -- Maratha-Golkonda Alliance and Karnatak Expedition (1677-78) -- Shivaji and Ekōjī on their Bijapurī Patrimony -- Shivaji and Party-factions at Bijapur Court.

SEC. III: BIJAPUR AND THE DECCAN POLICY OF SHIVAJI

Bijapur and the General Diplomacy of Shivaji

SEC. IV: BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH SAMBHĀJĪ (1680-86)

Appendix - LETEER OF SHIVAJI TO MĀLŌJĪ GHORPARE

page...(346-408)

CHAPTER VIII

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS IN INDIA

PART I

BIJAPUR-PORTUGUESE RELATIONS

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1508-1545)

Period of Exploitation and Portuguese Struggle for Survival on Bijapur Territory (1508-45) -- The Beginning of Direct Relations-The First Contest -- Bijapur's attempt to recapture Goa (1512) -- Naval Blockade of Dabhol by the Portuguese (1513) -- Hostile Diplomacy of Albuquerque-- Hostile Relations (1516-45).

SEC. II: SECOND PHASE (1545-79)

Period of Consolidation and Treaties -- Portuguese

Conspiracy against 'Ādil Shah -- Peace Treaty of 1546 Anti-Bijapur Alliance of Portuguese with Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar -- Treaty of 1548 -- 'Abdullāh Proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur by the Portuguese -- Bijapur's Alliance against the Portuguese -- Implications of the Treaties of 1571, 1575 and 1576 -- Hostilities (1576-77).

SEC. III: THIRD PHASE - PERIOD OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS (1579-95)

SEC. IV: FOURTH PHASE - PERIOD OF PORTUGUESE DOMINATION(1595-1655)

Triple Alliance of 'Ādil Shah, Portuguese and Niẓām Shah -- Portuguese Assistance to 'Ādil Shah against the Mughals -- Naval Hostilities - 1636 -- Friendly attitude of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah towards the Portuguese -- War and Peace (1654-55).

SEC. V: FIFTH PHASE - PERIOD OF QUIET RELATIONS (1656-86)

SEC. VI: FACTORS THAT DETERMINED THE RELATIONS

Portuguese Sovereignty of the Sea - The Cartaz System.

SEC. VII: PORTUGUESE IMPACT ON BIJAPUR

PART 2

BIJAPUR-BRITISH RELATIONS (1585-1686)

SEC. I: THE FIRST ENGLISHMAN IN BIJAPUR

SEC. II: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND BIJAPUR

Unhappy beginning in 1612 -- Establishment of Cordial Relations (1617-37) -- Bijapur-British Alliance against the Portuguese -- British Embassy to Bijapur -- Misunderstanding and Reprisal by the British -- Bijapur grants privileges to the British -- Consequences of British Help to Bijapur against Shivaji -- Agreement of 1668 -- The British on the Bijapurī Coromandel Coast --

Bijapur's concessions to the British -- Courteen at Bijapur -- Seizure of Kārwār Factory by the Bijapurīs.

SEC. IV: BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS BIJAPUR

PART 3

BIJAPUR-DUTCH RELATIONS (1637-86)

SEC. I: BACKGROUND: PORTUGUESE-DUTCH RIVALRY

SEC. II: ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDIAL RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE

Dutch Embassy to Bijapur -- Bijapur-Dutch Alliance -- Bijapur-Dutch Activities against the Portuguese

SEC. III: THE DUTCH ON BIJAPUR'S COROMENDEL COAST

Diplomatic Endeavours and Peaceful Relations -- Bijapur-Dutch Treaty, 1676.

PART 4

BIJAPUR-FRENCH RELATIONS

Sher Khan Grants Pondicherry to the French -- Helps them against Golkonda and the Dutch -- Factors Determining the Relation -- French-Dutch-English Rivalries -- Founding of Pondicherry and Establishment of Close Friendly Relations.- Bijapur-French Alliance 1675 -- French Neutrality in Shivaji's Campaign against Bijapur -- French Desertion.

page...(409-527)

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

SEC. I: THE FIVE PHASES OF BIJAPUR'S DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

First Phase (1489-1536) -- Second Phase (1536-65)-- Third Phase (1566-90) -- Fourth Phase (1590-1644) -- The Fifth Phase (1644-86).

SEC. II: THE PATTERN OF BIJAPUR'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

page...(528-538)

A P P E N D I C E S

A. Letter of Shivaji to Mālōjī Ghōrpaṛe -- at the end of Chapter VII.

B. Proceedings of Ratification of a Treaty between Bijapur and the Portuguese -- at the end of Chapter VIII.

C. Illustrations: Diagramatical Representation of the Diplomatic Positions -- at the end of Chapter IX.

D. Glossary page...(540-544)

E. Bibliography page...(545-563)

COMPANION VOLUME

(Maps and Documents)

Maps:

1) Bijapur and the neighbouring Western countries.
2) Bijapur and the Deccan Kingdoms in 1525.
3) The Deccan Kingdom and Disputed Territory 1561.
4) Bijapur in 1605.
5) Bijapur Kingdom in 1656-74.
6) Shivaji's Kingdom in relation to Bijapur Kingdom - 1680.
7) Bangalore - Province of Bijapur and Karnatak Tributories of Bijapur - 1656-80.
8) The Portuguese Territory of Goa, Bardez and Salsette.

Documents: Photo copies of Diplomatic Correspondences, Treaties, Inscriptions, Excerpts from the Manuscripts, etc.

Transliteration

th -- ث	ṣ -- ص	
ch -- چ	ḍ -- ض	(also ڈ as in Paṇḍit etc.)
ḥ -- ح	ṭ -- ط	(also ٹ as in Bannihaṭṭi etc.)
kh -- خ	ẓ -- ظ	
dh -- ذ	' -- ع	
ṛ -- ڑ	gh -- غ	
zh -- ژ	q -- ق	
sh -- ش	' -- ء	(as in Ma'athir, Munsha'at -- but not in Inshā)

Short Vowels -- a, i, u.

Long Vowels -- ā, ē, ī, ō, ū.

Oriental words which have passed into English language and are included in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (e.g., Khan, Shah, Sultan etc.) have not been transliterated, except where they are compounded with other words (e.g., Niẓām Shāhī, Shāh Jahān etc.). Current English spelling of names like Bijapur, Golkonda etc. has been retained.

Dates

Wherever two dates (e.g., 1024/1615) appear, the first indicate the Hijrah date and the other Christian era. Single date is always of the latter era.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ādāb	- Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī by Qābil Khan (MS. Sālār Jung, Hyderabad).
'Ādil Shāhī	- Tārīkh-i 'Ādil Shāhī by Nūrullāh (Text edited by A.N.M. Khaledi, Hyderabad 1964).
Aḥwāl	- Aḥwāl-i Salāṭīn-i Bījāpūr by S.M. Peerzada (MS., B.M. Add. 26, 270).
A.I.O.C.	- Proceedings and Transactions of All India Oriental Conference.
Akbar Nāmā	- Akbar Nāmā by Abul Faḍl (English Translation by H. Beveridge, B.I., Calcutta, 1910).
'Ālam Ārā	- Tārīkh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī by Iskandar Bēg Munshī (Tehrān, 1896).
'Ālamgīr Nāmā	- 'Ālamgīr Nāmā by Muḥammad Kāẓim (B.I., Calcutta, 1868)
Albuquerque (Stephens) / Albuquerque:	Albuquerque by H. Morse Stephens (Rulers of India Series), Oxford, 1897.
Al-Lubāb	- Muntakhab al-Lubāb by Khāfī Khān (B.I., Calcutta, 1869)
Al-Tawārīkh	- Muntakhab Al-Tawārīkh by Al Badāonī (edited by Maulvī Aḥmad 'Alī, B.I., Calcutta, 1869; (English Translation by W.H. Lowe, Calcutta, 1884).
AU	- History of Aurangzeb by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1930.
Bahmanīs	- The Bahmanīs of the Deccan by Prof. H.K. Sherwani, Hyderabad, 1953.

Basātīn	- Basātīnus-Salāṭīn by Ibrāhīm Zubairī, Hyderabad, 1310 H.
B.I.	- Bibliotheca Indica.
B.I.S.M.	- Bharata Itihasa Shanshodaka Mandala, Poona.
B.M.	- British Museum, London.
Briggs	- Rise of the Mohammeden Power in India (English Translation of Ferishta by John Briggs, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1909, Vol.III, reprint 1966 and Vol. IV, Calcutta, 1910).
Burhān	- Burhān-i Ma'āthir by Syed 'Alī Ṭabāṭabā (Hyderabad, 1936).
C.H.I.	- Cambridge History of India
Dagh Register	- Dutch Records at the Hague - Translated Extracts in the Appendices by Dr. Balkrishna: Shivaji the Great, Bombay, 1932.
Danvers	- The Portuguese in India, London, 1894.
Devare	- A Short History of Persian Literature, Poona, 1961.
D.H.C.	- Proceedings of the Deccan History Conference, 1945.
Dilkushā	- Tārīkh-i Dilkushā by Bhīmsen (English Translation by V.G. Khobrekar, Bombay, 1972.)
E.D.	- Elliot and Dowson's History of India as told by his own Historians, London, 1862-67, Reprints, 1952.
E.F.I.	- English Factories in India by Sir W. Foster, Oxford, 1910-27.

I (1618-21)	V (1634-36)	IX (1651-54)
II (1622-23)	VI (1637-41)	X (1655-60)
III (1624-29)	VII (1642-45)	XI (1661-64)
IV (1630-33)	VIII (1646-50)	XII (1665-67)
		XIII (1668-69)

Epigraphia	- Epigraphia - Indo-Moslemica
E.R.S.	- English Records of Shivaji (Shivaji Ter centenary Volume)
F.B.S.	- Foreign Biographies of Shivaji by S.N. Sen, Calcutta, 1927.
Ferishta	- Nauras Nāmā or Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī by Muḥammad Qāsim Ferishta, Bombay, 1831 - 32 (2 Vols.)
Further Sources	- Further Sources of Vijayanagara History by K.A. Nilakanta Sastri and N. Venkataramanayya, Madras, 1946.
Futūḥāt	- Futūḥāt-i 'Ādil Shāhī by Fuzūnī Astrābādī (MS., B.M., Add. 27, 251)
Gorekar	- Indo-Iran Relations (Cultural Aspects) Bombay, 1970, by Dr. N.S. Gorekar.
Haft Anjuman	- The Haft Anjuman of Munshī Udairaj, (English Translation as the Military Despatches of a Seventeenth Century Indian General by Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar, Calcutta, 1969.
House	- House of Shivaji by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Calcutta, 1948 (2nd Edition)
Hyd.	- Hyderabad
I.A.	- Indian Antiquary
I.C.	- Indian Culture, Calcutta
Is.Cl.	- Islamic Culture, Hyderabad.
I.H.R.C.	- Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission
Indo-Iranica	- Journal of the Indo-Iran Society, Calcutta
Jamī'ul-Murāsalat	- Nuskha-i Jamī'ul- Murāsalat by Abdul Qāsim (MS., B.M., Add. 7688)

J.A.S.B.	- Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal
J.B.H.S.	- Journal of the Bombay Historical Society
J.B.B.R.A.S.	- Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
J.B.R.S.	- Journal of the Bihar Research Society
J.B.O.R.S.	- Journal of the Bihar Orissa Research Society
J.I.H.	- Journal of Indian History
Lāhōrī	- Pādshāh Nāmā by 'Abdul Ḥamīd Lāhōrī (B.I., 1868)
M.I.M.	- Medieval India, a Miscellany, I, 1970 (Aligarh)
Makātīb	- Makātīb-i Shāhāna-i Ṣafawī wo Shāhāna-i Hindi (MS. Salar Jung)
Mankar	- English Translation of Sabhasad as Life and Exploits of Shivaji
Mīr Jumlā	- The Life of Mīr Jumlā by Dr. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar (Calcutta, 1951)
Monumenta	- Monumenta Historia India (English Translation of Dagh Register, in J.B.H.S.)
M.R.	- Modern Review, Calcutta
Muḥammad Nāmā	- The Muḥammad Nāmā by Muḥammad Ẓuhūr, (MS. Bijapur Museum)
Nibhandavali	- Shivaji Nibhandavali, B.I.S.M., Poona, 1930.
P.I.H.C.	- Proceedings of the Indian History Congress
Q.S.D.	- A History of the Quṭb Shāhī Dynasty by Prof. H.K. Sherwani (in Press)
Qazwīnī	- Pādshāh Nāmā (MS., B.M. Or. 173)
Rajwade	- Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhana
Sabhasad	- Sabhasad - Virachit Shiva Chhatrapati - Chen Charitra (English Translation by Dr. S. Sen: Shiva Chhatrapati)

Safawīyah	- Makātīb-i Zamāna-i Salāṭīn-i Safawīyyah (MS. Asafiyah)
Salar Jung	- Library of Sir Salar Jung, Hyderabad.
Sardesai	- A New History of the Marathas (Bombay, 1946)
Shiva Bharat	- Shiva Bharat by Paramananda
Shiva Kalin	- Shiva Kalin Patra Sangraha, B.I.S.M., Poona
Shivaji	- Shivaji and His Times by Sir Jadunath Sarkar (3rd Edition, Calcutta, 1929)
Souvenir	- Shivaji Tercentenary Souvenir, Poona, 1930
S.M.H.	- Source Book of the Maratha History (ed. by Rawlinson & Patwardan, Bombay, 1929)
Tabaqāt	- Tabaqāt-i Akbarī by Niẓāmuddīn Aḥmad (English Translation by Elliot & Dowson, reprint, 1952)
Tabrēzī	- Golconda Letters of 'Abdul-'Alī Tabrēzī,(MS., B.M., Addl. 6600)
Tadkirat	-Tadhkiratul-Mulūk by Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī, (MS., Salar Jung)
Tōzuk	- Tōzuk-i Jahāngīrī (English Translation by Rodgers and Beveridges, 2 Vols. London, 1909)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Part - 1

SEC. I: SCOPE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is an attempt at making an appraisal of the External Relations of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom of Bijapur with foreign countries as well as Indian States from its foundation in 895/1489 to its fall in 1097/1686.

The political geography of Bijapur Kingdom prevented her to flourish and exist in rigid isolation. Its history, therefore, is full of contacts and active diplomatic and commercial intercourse, with other countries and contemporary political India. The external relations of Bijapur were of a multifarious nature, being political and diplomatic, commercial and economic, social, cultural and religious. Though the relations were manifold, this thesis is mainly a graphic study of political and diplomatic relations and the principles underlying them.

The External Relations of Bijapur were multiplex. It maintained heterogeneous relations simultaneously with diverse states. Bijapur's diplomatic relations can be broadly classified into six groups of states -- the parent Bahmanī Kingdom, Iran and other

Islamic countries, Deccan Kingdoms and other South Indian States, the Mughals, the Marathas and the European settlements in India.

Though the diplomatic relations of Bijapur differed from state to state, the primary motives behind the relations were the struggle for existence and territorial expansion. To achieve this goal, Bijapur came in clash with several other states, and their diplomacy inter-acted. This inter-action of diplomatic relations has been carefully evaluated in this thesis to produce a synthesis of Bijapur's diplomatic history from its rise to its fall.

The thesis is mainly based on primary sources both, published and unpublished. Though the material on the subject is fairly extensive in several languages, it is mainly based on Persian sources. Almost all the primary Persian sources, relevent to the subject, both in India and abroad have been used and sifted to create a synthesis of diplomatic history of Bijapur. Archival documents, both in Persian and other languages, have been used. Epigraphic and numismatic material also has been exploited and utilised.

The secondary sources have been consulted with a view to find out the missing links.

SEC. II: EVALUATION OF THE SOURCES

Classification of the Persian Sources

The material on the diplomatic history of Bijapur Kingdom is fairly extensive and abundant in both Persian and non-Persian sources.

The Persian sources can be classified into two categories: Chief histories of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty and other histories of other States giving account relevant to the diplomatic history of Bijapur.

Chief Histories of Bijapur:

Contemporary

Muḥammad Qāsim Ferishta:	Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī
Mīr Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī:	Tadhkiratul-Mulūk (MS.)
Fuzūnī Astrābādī:	Futuḥat-i 'Ādil Shāhī (MS.)
Mullah Ẓuhūr :	Muḥammad Nāmā (MS)
Qādī Nūrullāh:	Tārīkh-i 'Alī 'Ādil Shāhiyyah

Non-Contemporary

Ibrāhīm Zubairī:	Basātīnus-Salāṭīn
Muḥiyuddīn Pirzada:	Aḥwāl-i Salāṭīn-i Bijapur (MS.)

Other Persian Sources: General Works
Diplomatic Correspondences
Archival Documents

Background

Most of the contemporary chroniclers were Persians. Ferishta and Fuzūnī hailed from the same place of Astrābād in Iran. Rafī'uddīn came from Shīrāz. Ẓuhūr and Nurullāh were not emigries from Iran but their immediate ancestors were Persian immigrants and so the chroniclers were Persianised in all respects. Thus the Persian and Persianised chroniclers, according to the prevailing trend in medieval India, adopted the Persian model for historical works and surveyed the social landscape from the foot of the royal

throne and treated the biography of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans as the history of the times. The works of the contemporary chroniclers of Bijapur - Ferishta, Rafī'uddīn, Fuzūnī, Zuhūr and Nūrullāh were the product of royal patronage at the 'Ādil Shāhī court. Hence, their historical conspectus was limited to the Bijapur court and they wrote under a serious handicap. The selection of material and criticism of events by these official chroniclers were determined by the wishes both explicit and implicit, of 'Ādil Shah and his minister in power. Obviously, the chroniclers overpraised their rulers and exaggerated their achievements. Thus, the psychology, preference, prejudices and religious sect of the chroniclers played a major role in shaping their historical writings on Bijapur.

When Ferishta, the first official chronicler of 'Ādil Shāhī court, was introduced by Shāh Nawāz Khan to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, the latter presented him a copy of Mīr Khawand's Rawḍatuṣ-Ṣafā and bade him to undertake the compilation of a comprehensive history of India, with Rawḍat as the model. This work and Tabaqat-i Akbar Shāhī of Niẓāmuddīn Aḥmad were the models of Ferishta's work.

Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī modelled his Tadhkirat on the lines of Rawḍatuṣ-Ṣafa. And Fuzūnī, who had elaborately expanded the Tadhkirat and carried further, has modelled Futuḥāt on the lines of Ferishta. Thus the Persian historiography of Rawḍat was in the background of the contemporary chroniclers of 'Ādil Shāhī court.

Muḥammad Adil Shah was inspired by Abul-Faḍl's Akbar Nāmā which was on the model of Ẓafar Nāmā. Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah following the Mughals, also adopted the practice of getting historical monograph written by the Court chroniclers. Muḥammad Nāmā was the first historical monograph of 'Ādil Shāhī Court, which was modelled

on the lines of Akbar Nāmā. Zuhūr, on the orders of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and at the express behest of the Bijapurī Minister Muṣṭafā Khan, compiled his work.

Following the tradition of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, his successor, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II got the historical monograph of Tārīkh-i 'Alī 'Ādil Shāhiyyah, compiled by the Court chronicler Syed Nūrullāh.

This tradition was continued even when Dakhni Urdu gained prominence in Bijapur. Nuṣratī compiled 'Alī Nāmā and Tārīkh-i Sikandar in the Dakhnī language.

Evaluation of the Sources

Ferishta compiled the general history of India from the earliest times, at the behest of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and presented it to him on 1015/1606. But later on it was supplemented with details upto 1033/1623.

Ferishta is the chief source for the diplomatic history of 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom of Bijapur, from its inception and evolution in relation to the Bahmanīs. He supplies details of the diplomatic missions, conflicts, disputes leading to hostilities with various Deccan states and conclusion of treaties etc. Elaborate and minute details of the campaigns which are useful for the interpretation of diplomatic history are given. As an eye-witness for the events of late 16th and early 17th century, Ferishta's graphic and concise account is fairly reliable and authentic. But there are exceptions. Thus for events which are not contemporary to him or known to him personally Ferishta is not certain and makes vague statements. For instance, he is not definite as to whether Yūsuf

'Ādil Khan declared independence in 895/1489 or 896/1489-90. He does not give the exact date. His account is incomplete at some places.

Ferishta has divided his history of India in three Maqālās. The third Maqālā, divided into six Raozas, deals with the kingdoms of the Deccan. Though the second Raoza fully deals with history of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty from its foundation, but the political relations with the Bahmanīs, during the evolution of the 'Ādil Shāhī kingdom are also found in the first Raoza, devoted to the Bahmanī Sultans. Ferishta has described chronologically, in different sections, the history of each 'Ādil Shāhī Sultan from Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II upto the year 1606.

Another drawback of Ferishta's history is that he has not fully narrated at one place the account of Bijapur's relations with other states. Some events of diplomatic relations between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar or Golkonda are not fully detailed under the history of the 'Ādil Shahs. Common events are differently narrated at different places. Thus, in some cases, accounts from two different parts have to be correlated in order to render the history intelligible. For instance the agreement of 1572 between 'Alī 'Ādil ShahI and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah I, is incomplete in both the parts of the history of the two kingdoms. The agreement is complete only when its terms given in different sections are combined together.

Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī[1] compiled the Tadhkiratul-Mulūk under the patronage of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II. The period of history of the

---

1. MS. No. His.142, Cat., I, 362 at Salar Jung Library, Hyderabad. For Short notice by Prof. V.R. Naitu, see the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (J.B.B.R.A.S.) XXII, 1905, 17 ff.

'Ādil Shāhī dynasty covered by Rafī'uddīn is almost the same as that covered by Ferishta. It records the history from the beginning of Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan's career to the reign of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, upto 1020/1611. Though it is primarily a history of Bijapur in nine chapters, it records briefly history of Bahmanīs in chapter one, and that of Sultans of Gujarat, Ahmadnagar and Golkonda in the sixth chapter. And brief notices of Mughal and Safawid rulers are given in the ninth chapter. While from chapter two to chapter five are devoted each to the first four 'Ādil Shāhī rulers, chapter seven is the continuation of the history of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, from the fifth chapter. Chapter eight records the history of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II's reign.

Rafī'uddīn's account of the reigns of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II are authentic; for, he was an eyewitness and under these Sultans he served in various capacities. Rafī'uddīn himself being a diplomat and an official of Bijapur's foreign department, his account on diplomatic history occupies a unique and special position.

Unlike Ferishta, who has suffixed royal titles of "Shah" to the first four 'Ādil Shāhī rulers, Rafī'uddīn does not do so. Rafī'uddīn who was not only a historian but a diplomat, well versed in politico-diplomatic relations between the Bahmanids and the 'Ādil Shāhīs, calls the first two rulers by their Bahmanī titles as "Majlis-i Rafī' Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan" and "Majlis-i Rafī' Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan". While to Mallū and Ibrāhīm he suffixes the title of "Khan" only. This is partly correct; as from 1534, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I was a full fledged sovereign and adopted the title of "Shah". However, Rafī'uddīn suffixes the title of "Shah" from the fifth

ruler, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I onwards. Some accounts of the diplomatic history to which Shīrāzī was an eye-witness, are different from that of Ferishta. For instance, Ferishta attributes the origin of the confederacy against Vijayanagar in 1564 to 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, whereas Rafī'uddīn who was not only a eye witness but was associated with 'Ādil Shah, and was present in the battle of Bannihaṭṭi, records that Ḥussain Niẓām Shah was the father of the confederacy.

The Futūḥāt-i 'Ādil Shāhī was compiled by Fuzūnī[2] in 1640-43. It is a comprehensive historical monograph of the reign of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, at whose instance, Fuzūnī compiled it. Fuzūnī supplements the facts recorded in the history of Ferishta. Its six parts, in chronological order, are devoted one each, to the first six 'Ādil Shāhī rulers. But mainly it is devoted to the reigns of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, to whose accounts Fuzūnī was an eye-witness. As such, the last two chapters are more comprehensive in their treatment than the preceding ones, and these chapters cover two-third space of the monograph.

Fuzūnī is an indispensible source for the diplomatic history of Bijapur; specially, for the relations with the Mughals, Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar. It gives certain unique accounts which shaped Shāh Jahān's policy towards Bijapur. For instance, the letter of Muṣṭafā Khan, addressed to Abul-Ḥasan Bijapurī envoy at Shāh Jahān's Court, which reveals a secret agreement between 'Ādil Shah and

---

2. MS., British Museum, Add., 27, 251. For short notices see Sir Jadunath Sarkar: "Malik 'Ambar - A New Life" - The Indian Historical Quarterly, September, 1933; K.K. Basu; "History of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II" - The Journal of the Bihar Orissa Research Society (J.B.O.R.S.) XXIV (4) 189 ff.

Shāh Jahān and which compelled the latter to be kind and friendly towards the former.

Contrary to the concise and simple style of Rafī'uddīn, Fuzūnī, following Persian historigraphy, has indulged in repetition of facts and fulsome adulations. Fuzūnī has unveiled the history in ornate and florid style, characterized by elegance and grace and scattered with flowers of rhetoric. He faithfully quotes numerous controversial versions of an incident and then finally attempts to give his own version. However, he sometimes ends the controversial account abruptly.

The Futuhāt is the only earliest source available on the history of the later period of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, beginning from 1015/1606 to 1036/1626. It is an exclusive and independent history of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty and it is certainly far more comprehensive and rich in details than the brief work of Rafī'uddīn. Each chapter of the Futūḥāt appears to be an expansion of the corresponding chapter of Tadhkirāt.

The Muḥammad Nāmā[3] of Mullā Ẓuhūr is mainly the history of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah's reign (1626-56); but it also gives an account of the later period of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II's reign and thus supplements Tadhkirat.

It is the only source giving minute details of Bijapur's diplomatic relations with the rulers of Karnatak, Ginji, Thanjavur,

---

3. MS., Bijapur Museum, Bijapur. It is a re-copy of the Kapurthala Library, For a short notice seeB.D. Verma: "History in Muhammad Nama", Shivaji Nibhandavali, II (2) 73 ff.

Madura, etc. It is an important source for the campaigns of Shāhjī and Shivaji in the south.

The historical account, relevant to the diplomatic history of Bijapur, given in the ten chapters of the Muḥammad Nāmā are: the first chapter mentions the hostilities with Ahmadnagar and conquest of Parēnḍa, siege of Bankāpūr; chapter two gives elaborate details of hostilities with the Mughals, diplomatic communications with 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah and marriage of the latter's sister with Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, dual diplomacy of Khawāṣ Khan in helping Ahmadnagar against the Mughals and at the same time invading its territory, and role of Bijapuri commander, Murārī Pandit in setting up a new Niẓām Shah. The third chapter mainly deals with the internal affairs of Bijapur. The fourth chapter mainly deals with the circumstances which led to the conclusion of the so-called Treaty of 1636 between Shāh Jahān and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. The terms of the Treaty given by Ẓuhūr are identical with those given by Lāhōrī. The fifty, sixth and eight chapters are fully devoted for Bijapur's campaign in the south; while the seventh is partly devoted to the Mughal campaign in the Deccan and the Karnatak affairs.

Ẓuhūr ends abruptly his account in 1654. Thus, he leaves a lacuna for the last two years of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah's reign.

The Tārīkh-i 'Alī 'Ādil Shāhiyya is a historical monograph by Qaḍī Nūrullāh,[4] written at the order of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II. It is the history of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II and narrates events from his birth to the ninth year of his reign, 1077/1666 when it was completed. It

---

4. MS. Salar Jung Library, Text edited and printed by Abul-Naṣr Muḥammad Khālidī, Hyderabad.

has ten chapters. From diplomatic point of view, the fifth chapter gives details of 'Ādil Shah's relations with Shivaji and the process of the evolution of the Maratha dominion by the gradual shrinkage of Bijapur kingdom. The sixth and seventh chapters mention Bijapur's campaign in the Karnatak, from the point where Ẓuhūr left. The eigth chapter gives details of Mughal-Bijapur hostilities and offer of 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah to send military assistance to Bijapur to meet the Mughal onslaught.

Since Nūrullāh was closely associated with the Bijapur Court, his narrative is reliable and authentic. It is written in elegant and flowery style with frequent poetic extracts, thus making the historical account tense and pedantic, full of picturesque similies and metaphors.

The Aḥwāl-i Salāṭīn-i Bijapur[5] of Ghulām Muḥiyuddīn Pīrzādā is a sketchy history of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty from the beginning to the death of Sikandar 'Ādil Shah in 1111/1699. The compilation of the work was started in 1221/1806, and completed on 5th Sha'bān 1236/1820. The work is divided into eight books, one each for the eight recognised 'Ādil Shāhī rulers. The work is too concise in details. It is more a chronological diary of important events. It is very useful in fixing dates for the diplomatic history of Bijapur.[6]

Ibrāhīm Zubairī's Basāṭīnus-Salātīn[7] is the only comprehensive and complete history of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty from its birth in

---

5. MS. British Museum, Add., 26, 270.
6. Most of the dates in this thesis are based on this Aḥwāl. But frequent references to it in the footnotes have been avoided.
7. Printed (Litho) Hyderabad, 1310. Partly (upto the reign of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I) trans. into Eng. by K.K. Basu and published in J.B.O.R.S. and IA. (New Series).

1489 to its fall in 1686. Following the plan of Aḥwāl, it is divided into eight Bustān; one each, recording chronologically, history of the eight 'Ādil Shāhī rulers (excluding Mallū Khan, whose account is given at the end of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah's chapter). Zubairī, who compiled this work, in 1240/1824-25, has based it on the following contemporary authorities: Ferishta, Rafī'uddīn, Ẓuhūr, Nūrullāh, Nuṣratī, Asad Khan, Khājī Khan, and Shaikh Abul-Ḥasan.[8] Except the last authority, Zubairī has based his account on all the original contemporary authorities and as such Basātīn may be considered almost as a fairly authentic source for the diplomatic history of Bijapur.

Other Persian Sources

If all the chief histories of Bijapur, both contemporary and non-contemporary are put together, even then they do not render complete diplomatic history of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty. They have to be supplemented by other sources, both Persian and non-Persian, in order to render a complete account of diplomatic history. The other Persian sources can be classified under General Works and Collection of correspondences.

General works

The Burhān-i Ma'āthir[9] by Syed 'Alī Ṭabāṭabā compiled at the behest of Burhān Niẓām Shah in 1000/1591-92, is an essential

---

8. Abul-Ḥasan compiled this history of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty from the beginning to the end in 1110/1698. See Ethe, I, 175.
9. Text published in Hyderabad in 1936 and English trans., of a part of the work by Major J.S. King as: The History of Bahmani Dynasty, London, 1900. And the other part was translated partly and published by King in Indian Antiquary (I.A.), September 1898, on-wards; and also by Sir Woseley Haig in (I.A.) from 1920 onwards.

source for the 'Ādil Shāhī-Bahmanī relations from 1489 to 1534; and it is a main source for the relations of Ahmadnagar-Bijapur, Mughal-Bijapur-Ahmadnagar and inter-statal relations of Bijapur with all the other Deccan Kingdoms.

For the Mughal-Bijapur diplomatic relations and for the Mughal campaigns of Bijapur, there is no dearth of material. For Akbar's reign the Mughal chroniclers Niẓāmuddīn Aḥmad, Abul-Faḍl and Badāpnī in their works Tabaqāt-i Akbar Shāhī,[10] Akbar Nāmā,[11] and Muntakhab-al-Tawārīkh[12] furnish sufficient material for the evolution of Akbar's diplomatic policy towards Bijapur and how he gradually exercised verbal strategy over the 'Ādil Shah. Equally important is Asad Beg's Waqā'i Asad Bēg[13] which provides essential details of Asad Beg's missions to Bijapur and the becoming of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah as a deciple of Akbar.

For Jahāngīr's reign the history of Mughal-Bijapur relations is provided in Jahāngīr's own memoirs Tuzuk-i Jahāngīrī[14] and in Iqbāl Nāma-i Jahāngīrī of Mu'tamad Khan. They supply useful information of diplomatic missions and correspondences and sending of pēshkash by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II to the Mughal Court. Details of

---

10. Elliot and Dowson Eng. Trans., New Edition 1952 (2 parts).
11. H. Beveridge's Eng. Trans., Vol. III, (B.I), 1910.
12. Text edited by Maulvi Ahmad 'Ali (B.I.), 1868, Eng. Trans., by Lowe (Vol.III).
13. MS., British Museum. Eng. Trans., by B.W. Chapman, Add., 30, 776. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "Asad Beg's Mission to Bijapur", Potdar Commemoration Volume, Poona, 1950, 184 ff. Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission (I.H.R.C.), XVIII, 87 ff.
14. Eng. Trans., by Rogers and Beveridge (two vols.).

the circumstances leading to adoptation of weak and reconciliatory policy by Jahāngīr towards Bijapur, in order to alienate the latter from Ahmadnagar are supplied by these chronicles.

Shāh Jahān's reign introduced new dimensions in Mughal-Bijapur relations. The circumstances which led to the issuance of the farmān (the so-called Treaty of 1636) in the name of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah are given in the Pādshāh Nāmā of Qazwīnī,[15] Lāhōrī[16] and in 'Amal-i Ṣwāliḥ[17] of Muḥammad Ṣwāliḥ Kambō. Lāhōrī and Qazwīnī give the text of the correspondences preceding the farmān and the text of the farmān in extenso. And the political implications and consequences of the so-called Treaty of 1636 are highlighted in the correspondence that followed the farmān and partition of the Ahmadnagar territory between the two rulers.

Khāfī Khan in his Muntakhabal-Lubāb[18] not only repeats the history of Mughal-Bijapur relations given by Lāhōrī but continues further. It is an essential source for Bijapur's relations during Aurangzeb's reign, which was marked by a changed aggressive policy towards Bijapur. It gives essential details of Mughal-Bijapur-Maratha triangular relations and the causes which led to the extinction of Bijapur.

The 'Alamgīr Nāmā[19] of Muḥammad Qāsim and Ma'athir-i 'Alamgiri[20] of Mustaid Khan give concise accounts of Aurangzeb's campaign against Bijapur and his policy towards the latter. Both

---

15. MS. British Museum, No.173.
16. Text published (B.I.), 1866 (two vols.)
17. Text published (B.I.), 1912-46 (three vols.)
18. Text published (B.I.), 1869.
19. Text published (B.I.), 1868.
20. Eng. Trans. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, 1947.

record the sending of 'Ādil Shāhī envoys with presents to the Mughal Court.

The Haft Anjuman[21] of Munshī Udai Rāj supplies the most authentic and essential material for the triangular Mughal-Maratha-Bijapur relations during Mīrzā Rājā Jai Singh's campaign. The triangular diplomacy preceding and following the Treaty of Purandar are masterly described.

The Tārīkh-i Dilkushā[22] of Bhimsen gives an eye-witness account of Aurangzeb's Deccan campaigns against the tottering Bijapur Kingdom. He supplies important information about the causes of Aurangzeb's hostile attitude towards Bijapur and thus leading to its extinction in 1686.

The Tārīkh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī by Iskandar Bēg Munshī, Court Chronicler of Shāh 'Abbās I is the basic source for the Ṣafawid-'Ādil Shāhī relations. It provides useful information on the exchange of diplomatic mission between the 'Ādil Shāhī and Ṣafawid courts. And enlightens about the role of Shāh 'Abbās I and II played in the Mughal-Bijapur politics, but from the Persian point of view.

The Ma'āthīrul Umarā[24] by Shāh Nawāz Khan, as a biographical dictionary of Mughal nobles, supplies good information about the Mughal campaigns of Bijapur and the diplomatic role the Mughal nobles played in the Mughal-Bijapur relations.

---

21. Eng. Trans. by Dr. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar as The Military Despatches of a 17th Century Indian General, Calcutta, 1966
22. Eng. Trans., V.G. Khobrekar, published, Bombay, 1972.
23. Published in Tihran, 1896.
24. Eng. Trans. by H. Beveridge, Baini Prashad, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1911.

Diplomatic Correspondences

Extensive use has been made of the diplomatic correspondences that passed between 'Ādil Shāhī court and the courts of other Indian States and Irān. Some of the diplomatic correspondences are found in general histories e.g., Tuzuk-i Jahāngīrī, Pādshāh Nāmā of Lāhōrī and Qazwīnī, Muntakhab-al-Lubāb of Khāfī Khan etc. But majority of the important letters, relevant to the diplomatic history of Bijapur are preserved in various collections of letters. The following relevant manuscripts has been utilised:

Jamī'-ul Murāsalat by 'Abdul-Qāsim Ḥaidar.[25]

Golkonda letters by 'Abdul 'Alī Tabrēzī [26]

Makātīb-i Zamāna-i Salāṭīn-i Ṣafawiyyah[27]

Inshā-i Tāliqānī by 'Abdul 'Alī Tāliqānī[28]

Guldasta[29]

Makātīb-i Shāhāna-i Ṣafawī wo Shāhāna-i Hind[30] by Mīrzā Ṭāhir Waḥid.

Makātīb-i Sulṭān 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shāh[31]

'Ādab-i 'Ālamgīrī by Qābil Khan[32]

Majmu'a: Inshā-i 'Abdul Wahhāb[33]

Munsha'āt-i Fārsī[34]

---

25. MS. British Museum, Add. Nol 7688.
26. MS. British Museum, Add. No.6600. Eng. Trans.: Dr. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar - I.H.R.C., XVII, J.B.R.S., XXX (2).
27. MS. Asafia Library, Hyderabad. No.01214.
28. MS. Salar Jung, A.N. 15, Cat. III, 846.
29. MS. Salar Jung, Inshā, 2731, Eng. Trans. of Letters by K.K. Basu: "The Golkonda-Court Letters", J.B.O.R.S., XXVI (4), 1940, 271 ff.
30. MS. Salar Jung A.N. 296. Cat., III, 1004.
31. MS. Salar Jung No.A.N. 295. Cat. III, No.847.
32. MS. Salar Jung (S.J)
33. MS. Salar Jung, A.N. 26.
34. MS. in Asad Effendi Library, Istanbul, Turkey.

The Jamī'ul-Murāsalat compiled in Irān by Abul-Qāsim Ḥaidar Bēg, about the middle of 17th century, is an essential source for the diplomatic correspondences that passed between the Ṣafawid and 'Ādil Shāhī rulers. It also contains the correspondence that passed between the Ṣafawid and Mughal rulers, regarding the triangular relations of Iran-Bijapur-Mughals relations.

'Abdul 'Alī Tabrēzī's Golkonda letters is an essential source for the Karnatak campaign of both Bijapur and Golkonda. The letters not only records the agreement between the two States and its implications but also enlightens the dual diplomacy played by all those involved - 'Ādil Shah, Quṭb Shah, Nāyaks of Ginji and Madura etc., and the role played by Shāh Jahān in settling the Bijapur-Golkonda conflict over the partition of Karnatak.

The Makātīb-i Zamāna-i Salāṭīn-i Ṣafawiyyah contains two very important letters which Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II wrote to Shāh 'Abbās II. They throw light on the Irān-Bijapur political relations. These letters are not found in any other source.

The Inshā of 'Abdul 'Alī Tāliqānī contains important diplomatic and friendly letters of 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah, addressed to 'Ādil Shah, on various aspects of Bijapur-Golkonda relations.

The Guldastā contains diplomatic letters of Shāh 'Abbās II, Shāh Jahān, Aurangzeb, Prince Sulṭān Muḥammad, etc., all addressed to 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah. They throw indirectly light on Mughal-Bijapur and Bijapur-Golkonda relations.

The Makātīb of Mīrzā Ṭāhir Waḥid contains letters of Shāh 'Abbās II in the name of Jahāngīr and the Deccan Sultans. These letters throw light on the role the Shah played in the affairs of Bijapur and Deccan in general. In these letters the Shah requested Jahāngīr to refrain from the hostilities against the Deccan

Sultans.

The Makātīb-i Sulṭān 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah contains numerous letters of 'Abdullāh addressed to 'Ādil Shah and other rulers, which throw light on various aspects of Bijapur-Golkonda relations.

The Ādāb-i 'Alamgīri of Qābil Khan contains several letters/ farmāns of Aurangzeb, addressed to 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II and Sikandar 'Ādil Shah on various aspects of Mughal-Bijapur relations, Bijapur-Maratha relations and Bijapur-Golkonda relations. They throw a flood of light on the aggressive and dictatorial policy which Aurangzeb adopted.

The Inshā-i 'Abdul Wahhāb contains useful diplomatic correspondences that passed between Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and the Mughal Emperor Jahāngīr and also with the Mughal Commanders in the Deccan.

The Munshāt-i Fārsī of 'Abdullah Effendi is a collection of Royal letters exchanged between the Ottoman Sultans and other Muslim rulers. It gives useful details about the role which the Afro-Asian rulers played in forming the confederacy against the Portuguese. See 36 for location

Archival Documents

In this category there are two types of documents. One are the Mughal documents[35] and the other 'Ādil Shāhī farmāns.[36]

---

35. Shāh Jahān and 'Ālamgīrī documents at State Archives, Hyderabad.

36. At State Archives, Hyderabad and some of them published edited by Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan: Farmans and Sanads of the Deccan Sultans, 1963 and some published by G.H. Khare: Selected Articles - Bharat Itihasa Shanshodaka Mandala (B.I.S.M.), Poona, 19.

The Mughal documents of Shāh Jahān's reign supply information about 'Ādil Shāhī envoys to the court of Shāh Jahān and to the court of Prince Aurangzeb ('Sultan Jiv'), Viceroy of Deccan. They furnish details of the purpose of the missions, name of the envoy, presentation of pēshkash and details of various other articles presented. They furnish details of Bijapurī deserters to the Mughal camp.

The 'Ālamgīrī documents furnish information on the Mughal diplomacy of tempting Bijapurīs to desert to the Mughal camp. Also they give details of Mughal encroachment into the internal affairs of Bijapur and in the Bijapur-Golkonda affairs.

The 'Ādil Shāhī farmāns, in the name of their officials throw a flood of light on the diplomacy the 'Ādil Shahs adopted in the military campaigns against Shivaji, Nāyaks of Karnatak, etc. The farmansof 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II enlighten about the nature of political relations between him and the Nāyaks of Madura and Thanjavur.

The 'Ādil Shāhī farmāns issued in the name of Europeans in the Deccan furnish details of the grants and concessions made to them. They are essential for the politico-diplomatic relations between Bijapur and the European settlement in the Deccan.

Non-Persian Sources (in Oriental languages)

Sanskrit Source

There are very few Sanskrit works useful for the study under review. The only Sanskrit source which has some bearing on this subject is the Anupurana or Shiva Bhārat[37] of Paramanand, a

37. Marathi Trans. by S.M. Divekar and D.V. Apte. Engl Trans in Source Book of the Maratha History (S.M.H.), ed. Rawlinson and Patwardhan, Bombay, 1927.

contemporary of Shivaji. Paramanand was a court poet, and has composed the life of Shivaji in epic style. His account, therefore, has become occassionally exaggerated. Besides, the scholarshave not yet succeeded in getting the complete work. In its present incomplete form it tells us about Shivaji's early activities upto 1661 A.D. only. However, it is a useful work for narrating the relations between the Marathas and the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers during the early phase of the rise of the Maratha power. The Cantos seventeen to twenty four of this epic present a graphic account of the Afḍal Khan's episode, which proved to be a landmark in the history of relations between the Maratha power and the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom.

Marathi Sources

State papers narrating the relations between the Marathas and the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom in the Marathi language are practically nil. We have to depend, therefore, on contemporary chronicles and some family papers.

The only nearly contemporary Marathi Bakhar or Chronicle is the Life of Shivaji written by Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad,[38] at the instance of Rājarām, nearly fourteen years after the death of Shivaji. Krishnaji was in the service of Shivaji, and hence it appears that he might have consulted important State papers, and

---

38. Eng. Trans, by J.K. Manker: Life and Exploits of Shivaji (Bombay 2nd ed. 1886) and S. Sen: Shiva Chhatrapati (2nd ed. 1925.

Th 3562

he might have personally witnessed many events of this period. His detailed account, therefore, is very useful for our purpose. Like Paramanand he too deals in greater detail the Afḍal Khan's episode.

The 91-Qalmī Bakhar[39] is another important nearly contemporary Bakhar originally written by Dattājī Trimbak Waqā'i Navīs and later on copied by Malkare. From the internal evidence, it appears that the Bakhar must have been written before 1685 or at least before 1713. It is an important source for the life and exploits of Shivaji. It supplies information about how Shāhjī's jagir was transferred and governed on his behalf; and its take over by Shivaji, then its gradual detachment from Bijapur and establishment of autonomous State under Shivaji. Thus enlightening about the political relations of Bijapur with the gradual expanding autonomous Maratha State of Shivaji.

As regards the records, we hardly get any authentic State papers in Marathi which would serve our purpose. We have, therefore, to consult certain family records, published by historians like Rajwade or institutions like Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala, Poona. It must be admitted at the outset, we get very little information from these papers, which would enable to establish the relationship between the Marathas and the 'Ādil Shahs.

The relevant volumes of the Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane[40] edited by V.K. Rajwade has some useful letters and documents which

---

39. Source Book of Maratha History. Five versions of the 91-Qalmī Bakhar are available, and they have been edited by five eminent historians like, V.B. Sane, V.K. Rajwade, D.B. Parasnis, Forrest and Jadunath Sarkar.

40. Eng. Trans in S.M.H.

enlighten about the nature of the 'Ādil Shāhī jagir held by Shāhjī and its transfer to Shivaji and the political relation of this jagir with the Bijapur kingdom during the evolution of the Maratha State.

The Marathi publications of the Bharat Itihasa Samshodaka Mandala, Poona, like the Shiva Charitra Sahitya, the Siva Kalin Patra Sar Sangraha, the Jedhe Shakavali, the Jedhe Karina etc. have been also consulted. These sources furnish us chronology of important events, Shivaji's campaigns against Bijapur etc.

Dakhni-Urdu Sources

The 'Alī Nāmā[41] by Mullā Nuṣratī is a historical poem in Dakhnī. The author as an eye-witness to the reign of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II has compiled this historical monograph in the form a long (about 428 pages) poem. Nuṣratī seems to have started compiling from the early period of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah's reign and finished in 1075/1674. The poem consisting of odes and laudatory prices is in seven qaṣīdāhs. The full details of the military campaign of 'Ādil Shah against Shivaji, the Mughals, and in the Karnatak etc. are vividly described in the poem. And at the end of each campaign, its conclusion and the peace treaty details are mentioned.

Arabic Sources

The Tuḥfatu'l-Mujāhidīn[42] by Shaikh Ḍamīruddīn is an important source in Arabic for the Portuguese diplomacy in the Malabar

---

41. Edited by Prof. A. Majeed Siddiqui, Hyderabad, 1959.

42. Eng. Trans M. Husain Nainar, Madras, 1945.

Coast. It gives details of the confederacy of Bijapur with other Deccan rulers against the Portuguese and Bijapur's attempts in vain to recapture Goa.

The Al-Fath-al Mubīyn lis Samari al-Ladhī Yahibb'l Muslimīyn[43] (Grand Victory of the Zamorin who loves the Muslims) by Muḥammad bin 'Abdul 'Azīz of Calicut is an Urzuza (epic poem) which gives important details about the Indo-Portuguese struggle for supremacy over the seas. It gives useful details about the diplomatic activities of various Indian rulers preceding their confederacy against the Portuguese. It is the only source which mentions about the diplomatic correspondences that passed between the 'Adil Shah and the Zamorin of Calicut.

Turkish Source

The 'Ali Akharul Yamani[44] of Muṣṭafā bin Ibrāhīm furnishes important details about the Muslim Confederacy against the Portuguese and specially the role that the Indian rulers played in co-operating with the Egyptian fleet in the naval battles.

Rajasthanī Sources

The Dingal letters[45] written by Aurangzeb to Shivaji throw a flood of light on Jai Singh's and Aurangzeb's dual diplomacy in

---

43. MS. India Office Library, London, MS. Or. No.1044.
44. MS. Damat Ibrahim Pasha Library, Istanbul, Turkey.
45. In Rajasthan State Archives, Bikaner. Eng. Trans. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar: House of Shivaji, Calcutta.

the Mughal-Maratha-Bijapur triangular relations.

Kanarese, Telugu and Tamil Sources

The Further Sources of Vijayanagara History by K.A. Nilakanta Sastri and N. Venkataramnayya give extracts in English of the numerous sources in the Kanarese, Telugu and Tamil languages; they provide useful and accurate information, where the Persian Chroniclers are lacking and corroborate, in most cases the Persian authorities.

European Sources

Portuguese

The original Portuguese record at the Goa Archives are the most essential and unique documents for the Portuguese-Bijapur relations. There are innumerable number of documents relevant to the diplomatic relations of Bijapur. The most essential sources are:

Assentos do Conselho do Estado[46] in five volumes (1618-1750), contain scores of documents of various discription relevant to the diplomatic relations of Bijapur and the Portuguese. They gave details of the proceedings of the Council of Portuguese Viceroy and others, regarding matters of Bijapur and the policy they adopted towards Bijapur.

The Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguese na India[47] contains documents on the diplomatic agents of the Portuguese and their dealings. They enlighten on the diplomatic procedures of the times. The role the agents, the Portuguese and the Bijapuri envoys played

46. Compiled by Panduranga S. Pissurlencar, 1953. A detailed subject Index to Assentos is under publication by Dr. Gune, Goa.
47. Compiled by Pissurlencar, Goa, 1952.

in bringing about war and peace, conclusion of treaties and various other diplomatic transactions are detailed in these documents.

The Livro de Pazes[48] contains texts of the peace treaties between the Portuguese and Bijapur. It contains also the proceedings of the ratifications of the Portuguese-Bijapur treaties which are not found in any other source of Bijapur history. These unique documents enlighten about the diplomatic practices of those days.

The Archivo Portuguese Oriental[49] (Vol.V) also contains treaties with Bijapur.

The Colleccao de Tratados[50] by J.F. Biker is a collection containing all the treaties and agreements entered between the Portuguese at Goa and Indian rulers, including the 'Ādil Shahs.

The Monogoes de Reino[51] contains documents of various description, which throw light on the maritime relations of the Portuguese and Bijapur. It gives details of how the Portuguese exercised illegal sovereignty of the seas and controlled the Bijapur shipping.

The Cartazas[52] are unique documents which controlled the Bijapur shipping in the Indian Ocean and the Arabian sea. It gives information about the number of ships the Bijapuris could ply in a year between their ports and the ports in the Persian and Arabian Gulf, details of the various prohibited and non-prohibited articles they could import and export. Above all the Cartazas

---

48. The Book of Peace Treaties.
49. Published from Lisbon.
50. Published from Lisbon, 1881.
51. "The Book of the Monsoon".
52. Passports for ships and shipping.

gave right to the Portuguese to raid and search any Bijapurī vassal at any time and impose penalty for the breach of the rules of the Cartazas.

The Portuguese translations of the letters and farmāns of 'Ādil Shahs, which were written in Persian and were sent to Goa are preserved in the Portuguese records. But since the Persian text of these documents are not available, the Portuguese translations supply essential material for the diplomatic history.

The Commentaries of the Great Affenso da Albuquerque[53] provide good material on Albuquerque's diplomacy towards Bijapur and the latter's attitude of reconciliation towards the Portuguese. It furnishes information of the decision of the king of Portugal regarding the policy to be adopted towards Bijapur. It contains personal letter to Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah.

English Factory Records

The correspondences of the English factors in the Deccan, compiled by Sir William Foster under the title the English Factories in India[54] and the new series of the same compiled by Sir William Fawcett[55] supply very useful material not only for the Bijapur's relations with the British factories in the South India but also furnish useful information about Bijapur's relations with the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French as well. They supply an impartial account of Shivaji's campaign against Bijapur and their diplomatic relations.

---

53. Eng. Trans. by Walter De Gray Birch, Haklyut, 1815-17.
54. Thirteen volumes of Foster from 1618 to 1669, published at London.
55. New Series published from English (Vols. I and II).

The Dutch Record

The Dutch record of Dagh-Register,[56] and the "Dutch Record at the Hague"[57] provide very useful information on not only Bijapur's relations with the Dutch in South India, but also on the Bijapur's diplomatic and political relations with other European settlements in India. They also provide independent and impartial information on Bijapur's diplomatic relations with the Deccan rulers - Shivaji, Niẓām Shah, Quṭb Shah and the South Indian Nāyak Rulers. The Dagh-Registers also mention various diplomatic missions to the 'Ādil Shāhī court. It gives text of the 'Ādil Shāhī farmāns relating to the Dutch which in the absence of the original farmāns in Persian supply essential material for the politico-diplomatic relations between the Dutch and Bijapur and enlighten on the duel diplomacy Bijapur adopted against the various European settlements in India.

French Source

The Memoirs[58] of Francois Martin supplies the essential material for the brief period of over a decade of politico-diplomatic relations between the French and the Bijapur. Further it gives authentic information about Shivaji's campaign of the Bijapurī provinces in the Coromandel Coast and the dual diplomacy of the

---

56. Eng. Trans. "Monumenta Historia Indiae" in Journal of the Bombay Historical Society (J.B.H.S.), 1928 Vol. I, onwards.

57. Eng. Trans. in Appendices by Dr. Balkrishna: Shivaji the Great, Vol. II, Pt. I. Eng. Trans. of some of the records are given by Dr. P.M. Joshi: "John Van Twist's Mission to Bijapur, 1637" Journal of the Indian History (J.I.H.) XXXIII (2) 111 ff. also Dutch Records in Shivaji Nibhandavali, I.

58. Memoires de Francois Martin (1665-1694), Paris, 1931.

French by allying with Shivaji against their benefactor, the 'Ādil Shah.

Jesiut Sources

The Jesiut letters[59] and accounts preserved in the private Archives of the Society of Jesus in Europe, furnish a good deal of information on the various facetsof Bijapur's diplomatic relations. These letters were written by the Jesiut Missioneries in South India, to their Superiors, are either in the Portuguese, or Latin or Italin. The Jesiut's letters provide useful and impartial accounts of missions of some Padrees to the Court of 'Adil Shah, dealings between Bijapur and Goa, Bijapur's campaign along the Coromandel Coast, Shivaji's campaign of Bijapurī provinces in the Coromandel and several other details.

Travel Accounts

The contemporary European travellers - Sir Thomas Roe[60] Lancester[61], Purchas[62], Ralph Finch[63], Thevenot[64], John Fryers[65],

---

59. Eng. Trans. of some of the Jesiut records are: H. Heras: "Jesiut letters and Accounts", I.H.R.C., 1942, XVIII, 16 ff. John Correa Afonso: Jesuit Letters and Indian History; H. Heras: "The Marathas in Southern India" Historical Miscellany (No.31), B.I.S.M. 1928, 7 ff. See also I.H.R.C., 1925, 130 ff.; J.B.H.S., 1928, I, 158 ff.
60. W. Foster (ed): The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of Great Mogul (2 Vols.).
61. Clements and Markhen (ed): The Voyages of Sir James Lancester to the East India, Haklyut, 1877
62. Samuel Purchas: His Pilgrims, London, 1625.
63. In Purchas: His Pilgrims.
64. Sen (ed.): Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri.
65. Dr. John Fryer: A New Account of East India and Persia, Crooke (3 Vols.).

Manucci,[66] Bernier,[67] Bowery[68] and Tavernier[69] etc., provide useful points as impartial authorities, for the inter-state relations of Bijapur with Indian States and with the European settlements in India.

Epigraphical and Numismatic Sources

Epigraphical evidences[70] of Bijapur furnish most important information on the political relations of 'Adil Shahs with the Bahmani Sultans. These have been fully utilised. The numismatic[71] evidences furnish important information regarding Persian impact on Bijapur and their religious leanings towards Persia.

---

66. Nicolai Manucci: Storia do Mogor (4 vols.) Trans. and ed. by W. Irvine.

67. Francois Bernier: Travels in the Mogul Empire, Trans, and ed. by A. Constable, London, 1897.

68. Thomas Bowrey: A Geographical Accounts of the Countries Round the Bay of Bengal (1669-78)

69. V. Ball (ed.): Travels of Jean Baptiste Tavernier.

70. Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1925-26; 1930-32; 1939-40: Dr. M. Nazim: Bijapur Inscriptions (Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India, No.49) 1936; James Bird; "The Ruined City of Bijapur -" J.B.B.R.A.S., May 1844, 367 ff.

71. G.P. Taylor: "The Numismatic Supplement"-Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (J.A.S.B.), VI (11 N.S)., December, 1910, 678 ff.; June 1912, 228.

Part - 2

The Evolution, Rise and Fall of the Bijapur Kingdom

SEC. I: POLITICAL BACKGROUND

DISINTEGRATION OF BAHMANI KINGDOM

A glimpse at the political situation in the Deccan, which was marked by political confusion and disintegration, during the last two decades of the 15th century is necessary to follow the trend of events which contributed to the evolution of the 'Adil Shāhī Kingdom of Bijapur.

The treacherous murder of Maḥmūd Gāwān, the saviour of Bahmanī Kingdom and the architect of a grand empire — on the 5th Ṣafar 886/5th April 1481 struck a fatal blow to the Kingdom. Maḥmūd Gāwān's dying words — "the death of an old man is of little moment, but to your Majesty (Sultan Muḥammad III) it will mean the loss of your character and the ruin of your Empire," proved to be prophetic. Within a decade, the vast empire of the splendid edifice of the Bahmanī Kingdom presented a chequered scene. His death removed a dominating personality and let loose the forces of disintegration. This signaled the beginning of the decline and fall of the mighty empire.

Soon Sultan Muḥammad III realised the folly of his indiscreet and unjust action of ordering execution of Gāwān. He was overwhelmed with remorse, and in delirium he constantly cried out that he was very much perturbed by the dream of the innocent Gāwān.

By this action of the Sultan many nobles and their followers lost confidence in the Sultan, and they, while withdrawing from the camp of the Sultan, communicated their opinion that they would not accompany the Sultan and that would shape their conduct by the advice of Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan. The Sultan soon summoned Yūsuf, who was instrumental in resolving the dispute between the Sultan and the nobles. But Yūsuf was no match to replace Gāwān. Soon factionalism at the court rudely subverted the political equilibrium; and egotism, intrigue, and disorder prevailed.

The year that lapsed between the death of Gawan and the death of Sultan Muḥammad on 5th Ṣafar 887/26th March 1482, was the first phase of the last chapter of the Bahmani dynasty; and it was full of foreboodings for the destiny of the Kingdom.

Maḥmūd Shah, the younger son and successor of Muḥammad III, was a boy of eight at the time of accession to the Bahmanī throne. Though he ruled for thirty-seven years, but he had neither the strength of the personal character, nor the guidance of an able prime minister, to enable him to maintain the integrity of his kingdom. He was nothing more than a puppet and his dominion was confined to the capital of Bidar and its immediate vicinity.

The first few years of the reign of the infant Sultan was signalised by a series of struggles and intrigues. The capital itself was for many days the scene of struggles between the Deccanis and the Ḥabashīs on the one hand and the Turks and the Mughals on the other. The Deccanī amīrs unanimously agreed to the succession of the Sultan Maḥmūd. Though at first the Deccanis came to an understanding with the Turkish clique, in the end they played false with them, and suddenly falling upon them they massacred the Turks. The cause was that the Āfāqīs gradually dominated the

society and captured the entire governmental machinery to the utter humiliation of the Deccanis. Thus there existed continuous party dissensions at the court and each party safeguarded its own interest. And this continued with unabated rancour. The Deccanis, dissatisfied by the Sultan's attitude, conspired to dethrone him. Consequently, on the night of 7th November 1487, the Deccanis entered the palace, and attempted to kill the Sultan. The attempt was foiled by the timely action of the Turkish slaves who were in attendance of the Sultan and who held the ground against the conspirators untill the Sultan escaped.

The Sultan from thence devoted himself entirely to amusement and totally neglected the administration. Consequently, the powerful governors of the Bahmani provinces, who enjoyed extensive authority, availed themselves of the preveiling anarchy and became recalcitrant to the nominal central authority. They began, from 895/1489, to exert and assert their autonomous authority within their provinces.

Thus seeds were sown for the dismemberment of the Bahmanī Kingdom. This, in due course, produced the five Sultanates — 'Ādil Shāhī at Bijapur, Barīd Shāhī at Bidar, Quṭb Shāhī at Golkonda, 'Imād Shāhī in Berar, and Niẓām Shāhī at Ahmadnagar. However, dismemberment of the Bahmanī kingdom and assumption of virtual independence by its provincial governors was not prompted by any disaffection towards the Bahmanī Sultan; and like other governors, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan and his successors entertained loyalty and affection towards the Bahmanī Sultans so long as the dynasty lasted.

After the assumption of the virtual independence by the Bahmanī governors the history of the Bahmanī kingdom was in fact the history of the Barīdī rule and its struggle for the hegemony

of tottering Bahmanī empire. Qāsim Barīd, entitled Barīdul-Mamālik, marched to Bidar in 1492 and compelled Sultan Maḥmūd to appoint him Prime Minister of the Bahmanī Kingdom. He then held the Sultan in thrall, and ruled at his own discretion in the name of the Sultan. After the death of Qāsim in 1504, his son 'Alī Barīd became Prime Minister.

The Barīdī rule was greatly disliked by almost all the leading nobles (including the provincial governors), which further aggravated the political conditions and facilitated the provincial governors to became autonomous.

After Maḥmūd Shah's death in 1518, the last four successors—Aḥmad IV (1518-20); 'Alāuddīn (1520-23); Walīyullāh (1523-26); and Kalīmullāh (1526-37 or 38), to the house of Bahmanīs were nominal rulers under the tutelage of the Barīds. Thus fell ignominously the magnificent edifice of the Bahmanīs. After the extinction of the Bahmanī Kingdom five Sultanates of 'Ādil Shāhī, Barīd Shāhī, Niẓām Shāhī, 'Imād Shāhī, and Quṭb Shāhī, which were under evolution from 1489, sprang into existence as independent sovereign states.

SEC. II: **RISE AND FALL OF THE 'ĀDIL SHĀHĪ KINGDOM OF BIJAPUR**

(1) Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan (895-916/1489-1510)

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan by carving out a new kingdom of his own from the Bijapur province of the tottering Bahmanī empire established a new line of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans with Bijapur as its capital. The new dynasty ruled over Deccan for nearly two hundred years — from 1489 to 1686, when it was finally absorbed in the Mughal empire by Aurangzeb.

The history of Bijapur is a record of almost continuous struggle for existence with both the external as well as internal forces. Community of faith and interest and dynastic-matrimonial alliances among the Deccan Sultans were powerless to curb their ambition of territorial aggrandisement. The 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans tried to acquire the hegemony of the Deccan, and this goal obviously clashed with that of the Niẓām Shahs of Ahmadnagar and the Quṭb Shahs of Golkonda. Factionalism was the major internal disruptive force which the 'Ādil Shahs had inherated from the Bahmanīs. Since it was a multi-national and multi-racial state, three factions — Āfāqīs, Deccanis and Ḥabashīs played a major role in shaping the destiny of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty. And eventually continous party strife proved fatal for the kingdom.

The alternation of Sunnī and Shī'ah doctrines with the change of ruler too had its repercussions on the nobles, who were the virtual pillars of the kingdom.

After the assumption of autonomous rule by Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan the first hostility against him was initiated by the Bahmanī Prime

Minister Qāsim Barīd. He did not like the independent authority exercised by Yūsuf at Bijapur. Qāsim wished to curb the power of Yūsuf and extend his own authority over Bijapur. Consequently, he induced Vijayanagar to join with him in attacking Yūsuf's territory. At the same time he approached Bahādur Gīlānī, who was the thānēdār and virtual ruler of Goa and the Konkan, to invade Yūsuf's territories. Consequently, the Vijayanagar forces marched to Rāichūr doab and attacked Raichur and Mudgal, while Bahādur occupied Jamkhandi. Through shrewed diplomacy Yūsuf made peace with Vijayanagar and then concentrated on Qāsim. In an action Yūsuf emerged victorious.

Since then the major part of Yūsuf's reign was spent in warding off the territorial enchroachments of neighbouring rulers. In 1510 he came in clash with the Portuguese at Goa, who captured that fort from the Bijapurīs. But, later in the same year, Yūsuf recovered it.

Thus by his able statesmanship and diplomacy Yūsuf weathered the initial storms with fortitude and laid a solid foundation of the new dynasty and the kingdom.

After a reign of twenty-two years Yūsuf died in 915/1510. At the time of his death the Bijapur Kingdom extended from Chaul in the north-west to Goa in the south. The rivers Bhīma and Krishna formed the northern and southern boundaries, while on the east the boundary ended at the confluence of the two rivers, near Rāichūr.

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan was a ruler of versatile genius and varied accomplishments. He was a great admirer and patron of learning and he invited scholars and poets from Persia, Arabia, Turkey and other countries. Though a pioneer of Shī'ah doctrine in the

Deccan, he adopted a considerate and impartial attitude towards the Sunnīs and created an atmosphere of harmony between followers of various creeds. And with the change of his faith he established close diplomatic relations with Iran.

(2) Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan (916-41/1510-34)

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan was succeeded by his younger son Ismā'īl. As he was too young to direct the affairs of the kingdom, the brunt of the rule fell to the regent Kamāl Khan Deccani.

Kamāl Khan restored the Sunnī doctrine in the state. By this act he gained the affection of the people and secured by his affability the support and allegiance of the nobility. He established friendly and cordial relations with the neighbouring rulers, putting to an end the existing discord and hostility. It was due to the skill and sagacity of Kamāl Khan that the splendour and elegance of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty reached a crowning point.

However, as Kamāl Khan wielded great power and influence in the court, he harboured evil designs to depose Ismā'īl and himself usurp the throne, but his attempt failed by the ingenuity of the Queen-Mother.

The rule of the regent Kamāl Khan Deccani was a period of hectic military activities against three contiguous neighbours — Ahmadnagar, Bidar and Vijayanagar, as a result of which considerable territorial gains were made. The Kingdom now extended beyond Chaul in the north, to Goa (which was lost to the Portuguese) in the south, and slopping eastwards, the rivers Nira and Bhima formed the north-eastern boundaries, the fartherest point being the confluence of the two rivers. The doab region (Raichur and Mudgal)

were lost to the Vijayanagar, but the Bijapurī arms now penetrated far into the Tilangana, up to Kovilkonda.

When Ismā'īl began to rule himself he re-introduced the Shī'a doctrine at Bijapur. He further strengthened the religio-diplomatic ties established by his father with Iran. Due to the community of faith between the rulers of Iran and Bijapur, Ismā'īl exercised his diplomatic pressure on the Sunnī bigot 'Alī Barīd, for the release of the Iranian ambassador who was unnecessarily detained and humiliated at Bidar. This gesture earned Ismā'īl great honour. The Shah of Iran, in a letter acknowledging the courtesy of Ismā'īl accorded him the royal title in 925/1519. Consequently, several practices of the Shī'as and their culture were introduced in daily life at Bijapur and closer contacts with Iran were firmly established.

(3) Mallū 'Ādil Khan (941/1534)

In accordance with the will of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan his eldest son Mallū succeeded him. Ismā'īl had appointed Asad Khan Lārī as the protector of the kingdom, with full powers to rule. However, Mallū by his lewd and licentious behaviour incurred the displeasure of the leading nobles, including Asad Khan. Eventually, through the conspiracy of Pūnjī Khātūn (Queen-Mother of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan) he was dethroned after a short reign of seven months.

(4) Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I (941-65/1534-57)

Ibrāhīm, younger brother of Mallū became the next Sultan through the machinations of the Āfāqī faction at the Court.

On his accession, he rejected the names of the twelve Shī'a Imāms from the Khuṭba and restored the exercise of the Sunnī practices. He deviated from the venerable traditions of his predecessors and introduced many innovations in the political and religious policies. He struck a fatal blow to the Āfāqī faction by degrading them (with four exceptions); and in their place enroled the Deccanis (including Marathas) and Habashis to the services and retained only four hundred Āfāqī troops as his bodyguard. Consequently, many Marathas acquired great influence at his court and it is noteworthy that public accounts were maintained in Marathi.

Ibrāhīm's anti-Āfāqī policy, however, considerably weakened the kingdom as the dismissed personnel joined the service of the neighbouring rulers. This exposed the kingdom to a series of invasions. Yet it was the veteran Āfāqī leader Asad Khan, who acting as a diplomatic counsellor to Ibrāhīm, saved the kingdom in the hour of crisis.

The reign of Ibrāhīm, which lasted twenty-four years and a few months, was full of alliances and counter-alliances with and against Ahmadnagar, Bidar, Berar, Golkonda and Vijayanagar. Although there were continuous military expeditions, much territorial expansion was not made, for gains in one direction were compensated by loss on the other side. Thus Bidar was conquered ,Chaul Sholapur and Kalyani were lost to Ahmadnagar. On the other hand considerable acquisitions were made in the south. Along the west-coast the fartherest point of Bijapur territory now extended below the port of Goa. Further though Golkonda was not subdued Bijapuri arms were able to reach the walls of Golkonda fort and return triumphantly.

(5) 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I (965-88/1557-80)

On the day of his coronation 'Alī abandoned the Sunnī practices and reintroduced the Shī'a Khuṭba and other practices. The Persian doctors of religion were granted full freedom to preach the Shī'a doctrine and were paid by the State for their missionary activities. The new Sultan restored back to power the Āfāqīs while relegating the Deccanis to a position of insignificance. Thus, he subverted all the dogmatic experiments which his father practised.

During 'Alī's reign Bijapur and Vijayanagar came very close to each other and 'Alī actually paid a visit to Vijayanagar City, where the Raya received him with great pomp and honour. The greatest event of 'Alī's reign was the successful formation of the Confederacy of the Deccan Sultans against Vijayanagar and their victory over the latter at the Battle of Bannihaṭṭī in 1565. As a result of this battle, Bijapur's southern boundary was extended up to the city of Vijayanagar, and further it opened the gates for future expansion of Bijapur further south. Consequently, at the end of 'Alī's reign, Bijapur Kingdom extended up to port of Honavar on the west coast and southern boundary along the line of Varada and Tungabhadra rivers.

During 'Alī's reign diplomatic relations with the Mughal emperor Akbar were established and envoys were exchanged.

In 1579, 'Alī having no son, appointed his nephew Ibrāhīm, son of his brother Shah Tahmāsp, as his successor. In the following year 1580 'Alī was assassinated.

(6) Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II -- (988-1037/1580-1627)

Ibrāhīm at the time of accession to the throne Ibrāhīm was only nine years old, and the management of the court devolved successively on Deccani nobles. But Ibrāhīm's aunt Chānd Bībī, the dowager-queen really controlled the affairs of the State. It was her diplomatic farsightedness which prevented the regents from usurping the 'Ādil Shāhī throne and she tried to maintain the semblance of sovereign authority by exercising some control over the regents. The period of regencies (1580-90) was marked by intrigues and struggle for supremacy at the court, which created semi-anarchial conditions. The struggle for power between the Āfāqī and Deccani nobles led to the emergence of a third group of Ḥabashīs who controlled, for some time, the destiny of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty.

A unique event in the history of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty happened during the reign of Ibrāhīm when the city of Bijapur was invested for twelve months (1580-81) by the united armies of the confederate Sultans of Ahmadnagar, Berar and Golkonda. However, Shāh Abu'l-Ḥasan, through his diplomatic maneuvers, saved the Kingdom.

When Ibrāhīm began to rule himself in 1590, he re-introduced the Sunnī practices by rejecting the Shī'a doctrines, which were prevalent under the regents. But he was tolerant to all creeds. But he was able to maintain equilibrium of power between various factions of his nobility, thus achieving great power by a harmonious blend.

Ibrāhīm exercised his sovereignty over Malabar and compelled its rulers to pay him annual tribute. The Nāyaks of

Karnatak and Mysore were also forced to pay tribute. The Kingdom in 1605 extended along the West Coast from Bankōṭ in the north to about Bhaṭkal in the south (except Ankola, Gersoppa, Honavar). The northern boundary was reached by the river Nira, on the east the district of Raichūr, Malkhed and Bidar separated it from Golkonda, while Akkalkōṭ, Naldurg and Kalyanī became frontier provinces, alternately overrun by the troops of Ahmadnagar, Bidar and Golkonda.*

Ibrāhīm entered into matrimonial alliances with the Niẓām Shāhīs, the Quṭb Shāhīs and the Mughals. The Bijapurī princess Khadījā was married (in 1580) to an Ahmadnagar prince, Ibrāhīm himself married (in 1586) the sister of Quṭb Shah, and gave his daughter in marriage to the Mughal Prince Dāniyēl.

With the Mughal onslaught on Ahmadnagar, Bijapur for the sake of her own security to maintain a buffer state between her and the Mughal State, came to the rescue of the sister Kingdom. And in 1597 the Bijapurīs and the Mughals clashed for the first time, at the Battle of Sonepat, in which the Mughals emerged victorious. Since then active diplomatic relations between Ibrāhīm and Akbar were established.

In 1602 Ibrāhīm built a new capital at Nauraspur. But on the astrologers' guidance he did not actually shift the capital. However, being very much fond of the place, he spent most of the time in the newly built lofty palaces at Nauraspur. Ibrāhīm's reign lasted for almost half a century. In 1627, at the time of his death Bijapur had attained great power and territorial expansion. He left a flourishing State with a full treasury and an army of nearly 80,000 cavalry and more than 200,000 infantry

---

*Please see Map No.3.

He was a remarkable man with a versatile genius and evinced keen and lively interest in every branch of fine arts. He was a liberal patron of letters, and a brilliant galaxy of scholars of almost all branches of learning adorned his court. He gave asylum to mystics, savants and ṣūfī-saints.

Ibrāhīm strove hard to evolve a distinctive Deccani culture, incorporating what was best in indigenous and foreign traditions. He devoted his life to music, poetry, painting and calligraphy. He was a author of note and composed the Kitāb-i Nauras embodying the collection of songs in the Deccani idiom. Ibrāhīm patronized a new Deccani school of painting, and a series of paintings in the Nujūmu'l-'Ulūm are the earliest example of Bijapurī School. Portraits of Ibrāhīm himself also reveal distinct features of Bijapurī School, which reached its zenith in his reign.

(7) Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah (1037-67/1627-56)

With the help of two Bijapurī nobles -- Daulat Khan (latter entitled Khawāṣ Khan) and Mīrzā Muḥammad Amīn Lārī (latter entitled Muṣṭafā Khan), Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah ascended the throne in 1627 at the young age of sixteen years.

Muḥammad's reign of thirty years, regarded as glorious in the history of Bijapur, witnessed momentous historical events.

Bijapur became partner with the Mughals in the extinction of Ahmadnagar. Muḥammad maintained friendly relations with Shāh Jahān and made peace Treaty of 1636, after the extinction of Ahmadnagar. And by a farman of Shāh Jahān he got assurances for the security of the independence of Bijapur from the Mughal aggression. Due to his good relations, Shāh Jahān formally recognised

Muḥammad's sovereignty and bestowed on him the title of "Shah" in 1648, the only ruler of Bijapur to receive such a recognition from the Mughals.

The Treaty of 1636 with the Mughals sealed the expansion of Bijapur in the north. So Muḥammad could only extend his dominions westwards into Konkan, southwards into Mysore, and eastwards into Karnatak. Consequently, during Muḥammad's reign the Kingdom attained its greatest extent, power and magnificance, and his dominions stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal.

Besides territorial expansion, Bijapur also attained peace and prosperity during Muḥammad's reign. His Kingdom yielded an annual revenue of seven crores and eighty four lakhs of rupees, besides five and half crores of tributes from vassal rulers and zamindars. Cultural activities like, poetry, painting and architecture etc., also received a great impetus. He did his best to emulate the glorious traditions left to him by his versatile father. Diffusion of general education and religious teachings were one of his chief concern, and he did his utmost to improve the socio-economic and educational standards of the people.

The colossal mausoleum of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, now named "Gōl Gumbaz" depicts even to this day, after a lapse of three centuries, the glory that Muḥammad's reign had attained. It is the greatest structural triumphs of Indo-Perso-Ottoman architecture of 'Ādil Shāhī period.

Muḥammad was the first ruler of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty to make a departure from the injunctions against figure and portrait painting which was scrupulously adhered to till his father's reign. He introduced fresco-paintings and portraits, the examples of which are -- the walls of Āsār Maḥal, Pavillion at Kumatgi and Sāt-Manzil.

Muḥammad's reign witnessed the rise of Shivaji to eminence and his founding of an independent Maratha State, initially carved out from the Bijapur Kingdom. In spite of the great glory and power that Muḥammad achieved he failed to check the rise of Marathas to independence. It may be argued that his policy of peaceful compromise indirectly helped the emergence of Maratha nation and statehood.

(8) 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1067-83/1656-72)

On the death of Muḥammad on 4th November, 1656, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, a youth of eighteen succeeded to the throne through the efforts of the Prime Minister Khan Muḥammad and the Queen, Barī Ṣūbibū, sister of Quṭb Shah of Golkonda.

His accession signalled disasters to the Kingdom and his reign marked the first phase of the decline of the mighty Bijapur empire.

Shāh Jahān, anxious to annex Bijapur to his empire, found a pretext in the legitimacy of 'Alī's parents. On Aurangzeb's plea, Shāh Jahān sanctioned the invasion of Bijapur and gave him a free hand to deal with the situation. This sanction of such a war was wholly unrighteous. Bijapur was not a vassal state of the Mughals but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal Emperor, and the latter had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. However, Aurangzeb, had to raise the siege and rush to the north for the war of succession to the Mughal throne.

With Muḥammad's death and 'Alī's accession disorder began in the Karnatak. The Nayaks tried to recover their former lands.*

*For the Karnatak Feudatories see Map No.7. Bangalore was Bijapur's administrative headquarter for controlling these feudatories.

out. On the other hand Shivaji increased the momentum of acquiring more and more Bijapur territory and carved out a new Maratha state, while his diplomacy prevented any Mughal-Bijapur coalition against him.

At the court things were even worse. With the coming of a young and weak ruler, the party factions and struggle for supremacy was at its zenith. To aggravate the evil, Aurangzeb intrigued with Bijapurī nobles and succeeded in winning over most of them.

Throughout his reign of sixteen years, 'Alī struggled desperately both against the Mughals and the Marathas. He thrice repulsed successively Mughal invasions. But when he died in 1672 the mighty and glorious Bijapur of Muhammad's time was deprived of most of its important territorial possessions. With the expansion of Shivaji's kingdom there was a corresponding shrinkage in the Bijapur territory.

'Alī's reign is marked by developments in Persian and Deccani literature and fine arts, and some good works of history were also produced under his patronage.

(9) Sikandar 'Ādil Shah (1083-97/1672-86)

Sikandar, a minor of four years was placed on the throne of Bijapur in 1672. The history of his reign is really the history of regents and wazīrs. It was a period marked by chronic civil war among the factious nobles, independence of the provincial governors, paralysis of the central administration, occasional Mughal invasions, and a secret alliance but pretended hostility with the Marathas.

Thus, allround deterioration further crippled the political

situation. The prestige of Bijapur was so seriously damaged by internal disruptions that the Mughal general Dilēr Khan almost coerced and humiliated Sikandar. Despite several sacrifices and desperate attempts on the part of Sikandar, he could not satisfy the growing greed of the Mughals. Sikander's alliance with Sambhājī further aggravated the Mughal-Bijapur relations. At last Aurangzeb himself marched out in 1685 with a large army to fulfill the last ambition of his life. After desperately defending his capital and standing the prolonged siege of 1685-6, Sikandar succumbed to the Mughals, and on 12th September 1686 Bijapur was occupied by Aurangzeb.

Thus ended the glorious career of about two centuries of the great 'Ādil Shāhī monarchy. The grandeur and glory of the 'Ādil Shahs is still alive in their scores of mighty and lofty monuments and specimens of fine arts.

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY OF BIJAPUR

SEC. I: FORMULATION OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY

(A) BACKGROUND

The Character of the Bijapur Kingdom

Bijapur was a theocratic, multi-racial, and dynastic State. It was predominantly an Āfāqī State. Besides the ruling Perso-Turkish elements, Bijapur's nobility included several races of Central Asia Arabs, Ḥabashis, Hindustanīs, Deccanis etc. Thus leading to factionalism at the Court. The Āfāqīs constituted the upper strata of the nobility and dominated the administration, both at the Central and Provincial levels.

The 'Ādil Shahs were Shī'as intermittently and there were periods when Sunnīsm prevailed as the State religion in Bijapur. Out of the nine rulers of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty five were Shī'a while the others were Sunnī. The Shī'a rulers looked to the Shah of Iran for allegiance spiritual, leadership, etc.

The territories of which Bijapur Kingdom was composed were collected in a rather haphazard way – by inheritance from the Bahmanis, by conquest which was indiscriminate in various directions

and by barter etc. Consequently, the inhabitants of the Kingdom lacked the unifying bond of a common nation-hood.

The only cohesive force which built and maintained the State was the dynastic loyalty, that too was blind and was based on power. It was the military power only that could maintain the integrity of the State. The Āfāqīs, in their own personal interest, were loyal to the ruler, of course with a few exceptions, and contributed much to the making of the external policy and continuance of the dynasty.

Bijapur was a feudal State of the medieval times. It was built on the system of contractual relations. The Sultan offered land and protection. His nobility reciprocated by allegiance and service both, military and civil. Consequently, it was subjected to the inherent danger of the delegated authority of losing actual control over the powerful vassals down in the feudal nexus.

Thus the various structural factors which contributed to the making of the Bijapur State shaped the formulation of the external foreign policy of its rulers and they constantly impinged on the external affairs, either directly or indirectly.

Organization for the External Affairs

The Sultan was the supreme power as a sovereign head of the State. He was the ruler, judge, administrator, military general, sometimes even a preacher and leader of the public worship. The personal character of the Sultan, the environment in which he was educated and brought up, his predilictions, whimps and fancies etc., had a profound bearing on the external policy. However, in case of a weak or infant ruler the sovereignty devolved upon the minister.

Though theoretically the Sultan's authority was unlimited, in practice he took advice of his ministers on matters of external affairs. The chief duty of these ministers was of course, implicit obedience to the sultan's wishes, whose decision was final.

Next to the sultan the highest officer of the kingdom was Vakīl-us-Salṭanat or simply Vakīl. He was generally know as Wazīr. During the sixteenth century the wazīr was incharge of practically the entire administration of the kingdom. Sometimes the wazīr acted as a regent for the infant sultan and thus controlled all the affairs of the state both internal and external. Even during the times of powerful sultans the advice of the wazīr in the external affairs carried weight. The wazīr could declare war or make peace at his discretion. Once during the reign of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, the wazīr was entrusted with the royal seal by the Sultan, so that, he could issue orders on any measure he deemed fit in the best interest of the state. As the wazīr's duties embrassed all duties, acting as the head of civil and military administration, conquering new territories, realising tribute from the vassals and subdued states, and maintain diplomatic relations with other states. In the discharge of all these duties the wazīr was assisted by several other officers of the central government at the capital and the provisional governors.

In important matters of external affairs the sultan consulted the Majlis-i Kingāsh which consisted of high officials of the court, military officials, and jagirdars. It was purely an advisory body. The sultan though not bound to accept its advice, often agreedto act upon it. On several conspicuous occasions the sultans implemented the policy of the Majlis in regard to the

external affairs.

(B) BASIC DETERMINANTS IN POLICY FORMULATION

Since the external policy of Bijapur was continually changing with the inter-action of internal and external forces, its rulers could never formulate and adopt a definite policy. Thus the polcies were not consistent; but were like topsy — they just grew. They were the result of the interplay of several factors which affected the formulation of the policy in different ways in different circumstances. But to a certain extent they grew out of the past policies — based on that inherited from the Bahmani Kingdom, heavily circumscribed by the logic of the events and depending on following basic determinants:

Political Interest and Objectives

Physical Geography

Economic Geography

Demography

Belligerent Power

Ideology

The Environment

Domestic Affairs

Political Interests and Objectives

In the beginning the fundamental policy objective of the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers was to preserve the territorial integrity of the Bahmani province of Bijapur and by autonomous rule to consolidate their hold over it to gradually carve out into an independent kingdom. To achieve this goal the first four 'Ādil Shāhī rulers, during the period of the evolution of the kingdom, maintained

nominal allegiance and owed sovereignty to the Bahmani rulers. After the extinction of the Bahmani rule in 1536, the fourth 'Ādil Shāhī ruler, Ibrāhīm assumed full independence and royal title.

From thence, the main objective in the formulation of Bijapur's external policy was to maintain its political independence and territorial integrity, which were essential for its existence. To this goal, Bijapur had to adopt different policies towards different states.

The interest and objectives of all the Deccan Kingdoms were almost identical with those perceived by Bijapur; and their policies had four common denominations. State's security, safe guarding or augmenting of State's power in relation to its neighbours, economic advancement and State's prestige. Bijapur while pursuing the basic objectives tried to achieve the hegemony of the Deccan. Obviously this clashed with the interests of the other powerful neighbours and each, in order to assert its influence, adopted incompatible means. Thus, throughout its history, which is a record of continuous strife. Bijapur was variedly aligned with her neighbours according to the circumstances and exigencies of time. None of her alliances and counter-alliances were consistent nor permanent. Evidently a consistent policy was not the aim but, security and integrity of the State were the sole motive, irrespective of any breach of previous commitment. Further community of religion among the Deccan Sultans could not also hold them together permanently.

The formulation of the external policy, adoptation of diplomatic techniques, alliances and counter-alliances knew no bounds when the security of the State was at stake.

Physical Geography

The external policy of Bijapur was inherent in its physical geography. The facts of physical features influenced the behaviour of the Bijapuris which in its turn dictated the attitude to be adopted towards their neighbours. Topography had a vital bearing on State's security, economic well-being and the belligerent power. The strategic location of Bijapur, its wide rivers, high mountains and sea played a major role in the settlement of frontiers. It was due to Bijapur's access to the sea that forced many Western countries to establish political and diplomatic relations with her. This also established her dominance over her neighbours.

The possession of the Raichur doab, a fertile tract rich in mineral resources, was the cause of recurring hostilities which her neighbours too coveted to possess and laid claim over its ownership.

In spite of the matrimonial alliances with her neighbour, the territory of Sholapur, Naldrug and its surroundings were the bone of contention between two contending powers.

The desire to maintain natural frontiers as the barrier with her neighbours involved Bijapur into hostilities subverting the status quo. Sometimes Bijapur adopted a forward policy seeking a simple and limited revision of her map or for expansion into a power vaccum and for hegemony of the Deccan.

Lack of natural frontiers facilitated Bijapur to conquer her weak neighbours.

Thus geography contributed much both, as an advantage and disadvantage to Bijapur's belligerent power and in shaping her policies.

Economic Geography

The dimension and fertility of arable land, natural resources of energy and raw materials too played a dominant role in shaping the formulation of Bijapur's external policy. Though Bijapur delcared wars frequently yet, they sued for peace and sought conclusion of war mostly on economic grounds.

The economic factor, with numerous elements having multi-directional effects, greatly contributed to the over-all belligerent power of Bijapur, which dictated the terms in war and peace.

Trade and Commerce — the economic nexus, brought Bijapur move closer to some of the Western countries and made necessary diplomatic relations with them. It was the maritime trade which compelled Bijapur to reconciliate and grant political concessions to some of the Western countries who were powerful at sea.

Demography

The size and nature of the population of Bijapur influenced greatly the external policy. Bijapur's population was heterogenous. Besides the Indians, it inhabited innumerable foreign emmigrants from various parts of Central and South-central Asia, including Afghanistan. The foreign emmigrants formed the Āfāqī party at the court, which played a major role in shaping the destiny of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty. The Āfāqīs were greatly patronized by almost all the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers and were in fact invited to settle down in Bijapur. The emmigrants were though foreign in the beginning but after coming to Bijapur they made it their home and settled here permanently.

The bulk of the Bijapur army was drawn from the so-called foreign emmigrants. And during the middle of the 17th century the Afghans formed more than half of the Bijapurī army. Thus racial element was the dominating factor in shaping the external policy.

Belligerent Power

Bijapur's belligerent power depended mainly on the military strength, impregnable forts, arms, foreign horses available and physical, economic and human geography. Any action or policy of Bijapur was dictated by the arms. War was considered as a function of policy. Diplomacy and arms went together.

Military weakness of Bijapur was considered an invitation to invasion. Consequently, large and strong army formed part of the policy. Diplomacy was clearly related to the military strategy, which is evident from the scores of alliances and counter-alliances, both offensive and defensive, which Bijapur formed.

On the contrary, too large an army for the defences of the Kingdom was often a temptation for adopting a forward policy. It was Bijapur's strong belligerent power which tempted it to acquire the hegemony of the Deccan. It also enabled Bijapur to expand her dominions from Arabian sea to Bay of Bengal during the 17th century.

A large army, partly feudal, was maintained by Bijapur to sustain its external policy. The feudal army was composed of various Indian and foreign races.

Ideology

In medieval times it was the religious ideology that pre-

vailed in shaping the external policy, though at times it did not exert its influence. The 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom being Islamic in character (but was tolerant towards other religions), the two ideologies, Sunnī and the Shī'a, shaped the external policy of Bijapur. The 'Ādil Shahs intermittently adopted Sunnī and Shī'a doctrines, which altered the social relations, modified States attitude towards other States and changed the character of the kingdom. To aggravate the matters, policy determination had to cope with the problem of ideological disputes, which made the implementation of policies difficult and sometimes impossible. On occasions Bijapur had to change the ideology due to its impact on the external relations with other States, who took up arms against Bijapur. On the one hand ideology was advantageous for Bijapur, as it enabled her to maintain closer contact with a powerful Islamic country, while on the other it prevented her alignment with other powerful States.

The Environment

There existed traditional suspicion and antipathy among the Deccan Kingdoms contemporary to Bijapur. In spite of friendly and family relations (by marriages) not only 'Ādil Shahs, but their counterparts in the Deccan, considered their contiguous neighbours as their enemies and neighbours of their enemies as their friends. Thus, always prejudiced the Deccan rulers maintained an intelligence service to keep themselves well informed of the happenings in the neighbouring States. The rulers themselves corresponded and kept themselves well informed. Their ambassadors also reported to their rulers.

Domestic Affairs

Though the internal and external policies of Bijapur were separate, yet they were interdependent. Repercussion of one over the other was inevitable on almost all occasions. Internal prosperity tranquility and stability contributed much to adopt a strong and a consistent external policy.

The character of the Bijapur Kingdom required raising of feudal armies. Every official of the State was required to maintain certain number of soldiers and horses, according to his rank. The deployment of feudal armies during war had its repercussion on the external policy.

Factionalism at the Bijapur Court had a profound impact with far-reaching consequences on its external policies. Any change in ruling faction correspondingly changed the course of external policies. The powerful factions — Āfāqīs, Ḥabashīs and the Deccanis were obviously of divergent views and when in power each tried to subvert the policies of the other. Each party tried to disapprove the action of the other. To whom one party considered State's enemy, the other tried to extend its friendly hand. With a change in the ruling faction, the new party tried to subvert all the previous commitments to other states by their predecessors.

Sometimes the internal party quarrels at Bijapur were resolved amicably by the mediation of other States.

The inextricable mixing of internal and external affairs was patent among the Deccan Kingdoms, who were allied to each other by their ethnic origin of being succession states of the Bahmani Kingdom, and due to their close geographical proximity, with their common political interests and motivations.

SEC. II: THE STRUCTURE OF THE DIPLOMATIC PRACTICES

The Instruments of the External Policy

The diplomatic practices followed by 'Ādil Shahs of Bijapur were an admixture of Oriental, Persian, Arab, Mughal and Ottoman techniques. Broadly the instruments by which the 'Ādil Shahs of Bijapur implemented their external policy and which gave shape and direction to it were:

Diplomacy;

Conquests and Condominiums;

Economic Actions;

Armed Forces; and

Matrimonial Alliances.

Diplomacy

Following the traditions of their predecessors - the Bahmani Sultans, the structure of the diplomatic practices of the 'Ādil Shahs of Bijapur was based upon acceptance of the fact of the right of existence of a number of independent territorial kingdoms of the Deccan, free from external control and able to pursue their own interests by bargaining and fighting with one another. The Deccan politics were a competitive struggle for power, each ruler waged a war on the other creating an uneasy equilibrium in which the weak combined against the strong in order to maintain the balance of power in which no one kingdom could become so powerful as to threaten the independence of the others. Thus, maintenance of diplomatic relations first among the Deccan Kingdoms and then with

other Indian States and foreign countries became a necessity.

The traditional diplomacy adopted by the 'Ādil Shahs was of the following forms:

Diplomatic Communications;

Diplomatic Sanctions;

Treaties, Contracts and Agreements;

Persuasion, Compromise and Diplomatic Pressures;

Duplicity and Coersion;

Espionage;

Use of threat of force in the Background of Negotiations; and

Good offices and Mediation.

Diplomatic Communications

Diplomatic correspondence were not only made by 'Ādil Shahs with their counterparts in other States but were also made by their ministers and nobles. The correspondences which the 'Ādil Shahs themselves made fall into five categories: Those addressed to other Sultans of the Deccan were on equal terms; those addressed to the Shah of Iran were on the terms of a subordinate official writing to a Sovereign; those addressed to the Mughal Emperors, were on the terms of a provincial governor writing to an Emperor, they were in the form of an 'Arzī or 'Arzdāsht; those addressed to petty Rajas, Nayaks as a sovereign writing to vassals; and to the European officials in the Deccan, a royal farmān was sent.

The 'Ādil Shāhī diplomatic correspondences were sent through special envoys. The special envoy personally presented the communique at the Court of the receiving State in the absence of resident Bijapurī envoy. But in the presence of the latter, the carrier-envoy passed on the letter, with the presents etc., to

to the resident envoy, who in turn use to present it in the Court. Secret matters were not mentioned in the letter, but in it was mentioned that the special envoy will also communicate verbally some important matter for consideration and negotiations. The envoys were authorised to make verbal negotiations and settle problems, disputes, alliances and counter-alliances. Verbal negotiations were very common during post-war period for the settlement of peace-treaty. Moreover, due to lack of fast communications, the Bijapurī envoys were given absolute power to negotiate treaties etc. Thus the verbal negotiations very often created external policy.

Negotiations were at various official levels but also at summit meetings between the Sultans, frequently with their counter parts. The Sultans, almost at the end of every war met at a summit conference and resolved their conflict and disputes.

Diplomatic Sanctions

The diplomatic sanctions which Bijapur practised were in the nature of recognition and non-recognition of any political change in other States. The types of recognitions were de facto and de jure. The diplomatic sanctions were either formal document or an oral declaration.

The de jure recognition was that whenever any change in the Government or the ruler occurred in the other State the 'Ādil Shahs made a formal recognition by a diplomatic action. This they did by deputing a special envoy or a plenipotentiary with formal letter of recognition, compliments, praise and best wishes for the future. While the de facto recognition was the acceptance of the new political or ideological change as an inevitable, with or without an official statement of recognition.

Treaties, Contracts and Agreements

The treaties which Bijapur made with other States were of four types — Oral and Written treaties, Contracts and Agreements. They were motivated by either military alliance, peace, or commerso-economic purpose.

As per the custom and practice of the medieval times Bijapur too made oral and secret treaties with other States. Wars were concluded and peace was made on the basis of the verbal agreements among the Deccan Sultans or their officials. Territory was ceded or acquired on the basis of the verbal treaties. And at the same time, peace was broken and wars declared on the breach of the verbal treaties. They were both political and military in nature. The verbal treaties were bilateral and multi-lateral.

The written treaties of Bijapur which has come down to us are only those with the Mughals and the Europeans. The treaties with the Mughals were unilateral and political in nature. While those made with the Europeans were bilateral, less political and more economic in nature. The Bijapur—Portuguese treaties were termed as "Contracts" ("Contrados"). Protocols preceded before the signing of treaties and were later on ratified.

The treaties with the Portuguese were drafted and signed at Goa. The practice followed was that, for this purpose, a plenipotent envoy was deputed by Bijapur to Goa who negotiated and settled the terms of the treaty at his own authority and discretion and under his seal. The draft treaty was later on sent to Bijapur for ratification and on its return a special ratification ceremony was held at Goa, then the treaty came in force.

Persuation, Compromise and Diplomatic Pressure

The basic technique of Bijapur's diplomacy was an endeavour to persuade rulers or representatives of other states through inducements and appeals to reason, friendly or matrimonial attachment, magnanimity, self interest, pride or even fear. This the Bijapuris did through manipulation against their own enemies. They tried to instil in the minds of others thoughts that evoked favourable response. It was the technique of persuation and mutual compromise that enable the Deccan Sultans to form and break frequent alliances and counter-alliances. Formal approaches by the Sultan, his minister and nobles was often supplemented by informal conversation with receptions, cocktail parties dinners, etc., in order to achieve the goal for which the Government spent lavishly.

When the ordinary forms of persuation alone were not sufficient to achieve the desired ends, Bijapur brought on to play inducements and diplomatic pressures, in various forms through direct and indirect means.

Duplicity, Bluff and Coercion. Duplicity

Deceit and duplicity were traditional characteristics of medieval Deccan politics; and Bijapur was not an exception. These were in fact the recognised and accepted techniques of the diplomacy of medieval times. Bluff involving coercion was not uncommon in Bijapur's diplomacy.

Threat to attack and ultimatums were the part of doubl e dealings by Bijapur and other Deccan Kingdoms. Each tried to play or outmoot the other. At times, though there were no aggressive designs yet, show of military strength was a part of duplicity.

Espionage

It was one of the common practice of diplomacy among the Deccan kingdoms during the medieval times. Every State, of which Bijapur was not an exception, appointed special staff for spying between the Deccan kingdom. This helped in knowing the activities of the enemies not only during war times but during peace times. Espionage was more active during the war times and they were also employed to find out the position of the provisions in the enemy camp, which dictated the terms of war and peace. Due to lack of fast moving transport and communications, the armies took months or quite a considerable time to start on expedition, as such espionage were very effective in bringing news of the impending danger and thus facilitated advance preparation to meet the challange.

Use of threat of force in the Background of Negotiations

Show of military power was a part of diplomacy. The use of forces short of war was invoked by Bijapur on many occasions, as an accompaniment to diplomacy when other techniques failed to provide the desired protection and satisfaction. Occasionally or rather often, show of large Bijapur forces, was used to compel the enemies from any aggressive designs, or to settle a treaty on favourable terms or to hold in check a powerful neighbour from casting envious eyes on a weaker ally of Bijapur or in exacting tribute from the South Indian feudatories. Force was the main factor in shaping Bijapur's external relations.

Good offices and Mediation

Very often Bijapur offered its good offices to help and

resolve the disputes among the Deccan Kingdoms. It did succeed, on several occasions in finding a basis for an amicable settlements between her neighbours. The key to the success of Bijapur as a mediator in the Deccan politics was partly due to its astuteness in closing the gaps between the positions of the parties and in suggesting acceptable grounds of accommodations. But very often while mediating Bijapur diplomatically safeguarded its own interest and tried to accrue benefits from the settlements. It was Bijapur's key location which gave it a dominant position to play a role of mediator.

Conquests and Condominiums

Territorial acquisitions were one of the main and most active instruments by which Bijapur implemented its external policies.

During the medieval times the term "Conquest" had double meaning - the territories which were conquerred and directly absorbed within kingdom and governed by the Bijapur officials were called conquests; while the territories of petty Rajas, Nayaks etc., which were subdued and compelled to acknowledge overlordship of 'Ādil Shah, but their territories were left to them to govern on payment of annual tribute were also called "conquest". Territories so acquired by both the mode of conquests were included as part of the Bijapur kingdom.

It was by the second mode of conquests that Bijapur was able to extend its dominions rapidly from Arabian sea to Bay of Bengal in the 17th century.

Payment of annual tribute by feudatories to Bijapur was compulsory. Failing to pay tribute was an invitation to military

action by Bijapur to reimpose their authority.

The policy of condominiums for acquiring south Indian territories of the former Vijayanagar kingdom proved to be most successful. More so because of the inability of 'Ādil Shah to directly govern the far flung provinces of the kingdom. So, they were satisfied with annual tribute, in cash and kind and left the newly acquired territory on acknowledgement of 'Ādil Shah's sovereignty. Such condominiums, owed sovereignty to both 'Ādil Shah and the local Chief or the Nayak.

Economic Actions

The policy objectives of Bijapur lying behind the use of economic actions as an instrument of external relations, were not always economic, but the means were economic. Some of the goals of Bijapur's external policy were directed to be economic - for securing requirements through the expansion of trade. It was the economic needs that dictated and shaped the external policy of Bijapur in relation to the Portuguese in particular and other Europeans in general. Thus, ipso facto Bijapur's relationship with the Europeans (for its maritime trade) was economic. The instruments for the policies of Bijapur pertaining to the external trade were; agreements, tariffs, quantitative controls and directed trade etc.

Armed Forces

Bijapur adopted recourse to military force as the final arbitrator in conflicts. Military power formed an integral part of the backdrops of Bijapur's external affairs. The external policy and supporting programmes of Bijapur were materially

concerned with the military instrument of policy. The entire strategy of Bijapur's external policies rested on its military power. It alone dictated the terms in war and peace. Specially in relation to Deccan politics, the military instrument was used by Bijapur for two general purposes — to influence the external environment and to enhance its internal stability. Thus, Bijapur in Deccan politics used its forces as a backdrop to strengthen diplomacy, as an instrument for a show of force, and for active military operations. Bijapur's military strategy was inseparable from other types of instruments of policy — diplomatic, economic and psychological.

Matrimonial Alliances

Matrimonial alliances among the Deccan Sultans and with the Mughals were one of the strongest instruments of diplomacy adopted by Bijapur. Though, at times they proved very useful and had the desired effect yet, some times the Deccan Sultans disregarding the matrimonial alliances made wars on each other.

On occasions, to save a certain crisis and political situation Bijapur entered into matrimonial alliances. By this system the 'Ādil Shahs established dynastic relationship with the Bahmanis, the Mughals and with almost all the five contemporary Deccan Sultanates.

(B) Diplomatic Usage

During the period of the evolution of the Bijapur kingdom (1489-1536) and after its full independence the 'Ādil Shahs exercised their right of legation (droit de legation) and exchanged envoys with other states.

Following the traditions of the Persian diplomacy the diplomatic agents of Bijapur were called Ilchī, Safīr, Vakīls, Rasūlān, Ḥājib etc., all meaning an ambassador. Their functions were called as Ilchīgirī, Sifārat, Vakālat, Risālat, Ḥujjābat.

The Bijapurī envoys to other Courts were in the nature of permanent, Resident, visiting, ordinary, and extraordinary according to the purpose. On several occasions, time factor or the duration of the stay of Bijapurī envoys at other Court was not the criterion. Moreover, the leave for the envoy depended not on him or the ruler whom he was representing but on the ruler of the Court he was attending. The 'Ādil Shah's detained ambassadors to their court for years. The number of envoys was not restricted. Envoys were sent in rapid succession. Even before the return of one envoy sent earlier on a particular mission, another envoy, with a different mission was despatched.

Besides the special envoys, 'Ādil Shahs sent visiting ambassadors annually on the day of Nauroz to the Mughal Court and/or to the Court of the Mughal Viceroy of the Deccan with special offerings (peshkash) and gifts. It was a regular feature for 'Ādil Shahs to send diplomatic envoys, with rich presents to the Mughal Court.

The Bijapuri envoys or ambassadors enjoyed complete representative character. As they were the only means through whom 'Ādil Shahs could communicate with other rulers. They were authorised by 'Ādil Shah to negotiate peace, treaties, and ratify treaties.

There were five kinds of missions on which 'Ādil Shahs deputed their envoys:

Ordinary Missions - The usual permanent missions were rare in the medieval times. Sometimes Bijapur had permanent mission at some courts.

Regular Missions - The vakil sent annually to the Mughal Court on the Nauroz day with the peshkash, gifts etc.

Special Missions - When the envoys were deputed to condole the death of a monarch and to congratulate the new sovereign on his accession. This practice was very common among the Deccan Sultans.

Political Missions - They were to negotiate peace or war, signing of a treaty, ratification of a treaty, for the formation of an alliance and counter-alliance - a very common feature among the Deccan Sultans.

Secret Missions - These were usually politico-diplomatic in nature. They were sent to form either an alliance or counter-alliance.

The 'Ādil Shāhī envoys to the Courts of other States always carried a letter of credence. The letter not only introduced the envoy but also gave full details of the purpose of the mission. Sometimes it carried authorisation empowering the envoy to negotiate any matter relating to an alliance, treaty etc., on behalf of Bijapur government. The letter of credence were peculiar in nature. They were valid only for the particular envoy and the mission for which it was meant. In some cases, the letter of credence gave full power (Plein Pouvoir) to negotiate a treaty or ratification of the previous treaty. It also authorised the envoy to make some secret verbal communication on behalf of the ruler and carry back verbal reply.

Diplomatic pass-port to the diplomatic agent of other states was issued by 'Ādil Shah in the form of a farmān. Without this,

the envoy could not proceed further into the Bijapur territory from the point of entry. The 'Ādil Shāhī farmān also provided instructions to the Bijapur officials for the safe conduct of the ambassador during his journey to the court and back.

The arrival of embassies, specially from foreign countries, was a matter of great importance to the 'Ādil Shahs. For, it signified the recognition of their position and status. Further embassies were anticipated and welcomed by the 'Ādil Shah on his accession, as it meant recognition of his succession.

Ambassadors were warmly welcomed and were received cordially with usual honours. They were accorded reception at several points on his journey to the court. A special officer was appointed by 'Ādil Shah to go ahead to meet the ambassador and conduct him to the Capital. 'Ādil Shāhī farmān was issued to the officials of the provinces through which the ambassador was to pass, for his reception. In certain cases nobles were sent forward from the Court to receive the envoy at the frontier and accompany him to the Bijapur. In some cases of an special ambassadors (who was certainly an ordinary man compared to 'Ādil Shah) but the 'Ādil Shah himself went a few miles outside the city of Bijapur.

In spite of showing such an honour, the 'Ādil Shahs rarely granted audience to any ambassador immediately on his arrival at Bijapur. A date was fixed, according to the will of 'Ādil Shah, for the audience of the ambassador.

For the ambassador a good house was choosen in Bijapur for his lodging. Sometimes he was allowed to stay with leading court official. The Ambassador, during his stay in Bijapur, was treated as a royal guest; and a large part, sometimes entire, expenses of the ambassa-

dor were defrayed by the 'Ādil Shah.

The Ḥājib or Lord Chamberlain of Bijapur was the link between the 'Ādil Shah and the outside world. It was his duty to introduce ambassadors and other persons to the Sultan.

Every ambassador was required to offer salutation to the Sultan. After the salutation and a brief conversation between the envoy and the Sultan, the next thing was the delivery of the credential letter or a Royal Letter or a farmān (in the case of the Mughals). The normal custom at the 'Ādil Shāhī Court was for the ambassador to hand over the letter to one of the nobles in attendance, who would then place it in the Sultan's hands. An exception was made in the case of the Persian and Mughal ambassadors from whom the Sultan condescend to accept the Royal Letter directly. The letter was usuallyread by some official of the Court in the presence of all. Secret communique was read privately by the Sultan. After the reading of the letter the audience generally ended in the Sultan giving a note of honour and a reward in cash and kind to the ambassador which the latter received with cremonial salutations.

An ambassador to Bijapur was expected to return to his State as soon as the purpose of the mission was over. The letter of Credence almost invariably included a request for the ambassador's early dismissal. However, leave to depart depended on the will of 'Ādil Shah. The latter considered an insult and disgrace to grant leave immediately.

The period of stay for the permanent or resident ambassador was not limited. At Bijapur, the Deccan Kingdoms were usually represented by resident ambassadors. Bijapur reciprocated this

gesture by appointing permanent ambassador at the Courts of the Deccan rulers and at Portuguese-Goa.

'Ādil Shahs were fond of conferring rich rewards lavishly on ambassadors of other States. This wasthe routine practice with a view to enhance their reputation and to please the ambassadors in order that they carried good opinion to their monarchs.

On arrival of ambassadors at Bijapur, their return was not at their discretion nor on that of the Court they represented but depended on the 'Ādil Shah. A date for the dismissal was to be approved by 'Ādil Shah beforehand. On the appointed date the ambassador had to present himself before 'Ādil Shah or the Regent. On this day the Sultan honoured the ambassador with special robes, presents for him and for his ruler, and sent any communication written or verbal, through him.

Besides the political missions, 'Ādil Shahs not only received but also reciprocated semi-diplomatic missions. They were in the nature of individuals or religious groups, travellers and traders.

During the times of strained relations due to hostilities or in anticipation of declaration of hostilities Bijapurī ambassadors were recalled from the Courts they were stationed. Sometimes during the hostilities, the ambassador of the hostile state resided at Bijapur and had audience with 'Ādil Shah in order to settle the conflict. Usually during the times of strained relations 'Ādil Shah treated the ambassadors of the hostile state with contempt and insult. However, 'Ādil Shahs never tried to insult or ill-treat the Mughal ambassadors during the times of hostilities.

The formulation and implementation of Bijapur's external policies was the result of a wide variety of facts, attitudes,

circumstances and were subject to traditions, geo-political and ideological interpretations domestic milieu etc., and whims and fancies of the person or faction at the helm of affairs at the Court. The mechanists of all these factors were both advantageous as well as handicaps for the policy formulation and implementation, thus necessitating deviation from maintaining any consistancy and adhering to any fixed principles of the external relations. Throughout her history of external affairs, as will be evident from the following chapters, Bijapur's external policy was inextricably tied with domestic issues and ideological trends. External affairs were not only political relations but were socio-economic, religious, ideological, psychological etc., as well. The external affairs were not only related to the domestic milieu of the kingdom that created external affairs, but were also influenced by the external currents and pressures from outside the kingdom.

As will be evident, Bijapur never evaluated and developed any basic policies deliberately. 'Adil Shahs basic policy was territorial aggrandisement and monetary gains. Throughout, Bijapur's decisions of policy were quick, tactical and without permanency. All fast-moving inter-statal events of the Deccan Goa politics were metted swiftly and were setteled swiftly to give a new shape to its new policies, motivated by fresh interests etc. Thus, consistancy in any actions were never found. There were no rigid principles of Bijapur's external policies.

———

CHAPTER III

THE 'ĀDIL SHĀHĪS AND THE BAHMANĪS
(1489-1536)

RELATIONS DURING THE EVOLUTION OF THE BIJAPUR KINGDOM

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan, Maḥmūd Gāwān and Sultan Muḥammad III

Yūsuf Bēg Turkmān,[1] who migrated from Turkey and Persia to the Deccan in 1461, entered the Bahmanī service as a personal attendant of Sultan Muḥammad III. Later on, the Bahmanī Wazīr Maḥmūd Gawan adopted him as his son. Yūsuf's upright conduct, conscientious discharge of duties and winning ways caused delight to the Sultan and he was granted a manṣab of three hundred and the jagir of Gogi with its administration. His loyal service earned him the title of "'Ādil Khān" and a manṣab of one thousand. And he was enrolled among the Bahmanī amīrs.[2]

---

1. Munajjim Bashī, an Ottoman historian ascribes Turkmān origin ("Turkmanul-asl") to Yūsuf Beg - Jami-ud-Duval, cited by Prof. Hikmat Ertaylan: 'Adil Şahiler, 3. The claim of Indo-Persian historians that Yūsuf Beg was a descendent of Ottoman Sultan Murād II is spurious. This claim is also not upheld by another Turkish historian - Halil Edlem: Duwel-i Islamiyya, 495, cited by Ertaylan, loc.cit. Further, Yūsuf Bēg's name does not find place in the detailed genealogy of Murād II, by a modern authority - Dr. A.D. Alderson: The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, 112, 161 (Genealogical Table XXVI).

2. Ferishta, II, 5; Basātīn, 14 f.

In 1472 Yūsuf was appointed Sarlashkar of Daulatābād and was granted manṣab and royal robes of the highest rank of the Bahmani Court. His position was further enhanced when he conquered the territories of Virakhera and Antur,[3] from the Maratha chiefs. Being highly pleased by Yūsuf's success the Sultan granted to him the conquered territory as jagir. On his return to the capital he was accorded a royal reception by the Sultan and ordered Gāwān to entertain Yūsuf as his guest in his house for a week. The Sultan also attended the feast, held in honour of Yūsuf, at the residence of Gāwān. Further, Yūsuf was appointed as Ṭarafdār of Daulatābād.[4]

Yusuf succeeded Gāwān, after the latter's death, as leader of the Āfāqī party. Considering his loyal service and great influence he exercised over the Āfāqī nobles, the Sultan Muḥammad honoured him in 1481, by conferring the titles of "Majlis-i Rafī'" and "Malik-al-Sharq",[5] and appointing him as Ṭarafdār of Bijapur province.[6]

Based on this Bahmanī province of Bijapur which Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan held it as jagir and governed it on behalf of Bahmanī Sultan that he developed it scrupulously but gradually, into an autonomous rule and then carved out the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom, which, with the extinction of the Bahmanī Kingdom became automatically independent. During the transitional period - 1489 to 1536, when the Bahmanī

---

3. Virakhera and Antur are in Aurangābād district situated about 19°58' N. 75°57' E. and 20°27' N. 75°15' E. respectively.

4. Ferishta II,5
   Bahmanīs, 318 f.

5. Basātīn, 15; Burhān, 156, 204, 205; King, 136 f., 142.

6. Ferishta, II, 5.

Kingdom was fast approaching dissolution, the sovereignty of the Bahmanī Sultan over the province of Bijapur got slowly transferred to Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan and his successors, as they became more and more autonomous on all matters and acted independently, without the consent of the Sultan or his government at the centre.

Among the Bahmanī governors, the first to become independent was Malik Aḥmad Baḥrī of Ahmadnagar. Then he sent envoys to Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan and Fatḥullāh 'Imādī, persuading and insisting them to declare independence from the Bahmanī rule, and introduce Khuṭbah, coins and other insignia of royalty in their own names. Eventually it was agreed between them to declare independence and adopt royal practices of a sovereign. Consequently, the three Bahmanī governors — Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan, Malik Aḥmad Baḥrī and Fathullāh 'Imādī, in the year 895/1489, replaced in their respective provinces, the name of the Bahmanī Sultan in the Khuṭbah by their own names and held the royal Chatr over their heads.[8] Thus they assumed virtual independence.

However, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan did not assume royal title "Shah" or "Sultan".[9] Nor he issued coins with his name. The Bahmanī coins were still legal tender in Bijapur.[10]

---

7. The evolution of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty and Kingdom is in accordance with the principles described by Ibn Khaldūn: The Muqaddimah (Eng.Trans. by Frauz Rosenthal, 130 ff.).

8. Ferishta, I, 712. At another place (II, 6) Ferishta gives the date of Yūsuf's independence as "895 or 896"/1489-90. Sir Ghulām Yazdani places the event in 1490 - Journal of Hyderabad Archaeological Society, 1918, 89 ff. Since the year 895 extends over 1490, it is also acceptable. However, exact date is not recorded.

9. Though Ferishta clearly mentions that Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan changed title from "Khan" to "Shah" yet, it is not acceptable, as it is not confirmed by epigraphical and numismatic evidences.

10. Dr. I.H. Ghauri: "Kingship in the Sultanate of Bijapur and Golconda", Is.Cl., Jan., 1972, 42.

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan's Bijapur Kingdom at its birth extended from river Bhīma ("Bhura") to Bijapur and from river Krishna to Raichur.[11]

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan - Vassal of the Bahmanī Sultan

From 1489, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan ruled independently in the Bahmanī province of Bijapur, which became his hereditary dynastic kingdom. Without the consent of the Sultan or his court, Yūsuf not only invaded other kingdoms but also subdued the territory under the jurisdiction of the Sultan. At the same time he also defended his own territory. He exercised the right of legation (droit de legation) and exchanged envoys with other states.

However, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan did not sever relations with the Sultan of the parent kingdom, but on the contrary maintained good relations and continued to send annual presents to him. He remained loyal to the Bahmanī house and mentioned the name of Sultan Maḥmūd Shah as the reigning sovereign in the inscriptions on the buildings and formal documents.[12] Obviously implying that he acknowledged the suzerainty of Bahmanī Sultan and ruled over Bijapur as his vassal. And, as a loyal vassal, he obeyed and rendered help to the Sultan on several occasions. Irrespective of the full independence he enjoyed, both in the internal and external affairs of Bijapur, he respected the person of the Sultan.[13] The reason

---

11. Ferishta, II, 6.

12. Ghulam Yazdani: "Inscriptions of Shahpur, Gogi and Sagar, Gulbarga District" - Epigraphia, (1931-32), 19, fn. 1.

13. H.K. Sherwani: "Independence of Bahmani Governors" - P.I.H.C. (9th Session), 1945, 159-62.

for this attitude was that his efforts for self-determination and independent actions were prompted not so much by dissatisfaction towards the Bahmanī dynasty, for which he entertained sentiments of loyalty and affection, but because loyalty to the Sultan became no more than subservience to an ambitious Barīdī minister.[14] The loyalty is further evident from another instance when, after introducing his name in the Khuṭba, he became aware that it was a mark of disrespect to the Sultan, he reinstated Sultan Maḥmūd's name in the Khuṭba, to suit the exigencies of time.[15]

Thus, in persuance of the policy outlined above, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan enlightened the Sultan, through a letter, about the rebellious activities of Malik Dīnār Dastūr-i Mamālik. Yūsuf offered to quell the rebillion in concert with the Sultan. Consequently, the Sultan, in 1492, marched out with his army and nobles. He was joined by the contingent of Yūsuf, who made obeisance to the Sultan at the camp. On Sultan's orders Yūsuf commanded the right wing of the Bahmanī army. After the battle, when Malik Dīnār was captured as a prisoner, Yūsuf interceded for his release. Yūsuf, in the presence of several nobles, placed "his head on the ground of submission," and entreated the Sultan to pardon Malik Dīnār. The Sultan obliged Yūsuf and pardoned Dīnār.[16]

---

14. Khaja Muhammad Ahmad: "Inscriptions of Raichur in the Hyderabad Museum" - Epigraphia, (1939-40), 11.

15. Bahmanis, 392.

16. Burhan, 145 f.; King, 124 ff.

In 1493-94, after the campaign against Bahādur Gīlānī, while the Sultan was passing through the territory of Bijapur, Yūsuf sent a deputation of a few nobles to wait on the Sultan with a request to visit Bijapur. The Sultan readily accepted the invitation. At Bijapur the Sultan was received right-royally by Yūsuf. He showed great hospitality throughout the ten days of the Sultan's stay at Bijapur. He presented rare and valuable articles to the Sultan. And, at the time of Sultan's departure, Yūsuf gave him secretly fifty thousand hun.[17]

In June 1500, when the Sultan summoned Yūsuf (along with other nobles), the latter complied with the orders and marched to the capital Bidar. He participated in the siege of Ausa, which was defended by Barīd-i Mamālik and his men.[18]

In the following year, when Barīd-i Mamālik had seized the entire power of the Bahmanī government all the nobles of the Kingdom got disgusted and wished to bring to an end the anarchy. Thus, in 1501, most of the nobles, including Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan, united together for the extermination of the Barīdī rule and marched to Bidar. But, due to the intercession of the Sultan, the nobles came to an understanding and settled the differences amicably.[19]

At the same time a conference was held among the nobles and the Sultan in which it was decided that: every year all the nobles should attend the Sultan at the court; that a joint campaign against

---

17. Ferishta, II, 10; King, 131, 134.

18. King, 136.

19. ibid., 137.

Vijayanagar be undertaken; and as per the adivce of Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan, twenty thousand horses be added to the jagir of Malik Quṭbul Mulk. After the conference Yūsuf returned to Bijapur.[20]

In accordance with the above plan the Sultan, in the middle of the year 908/1502 started for the campaign of Vijayanagar. And according to the terms of the agreement Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan joined the Sultan with his contingent. After the successful conclusion of the campaign, the Sultan granted the territory of Rāichūr and Mudgal to Yūsuf, which was recently conquered from Vijayanagar.[21]

With the usurpation of absolute authority by Barīd-i Mamālik in 909/1503, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan came to the rescue of the Bahmanī Sultan. Yūsuf formed an alliance with other nobles and marched to Bidar against Barīd-i Mamālik. When they arrived near Bidar, the Sultan nolens volens resolved upon war with them, and hoisting his standards endeavoured to repel the hostile army. In an encounter the Barīdī army was defeated leading to the flight of Barīd-i Mamālik. On hearing this news, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan was delighted, and hastened to wait on the Sultan. The Sultan presented Yūsuf with a special robe of honour. After paying homage, Yūsuf returned to Bijapur.[22]

In order to strengthen his position and gain priority over other nobles, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan thought it prudent to establish matrimonial relationship with the Bahmanī house, by giving his daughter Bībī Sittī to the infant Crown Prince Aḥmad. Accordingly, early in the year 909/1503-4, Yūsuf made the proposal to the Sultan in a letter. The Sultan readily and heartily accepted the

---

20. idem.
21. King, 138; Further Sources, III, 179.
22. King, 139.

proposal. Then the Sultan and Yūsuf marched towards Gulbarga for the betrothal ceremony. But as the age of the bridegroom was only four years and that of bride three years, the question of the latter accompanying to the house of the former was postponed for six years.[23]

But the auspicious occasion of marriage was marred by the perennial strife between Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan and Barīd-i Mamālik. Yūsuf's demand to possess Gulbarga, Aland, Gangāwatī and Kalyānī, so that his territory might become contiguous with those of the Sultan, sparked the animosity of Barīd-i Mamalik and led to hostilities. In this conflict, the Sultan, on account of the new matrimonial relationship sided with Yūsuf. The hostilities lasted for three months, at the end of which Yūsuf emerged victorious. This heightened the status of Yūsuf so much that the Sultan would not take a seat in the presence of the former.[24]

Bitter animosity between Yūsuf and Dastūr Dīnār still persisted. And in 1504, the former unable to cope up with the combined armies of Barīd-i Mamālik and Aḥmad Baḥrī, fled and took refuge with the Sultan. The latter entirely forbade Yūsuf to quarrel with Barīd-i Mamālik. Thus admonished, Yūsuf in accordance with the orders of the Sultan, made a friendly compact with Barīd-i Mamālik.[25]

The introduction of Shī'ah faith by Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan in 911/1506 for the first time in the Deccan annoyed Sultan Maḥmūd very much. And when he was petitioned by the leading 'Ulemās, theologians and other nobles for help in defending the Sunnī doctrine,

---

23. King, 139 f.; Bahmanis, 377.
24. idem.
25. King, 140 f.

he in conjunction with Amīr Barīd, Aḥmad Niẓāmul-Mulk and Quṭb Shah, made preparations for a religious war against Yūsuf. In the meanwhile, the Sulṭan sent an ultimatum to Yūsuf to stop the innovation. When the armies of the Sultan and other nobles were ready to march against Yūsuf, the latter, finding his position untenable fled to Berar and thence to Khāndēsh. He was pursued by the Sultan up to Kalam, in Berar. But on being reprimanded by 'Imādul-Mulk of Berar and persuaded to give up the Shī'ah creed, Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan complied with the wise counsel and issued orders to his agent at Bijapur to discontinue the Shī'ah Khuṭbah and reinstate the Sunnī Khuṭbah.[26] Thus, the ultimatum of the Sultan had a profound impact in deviating Yūsuf, at least publicly, from his leanings towards Shī'ah faith. But the incident proved Yūsuf's dual allegiance to two different rulers. He owed nominal political sovereignty to Bahmanī Sultan and religious allegiance to the Shah of Iran.

Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan died early in 916/1510.

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan and Sultan Maḥmūd

When Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan succeeded his father Sultan Maḥmūd conferred the title of "'Ādil Khan" and the province of Bijapur on him; and also settled on him a quarter (sawa) of the Kingdom of the Deccan, which had been entrusted earlier to Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan.[27]

This introduced unprecedented relationship. The Sultan, due to his weakness and growing power of the virtually independent vassal Ismā'īl thought it prudent to accept the hereditary succes-

---

26. Basātīn, 20 f.; Ferishta, II, 20; King, 141 f.

27. Burhān, 161; King, 142.

sion at Bijapur. This political wisdom assured the Sultan the loyalty of Ismā'īl and consolidated his position.

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan reciprocated this gesture by acknowledging the suzerainty of the Sultan. He accorded the highest position of the Khalīfa[28] to the Sultan and considered himself as his wazīr. In an Arabic inscription[29] on the Fatḥ Burj (Bastion of Victory) at Rāichūr (then within Ismā'īl's jurisdiction) dated 921/1515 it is recorded that it was constructed during the "Khilāfat of Sultan Maḥmūd al-Bahmanī ---" and during the time when (Ismā'īl) "'Ādil Khan son of 'Ādil Khan, was the Minister."[30]

Similar reference to the Khilāfat of Sultan Maḥmūd and wizarat of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan are found in the inscription of a mosque recording its construction in 1515.[31]

---

28. Here Khalīfa and Khilāfat are used in its secondary sense of 'sovereignty' and not in its primary sense — the sovereign head of the entire Muslim world and the Vice-regency of God.
29. Epigraphia (1939-40), op.cit., 6.
30. The relevant text reads:

عهد خلافة السلطان الاعظم شمس الدنيا والدين محمود شاه البهمنى
ووزارة الخان الاكرم مجلس الرفيع عادل خان بن العادل خان الغازى

31. Epigraphia (1939-40), op.cit., 15; Dr. Nazim: Bijapur Inscriptions, 26 (Inscription No.3256, Plate I). The relevant text reads:

اين مسجد در دور سلطان محمود شاه بن محمد شاه بهمنى بنا كرده خواجه سنبل نايب غيبت
عادلخانى شهور سن ثمان عشر وتسعمايه هجريه

Th 3562

However, Ismā'Īl 'Ādil Khan, in spite of owing nominal sovereignty to the Sunnī Sultan Mahmūd, got the Kalīmah inscribed according to the Shī'ah faith. The Kalīmah on the top panel of the Bastion of Victory reads: "Lā-Ilāhā Illallāh Muḥammadu'r Rasūl-Allāh 'Alī walī Allāh."[32] The last three words "'Alī walī Allāh"[33] are significantly of Shī'ah doctrine. Obviously, implying that Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan owed nominal political allegiance, like his father to the Bahmanī dynasty and for religious allegiance to Ṣafawid dynasty of Iran. But in spite of this division of loyalty and faith the Sultan did not take any action against Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan as was taken under similar circumstances during the times of Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan. Probably the Sultan was too weak to take any action this time.

On the contrary, Ismā'Īl 'Ādil Khan enjoyed considerable influence over the Sultan. At the former's entreaty the latter conferred the title of 'Imādul-Mulk on Malik 'Ālauddīn and granted him the province of Ellichpur. Further, the Sultan granted Shōlāpūr(Sandlapūr) to Kamāl Khan, regent and general of Ismā'Īl.[34]

In the year 1514, Ismā'Īl 'Ādil Khan along with several other nobles paid homage to the Sultan. At this moment, Amīr Barīd,

---

32. Epigraphia (1939-40), op.cit., 16. The relevant text reads:

لا الٰہ الا اللہ محمد رسول اللہ علی ولی اللہ

33. The same motto — "'Alī walī Allāh" is found on the Persian coin of Shāh Ismā'Īl Ṣafawī I - Sir Percy Sykes: A History of Persian, II, 158.

34. King, 142.

jealous of the growing power of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan, persuaded the Sultan to march against him. The two armies clashed at Alandpūr. Amīr Barīd took to flight at the end of the day, leaving behind the wounded Sultan and the Crown Prince Aḥmad.[35] Ismā'īl took the Sultan to Bijapur with utmost respect.

After a short stay at Bijapur the Sultan left for Bidar accompanied by a contingent of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan. It was on this occasion that Bībī Sittī was actually given away by Ismā'īl to be in attendance on the Sultan at Bidar, on his behalf as his deputy and to act as <u>wazīr</u> to the Sultan.[36]

The Sultan, while pardoning the offences of Dastūr Dīnār, interceded in the latter's conflict with Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan. Through a <u>farmān</u>, of the 1515, the Sultan directed Ismā'īl to settle the issue amicably. Ismā'īl, in compliance of the orders, reconciled with Dīnār.[37]

'Aẓmatul-Mulk, the deputy of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan and acting as <u>wazīr</u> of the Sultan, was instrumental at his own initiative, in bringing about the campaign against <u>Khudāwand Khan</u>. A <u>farmān</u> of the Sultan was issued in 1517, to all the nobles to march to the Capital with their contingents. Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan too complied with the orders of the <u>farmān</u>.[38]

<u>Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan and Aḥmad Shah, Walīyullāh, Kalīmullāh</u>

The successor of Sultan Maḥmūd was his son Aḥmad, the brother-in-law of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan. He ruled nominally as a

---

35. <u>Burhān</u>, 164; Briggs, II, 550.
36. King, 143 f.
37. <u>idem</u>.
38. <u>idem</u>.

puppet of the Prime Minister Amīr Barīd, for about two years. The Sultan was in closest grips of Amīr Barīd and had no liberty to do anything. On one occasion when the latter misbehaved with the former, the Sultan sent word to Ismā'īl, complainting the harsh treatment of his minister. Ismā'īl could only send costly presents with the ambassadors to the Sultan. But before the ambassadors could reach, the Sultan died on 15th December, 1520.[39]

Yet another puppet Sultan Walīyullah came to the Bahmanī throne. Though he ruled nominally from 1523 to 1526 as a puppet in the hands of Amīr Barīd, yet Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan acknowledged his suzerainty. He considered himself a mere "wazīr" of "Bādshāh Walīyullah", as recorded in two inscription of the year 931/1526 and 932/1526 from Sāgar. One inscription is regarding the commemoration of the erection of a mosque and the other is on a tablet fixed to the 'Āshūr Khāna.[40]

The last Sultan of the Bahmanī dynasty was Kalīmullāh, grandson of Yūsuf 'Ādil Khan. He was sovereign only in name and was not even permitted to leave the palace. Once in 1528, when the life of the Sultan was in danger, he fled to his uncle Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan. Ismā'īl received the Sultan honourably in hopes of using him as puppet and tool for personal gains. But the Sultan was dissatisfied with Ismā'īl's reception. The latter tried to confine the former. So the Sultan left Bijapur for Ahmadnagar.[41] Yet, in spite of the hopeless position of the Bahmanī Sultans, Ismā'īl did not assume royal title. The proofs of this spirit of loyalty is confirmed by all the epigraphs of his reign, in which he is only

---

39. Ferishta, I, 727; Bahmanis, 415.
40. Epigraphia (1931-32); op.cit., 18 f.
41. Ferishta, I, 729; Bahmanis, 417.

mentioned as "'Ādil Khan".

Mallū 'Ādil Khan, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Khan and Kalīmullāh Bahmanī

Though Mallū 'Ādil Khan, as a legal heir and according to the will of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan, succeeded the latter, yet a formal recognition of his succession by the Bahmanī Sultan Kalīmullāh, was not made. The Sultan did not confirm the Government of Bijapur on Mallū 'Ādil Khan nor granted any titles, as was done in the case of his father, Ismā'īl 'Ādil Khan. Epigraphs of Mallū 'Ādil Khan do not bear any titles.[42]

However, his successor Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Khan I, was granted the title of 'Majlis-i Rafī' 'Ādil Khan' by the Sultan, as recorded in an epigraph[43] of the year 943/1536. That is, even the fourth ruler of the dynasty owed allegiance, though nominal, to the Bahmanī Sultan and considered him as his sovereign. But Ibrāhīm appears to have assumed the royal title of "Shah"[44] either about the end of 943/1536 or early in the year 944/1537.

Obviously, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I assumed the royal title and became a full fledged sovereign only after the disappearance of Ilhāmullāh (son of Sultan Kalīmullāh) who was not proclaimed Sultan.

With this the Bijapur-Bahmanī relations came to an end. But the Bahmanī coins were legal tender in Bijapur even after the extinction of the Bahmanī rule.[45]

---

42. Epigraphia (1939-40), op.cit., 11.
43. Dr. Nazim, op.cit., 26 (Inscription 3251, Plate I).
44. Epigraphia, (1939-40), op.cit., 11.
45. Dr. I.A. Ghauri: "Central Structure of the Kingdom of Bijapur", Is. Cl., Jan., 1970, 30.

CHAPTER IV

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC WORLD

(A) BIJAPUR-IRAN[1] RELATIONS

SEC. I: FACTORS DETERMINING THE RELATIONS

Anthropological Relations and Āfāqī Demography

From the eight century onwards wave after wave of immigrants from 'Ajam (Persia and Central Asia) poured into India as a peaceful traders or proud conquerors. These immigrants slowly migrated to the Deccan parts of which later constituted the Bijapur Kingdom. Further, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the political situation in Persia deteriorated due to the Mongol devastation. Consequently, several thousands of peace-loving Persians fled to west coast of India and settled there or migrated to other parts. Again emigration took place due to the transfer of the capital from Delhi to Daulatābād by Muhammad bin Tughluq bringing in the nobility and the gentry consisting of Persians and Central Asian nationals to the Deccan.

---

1. For the purpose of our study, "Iran" or "Persia" implies present territory of Iran, Iraq and Persian Gulf islands. (See Encyclopaedia of Islam, III, 1038). For various independent Persian States existing at the end of the fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth century see f.n.14, infra.

Thus by the time the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty was founded in the late fifteenth century, the demographic structure of the Bijapur consisted of "Iranian race", which included not only Persians but also Afghans and others. The "Iranian Plateau" which extents over Persia, Baluchistan, Afghanistan and eastern portion of the Asia Minor etc. is the domain of the "Iranian race".[2] The 'Ādil Shāhī nobility and the upper strata of the population, besides Turks, were Persians and Indo-Afghans, who were ethonologically Aryans, and constituted the bulk of the Bijapur army. In 1529 Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah formed an army of ten thousand cavalry consisting of Persians, Arabs, Turks, Uzbegs, Kurds etc.[3] The Kurds and Armenians too belong to the Iranian race.[4] And by 1660, the Afghans formed more than one-half of the army of Bijapur.[5]

Though the demographic structure of Bijapur consisted of various types of Iranian race, of one single ethnological family but, they differed slightly in their cranial morphology.[6] The Indo-Afghans were dolichocephalic and leptrorhine, while the Persians were sub-dolichocepholic.[7]

---

2. W.B. Fisher (ed.): The Cambridge History of Iran, I, 5; Eugene Pittard: Race and History, 360.
3. Briggs, III, 34.
4. Pettard, loc.cit.
5. Haft Anjuman, 105.
6. Pettard, loc.cit.
7. L.H. Dudley Buxton: The Peoples of Asia, 45; Pettard, op.cit., 360, 363.

   The most generally adopted criterian for racial classification is cephalic index: the percentage-ratio of head - breadth to head length. The skull in which the breadth is 80% or more is termed branchycephalic or short-head; when the ratio is 75% or less the skull is classified as dolichocephalic. Nasal index is also taken into consideration for the classification of the races. It is found by the breadth of the nose, measured by stradding the nostriles, in relation to its length. Leptrorhine is one of the four types of nasal openings. (V. Gorodon Childe: The Aryans, 97; Pittard, op.cit., X, 43-44.

Further, the Āfāqī emigrants who had settled permanently in Bijapur and Indians, that is, Perso-Aryans and Indo-Aryans emerged from a common racial stock and migrated from a common homeland, sharing common linguistic racial past and at one time they co-existed.[8] Thus, the Iranians and Indians are like two brothers, who, according to a Persian legend, had got separated from each other, one going to the east and the other to the west.[9] This racial affinity betweenn the Persians and the people of Bijapur persisted even centuries after migration and which was strengthen, time and again, by the periodical influx of immigrants from Persia and Central Asia.

Cultural Affinity

Bijapurī culture in particular and Indian culture in general was the result of a long fusion of endless ethnic unity. The idea of races in its formation has been varied, extensive and deep. Its innumerable incidents were drawn from different sources.

Iran and India being adjacent countries, have both been from the remote past a common ground of cultural activities of different branches of the Aryans; and they had maintained a fairly regular interchange of cultural values, which moulded their mutual lives in social, intellectual and religious spheres.[10] Thus, close cultural relationship between Iran and Bijapur existed through the ties of common blood of Āfāqīs, religious beliefs, ritual observances, customs and manners. And culture being complementary to trade, commercial relations between Bijapur and Iran provided

---

8. Childe, op.cit., 30-33, passim; Buxton, op.cit., 125.
9. Indo-Iranica, XVII (2) June 1964, 27.
10. T.N.Devare: A short History of Persian Literature, 1.

opportunities for mutual understanding, appreciation, interested influence. The indigenous ideas and attitudes, mixed with Persian thought and traditions formed the composite culture of medieval India in general and Bijapur in particular.[11]

With the introduction of Shī'ah religion almost simultaneously both in Iran and Bijapur the rulers of the latter looked to those of the former as a source of inspiration. The Shī'a practices at Bijapur naturally made it a replica of Persian culture. The Shī'ah relition gave a new set of ideas and social pattern. The Perso-Bijapur collaboration in political and religious affairs had its repercussions not only on cultural and intellectual activities of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans, but its impact penetrated deep into various aspects of life and society at Bijapur.

Commercial Factors

Several factors contributed to the deep interest shown by the Bijapurī traders in the Persian market. The easy accessibility of Persia by sea route from the Bijapurī ports was one of the factors.

Bijapur could get foreign horses only from Arabia Iraq and Persia. Owing to irregular and uncertain supply from Arabia and Iraq, Bijapur had to entirely depend on Persia for a regular supply of horses. It was an item of primary military importance for an efficient cavalry, without which Bijapur could not maintain its army. This necessity encouraged Bijapurī rulers to sustain and maintain economic ties with Persia in a determined manner. And due to Perso-Mughal conflict over Qandhar, the "ruler of Persia was

---

11. N.S. Gorekar: Indo-Iran Relations, 2.

happy to allow the export of horses (to Bijapur) which could be used in war against his foe."[12] The horse trade between Iran and Bijapur was carried on by the private Arab, Persian and Bijapurī merchants.[13] Moreover, in order to maintain their alien culture, the Āfāqī nobility, including the Persians required Persian articles of various description for their daily life. This necessitated regular naval trade between the two States, more so because Persia too needed various Indian articles, which were exported from the Bijapurī ports. The chief ports of Bijapur-Dabul and Chaul, were great commercial marts which had large trade with Persian Gulf and the Red-sea. And these goods exported from Bijapur to Persia found their way to Europe also.

SEC. II: POLITICAL RELATIONS

'Ādil Shahs and the Ṣafawīs

At the time of the founding of the Bijapur Kingdom in 1489 and up to 1501 Persia presented a chequered political scene. It was parcelled out into numerous Persian States, ruled by different rulers.[14] During this period (1489-1501) there seems to be neither

---

12. Surendra Gopal: "Aspects of Indo-Persian Trade in the 17th Century, P.I.H.C., 1969, 244.
13. Dr. P.M. Joshi: A History of Bijapur Kingdom, 78 f.
14. Ghulam Sarwar: History of Shah Ismā'īl Safawī, 43.
    The different independent Persian States at the end of fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth century were (1) Adharbaijān; (2) Persian Iraq and Fārs; (3) Arabian Iraq; (4) Diyār Bakr; (5) Yazd; (6) Khurāsān; (7) Abarqūh; (8) Kirman; (9) Kāshān; (10) Khwar, Simnān and Firuz-Kuh; (11) Gīlān; Lahijam— Sarwar, op.cit., 30-39 passim, 43.

any political nor diplomatic relations between Bijapur and the Persian States. However there existed cultural and commercial relations and there was a continuous flow of Persian emigrants to Bijapur, who were patronised by Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah.

Political and diplomatic relations between Iran and Bijapur were established after the accession of Shah Ismā'īl Ṣafawī to the throne of Azerbaijan in 1501. Then within a decade Shah Ismā'īl conquered and consolidated all the Persian States into one united State, ruled by a single Ṣafawī monarch.

The Vital Link — Shī'ah Ideology

Before coming to India, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, during his wanderings in Persia, about 854/1450-1 was taken to Ardabīl by Khwājā 'Imāduddīn. At Ardabīl Yūsuf was enrolled as disciple of the venerable Shaikh Ṣafīuddīn,[15] ancestor of Shah Ismā'īl of Iran and and from whom the Safawi dynasty took its name.[16]

Thus, both Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and Shah Ismā'īl being disciples of the same house had strong leanings towards Shī'ism, which became the basis for their political relations and formed the vital link between the two States.

Shah Ismā'īl, immediately after his accession to the throne of Azerbaijan introduced Shī'ism in Iran and got the Khuṭbah read in the name of the Twelve Imāms.[17]

While at Bijapur Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah being unaware of the happenings in Iran, called an assembly of his nobles in 908/1502 and proposed his long cherished desire to promulgate the faith of

---

15. Briggs, III, 2.
16. Percy Sykes: A History of Persia, II, 158.
17. Sarwar, op.cit., 39.

Imāmīyah and have the Khuṭbah read in the Shī'ah fashion. However due to the unwillingness of his powerful Sunnī nobles he deferred the idea temporarily.[18]

But, when the news arrived from Persia about the introduction of Shī'ism by Shah Ismā'īl, Yūsuf became elated and wished to follow in the foot-steps of the Ṣafawī monarch, as a disciple of that house.[19] Consequently, he took measures without delay, to accomplish his objective. In November 1502, Yūsuf himself went to the mosque of the Ark-fort, along with several nobles, and got the text of the Aẕ'an modified with the addition of the words - "'Alī Walī Allāh", and then caused the Khuṭbah to be read in the name of the Twelve Imāms[20] in exactly the same fashion Shah Ismā'īl did at Iran.[21] However, the dissatisfaction of powerful Sunnī nobles and diplomatic pressure of the neighbouring rulers, compelled Yūsuf to discontinue the innovation and restore the Sunnī practices. But as soon as both, the internal and external pressures faded out, he re-imposed Shī'ah doctrine. But this time he gave liberty to the public to practise whichever faith they wish, without any compulsion.[22]

During the infancy of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah, when Kamāl Khan was regent, the latter belonging to the Sunnī School gave an impetus to his own faith. In conformity with the old usage, he got in 1511, the Khuṭbah read in the name of the immaculate Caliphs.[23] Thus temporarily the vital link between Iran and Bijapur was broken.

---

18. Ferishta, II, 18 f; Basātīn, 19. 19. Ibid., II, 22.
20. idem. 21. Sarwar, loc.cit. 22. Basātīn, 21.
23. Basātīn, 27.

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah soon after assuming the reigns of the government reimposed the Shī'ah practices in 1514 and showed greater zeal for this creed than his father.[24] The background of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah's leanings towards Shī'ah ideology was the impact of his foster-aunt Dilshad Agha, a Persian lady of Shī'ah faith and who was instrumental in bringing Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah to power.[25]

In return for the small help which Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah rendered in getting release of Persian ambassador from Bidar, the Shah of Irān paid him glowing tribute in 1519, through a letter. The Shah very much appreciated the religious leadership of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah in sponsoring Shī'ism in Bijapur. Thus elated and encouraged Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah ordered for holding prayers for the longivity of Shah Ismā'īl Ṣafawī, on every Friday and 'Īd days; and this practice was strictly followed during the entire reign of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah, upto 1534.[26]

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah's efforts to popularise and maintain Shī'ism were relegated by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, on his accession in 1534. He suppressed the rituals of Imāmiyah and rejected the names of the Imāms from the Khuṭbah; and he restored officially the exercise of the Sunnī practices.

But, once again the ideological bond was re-established by 'Alī 'Ādil Shah (1557-80). On his very day of his coronation, he reinstated the Shī'ism as the State-creed of Bijapur. He modified the Aza'an according to the Shī'ah fashion; and while removing the names of the Caliphs from the Khuṭbah, he introduced those of the Imāms.[27]

'Alī did his best to propogate Shī'ism. He patronized at his court master minds of Irān, Tūrān, Kirmān and Khurāsān. And

---

24. ibid., 33.
25. Briggs, III, 24.
26. Briggs, III, 28.
27. Basātīn, 78.

about three hundred of these foreigners called Tabraiyan were appointed in the State services to abuse or vilify the Caliphs.[28] The curses against the Caliphs were uttered in the Sultan's presence, in the mosques, and at the public audiences. The Shī'a doctors were paid by the State for their missionary activities.[29]

Thus, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I re-established firmly Shī'ism. "Iyyāma-i Ma'ṣūmīn", which in the words of Shah Abbas I of Iran, was the vital link of Perso-Bijapur relations. Further, Shah Abbas I in a letter to 'Ādil Shah says that the Ṣafawī and 'Ādil Shāhī dynasties were one family of "Tyyabīn and Ṭaherīn".[30] The link was strengthen during the seventeenth century by 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II.[31]

Among the Sunnī rulers it was an orthodox belief to regard the 'Abbasid Khalīfa of Baghdād as the final authority and the legal sovereign of all the Islamic world. As such, it was generally considered expedient, to get legal sanctions of their rule from the Khalīfa. They held the view that a king could hold the title of Sultan only with a convenent between him and the Khalīfa.[32]

Likewise, the Shī'a rulers of the Deccan during the sixteenth and seventeenth century looked to the Ṣafawids of Persia for their link with Dār al-Islām.[33] The Shī'a rulers of Bijapur too sought

---

28. idem. 29. Briggs, III, 70. 30. Makātīb, 21(b)

31. Out of the nine rulers of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty, five — Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah, Mullū 'Ādil Shah, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II were definitely Shī'a.

32. T.W. Arnold: The Caliphate, 101 f.

33. 'Azīz Aḥmad: Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, 52.

recognition, patronage and guidance from the Ṣafawids.

As such, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah in 1509, sent Syed Aḥmad Harawī to Iran with presents and "declaration of attachment to Shah Ismā'īl Ṣafawī," due to his success in establishing Shī'ism at Bijapur.[34] But the recognition came about a decade later, in 1519, when Shah Ismā'īl in a letter sent through the Iranian ambassador Amīr Ibrāhīm Beg, addressed Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah with Royal titles: "Glory of the Kingdom, State and Majesty etc.,"[35] as an independent ruler. Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah highly gratified at the flattering acknowledgment of his sovereignty said that "now his dynasty got royal status."[36]

Immediately, Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah ordered for the recitation of prayers for the Ṣafawid dynasty in the Khuṭbah of Friday, 'Īd day etc.[37] Obviously, it implies that Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah has acknowledged the Ṣafawid monarch as the final authority and legal sovereign of Bijapur. He may be said to have established a convenent like that of Khalīfa. Further, 'Ādil Shah's going down twelve miles to receive the Iranian ambassador clearly indicates the acceptance of subordination, like a vassal or protectorate, of the Shah of Iran. Therefore, it may be inferred that "Bijapur appeared as if it was an extention of the Persian Kingdom ---."[38]

The existence of the theoritical and spiritual sovereignty of the Ṣafawids over the Shī'a rulers of Bijapur is further confirmed from a letter of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II of 1612, addressed to Shah Abbas I. In the letter, preserved in Makātīb-i Zamāna-i Ṣalāṭīn-i Ṣafawīyah, 'Ādil Shah writes that: it is "from the

---

34. Briggs, III, 17. 35. Briggs, III, 28. 36. idem.
37. idem. 38. Devare, op.cit., 72.

humblest slave Ibrāhīm to the exalted Emperor Shah Abbas --" and that "Deccan territories form as much as a part of Ṣafawī Empire as the provinces of Iraq, Fārs, Khurāsān and Azarbaijan. Accordingly, the names of the Ṣafawī monarchs have been recited in the (Friday) sermons and will continue to be recited in future. Our forefathers were appointed to rule over these territories and protect them by His Majesty's ancestors. So our function is to rule the countries on His Majesty's behalf and defend them against foreign aggression. And we would be as enthusiastic in performing our duties and rendering our service to His Majesty as other Governors and officials."[39] However, these considerations of 'Ādil Shah were absolutely theoritical and nominal, consistent with the traditions of the medieval times.

The case of Bijapur is analogous to that of Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century. Theoritically the Delhi Sultanate was a part of Abbasid Caliphate,[40] and as such an Arab traveller observed that a traveller could "pass from the confines of China to the Pillars of Herculas, from the banks of Indus to Cicilian Gates, from the Oxus to the shores of Atlantic, without stepping outside the boundaries of the territory ruled over by the caliph of Baghdād."[41] And in the fourteenth century Bahman Shah, the founder of the Bahmanī dynasty, acknowledged the theoritical supremacy of the Abbasid Caliphate and on the coins he styled himself as "right hand of Caliphate."[42]

---

39. Ṣafawīyyah, 404 ff.
40. K.A. Nizami: Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century, 84.
41. T.W. Arnold: "Arab Travellers and Merchants (1000-15000)" - Travel and Travellers of Middle Ages, 89. Percival Newton (ed).
42. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "The Bahmani Kingdom" - The Delhi Sultanate, VI, 257. Mahmud Ali: "Contribution of the Bahmani Kings to Indian Civilisation," P.I.H.C., 1941, 595.

Though the sovereignty of the Ṣafawids was only theoritical and nominal, yet the 'Ādil Shahs in practice did seek from them help, guidance and advice. Once in 1612, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, while seeking the advice of Shah Abbas I, on the Mughal-Bijapur relations, sought the latter's permission in the following words - "whether to send a Bijapurī ambassador to the Mughal court or not-- we would seek clarification in this matter, from the court and may act as directed."[43] This practice is corroborated from a letter of Shah Abbas I to Sultan Muḥammad Quṭb Shah of Golconda (1611-25). In the letter, the Shah says that "'Ādil Shāhī rulers always reported and consulted in an affectionate way, in every matter, as per the royal courtesy."[44]

However, the Safawids never expressed themselves, the opinion, that they were the sovereign authority of Bijapur. On the contrary, the Safawids treated 'Ādil Shahs as independent rulers, right from the times of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah.[45] In a letter of 1612, preserved in Jamī'ul-Murāsalat, Shah Abbas I prefixes honourific titles with the name of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, and he is addressed as an independent sovereign ruler.[46] But still, in the letter there is a touch of his (Shah Abbas') superiority (which was a fact) manifesting that he was the protector and benefactor of 'Ādil Shah and Bijapur.[47] This manifestation is corroborated by an independent authority Sir Thomas Roe, who wrote in 1616 that the "Persian King takes to heart the protection of the Kings of Deccan" (including 'Ādil Shah).[48]

---

43. Ṣafawīyyah, loc.cit. 44. Makātīb, 159. 45. Briggs, III,28.
46. Jamī'ul Murāsalat, 249(b) 47. idem
48. Purchas, IV, 449.

A unique feature of the Ṣafawid-Bijapur relationship was that Shah 'Abbās I, while holding the theoritical sovereignty of Bijapur, allowed the Mughal Emperor, Jahangir to exercise legal sovereignty of Bijapur. While advising Jahangir to make a peaceful settlement of Deccan affairs, without conquering the Deccan kingdoms Shah 'Abbās I, desired that Bijapur should be allowed to remain a tributory of the Mughals, on payment of annual tribute.[49] Thus, Bijapur formed a link between the Ṣafawids and the Mughals, the two of the three great empires of Dār al-Islām of the seventeenth century. This contributed to the unity of the Dār al-Islām of the period in the midst of diversity.[50]

SEC. III: DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Diplomatic Missions: Exchange of Ambassadors and Envoys

The initiative to establish diplomatic relations with Irān was taken by Bijapur. In 1509, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah for the first time sent his ambassador, Syed Aḥmad Harawī with presents etc., to the Court of Shah Ismā'īl I.[51] As a diplomatic sequel, in the following year,[52] the Shah sent an ambassador to 'Ādil Shah inciting him to join him in a general war against the Portuguese. The Persian ambassador, along with one from Ormuz (in Persian Gulf) on

---

49. Jamī'ul-Murāsalat, 229(b); Makātīb, 57.
50. From early sixteenth century to the end of seventeenth century almost the entire territory of the Dār al-Islām was absorbed by the three great empires of the Ottomans, the Ṣafawids and the Mughals - See 'Azīz Aḥmad, op.cit., 22.
51. Briggs, III, 17.
52. Dennison Ross places this event in 1513 (C.H.I., V, 12) whereas Albuquerque in 1510. The latter seems to be more correct - Albuquerque, 77.

their arrival at Goa found that the place has been already conquerred by the Portuguese. So, they diplomatically pretended and adroitly changed the purpose of their mission, and made overtures of friendship to Albuquerque.[53] The Persian ambassador, later on, proceeded to Bijapur to meet 'Ādil Shah.[54]

In the meanwhile, Harawī, continued to reside, even in 1514 at the Court of Shah Ismā'īl. The Portuguese ambassador, Ferria, sent by Albuquerque from Goa, in 1514, found Haravī much offended at the better reception accorded to him.[55] Thus, Haravī was a resident ambassador of Bijapur at Iran from 1509 to 1514 or even much later, because exact date of his return is unrecorded. But, it is quite certain that he returned back to Bijapur by 1522, since in 1523 he was sent as an ambassador to Ahmadnagar.[56]

The Persian ambassador who had proceeded from Bijapur to Bidar was detained by Amīr Barīd. In this dilemma the ambassador approached Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah, through a letter, and sought his assistance for his release. 'Ādil Shah promptly came to the rescue; and through his diplomatic manoeuver, he obtained the requisite permission from the Bahmanī Sultan for the release and safe return of the Persian ambassador. On his return journey the ambassador met 'Ādil Shah at Allahpūr, when the latter honoured the former with rich presents and provided suitable escort to accompany him to the port of Dabhol, from whence he embarked for Persia.[57]

Shah Ismā'īl, in recognition of this meritorious service of 'Ādil Shah, sent in 1519 a special plenipotentiary, Ibrāhīm Beg

---

53. Albuquerque, 77. 54. Briggs, III, 28. 55. Albuquerque, 135.
56. Briggs, III, 30. 57. ibid., 28.

to Bijapur, with a letter and valuable presents. On arrival at Bijapur, Ibrāhīm Bēg was accorded a warm and rousing reception by 'Ādil Shah.[58]

With the adoption of Sunnī doctrine at Bijapur by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I, on his accession in 1534, there was seldom any diplomatic activity between the two States, upto the end of Ibrāhīm I's reign in 1557.

In spite of anti-Shī'ah policies of Ibrāhīm I at Bijapur, Shah Tahmāsp of Iran did not manifest any anti-Bijapur attitude. Thus in 1548, when Burhān Niẓām Shah I of Ahmadnagar sought military help from Iran against Bijapur,[59] Shah Tahmāsp did not respond.[60] This diplomacy of the Shah towards Bijapur, a Sunnī State at that time, is quite significant, even though there existed community of faith at Iran and Ahmadnagar. Probably for the good of the Shī'ah population in Bijapur he did not like to take sides; and moreover, practically it was not feasable to render any help.

With the accession of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, in 1557 and reintroduction of Shī'ism at Bijapur diplomatic ties with Iran were resumed. It is not known when they were resumed and when the first embassy from Bijapur was sent to Iran by 'Alī I. But, Iskandar Munshī in 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī, records that the second embassy from 'Alī I came to Shah Tahmāsp in 984/1576.[61] Thus the first embassy must have gone to Iran between 1557 and 1576; that is, after the accession of 'Alī I in 1557 and before the death of Shah Tahmāsp in 1576.

---

58. ibid.
59. Burhān (I.A., XLIX, 199).
60. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "Adil Shahi Administration", P.I.H.C., 1940, 238, fn.6.
61. 'Ālam Ārā, 89.

Through his ambassador 'Alī I communicated to the Shah that in his kingdom Khuṭbah of twelve Imāms is recited and that the name of Shah Tahmāsp is also mentioned in the prayers.[62]

Even though Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II who ruled from 1580 to 1626 was a devout Sunnī, yet he maintained cordial diplomatic relations with Iran. As a tolerant ruler, Ibrāhīm proved that Perso-Bijapur relations can be friendly, on a more or less permanent basis, irrespective of the vital link, Shī'a ideology.

Mīr Khalīlullah, a stipendiary preceptor and guide of Shah 'Abbas I, was a Persian emigrant at Bijapur, were he rose to eminence as Calligraphist and became a close associate of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II.[63] Later on Shah 'Abbās I sent for Khalīlullah. Ibrāhīm readily sent off Khalīlullah as his plenipotentiary to the court of Shah 'Abbās. Iskandar Munshī mentions this embassy in the year 1613 in the following terms: "as the rulers of the Deccan had great sincerity and friendship with the Ṣafawī monarchs from very old times, some time prior to this date 'Ādil Shah, the ruler of Bijapur sent Mīr Khalīlullah."[64] The purpose of this embassy is wrongly attributed as 'Ādil Shah being "alarmed at the growing friendship between the Shah, their natural ally and Jahāngīr, their old enemy, and hearing of Khan 'Alam's reception in Persia and his influence over the Shah," immediately sent his ambassador.[65] According to Futūhāt-i 'Ādil Shāhī, it was when Shah 'Abbās I sent for Khalīlullah that Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II took the opportunity to send him as his plenipotentiary and 'Ādil Shah did not send him at his

---

62. idem. 63. Futūḥāt, 367. 64. 'Ālam Ārā, log.cit.,
65. Dr. 'Abdur Rahim: "Mughal Relations with Persia" - Is.Cl., Oct., 1934, 659.

own initiative.[66]

The outcome of Khalīlullāh's embassy was Shah 'Abbās I's intercession in the Mughal-Bijapur affairs and 'Ādil Shah's successful intrigue in the Perso-Mughal conflict over the Qandhār.

Role of Shah 'Abbās I in the Mughal-Bijapur Conflict.

But for the diplomatic and moral pressure exercised by the Ṣafawids in favour of 'Ādil Shahs, the Bijapur kingdom would have been very likely wiped out much earlier than the time of Aurangzeb. Shah 'Abbās I was very much interested in the preservation of the independence of Bijapur Kingdom. And due to obvious reason he did not like the extinction of the Shī'ite Kingdoms of the Deccan.

After Akbar's death and on Jahāngīr's accession the latter demanded 'Ādil Shah to send an envoy to the Mughal Court offering condolences on the demise of Akbar and congratulations on his Coronation. The 'Ādil Shah instead of dealing with the matter himself wrote to the Shah of Iran for advice, as to whether a Bijapurī envoy be sent to the Mughal Court or the one from Persia is sufficient.

To Jahāngīr's request, 'Ādil Shah gave an arrogant reply which enraged the former and he decided to annex the Bijapur Kingdom. Consequently, he despatched a large army to the Deccan. At this critical juncture, alarmed of the situation, 'Ādil Shah sought the assistance of Shah 'Abbās I in the following terms: "Although we on our part are fully determined to defend our countries and could not allow the Mughal ruler to occupy an inch of them, it is necessary that His Majesty (Shah 'Abbās I) should unhesitently come forward to help us in this vital matter."[67] Further, 'Adil Shah

---

66. Futūḥāt, loc.cit.
67. Ṣafawiyyah, loc.cit. For the text of the letter see (Companion). Volume

pleaded help from the Shah on the ground that "the inhabitants of these regions had a peaceful life under the protection of His Majesty's ancestors, our request is that His Majesty should not leave us undefended."[68] There were two possible ways in which the Shah could render any help to Bijapur. One is obviously 'Ādil Shah wanted the Shah to act as a arbitrator between him and the Mughal Emperor and exercise diplomatic and moral pressure in restraining military expedition on Bijapur. The other alternative was by the creation of a diversion, in favour of Bijapur, by way of an attack on Qandhār, a Mughal possession in the North West Frontiers.

The Shah preferred to first course and recommended the case to Jahāngīr for a peaceful settlement, through the embassy of Muḥammad Riḍā and by writing three letters to Jahāngīr. Regarding this embassy, Sir Thomas Roe cynically observes: "It is pretended that he comes only to treat a peace for the Deccanis, whose protection (Shah) 'Abbās taketh to heart, envying the increase of the empire."[69] However, there is no reference to such recommendation in the letters of the Shah preserved in Tōzuk-i Jahāngīrī.[70] But three letters of the Shah and relevant to the affairs of Bijapur are preserved in the Munshaats of 'Abdul Ḥusain Ṭūsī and in Majma'ul-Inshā of Qāsim Aiwaugli Ḥaidar.[71]

In the first letter the Shah pleaded very politely for the "noble rulers of the Deccan high in rank and position," who had the claims of being "neighbours" (Jawari) of Jahāngīr and requested him "to pardon the faith of the erring Deccanis and open the doors of mercy and favour to them for the sake of the writer in view of the concord, amity and friendship existing for such a

68. ibid. 69. W. Foster (ed): The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, I. 70. Tozuk, I. 71. S.H. Askari: "Indo-Persian Relations with Special Reference to the Deccan" - Studies in Asian History, 229.

long time between their royal houses."[72] (Mughal and Ṣafawid houses). This letter having failed to produce the desired effect, a second letter followed. In this, the Shah, not only reiterated the previous plea but also gave his own assurances for the good behaviour of the Deccan rulers in the following terms: "For the sake of the well-wishing writer the fault and short-comings of the Deccani rulers should be forgiven and over-looked. In case anything happened from their side in future which went against the wishes of the addressee of the family of Ṣāḥibqarān, the work of reprimanding them might be left to the writer so that people might talk about the strong ties of alliance and friendship which made one king excuse big offences and abandon big conquests only on the receipt of letters and messages of another king."[73]

From the above two letters of Shah 'Abbās it is quite evident that he emerged out as the champion for the cause of the preservation of the Bijapur. He requested Jahangir to leave entirely the affairs of the Bijapur at his discretion and not to take any action against 'Ādil Shah. He even took the responsibility of reprimanding 'Ādil Shah. The second letter had its desired effect and the request of the Shah was "virtually accepted" and "royal favours"[74] were shown towards 'Ādil Shah.

However, sometimes later when "the news of the renewal of 'regardlessness' (by Jahāngīr) to 'Ādil Shah came to the knowledge of the Shah, he again pleaded with Jahangir. This time, on the ground

---

72. A.H.N. Tusi: Munshaat, Letter No.40, cited by Askari, op.cit., 229.
73. ibid., letter No.106.
74. Askari, op.cit.,230.

that 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans were "bound by strong ties of loyalty and submission and did not possess the might and power to display an attitude of opposition."[75]

Again, on the decision of Jahāngīr to annex Bijapur Kingdom, Shah 'Abbās advised the former that it would make little difference whether the 'Ādil Shah was allowed to remain "submissive and tribute paying vassals", or other were made to take his place. He further suggested that if 'Ādil Shah was left in his possession, it would cause no harm to the Mughals. The letter of the Shah concludes with a very strange offer to Jahāngīr, that if he is bent upon conquering Bijapur, for the sake of territorial gains, then in that case the Shah wrote "this well-wisher would be happy to give up an equivalent or even a larger territory from his dominions."[76]

These correspondences clearly manifest the role of Shah 'Abbās I as the "preserver" of Bijapur Kingdom. He was even prepared, and in fact offered, to sacrifice his own territory at the North West Frontier of Mughal Empire. But, he wanted Bijapur (and Golkonda) to remain independent, acknowledging theoritical sovereighty of the Shah and legal sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor, like a Mughal vassal. As an arbitrator in the Bijapur-Mughal relations, he did succeed in evolving a solution to their conflict and effected temporary, if not permanent, peaceful settlement. And to a certain extent the diplomacy of Shah 'Abbās I, shaped the Deccan

---

75. Jami'ul Murāsalat, 229(b); Haidar, op.cit.

76. Nūrullah Falsafī: Zindagān-i Shah 'Abbas I, V, IV, 302, cited by S.M.R. Naqvi: "Shah 'Abbas and the Conflict between Jahangir and the Deccan States"- Medieval India, I, 277. In view of the historical facts and evidences, Dr. Riazul Islam's conclusion that the Shah's de marche had no effect on the Mughal policy in the Deccan is not tenable - Indo-Persian Relations, 96.

policy of Jahāngīr in general, and in particular Bijapur-Mughal relations. The Shah interprets the peace treaty of 1617 between Deccan Kingdoms and Mughals as a result of his recommendation and pressure on Jahāngīr.[77]

Intrigue of 'Ādil Shah in Perso-Mughal Qandhār Affair

In the year 1022/1613, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II in a personal letter, sent through Khalīlullāh to Shah 'Abbās I, tries to enlighten the Shah about the recent political developments in India. Though the letter[78] is written in a humble tone but, it is highly diplomatic. The salient features of its contents are: to create animosity in Perso-Mughal relations; inducement to the Shah to attack and conquer Qandhār; and the readiness on the part of Deccan Sultans to collaborate in this venture against the Mughals, by creating diversion in the Deccan, in favour of Irān. In a nutshell it was a proposal for a Perso-Bijapur alliance against the Mughals. Obviously, this diplomatic maneuver of 'Ādil Shah was in order to counterbalance the constant Mughal pressure over Bijapur.

From the letter, it is quite evident that it was 'Ādil Shah who at his own initiative was intriguing in the Qandhār affair and not Shah 'Abbās, with a covetous eyes on the Trans-Indus portion of the Mughal empire.[79] However, the Shah was tempted by the proposal of 'Ādil Shah and came to a secret understanding with Bijapur, obviously through the embassy of Shah Qulī Bēg, who came to Bijapur in 1614-15 as an special envoy of Shah 'Abbās.[80] Shah Qulī was accompanied with his counter-part, Khalīlullāh. The whole scheme seems to have been finalised during the second mission of Khalīlullāh.[81]

---

77. Naqvi, op.cit., M.I.Q., I, 276. 78. Ṣafawiyyah, loc.cit.
79. Abdur Rahim, op.cit., Is.Cl., 1934.
80. 'Ālam Ārā, II, 866. 81. idem.

sion of Khalīlullah to Iran in 1618 who carried a personal letter from 'Ādil Shah to the Shah. And the intrigue materialised on Khalīlullah's return to Bijapur in 1621-22, along with his Persian counter-part, Ṭālib Beg.[82] Soon after their arrival at Bijapur, hostilities commenced in the Deccan against the Mughals. Shortly after, an attack on the Qandhār was launched by the Shah, obviously after the despatch of best Mughal generals to the Deccan. Thus the intrigue proved to be successful as, Jahāngīr was outwitted by the Shah of Iran who recovered Qandhār in 1622. And the Mughals were unable to cope up at two parts.[83]

Shah Ṣafī and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah

After the death of Shah 'Abbās I and accession of Shah Ṣafī in January 1629, there seems to be an interruption of a few years in the diplomatic exchanges between Iran and Bijapur. And the initiative, to resume the ties, seems to have been taken by Shah Ṣafī. Probably the Shah was guided by Shah Jahān's expansive imperialism. In late 1046/1637, Shah Ṣafī appointed Aḥmad Beg Qurchī to proceed on a mission to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah.[84] Through Aḥmad Beg, the Shah sent a formal letter to the 'Ādil Shah. The letter[85] began with the expression that it was a great pleasure to write a letter to the 'Ādil Shah, with usual words of compliments and reminding him the old friendship and attachment subsisting

---

82. ibid., II, 951.
83. 'Abdur Raḥīm, op.cit., Is.cl., 1934.
84. Yūsuf Walīh: Khuld-i Barīn, V, 63(b) - cited by Riazul Islam, op.cit., 118.
85. Makātīb, 128.

between the two dynasties, which he calls as a family of "Tyyabīn" and "Taherīn" and strengthened by religious tie of Iyma-i Māsūmīn. Then he goes on to give details of the political developments in central and western Asia and he concludes with a request to maintain regular diplomatic correspondence, with an offer to come forward unhesitantly for any help he may require.

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah reciprocated this gesture by sending in the same year, his envoy Raḥīm Muḥammad to the court of the Shah Ṣafī. Shah Ṣafī gave an early conge in 1637 to Raḥīm Muḥammad and entrusted him with a letter.[86] Obviously Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, as his predecessors, looked for help to Shah Ṣafī. But the latter was too weak to exert any pressure on Shah Jahān to check his imperialism in the Deccan.

The Mughals suspected that the diplomatic missions between Iran and the Deccan States was directed against them, and they strongly objected to dispatch of any embassy from the Deccan to Iran. Consequently, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah could not send the usual congratulatory embassy on Shah 'Abbās II's accession, in 1642.[87]

Perso-Bijapur Intrigues against the Mughals

One of the causes, which prompted Shah 'Abbās II to take sides with Murād against Aurangzeb in the War of Succession, was to avoid the possibility of extinction of the Deccan Kingdoms, sequel to the success of Aurangzeb.[88] And the Shah was not slow

86. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ: Majmū'a-i Makātīb-i Mukhtalif, cited by Riazul Islam, log.cit.
87. Riazul Islam, log.cit.
88. 'Abdur Rahim, op.cit., Is.Cl., Jan.1935, 123.

to seize the opportunity, offered by the War of Succession, to inflame the 'Ādil Shah (and the Quṭb Shah) against the Mughals.

The Shah sent his envoy Mīrzā Muqīm Kitābdār, with a letter to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. In the letter the Shah, after reminding him of the old ties of friendship and religious affinity which bound the two houses, makes a gentle complaint against the temporary interruption in correspondences and lack of unity between the Deccan States, which encouraged the 'evil-minded' and 'faithless' enemies to gain upper hand. Since there was still time to make amends, he urged the 'Ādil Shah to sink his differences with Quṭb Shah and emphasised on their sectarian solidarity in order to take the utmost advantage from the confusion arising from the civil war among the Mughals. He further says that, Mīrzā Muqīm would communicate in his private audience what the writer (the Shah) had in his mind.[90] Obviously, Muqīm was to communicate the secret coalition between the Shah and Murād on the one hand and the Shah and the rulers on the other hand.[89]

Further, in another letter, the Shah while advising 'Ādil Shah (and Quṭb Shah) to initiate hostilities against the Mughals, assured them that he too was preparing to move his own forces against the Mughal empire. However, the rapid victories of

---

89. Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah was Sunnī.

90. Inshā-i Ṭāhir Waḥid, cited by Riazul Islam, op.cit., 122, and Hasan Askari, op.cit., 236 f.
Makātīb, 110 ff. Simultaneously the Shah also wrote to 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah to compose his differences with 'Ādil Shah- Makātīb, 109 f.; see its trs. by K.K. Basu: "The Golconda Court letters", J.B.O.R.S., XXVI (4), 272 f.

Aurangzeb over Dārā Shikōh (April and May 1658) sufficed to keep the Deccan rulers from acting upon the Shah's counsel.[91] And the accession of Aurangzeb to the Mughal throne in 1658 altered the whole course of Perso-Bijapur diplomacy.

Soon after, Aurangzeb's accession, 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah approached Shah 'Abbās II to save them from the threatened extinction. Consequently, Shah 'Abbās II, through the customary embassy of Budakh Beg, in 1660, to congratulate Aurangzeb, not only verbally communicated his desire for the preservation of the Deccan states but sought the latter's assurances. This interference, Aurangzeb resented, and which was one of the main cause of the subsequent misunderstanding in Perso-Mughal relations.[92] Following this, there seems to be a diplomatic lull between Iran and Bijapur. Probably, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II must have realised the futility of persuing Shah 'Abbās II to champion his cause. And this lull continued after Shah Sulaimān's accession to the Ṣafawid throne in 1666. Sulaimān was an utterly incompetent and weak ruler.

SEC.IV: PERSIAN IMPACT ON BIJAPUR

Persianization of 'Ādil Shahs

Though Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah was a Turk yet, before coming to India, he was completely Persianised. He was educated in Persian and brought up at Sawa (in Persia) under the guidance of 'Imāduddīn Maḥmūd, a Persian merchant.[93] Further, his travel to famous places—Kāshān, Iṣfahān and Shīrāz, in Persia totally Persianised his thought and behaviour. The spirit of Persian Renaissance, though

---

91. Riazul Islam, op.cit., 122.
92. 'Abdur Rahim, op.cit., Is.Cl., 1935, 125, 128.
93. Ferishta, II, 1.

a spent up force in the fifteenth century, had so much captivated his imagination that, after he became Sultan of Bijapur, he showed anxiousness to recreate and revive as much of Persian culture and traditions of Sassanids as possible. As such, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah was "more Persian than Turk by training and culture."[94] His strong leanings towards Shī'ism, the national religion of Persia, completed his Persianisation by its adoption at Bijapur as a State religion.

Yūsuf had segragated, his son, Ismā'īl from the Indian environment and entrusted him to Persian and Turkish teachers, Muḥammad Kash and others.[95] Likewise, successive 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans appointed Persian scholars as tutors to their children. As for example, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I in spite of his anti-Āfāqī policy, appointed first Khwāja 'Ināyatullah, Shīrāzī and then later on, Mullāh Fatḥullah Shīrāzī, as tutors to Prince 'Alī.[96] These Persian scholars completely Persianised 'Alī in all spheres of life. He was not only given coaching in Persian language, but through the medium of Persian into various branches of learning - syntex, logic, theology, philosophy etc. He became master of Persian calligraphy and penned in Naskh, Thulth and Riqa styles.[97]

Though Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II received his early education through the indigenous languages, yet from his twentyfourth year of life (1594) he was taught Persian literature by Shah Nawāz Khan, the Jumdatul-Mulk.[98] Ibrāhīm II attained very shortly the requisite

---

94. Devare, op.cit., 70.
95. ibid., 84.
96. ibid., 76.
97. ibid., 77.
98. Basātīn, 231 f.

command over Persian literature and was a great adviser of Makhzanul Asrār of Niẓāmī and Rawzatuṣ Ṣafā of Mīr Khwand.[99] Shah Nawāz Khan actively facilitated Ibrāhīm II's liking for Persian by arranging to place a number of standard Persian works of prose and poetry within the easy reach of the Sultan who was naturally tempted to read them in leisure hours. Shah Nawāz Khan's plan worked admirably and within a short period, Ibrāhīm II could speak fluently in Persian, and his study of literature and history considerably advanced.[100]

Persian Element in 'Ādil Shah's Administration

Several factors contributed to the making of 'Ādil Shāhī administrative system. The heritage, race and creed of its rulers and the nobility had a profound bearing. The 'Ādil Shahs being successors to the Bahmanīs, they inherited all the Persian element and culture already existing in the Bahmanī administration. The 'Ādil Shāhī administrative system was "faithfully modelled on that of the Bahmanī's."[101] And the 'Ādil Shāhī administration took its colours from the race and creed of its rulers. Though they were of Turkish origin, but were Persianised. Then, the bulk of the Āfāqī nobility and ministerial staff, brought with them to their new home, as model, the type of administration which had long been prevalent in their native places. This was later on modified in certain cases to suit the local environment and objectives. Thus, the 'Ādil Shāhī administration presented a combination of Perso-Arabic and Turkish system in Deccani setting. And more or less

---

99. Devare, op.cit., 85.
100. Devare, op.cit., 85 f.
101. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "Adil Shahi Administration" - P.I.H.C., 1940, 235.

the Bijapurī system of government became a replica of the Persian system, from the theory of Kingship to names and nomenclature of institutions and officers, court etiquette and army organisation on mansabdārī system etc., every detail of 'Ādil Shāhī organisation breathed the Persian atmosphere. The Persian language was adopted as the official language for all administrative purposes. It became the language of the cultured elite.

Like the Sassanids, the 'Ādil Shah was the supreme power in the State; he was the ruler, judge, administrator, military leader, sometimes even preacher and leader of public worship.[102] The court ceremonies and social etiquette at Bijapur was mainly drawn from Sassanian traditions. Shī'ism was declared several times as the State religion of Bijapur. And on the model of the Persian national army of the Ṣafawids a uniform of the scarlet cap of twelve gores was introduced by Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah in the Bijapur army and it was strictly enforced.[103] This was in imitation of Qizilbāsh's of Persia.[104] The Shī'a ideology penetrated in all walks of both official and private life and its influence was felt even during the period when the 'Ādil Shah was not a Shī'a.[105] The Shī'a legends: "'Alī Ibn-i Abī-Ṭālib" (Alī son of Abū Ṭālib), "Ghulām 'Alī" (Slave of 'Alī), "Ghulam 'Alī Murtaẓā" (slave of 'Alī the chosen) were incorporated on the 'Ādil Shāhī coins. Similar inscriptions are found on the mosques built during the times of the Shī'a

---

102. ibid.
103. Ferishta, II, 33; Basātīn, 33.
104. Sarwar, op.cit., Sykes, op.cit., II, 159.
105. G.P. Taylor: "On some Copper coins of 'Adil Shahi Dynasty of Bijapur," J.A.S.B., December, 1910, 681 ff.

rulers. Likewise the words - "Nāib-i 'Alī" (Viceroy of 'Alī) adopted by the Shī'a rulers is found on all the 'Ādil Shahi farmāns of both the Shī'a and Sunnī periods, irrespective of the ruler being a Shī'a or a Sunnī.[106]

Persian coins called Lārī, originally minted in the district of Lār, at the head of the Persian Gulf was adopted by 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, who issued a silver Lārī.[107] Bijapur embraced a large portion of the Konkan littoral, where the traders from Persia often landed and hence to meet the local demand for the Lārīs the 'Ādil Shah caused them to be struck in their names.[108] It seems that the Lārīs were current only in the coastal areas of the kingdom and and not in its interiors. And it seems that the Persian coin "'Abbāsī" of Shah 'Abbās II's time was a legal tender at the Bijapurī ports.[109]

Likewise, in all the departments of the 'Ādil Shāhī organisation, Persian impact was dominant. A comparative study reveals many features in common between the two states.

The Role of Persian Nobility in Bijapur

The Persian nobility played a major role in shaping the external and internal policies of Bijapur and in shaping the destiny of kingdom itself. It was the image of Persian system in the

---

106. Dr. Iftikhar Ahmad Ghauri: "Kingship in the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda" - Is.Cl., January 1972, 48.
107. John Walker: "The Arabian Larin" - Is.Cl., January, 1936, 94 ff.
Geo P. Taylor: "On the Bijapuri Lari or Larin", - J.A.S.B., December, 1910, 687.
108. I.A. Ghauri: "Central structure of the Kingdom of Bijapur" Is.Cl., January, 1970, 31.
109. Dr. A.R. Kulkarni: Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji, 245.

minds of the 'Adil Shahi nobles that prevented Bijapur Kingdom from ruins. The Persian nobles - Muṣṭafā Khan Ardistānī, Shah Abu Turāb Shīrāzī, 'Ināyatullah Qazwīnī, Qāsim Beg Tabrizī, Ḥusain Injū and Shah Ja'far (a brother of Shah Ṭāhir) had before them the ideal of United Persia under Ṣafawid (Persia which was a nation once again self-contained centripetal, powerful and respected) made efforts to shun the personal rivalries among the Dedcan Sultans and to form a political alliance amongst the rival kingdoms. This eventually brought about the overthrow of the mighty Vijayanagar kingdom.[110]

Throughout the history of Bijapur, Persian nobles enjoyed 'Ādil Shāhī patronage and exerted influence in the politics of Bijapur. A few eminent Persian nobles were: Shah Ṭāhir and Asad Khan Lārī who brought about peaceful pact by their efforts between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar; Afẓal Khan Shīrāzī, Wakīl-us-Salṭanat and Mīr Jumlā, was the saviour of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1580-1627) from the treachery of Kamāl Khan and Kishwar Khan; Shah Faṭhullah Shīrāzī - renowned doctor of the learning and philosophy of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I's reign was known as "Ten Intelligences" (Dih Aql), because of his versatile genious. Ḥakīm Aḥmad Gīlānī and 'Ainul-Mulk Shīrāzī were two scholars who were accorded a grand reception on their arrival at Bijapur and were liberally rewarded; Mīr Shamsuddin Muḥammad Iṣfahānī was the Ṣadrul Jahān; Shah 'Abdul Qāsim Anj. and Murtaẓā Khan Anjū were the companions of the king; Rafī'-uddin Shīrāzī, the author of Tazkiratul Mulūk who came to Bijapur in 1560 remained in royal service for several years; Muṣṭafā Khan Ardistānī and Shah Abū Turāb Shīrāzī featured conspicuously in the political events of 'Alī I's reign. Abū Turāb was instrumental

110. Devare, op.cit., 79.

to a temporary amelioration between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar; Ṣadruddin Muḥammad Shīrāzī (later known as Shah Nawāz Khan) Prime Minister Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, and then Jumdatul-Mulk of Bijapur commanded reverence and devotion in every class, under the aegis of his enlightened administration, Bijapur revived the traditions of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I's period.[111]

Thus, the Persian diplomats at Bijapur controlled the strings of political strategy not only in the Deccan but in the Perso-Mughal-Bijapur relations.

Patronage of Persian Scholars and Literature by 'Ādil Shahs

With the Mongol cataclysm in 'Ajam, the Persians and their culture suffered a severe blow. And with the deterioration of the political situation in Persia during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries due to the intense military activity, thousands of peace-loving Persian scholars fled to Delhi and the Deccan, where they found a welcome patronage. In some cases the 'Ādil Shahs sent for the poets and scholars from Persia and some were exchanged between the two States.[112] Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah was a liberal patron of learning and invited scholars and poets from Persia to partake of his munificent patronage.[113] Likewise, all the 'Ādil Shahs (except Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I: 1541-57), patronised Persian scholars and they flourished at Bijapur.

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II was a liberal patron of letters, and a brilliant galaxy of divines, poets, ministries, musicians,

---

111. ibid., 70 f., 78, 81, 83. See House, 90 ff.
112. Gorekar, op.cit., 161.
113. Briggs, III, 18.

painters, illuminators, historians and traditionalists from Iran adorned his Court.[114] Thus, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II's reign "may be regarded as the golden age for Persian literature in Deccan,[115]" which in pageant of the prodigies of art and exudition surpassed the splendour of the court of Shah 'Abbās I of Iran.

Under the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers Persian literature flourished at Bijapur. They established schools specifically for the teaching of Persian studies. Persian was the medium of instruction. Pupils were provided with every comfort; they were supplied lodging, board and pocket money. Scores of peoms were compiled not only in Persian but in Deccani with the adoptation of Persian metres and cannons of versification.[116] The literature produced at the Bijapur had far reaching cultural values. As the Shī'a religion influenced Deccan poetry by turning the thoughts of the local poets in the channels of the lives of the Imāms and the tragedy of Karbalā. Lament for the murdered Ḥusain and his elegies (Marthīya) became the universal poetical type. And under 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, one poet bore the title of Mirza 'Marthīyah Khan' or the chanters of elegies.[117] Another poet Hāshim'Alī compiled Marthīyahs under the title Dīwān-i Ḥusainī.[118]

Likewise scores of literary works and histories were compiled both at the court under the patronage of 'Adil Shahs and privately.

---

114. Devare, op.cit., 108.
115. idem.
116. Basatin, 351.
117. ibid., 432.
118. Basatin, 432; House, 3.

Persian Art and Architecture at Bijapur

The art of Bijapur school owes much to the Persian School. The paintings of Bijapur can be traced from the third quarter of the sixteenth century onwards. This school was patronized by 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II as they were adept in the art of painting and varnishing.[119]

Persian element entered largely in the paintings of the Bijapur school. The Nujūmul-'Ulūm (star of Sciences) painted in 1570, during the reign of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I is in part local adoptations of the early Ṣafawid traditions and mode of painting. Specially the 36th Chapter "On the subjugation of the fairies and super-natural things, according to Indian and Khurāsānī method" is illustrated with power and logic. Upto folio 240, the illuminations of the Nujūmul 'Ulūm obviously endeavours to appear Persian. But whatever reference they bear to Persian painting does relatively little to connect them with contemporary Ṣafawid work. It contains the bundles of grass or plants of different size, culled from Persian painting of Ṣafawid traditions. The costumes are mixed Perso-Deccan. Their trim outlines hold clear and contrasting colour surfaces, more familiar with the Persian palette, then are the outlines with those of Persian figures. Their flux they convert into a staid solidity, ponderous in the horizontal. The downward gliding ease of the Persian line they transmute into an amplitude near to the right angle and changed with a movement as much banked as it is fierce. In these illuminations, the work of artisans, impoverished in their means and provincial form a Ṣafawid point of view, a determined movement is unmistakable and this is a most vital feature of these painting. Further, the

---

119. Kt. Kramrisch: A Survey of Painting in the Deccan, 117.

placing of coloured massives accurately outlined with a propelling power had a surface sprinkled with delicate Persian motives.[120] The distinguishing feature in book illustrations of the Bijapur paintings was the Persian type of making the ground vibrant, around the determined movement of the leading figure.[121]

The seventeenth century paintings of Bijapur, display Ṣafawid and Mughal settings similar to the Ṣafawid miniatures (established as a type of Sassanian Art). We find the figures of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shah and the attendants with a gold ground, pited level with the eye and a slanting ground.[122] The incorporation of Ṣafawid traditions in Bijapur paintings is attributed to Mullā Fārūqī Ḥusain, a painter from Shīrāz, who was attached to the court of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II. In the "land scape" painting of Bijapur of the seventeenth century also, we find the Ṣafawid trend of flowering trees with branches curved in three dimensions. And the scattering of the motives on the ground with turfts and foliage are after the Persian pattern.[123] These are some of the illustrations of the Bijapur paintings, full of Persian motives, traditions and technique, besides having Mughal and local incorporations.

Persian calligraphy the masterpieces of arts - had also entered Bijapur through various ways in many forms. Masterpieces of Nasta'līq style, evolved by the Persians, was adopted in Bijapur for all purposes. All Persian manuscripts are in this style.

---

120. ibid., 120, 123 f.; H. Goetz: "Persia and India After the Conquest of Mahmud" - The Legacy of Persia (ed. A.J.Arberry), 107 ff.
121. Kramrisch, op.cit., 124.
122. G. Yazdani "Two Miniatures from Bijapur", Is.Cl., 1935, 211-217, Passim.
123. Kramrisch, op.cit., 130, 152, 157.

Another style of writing Persian was shakistah which is found mostly in official documents. Persian calligraphy is also preserved in the inscriptions of scores of 'Ādil Shāhī monuments.

The 'Ādil Shahs were great builders and have left behind them more monuments of notethan all the rest of the Deccan Kingdoms put together. The architectural buildings of Bijapur comprise mosques, tombs, and palaces. In Bijapur architecture, the Iranian element is so much predominant that the whole architecture looks Iranian in style. The domes of all the 'Ādil Shāhī monuments are of Persian origin.[124] Likewise if we study in detail the plan and elevation of various monuments they reveal Persian origin. However, besides Persian the monuments in its design are mixture of Syrian, Byzantine and Egyptian styles. The cause was that the 'Ādil Shahs wanted to imitate the architecture of Turkey, Iran, Iraq etc., and as such the engineers employed were chiefly Turks and Iranians. Masons were Indians and even the calligraphist and artistis were Āfāqīs.[125]

---

124. H. Goetz, op.cit., 100, 105 f.
K.A.C. Creswell: "Indian Domes of Persian Origin" - Asiatic Review, V, 1914, 475 ff.

125. A.M.A. Shustery, Outlines of Islamic Culture, I, 256.

P a r t 2

Relations with other Islamic countries

(Turkey, Egypt and Arab States)

Bijapur's diplomatic relations were mainly concentrated with Iran; and there seems to be hardly any diplomatic relations with other Islamic countries of Asia and Africa.

There were racial, cultural and commercial relations with the Ottoman Turkey. The continuous stream of Turk immigrants to Bijapur formed an important percentage of the 'Ādil Shāhī nobility. The Āfāqīs dominated the Bijapur court. Their demography played a major role in the external relations of Bijapur. As for example, the number of Turks, in the small Bijapurī port of Dabhol, was about fifteen thousand. This was a strong inducement to the Ottoman Sultan Salīm I to join the Muhammadan alliance against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean.[1] The Turks of Dabhol were mostly merchants and had trade relations with their counter part in Turkey.

While the Arab States of Asia and Africa, in a sense were intimate neighbours of Bijapur, only the ocean between them separated them as a broad highway. The intercourse between Arab States and South India dates back to pre-historic times. Their relations, during the medieval times, were motivated by mutual commercial gains, reinforced by the common bond of Islam.

---

1. Letter of Malik Ayāz, Governor of Dieu, Gujarat to Ottoman Sultan Salīm I - Abdullah Effendi: Munshāt-i Fārsī, 149 a, f.

There was hardly any ground for Bijapur or Arab States to maintain diplomatic relations between them. Only on few occasions the Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt and Arab States came in diplomatic contacts. But there were constant commercial inter-course between them. Continuous groups of merchants, travellers and pilgrims of the Arab States visited Bijapur and vice-versa.

Regio-Political Relations with the Ottomans

Some of the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans were Sunnī, followers of Abū Ḥanīfā School. They owed their allegiance to the four Immaculate Caliphs[2] - the successors to Prophet Muḥammad, a practice adopted by the Ottoman Sultans. The Sunnī 'Ādil Shahs got the Khuṭbah read in the name of the Immaculate Caliphs.

The Sultan or a king in an independent Muslim State was regarded as the viceroy of the Caliph.[3]

The Ottoman Sultan Salīm conquered Egypt in 1517. At this time, Al-Mutawakkil was the last of the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt. About 1520, when Sulaiman was the Ottoman Sultan, Al-Mutawakkil resigned his rights of Caliphate and ceded his title to Osmanli or Ottoman Sultans of Turkey. By virtue of this, the Ottoman Sultans claimed not only "the sovereignty of the Muslim world" but the right to the Caliphate itself. That is, they claimed the spiritual,

---

2. The four Caliphs are Abū Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthmān and 'Alī, the legitimate Caliphs or Imāms.
3. Murray T. Titus: Indian Islam, 54. In the Islamic conception of sovereignty, the functions of the priest and the sovereign were concentrated in one and the same person - S. Khudā Bakhsh: Essay - Indian and Islamic, 25.

as well as political power held by the successors of the Prophet.[4]

Consequently, the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultans, who professed Sunnī faith and got the Khuṭbah read in Bijapur in the name of the Caliphs came virtually within the jurisdiction of Ottoman Khilāfat. The rulers of Bijapur who professed Sunnī faith, during the times of Turkish Caliphate were: Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah (only during the regency of Kamāl Khan (1510-15), Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I (1535-57), Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1580-1626) and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah (1626-56). The founder, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah though got the Khuṭbah read alternately in Sunnī and Shī'ah fashion; yet he was Shī'ah at heart and owed allegiance to the Ṣafawid house. The last of the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers, Sikandar got the Khuṭbah read in the Sunnī fashion from 1680 onwards and in it included the name of Aurangzeb. Thus the nominal Caliphal allegiance was transferred from the Ottoman to the Mughals.

Thus, during the Sunnī period (up 1680) of 'Ādil Shāhī Sultanate, the Sultans of Turkey may be said to have assumed the theoritical sovereignty - temporal as well as spiritual of the Bijapur kingdom.

It seems that Bijapur and Ottoman Turkey probably never maintained any diplomatic relations. But, the Turkish national symbol - the Crescent and Star, was adopted by the 'Ādil Shāhī rulers, as the royal emblem on all the public buildings in Bijapur.[5]

---

4. Sir William Muir: The Caliphate - Its Rise, Decline and Fall, 596. Cari Brockelmann: History of Islamic People, 289. The Ottoman Sultan received the sacred banner and other relics of the Prophet Muhammad from Al-Mutawakkil - A.M.A. Shushtry: Outlines of Islamic Culture, I, 65.
5. H. Cousins: The Architectural Remains at Bijapur, 61; Dr. Nazim Bijapur Inscriptions, 17.

This symbol was not the religious symbol of the Muhammadans. Evidently, the 'Ādil Shahs tried to preserve their racial link with the Ottomans, in spite of their allegiance to the Ṣafawids, due to the political reasons.

Bijapur-Egypt Alliance against the Portuguese.

Egypt's contacts with Bijapur was a reaction to the Portuguese challenge in the Indian ocean. It was a common menace to the commercial and navigational interest of the Mamlūk Sultan of Egypt, 'Ādil Shah of Bijapur and other rulers of Western India.

Before the advent of the Portuguese, the Arabs, Persians, Turks and Indians exercised complete authority of the India's overseas trade. The Portuguese supremacy at sea paralysed the seaborne trade of the Muslims in the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf etc. The Red Sea merchants lived in Jedda and had their factors at the important ports of Western India. The rulers of Arab States and Egypt who controlled the important ports levied duties on Indian goods pass ing up the Red Sea, across the Egypt on their way to Alexandria. The advent of the Portuguese deprived these rulers of their income from the sea.[6]

When the Portuguese captured the important port of Socotra, which controlled the entrance to the Red Sea, it arose the jealousy of all the concerned States.[7] Further, the news that the Portuguese decided to appoint a resident viceroy and to keep a standing fleet in Indian waters, impelled Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and

---

6. Whiteway: The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 7 f.; C.H.I., V, 1.
7. Auguste Tunssaint: History of the Indian Ocean, 104.

Mahmūd S hah I of Gujarat to negotiate with the Sultan of Egypt for a joint action against the Portuguese.[8] The Ottoman Sultan Salīm I was also requested to join the league.[9] But he did not take part. Ahmadnagar[10] and Zamorin of Calicut, at the request of 'Adil Shah, through a personal letter, joined the league.[11]

It was arranged that a fleet should be equipped at Suez and sent to India to cooperate with the light wasting craft. Assistance and cooperation was to be given by Gujarat, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur; and information as to the movements of the Portuguese fleet was to be furnished by the Zamorin of Calicut, in order to enable the Egyptian fleet to work out its strategy.[12]

The Egyptian fleet was placed under Amīr Husain, a naval Commander of the Mamlūk Sultan, Qanswah al Ghuri. While the Gujarat fleet was organised by Malik Ayaz, Governor of Dieu, and Bijapur also sent a small fleet, at its disposal at Dabhol, to join the Egyptian fleet. The allies gave a crushing defeat, in 1507, in a naval battle to the Portuguese fleet, commanded by Lorenzo, off Chaul.[13]

---

8. C.H.I., V, 9; Sir Denison Ross: "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517", J.R.A.S., 1921, 549.

9. Abdullah Effendi: Munshāt-i Fārsī, 149 a, f. Letter of Malik Ayāz, Governor of Dieu to Sultan Salīm, I; in the letter the Malik tempted Sultan Salīm by saying that there are about fifteen thousand Turks in the Bijapurī port of Dabhol and they all will cooperate with the Turkish fleet against the Portuguese.

10. Longworth Dames: "The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the sixteenth Century", J.R.A.S., January 1921, 5.

11. M. Abdul Aziz: Fath-al-Mubiyn lis Samari al Ladhi Yuhibb'l Muslimiyn, Stanza 119-122. This is the only source which mentions about the sending of messenger twice by 'Ādil Shah to Zamorin and the latter's reply to the former in the affirmative.

12. Longworth Dames, log.cit.; Toussaint, log.cit., Sir William Muir: The Mamluk or Slave Dynasty of Egypt (1260-1517), 181.

13. Mustafa Bin Ibrahim: 'Ali Akhar ul Yamani, 31 a ff.

But with the capture of the Bijapurī port of Goa by the Portuguese on 25th November, 1510, the league of Bijapur, Egypt etc., was broken.[14] And with the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517, the alliance became obsolete.

Religio-Political Relations with Egypt

After the sack of Baghdad, in 1258 by the Mongol conquerer Hulago and the death of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustasim the centre of Caliphate shifted to Cairo. The succession of the Egyptian Caliphs was maintained unbroken in the same line till 1517.[15] During this period of Egyptian Caliphate, the 'Adil Shahs, professing Sunni faith were obviously under its nominal spiritual leadership and guidance.

In 1512-13, the Qāḍī of Cairo, sent rich presents and his special blessings with encouragement to carry on the religious struggle against the Portuguese.[16] The sending of special blessings was not without significance. It may be argued that the Chief Priest of Cairo had, to a certain extent, spiritual leadership of the Muslim World.

Relations with Arab States

Bijapur's relations with Arab States of Asia and Africa was mostly commercial and cultural and there were hardly any diplomatic relations. Moreover there was no common ground to maintain any

---

14. Commissariat: History of Gujarat (1297-1573), 252 f.
15. Sir William Muir: The Caliphate, 593 f.
16. Ali Akhar ul Yamani, op.cit., 50, 6. This piece of information is not found in any other source of Bijapur's history.

diplomatic relations. Moreover there was no common ground to maintain any diplomatic relations. However, there was constant flow of scholars and other religious persons to Bijapur.

Only once the Sultan of Malindi in East Africa sent an envoy to the court of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah in 1638.[17] Probably there were exchange of diplomatic missions between the two States.

---

17. Monumenta, J.B.H.S., September, 1928, 197.

CHAPTER V

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE SUCCESSION SULTANATES OF BAHMANĪ KINGDOM AND OTHER SOUTH INDIAN STATES

P a r t 1

Bijapur's Relations with the Succession Sultanates of Bahmanī Kingdom

Inter-statal Relationship

The dismemberment of the Bahmanī Kingdom and the establishment of the five Sultanates: Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Golkonda (Tilang), Berar and Bidar created an unprecedented political situation in the Deccan. Above everything else it introduced the idea of division and partition fruitful of discord and strife.[1] The inter-state relationship of these five Sultanates is a record of almost continuous strife. The kingdoms being contiguous, frequent disputes were routine matter between them, mostly in a bid to possess the border lands. These border areas, later on, became bone of contention for internecine wars. Thus, the sultans always entertained bitter animosity against one another and waged protracted wars throughout their existence. One of the causes of the incessant internecine wars, may be attributed, as a result of the disintegration of the Bahmanī Kingdom into improper linguistic divisions, which kept the balance between the elements inhabiting the table land.[2]

---

1. P. Ramamurti: "Inter-State Relations in the Deccan" (1529-1707), P.I.H.C., 1945, 306.
2. Q.S.D. 82.

At first the rival sultans were absorbed in consolidating their hold over the territory they had grapped from the tottering Bahmanīs. Then mutual intrigues among themselves and against each other engaged their attention. Sometimes Bijapur, Golkonda and Berar allied in a tripple alliance against the dual alliance of Ahmadnagar and Bidar. Soon, on some pretext or the other, a reshuffling of powers was effected and a new grouping of the alliances emerged. Thus the mutual alliances among and against themselves became a regular feature. Only on one occasion, in 1565, the sultans kept aside their mutual conflicts and united in a joint front against the Vijayanagara. From these competitive struggles emerged out the principle of the balance of power, which the sultans consciously or unconsciously formulated.[3] Throughout their history, the relationship between the five succession Sultanates was marked by 'Kaleidoscopic alliances and almost continual war', in the course of which Berar was absorbed by Ahmadnagar in 1574[4] and Bidar by Bijapur in 1619.

Bijapur's relations with the Deccan Kingdoms were so much inter-woven mutually that it is impossible to mention the relations with one kingdom without the mention of the other kingdom.

SEC. I: AHMADNAGAR-BIJAPUR RELATIONS

Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and Aḥmad Niẓām Shah

Ahmadnagar-Bijapur relations were based on the relations existing prior to 1489 between Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and Aḥmad Niẓām

---

3. Ramamurti, op.cit., P.I.H.C., 168 f., 306 f.
4. Tapan Ray Chaudhri: Jan Company in Coromandel, 3. feeble reference

Shah. That is, when both the founders of two kingdoms were Bahmanī officers under Sultan Muḥammad Shah II.

Prior to 1489, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, as a Khan was head of the Āfāqī party at the Bahmanī court and while Aḥmad Niẓām Shah, as a malik was member of the opposite party - the Deccani. Thus, there existed between the two founders mutual animosity and party strife. In 1482, Aḥmad and Yūsuf, as leaders of two parties, had a bloody conflict, which lasted for twenty days with much loss of human life and blood. Eventually, the two rival factions had to conclude peace, and Yūsuf evinced cordiality with Aḥmad.[5]

When Aḥmad was trying to suppress the rebellious activities of Zainul 'Ābidīn in 1486, Yūsuf took side with 'Ābidīn against Aḥmad, by sending a large force to the succour of 'Ābidīn.[6] But when Sultan Maḥmūd Shah Bahmanī sent a farmān to Yūsuf, the tarafdār of Bijapur, to march with an army to suppress the rising power of Aḥmad Niẓāmul-Mulk, Yūsuf instead of obeying the orders of the Sultan, sent messenger to Aḥmad assuring him of his co-operation and goodwill, and secretly encouraged him to mature his ambitions designs of carving out an independent kingdom.[7] It was on the advice of Yūsuf that Aḥmad discontinued the names of Bahmanī Sultan from the Khuṭbah and introduced his own name.[8]

With the proclamation of Shī'ah faith by Yūsuf in 1504, a Sunnī confederacy was formed by 'Alī Barīd against Yūsuf 'Ādil,

---

5. Burhan, 85; Briggs, II, 530.
6. Burhan, 193 ff., Briggs, II, 530.
7. Briggs, II, 530.
8. Briggs, III, 121.

which Aḥmad too joined.[9] To initiate hostilities, a pretext was evolved. Thus, Aḥmad sent his envoy to Yūsuf demanding surrender of Naldrug. To which the latter declined. Then Aḥmad joined the allies of 'Alī Barīd and marched with a large army against Yūsuf.[10]

Yūsuf resorted to strategem by diverting the attention of the allies and disuniting them. He attacked the Niẓām Shāhī possession of Bīr, burnt and destroyed it. Consequently, Aḥmad broke away from the confederacy and marched to the rescue of his pillaged territory. This averted further fighting.[11]

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Burhān Niẓām Shah

In 1514, when 'Alī Barīd formed an alliance to crush the power of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah, Burhān joined the allies. The allies attacked Bijapur, but 'Ādil Shah emerged victories.[12]

Ismā'īl in order to avenge the defeat, which he suffered at the battle of Rāichūr, in 1519, sought alliance with Burhān against Vijayanagara and Amīr Barīd. Consequently, letters and civilities were inter-changed between Bijapur and Ahmadnagar courts. 'Ādil Shah sent Syed Aḥmad Hirawī, as his ambassador, to Niẓām Shah, to cement the bond of friendship. At Ahmadnagar he was accorded a grand reception. At the emissory talks, it was decided, to have a summit meeting at Shōlāpūr between the Sultans of the two States and to form a matrimonial relationship between the two dynasties. Consequently, the nuptials, between Marīam, sister of Ismā'īl, and Burhān were celebrated with great rejoicing, in May 1524.[13]

---

9. Basātīn, 21.
10. Briggs, III, 15.
11. Briggs, III, 15 f.
12. ibid., 27.
13. Ibid., 30 f.

It is asserted that, in the treaty of alliance, formed on this occasion, Ismā'īl consented to give, as a marriage-dowry, the fort of Shōlāpūr with its five and a half districts. However, this condition of the alliance was not immediately fulfilled; and when Burhān demanded its cessation on the basis of Asad Khan's promise, 'Ādil Shah refused to comply, on plea of being unware of the promise. Consequently the alliance, which originated for the conquest of Vijayanagar, was shattered to the ground. Cordiality soon turned into bitterness and hostilities began. This breach of faith, on the part of 'Ādil Shah, very much offended Niẓām Shah, who to avenge it formed a triple alliance, with Amīr Barīd and 'Imād Shah against 'Ādil Shah.[14]

In 1526 the confederate army of Ahmadnagar, Bidar and Berar, marched to besiege Sholapur and to occupy the ceded districts. 'Ādil Shah moved to meet the aggression. The encampment of the two armies continued for forty days, during which time Bijapurī forces hovered round the allies' camp daily and cut off their supplies. Though initially, the Bijapurīs were at a loss, but later on, they gained upper hand when the Berar army fled from the battle field, without making any opposition. While Burhān, though first tried to oppose, with the help of the re-inforcement of Amīr Barīd, but later on he withdrew to Ahmadnager dejected. 'Ādil Shah returned triumphantly to Bijapur.[15]

'Ādil Shah followed up the victory by successfully instigating 'Imād Shah of Berar to break-up with Niẓām Shah. Then the

---

14. idem.
15. ibid., 31 f.; Basātīn, 35 f.

two captured the Niẓām Shāhī possession of Pathardi (Pathri). However, Niẓām Shah in alliance with Amīr Barīd re-captured it.

Though in 1528 Niẓām Shah showed hostile attitude towards Bijapur but, in the following year, when Ahmadnagar was invaded by Bahādur Shah of Gujarat, he appealed for help to 'Ādil Shah. But for 'Ādil Shah's prompt financial and military help, Ahmadnagar would have been over-run and conquerred by Bahādur Shah.[16] In the same year Niẓām Shah repaid back this obligation by agreeing to maintain neutrality during Bijapur's attack on Bidar.[17]

In 1532, Niẓām Shah tried to mediate in the Bijapur-Bidar conflict, and wrote a imperious letter to 'Ādil Shah to refrain from hostilities. 'Ādil Shah reacted angrily and gave a haughty reply, saying that he never interfered in Niẓām Shah's affairs and as such he had no business to interfere in Bijapur's affairs.[18] This arrogant reply annoyed Burhān Niẓām Shah. Though he was really ashamed, yet, to show his pride and power, he marched, towards Bijapur and tresspassed Bijapurī territory. A battle was fought between the forces of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, in which the former emerged victorious.[19]

However, the two Sultans realised the futility of their mutual enmity and quarrels, which only deterioratedtheir economy and strength. Instead, they worked out a mutual strategy to conquer their weaker neighbours and extend their domains. Consequently, they concluded a partition treaty, defining their respective

---

16. Briggs, III, 105.
17. ibid., 34.
18. Briggs, III, 138.
19. Basātīn, 45.

sphere of military operations. It was agreed that 'Ādil Shah should undertake the conquest of Tilangana and Niẓām Shah that of Berar. But this project was frustrated by the sudden demise of Ismā'īl in 1534.[20]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Burhān Niẓām Shah

In 1538 the change in the state religion at Ahmadnagar, created a corresponding change in the external relations. Ibrāhīm, like other rulers, got entranged at this insult of the Sunnī doctrine. Bijapur joined the leage of Sunnī rulers of Gujarat, Khandesh and Berar against Ahmadnagar, to conquer and divide it among themselves. However, Niẓām Shah resorted to strategem and diplomacy, through which, he broke the confederacy and assaulted a crushing defeat to Bijapur.[21]

In 1542, dissensions arose at the Bijapur court. Niẓām Shah, taking advantage of this situation, invited Amīr Barīd to a coalition against Bijapur. Simultaneously, he made a propaganda that Asad Khan, minister of Bijapur, in conformity with his Shī'ah feelings, had invited Niẓām Shah and Amīr Barīd to invade Bijapur and promised to surrender Belgaum. Although there was not the slightest truth in this story, yet it was sedulously spread. Then, Niẓām Shah marched to Shōlāpūr and captured it and made it over to Khaja Jahān the disputed five and half districts of the dowry. And then he took possession of Belgaum, plundering on the way, the towns that did not submit to him. The false hypnotising propaganda

---

20. Briggs, III, 139; Basātīn, 46.

21. Briggs, III, 139 f.

of Niẓām Shah proved to be successful. As Asad Khan, having lost the confidence of 'Ādil Shah, was compelled to cross over to Niẓām Shah, with his contingent. Niẓām Shah then marched to Bijapur city. 'Ādil Shah, deprived of his minister, and without confidence in those around him, deserted his capital and took shelter at Gulbarga. But with the arrival of a re-inforcement under 'Imād Shah of Berar, to the rescue of Bijapur, Asad Khan changed side and came back to the side of 'Ādil Shah, by joining the Berar army. This compelled Niẓām Shah to retreat to Ahmadnagar. He was chased by the allie and was compelled to flee from Ahmadnagar to Daulatabad. Then Amīr Barīd and Niẓām Shah concluded peace and restored the five and half districts to 'Ādil Shah, with a promise to not to molest Bijapur again.[22]

Subsequently, Niẓām Shah being ashamed of the defeat and loss of Shōlāpūr and its dependencies, tried successfully, through diplomatic strategy to create animosity between 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj of Vijayanagar. Fuzūnī says that Burhān and Rāmarāj met personally at Rāichūr and it was agreed to remove the barrier, the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom between them.[23] Then, he allied with Quṭb Shah, Amīr Barīd and Khwāja-i Jahān (of Parēnḍa) and sent an army to invade Bijapur. Next, Niẓām Shah laid siege to Shōlāpūr and its dependencies and laid waste the entire surroundings. 'Ādil Shah

---

22. Futūḥāt, 68 f.; Basātīn, 58 f.; Briggs, III, 55, 140 f.

23. Idem

on the other hand, raised an army in self-defence. The Bijapurī forces defeated the attacking horde of Niẓām Shah.[24]

In the meanwhile, on the request of Niẓām Shah, Jamshīd Quṭb Shah reached the confines of eastern Bijapur and started plundering and occupied the whole country upto the walls of Gulbarga. While the other ally of Niẓām Shah Rāmarāj, on his part sent a large army to attack Rāichūr and Mudgal. Now 'Ādil Shah was in critical circumstances, being attacked from all sides by the enemies and it was obviously impossible to meet the invasion on all the fronts. Hence 'Ādil Shah on the advice of a Council, thought it expedient to surrender Shōlāpūr to Niẓām Shāh, to establish peace.[25]

In 1546, Burhān Niẓām Shah, at the instigation of Rāmarāj moved again to reduce Gulbarga. Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah marched from Bijapur to oppose him. Upon his arrival on the bank of Bhīmā river, he discovered Niẓām Shāhī army was strongly posted on the eastern bank of the Bhīmā river and found it impossible to cross, so he encamped on the opposite bank. Both armies lay in-active for three months during the rains. At length, 'Ādil Shah, tired of inactivity, found means to cross and attacked the Niẓām Shāhīs, who were totally defeated with heavy losses. Niẓām Shah, in despair, now sent Shāh Ṭāhir to beg the assistance of 'Alī Barīd, who, however, declined.[26]

In the following year, when Niẓām Shah attacked Bidar and laid siege to Aussa[27] on the request of 'Alī Barīd, 'Ādil Shah

---

24. Futūḥāt, 71 a-b; Basātīn, 60 f.
25. Futuḥāt, 71 b; Briggs, III, 56.
26. Briggs, III, 57.
27. Aunsa or Owsa - on the bank of Manjra river, about 76°.5'E. 18°.5'N.

marched to the help of 'Alī Barīd. The allies then raised the siege of Aunsa and in a battle the allies were defeated. Niẓām Shah then captured Udgīr[28] and proceeded to Qandhār. Here, the allies made another effort to raise the siege but, were defeated for the second time and Qandhār fell to the Niẓām Shah.[29]

While Niẓām Shah was returning, after his success over Bijapur, in 1548 to Ahmadnagar, on the way, he was approached by the deputies of a political party in Bijapur. They reported to him that the people were so oppressed by the cruelties and mal-administration of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah that the nobles were desirous of replacing him by the Prince 'Abdullāh, younger brother of 'Ādil Shah. 'Abdullāh at that time was seeking asylum at Goa. The Bijapurīs represented that without Niẓām Shah's help nothing could be effected. Quṭb Shah was also invited to coalesce with Niẓām Shah for this purpose, and the allied sovereigns accordingly moved towards Bijapur. Niẓām Shah first invaded Bijapur territory, and failing in an attempt to seize Belgaum, he was compelled to retreat. But soon, Asad Khan's death tempted Niẓām Shah to make another attack on Bijapur. He accordingly deputed ambassadors to Rāmarāj, inviting him to a confederacy. Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah on hearing these anti-Bijapur moves by Niẓām Shah, treated with disrespect the resident ambassador of Vijayanagar at his court. The ambassador quitted Bijapur, without taking leave. Then Niẓām Shah, on the advice of Ramārāj moved from Ahmadnagar, and blockaded Kalyānī. 'Ādil Shah marched to relieve it, and advancing within

---

28. Udgīr - N.W. of Bidar, 77°.5' E, 17°.9' N.

29. Briggs, 141 f.; Futūḥāt, 72 a.

sight of the Niẓām Shāhī forces, pitched his camp and entrenched himself. Niẓām Shah, unwilling to raise the siege, also fortified his lines. The Bijapurīs blockaded the supplies to Niẓām Shāhī forces. One fine morning Niẓām Shah made successfully a surprise attack on the Bijapurīs. After this defeat 'Ādil Shah in distress, fled, through Niẓām Shāhī territory, to Parenda and shut himself in the fort. But at the approach of Niẓām Shah, he retreated to Bijapur. The Niẓām Shāhī troops then occupied Parenda.[30]

In the following year 1549, Niẓām Shah again marched his army through Bijapurī territory without opposition, and held a conference with Rāmarāj in the vicinity of the fort of Rāidhūr. They resolved that they should both aggrandise themselves by attacking Bijapur. It was agreed that Rāmarāj should capture Rāichūr and Mudgal[31] with their dependencies on the south of the Krishna, and that Niẓām Shah to capture Shōlāpūr and Gulbarga. Accordingly, Vijayanagar forces besieged Shōlāpūr and after a blockade of three months, carried it by assault. On hearing that Rāmarāj had already reduced Rāichūr and Mudgal and had returned to Vijayanagar, Niẓām Shah also retreated to Ahmadnagar.[32]

Again in 1553, Niẓām Shah formed an alliance with Rāmarāj and marched towards Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah unable to cope up, retired to Panhala while the allies besieged Bijapur. But falling suddenly ill, Niẓām Shah raised the siege and retired to Ahmadnagar.[33]

---

30. ibid., 142 f.; ibid., 72 b.

31. Please see Map No.2 for the disputed territory of the Rāichūr Doāb.

32. Futūḥāt, 71; Briggs, III, 144.

33. idem.

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah I

On Ḥusain Niẓām Shah's accession in Ahmadnagar, on 9th February 1554, Shāh 'Alī and Mīrān Muḥammad Bāqar fled to their uncle Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, at Bijapur; and Shāh Ḥaidar having gone to his father-in-law, Khwāja-I Jahān at Parēnda, laid claim to the throne of Ahmadnagar. Later on, Niẓam Shah occupied Parēnda and Shāh Ḥaidar with Khwāja-i Jahān sought refuge at Bijapur. Now Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shan openly espoused the cause of Shāh Ḥaidar and Khwāja-i Jahān for which help he was to receive Shōlāpūr and Kalyānī. Thus, 'Ādil Shah, declaring war against Niẓām Shah, marched to Shōlāpūr. In the meantime, Niẓām Shah formed an alliance with 'Imād Shah of Berar, and with the re-inforcement, marched towards Shōlāpūr.[34]

The opposing forces of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur clashed and in the conflict the latter met with a few reverses. 'Ādil Shah was forced to take refuge in the citadel of Bijapur, which was ultimately blockaded by Saif 'Ainul-Mulk of Ahmadnagar. Thus pressed hard 'Ādil Shah sought for assistance from Rāmarāj. The latter sent an army under his brother Venkaṭādri. This made 'Ainul-Mulk to withdraw to Ahmadnagar.[35]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah I

The internal troubles in Bijapur, arising out of the death of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I, in 1557, emboldened Niẓām Shah to avail the opportunity and aggrandise the Bijapur territory. Thus, Niẓām Shah in concert with Quṭb Shah marched to invade Bijapur. 'Alī

---

34. Briggs, III, 145.
35. ibid., 64, 144.

'Ādil Shah, to avert the defeat, sought help from Ramarāj. The latter using his verbal strategy, directed Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah to withdraw. Quṭb Shah complied with the request, due to personal obligations. Thus Quṭb Shah quietly deserted his ally and withdrew. Consequently Niẓām Shah, after making in vain overtures for help to 'Imād Shah in 1559, withdrew to Ahmadnagar.[36]

In the meantime, the allied sovereigns of Bijapur, Golkonda and Vijayanagar, invaded Niẓām Shāhī territories. The forts of Kalyānī and Shōlāpūr were bargained for the terms of peace; this being refused, the confederates marched to Ahmadnagar, with a large army. Niẓam Shah unable to cope up with these forces, fled from Ahmadnagar to Paiṭhan, whence he deputed embassies to Berar, Khāndēsh and Bidar soliciting help. Meanwhile, the allies laid siege to Ahmadnagar; but Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah, unwilling that 'Ādil Shah should add this fort to his dominions, connived at supplies passing through his camp to the garrison, and later on slipped away to Golkonda.[37]

When the siege was pressed hard, the Niẓām Shah deputed Qāsim Bēg and Mullā 'Inayatullah to Rāmarāj seeking peace. Then the allies granted peace on the following terms:[38] that Niẓām Shah to cede the fortress of Kalyānī to 'Ādil Shah; that he should put to death Jahāngīr Khan, who commanded the auxiliary troops of Daryā 'Imād Shah and who was extremely active against the allies; and that he should pay a visit to Rāmarāj to receive pān from his hands.

---

36. ibid., 6, 145 f.
37. idem.
38. Briggs, III, 147.

After the meeting between Niẓām Shah and Rāmarāj, the former gave the keys of the fort of Kalyānī to the latter, who in turn passed it to 'Ādil Shah. Though the treaty was concluded between Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar but Bijapur was the cause, indirect party and benefactor of it.

Niẓām Shah did not loose hopes of recovering back Kalyānī and he made attempts for its recovery. For this purpose in 1562, Niẓām Shah and Quṭb Shah met in the neighbourhood of Kalyānī. To strengthen their alliance and bond of friendship, Bībī Jamīlā, the daughter of Niẓām Shah was married to Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah. Immediately, they laid siege to the Kalyānī fort. In this situation they were attacked by Rāmarāj and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, who were joined by 'Alī Barīd from Bidar and Burhān 'Imād Shah from Berar. Niẓām Shah's plan proved to be abortive, as Golkonda forces deserted and fled away. Niẓām Shah had to retreat, with heavy losses.[39]

The allies chased Niẓām Shah and even after raising siege of Ahmadnagar, they chased him to Junnair from whence he retired into the mountains. At the approach of the rainy season, the allies again laid siege to Ahmadnagar but after some time raised it. While Niẓām Shah tried to smuggle food grains into the fort of Sholāpūr, which was besieged by the allies.[40]

Confederacy against Vijayanagar

The indignity and atrocity committed by the army of Rāmarāj on the people of Ahmadnagar, as an ally of Bijapur, during the last

---

39. ibid., 148.

40. ibid., 149 f.

war, and the plunder of the Bijapurī and Golkonda territories by his forging party and his compulsion on both 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah to cede certain territories, opened the eyes of the Deccan Sultans.[41] For the time being both 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah forgetting their hereditory animosity and enemity, allied together along with their common enemies — rulers of Golkonda and Bidar.[42]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah resolved to curb Rāmarāj's insolence and reduce his power. For this purpose, on the advice of Shāh Abū Turāb and Kishwar Khan Lārī, 'Ādil Shah advised the latter to take measures to effect a general league[43] of the Deccan Sultans. To strengthen the military alliance, matrimonial alliances were

---

41. Futūḥat, 87 a-b. Briggs, III, 149 f.; Burhān, 403. Please see infra Part II, Sec. I of this Chapter, for the causes which led to the confederacy of the Deccan Sultans against Vijayanagar.

42. Both Basātīn (95) and Ferishta (Briggs, III, 150) clearly states that "four" Deccan Sultans formed the confederacy whereas Dr. Radhey Shyam: The Kingdom of Ahmadnagar, (120) writes "Quintiple Alliance of five Muslim Sultans of the Deccan -". Prof. Sherwani (J.I.H., op.cit.) toagree and says that it was "the League of the four Sultans" - Q.S.D., 141, 229, fn.43.

43. According to Basātīn (92) and Ferishta (Briggs, III, 74 f) it was 'Alī 'Ādil Shah who initiated the confederacy against Vijayanagar while according to Burhān (413) Niẓām Shah was the originator. While according to Raḍīuddīn Shīrāzī, it was Niẓām Shah who first thought that without the alliance of 'Ādil Shah it was impossible to be safe from the atrocities and dangers of Rāmarāj. Hence Niẓām Shah and Quṭb Shah agreed to make alliance with 'Ādil Shah. For this purpose, Niẓām Shah took the initiative by sending valuable presents with the key of the fort of Sandlapūr (Sholāpūr) through his son to 'Ādil Shah and with the proposal of materimonial alliance - Tadhkirāt , 46 a. For various controversial discussions see Q.S.D., 141, 229 fn. 42.

formed, by which it was agreed that Ḥusain Niẓām Shah should give his daughter Chānd Bībī in marriage to 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, with the fortress of Shōlāpūr as her dowry. And in reciprocation, 'Ādil Shah's sister Hadiyā Sulṭānā, was to be given as a consort to Murtaḍā, eldest son of Ḥusain Niẓām Shah. Further, it was decided to enter into a treaty of eternal friendship between the two dynasties, and they were to unite sincerely to reduce the power of Vijayanagar. For this purpose they were to march to Vijayanagar at the earliest practicable time. The terms of the treaty having been settled, Mullā 'Ināyatullāh accompanied Muṣṭafā Khan as ambassador, on his return to Bijapur. Then the political treaties and matrimonial agreements were drawn out and were mutually confirmed by the most solemn oaths. It was also agreed that, on the same day, nuptial rejoicing and festive should be held at Bijapur and Ahmadnagar, and the two princess be sent to their new homes.[44]

The four Sultans of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Bidar and Golkonda, after making necessary preparations and working out the strategy for war, jointly attacked Vijayanagar in 972/1565. 'Ādil Shah entertained his ally Niẓām Shah with great splendour and sent strict orders to all the governors of his kingdom to forward supplies of provisions from their districts regularly to the allies camp. This action was necessitated because Bijapur was contiguous with Vijayanagar and the allied army had to trespass through Bijapur territory. 'Ādil Shah was keen on pleasing his new friends and he told them that they should consider themselves as his guests and that he would gladly arrange for supplies for them as well as for their armies.[45]

---

44. Futūḥāt, 93 a-b; Briggs, III, 74 ff.; Tadhkirāt, 46 b.
45. Basātīn, 96.

The allied armies marched from Bijapur to Tālikōṭā, and thence to Krishna on 20-5-972/24-12-1564 and the great battle of Bannihatti was fought on 20-6-972/23-1-1565, which decided in favour of the Sultans.[46]

The Break-up of the Confederacy

Since there was no agreement of a permanent modus vivendi between the Deccan Sultans, soon after the battle of Bannihatti of 1565 the process of break-up started. The old hereditary animosity once again started playing its role. It was the jealousy of territorial gains that flared up mutual strife.

Before the conquest of Vijayanagar, it was agreed between the allies that the Krishna-Tungabhadra doab[47] should be restored, after the conquest, to 'Ādil Shah. But soon after the battle, when the question of distribution of the war gains arose, Niẓām Shah and Quṭb Shah sent secret messengers to Tirumala to not to restore the doab forts to the men of 'Ādil Shah. Tirumala, on his part, communicated lame excuses to 'Ādil Shah, adopting delaying tactics, expressing his inability to restore the forts immediately.[48]

In the meanwhile, when Muṣṭafā Khan, Quṭb Shāhī Commander went to hand over the keys of the doab, Ḥusain Niẓām Shah was touched to the quick and he sent a strongly worded message to Quṭb Shah to the effect that it was against all etiquette that Muṣṭafā Khan should hand over the territory to the representative of 'Ādil Shah without his consent.[49] Thus, apparently Niẓām Shah professed

---

46. Burhan, 416. Taḏkirāt, 47 f. For the details of the Battle Bannihatti, please see infra part II, Sec. I of this chapter.
47. For the importance of "The Rāichūr Doāb in the Deccan History Dr. P.M. Joshi; J.I.H., December 1958, 380 ff.
48. Basātīn, 109 f.
49. Sherwani, op.cit., J.I.H., 1958, 75 f.

friendship and cordiality towards 'Ādil Shah but in reality he possessed inner hereditory animosity. 'Ādil Shah too had evinced similar attitude towards Niẓām Shah.

'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah

Ḥusain Niẓām Shah was succeeded by a minor, Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah. This, 'Ādil Shah conceived a favourable opportunity for territorial aggrandisement. As such, he marched towards the south in 1566. When Venkaṭādri informed 'Ādil Shah's designs to Niẓām Shah and the Queen Khunzā Humāyūn, the latter could not tolerate the territorial expansion of Bijapur. Thus, she took the young Sultan with her and marched at the head of a large army to Bijapur. This compelled 'Ādil Shah to retreat to Bijapur expeditiously from Ānēgōndī. After frequent skirmishes for some time between the Bijapurī and Ahmadnagar forces, they dispersed.[50]

During the course of an year the hostile feelings between 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah were patched up; and at the request of the Queen-Regent of Ahmadnagar, 'Ādil Shah in 1567 marched with his army to her assistance during the invasion of Berar. But the alliance soon faded out and the depleted state of affairs at Ahmadnagar tempted 'Ādil Shah to extend his dominions. Thus, in the beginning of 975/1567, 'Ādil Shah detached Kishwar Khan, to invade Niẓām Shāhī territory. The Bijapurīs not only occupied Niẓām Shāhī territory, but also constructed a fort and named it Dhārūr. Consequently, Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah, now grown up, marched to recover his lost territory. He laid siege to Dhārūr, where Kishwar Khan

---

50. Briggs, III, 80.

shut himself up in the fort. In an assault, the latter was hit and killed; thereupon the Bijapurīs fled and the fort fell to the Niẓām Shah. With this signal victory, the latter also recovered other districts, which were captured earlier by the Bijapurīs. In the meanwhile, 'Ainul-Mulk, Bijapurī rushed towards Ahmadnagar for plundering and devastating Niẓām Shāhī territory. But on being chased by the Niẓām Shāhīs, he returned to Bijapur with heavy losses.[51]

Niẓām Shah admitted the weight of the argument put forth by Quṭb Shah that -- "None of us possess any rich and fertile land to the south of Bijapur. It is rumoured that, a Bijapurī force under Kishwar Khan has been despatched to that side. In view of our present resources we cannot offer any opposition to Bijapur. But with fresh conquest and annexations 'Ādil would grow more powerful and he would reduce us to subjection. Under such circumstances it is only becoming that we should attack Bijapur. We would, in that case either conquer a portion of his kingdom or compel him to recall his army devoid of any military glory." Consequently, Niẓām Shah persuaded Berar to join the confederacy against Bijapur. The combined forces of the three allies then marched into Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah came to Shāhdrug to meet the invaders. The allies had no courage to give battle. They marched against Bijapur through a different routs and halted near the tank at Shāhpūr. 'Ādil Shah, on the other hand, took no alarm. He detatched contingents to defend Bijapur. The allies laid siege to Bijapur. Two battles were fought in which the Bijapurīs offered

---

51. idem.

stubborn resistance. Finally the Bijapurīs emerged victorious. The allies retreated to their respective capitals.[52]

After the conclusion of peace, 'Ādil Shah desired to strengthen his relations with Niẓām Shah by an alliance. As such diplomatic relations between the two courts were re-established. 'Ādil Shah sent an envoy to Ahmadnagar for the confirmation of the last treaty and for the formation of an alliance against their common enemies. Niẓām Shah, once again forgetting all their past animosity with 'Ādil Shah, considered it expedient to establish good relations with Bijapur. In persuance of this policy, the 'Ādil Shāhī envoy was accorded a grand reception at Ahmadnagar. This was followed by the meeting of the two sultans near Owsa. Here a treaty of peace was renewed and military alliance was formed against Berar.[53]

Following this alliance, the combined armies marched towards Berar. After some skirmishes, the allies defeated the Berar army. Then, both the Sultans led an expedition to Berar. Tufāl Khan, unable to cope up with the combined strength, wisely retreated and played diplomatic strategy of fomenting animosity between the allies, by enticing 'Ādil Shah to march against Quṭb Shah for better gains. 'Ādil Shah acted foolishly. Forgetting that it was he who invited Niẓām Shah to form an alliance against Tufāl Khan, discarded the alliance, and retreated from the campaign. He even went to the extent of seizing the person of Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah.[54] This exposed 'Ādil Shah's duplicity and breach of trust.

---

52. Tadhkirāt, 50b .; Basātīn, 115 ff.
53. Burhān, 434; Basātīn, 118 f.
54. idem., Q.S.D., 159 f.

The conflict did not end. Now was the turn of the Queen Khunzā Humāyūn to avenge 'Ādil Shah's treachery, through an alliance with Tufāl Khan of Berar. Further, she wished to recover some of the districts which 'Ādil Shah had captured from Ahmadnagar. The combined armies of Ahmadnagar and Berar attacked Bijapur. The Queen's strategy was quite successful; as 'Ādil Shah got frightened and retreated. At the same time he detached Kishwar Khan to engage the allied army. Kishwar made Gulbarga his headquarters, from where he made skirmishes. Finally, after some time the allies raised the siege and returned.[55]

Though in 1566, Bijapur and Ahmadnagar joined in league against Berar, but in 1568, the rift appeared between the allies. 'Alī 'Ādil Shah seized the opportunity of the confused state of affairs at Ahmadnagar and abetting by the advice of Kishwar Khan, he wanted to avenge the loss of Rāichūr and Mudgal. When news of this proposed attack reached Ahmadnagar Niẓām Shah sought help from Golkonda and Berar. The armies of the three allies met between Qandhār and Kaulās. 'Ādil Shah was taken aback by these development and unable to cope up with the combination, retreated to Bijapur. The allies now advanced into Bijapur territory itself, forcing 'Ādil Shah to take refuge in the plains of Konkan. 'Ādil Shah then approached Ibrāhīm Qutb Shah for peace. On latter's advice[56] the allies withdrew.

However, 'Ādil Shah did not keep up the terms of the peace. Seizing the opportunity of the confused state of affairs at

---

55. idem.

56. Tadhkirat, 52; Basātīn, 120 f.

Ahmadnagar and rift between the Queen and the Niẓām Shah 'Ādil Shah captured Kondana and later on named it Dhārūr.[57]

After the fall of Khunzā Humāyūn in September 1569 Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah assumed power and decided to recover the Niẓām Shāhī territory captured by 'Ādil Shah during the regency of his mother. He first tried to settle the issue through diplomatic means and adviced Kishwar Khan to vacate Dhārūr. But the latter's insolent reply enraged Niẓām Shah. Immediately, Murtaḍā marched to Dhārūr, and after a short siege captured it. He then marched to Bijapur itself accompanied by the Golkonda forces.

The crafty 'Ādil Shah now having recourse to ruse, sent Shāh Abu'l-Ḥasan (son of Shāh Ṭāhir) to Murtaḍā, evincing the mutual benefits accruing from the friendly relations of the two states on the previous occasions. He also exhorted him about the futility of Ahmadnagar-Golkonda alliance. At the same time, 'Ādil Shah, on the diplomatic offensive, corresponded with Quṭb Shah and successfully created animosity between the two allies. Consequently, Quṭb Shah withdrew, resulting in the break-up of the alliance.[58]

Then 'Ādil Shah tried to be friendly with Niẓām Shah. But when the latter wished to avenge Quṭb Shah, 'Ādil Shah readily changed his allegiance and agreed to the proposal of Quṭb Shah against Niẓām Shah. Further, 'Ādil Shah came to a secret understanding with Shāh Ḥaidar and Jamāluddīn Ḥusain, former ministers

---

57. Briggs, III, 150; Q.S.D., 160, for controversial discussions of various sources about these two campaigns see Q.S.D., 236 f., fn. 93.

58. Briggs, 154; Q.S.D., 160 f.

of Ahmadnagar. But clever strategy of Niẓām Shah successfully prevented the junction of the allies. Thus, the confederacy fell to pieces, and in consternation the allies retreated to their respective capitals.[59]

However, 'Ādil Shah did not maintain this policy. Very soon, in 1572, he changed his allegiance. And once again, he allied with Niẓām Shah to form a dual alliance. 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah being inspired by the ambitious projects of territorial aggrandisement, agreed mutually that "'Alī 'Ādil Shah should conquer as much of the Karnatak as would produce a revenue equal to Berar and Bidar, which the latter kingdoms Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah should be at liberty to wrest from the hands of Tufāl Khan and 'Alī Barīd Shah."[60] Further, they agreed to exchange permanent envoys at their courts. Accordingly the two Sultans executed the terms of the treaty by undertaking their respective expeditions.

Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah maintained the integrity of the treaty with 'Ādil Shah inspite of being induced and tempted by Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah and Venkaṭādri of Vijayanagar. The latter had offered a sum of seven lakhs hung, as expenses of war on Bijapur. While

---

59. Briggs, III, 160.

60. Briggs, III, 155; Basātīn, 124 f.
Ferishta at two places (Briggs, III, 82, 155) gives slightly different version of the same treaty. Bidar and the revenues of Berar and Bidar are not mentioned at 82. However, at both the places (Briggs, III, 82, 155), where the terms of the treaty are mentioned, it is not mentioned that both Niẓām Shah and 'Ādil Shah were to jointly conquer Berar. In the terms of the treaty it is clearly stated that 'Ādil Shah should conquer as much of the Karnatak as would "produce a revenue equal to Berar and Bidar --" and not "-- an equal area to the two kingdoms --" as wrongly mentioned by Dr. Radhey Shyam (op.cit., 160).

the former was jealous of Bijapur's successful expeditions in the south, offered five thousand huns[61] per day for defraying the cost of expedition against Bijapur.

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah I

Death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I in 1580 altered the diplomatic relations of Bijapur. Niẓām Shah forgetting the past relations, casted envious and aggressive designs on Bijapur. The commotion at Bijapur, during the minority of 'Ādil Shah was a natural incentive for Niẓām Shah. He formed a pretext for the invasion in taking revenge for 'Alī 'Ādil Shah's help to 'Alī Barīd against Ahmadnagar. Acting on the notorious tradition of Deccan Sultans, Niẓām Shah seeking vengence on the son for the deeds of the father, detached Malik Bihzād for the investment of Shōlāpūr, which was the bone of contention between the two kingdoms. Bijapur retaliated and penetrated into Ahmadnagar territory and the Ahmadnagar forces were defeated at Daraseon. Niẓām Shah's plans were all upset; and in order to save the critical situation, he sought help from Golkonda. The combined armies of Ahmadnagar and Golkonda marched to the 'Ādil Shāhī fort of Naldurg and invested it. But soon, the allies realising the futility of investing Naldurg, turned towards Bijapur itself. They met no opposition, until they reached Shāhpūr, a suburb of Bijapur. In the meanwhile, the Bijapurī garrison of Naldurg, rushed to Bijapur's rescue and gave a pitched battle to the allies. The Bijapurīs were forced to shut up in the fort on the defensive. The defences of the fort were in grave danger, due to the civil strife. Further, the defection

---

61. Burhān, 482; Q.S.D., 170.

of Kishwar Khan and 'Ainul-Mulk and their cross over to the side of Ahmadnagar encouraged the invaders.

At last the Bijapurīs had no other alternative than to sue for peace and to come to terms. As such they resorted, in vain, to underhand dealings, by sending Syed Murtaḍā to the Commander of the Ahmadnagar forces, with a message that they are prepared to appoint his friend Shāh Abul-Ḥasan as Pēshwā, provided, that Murtaḍā breaks with and attacks the Golkonda forces. The Bijapurīs then resorted to guerilla warfare. This compelled the allies to raise the siege of Bijapur and retreat. While retreating, they ravaged the country at several places — Satārā, Gulbarga, Mīraj, Pāibāgh etc.; and they again laid siege to Naldurg. But the death of Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah in June 1581 changed the situation.[62]

With the arrival of new Sultan Muḥammad Qulī Quṭb Shah at Naldurg, in September 1581, the siege operations were intensified. But when the allies could not capture it even after four months of investment by fair means, they resorted in vain to underhand dealings, by tempting and bribing the defenders. Quṭb Shah got sick of unsuccessful fighting and decided to return back, leaving a composite contingent to guard the territories which were recently wrested from Bijapur. The allies then returned to their respective capitals, in about the middle of February 1582. Later on, the contingent was compelled by Bijapurīs to withdraw.[63]

Dilāwar Khan, the regent of Bijapur, in order to re-establish cordial relations with Ahmadnagar, sent in 1584, his

---

62. Burhān, 482; Q.S.D., 170.

63. Briggs, III, 94, 269.

ambassador to Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah. The latter requested for Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah's sister Khadījā Sulṭānā, in marriage for his son Mīrān Ḥusain. Both the parties agreed to strengthen their dynastic relations through the new matrimonial alliance. As such Qāsim Bēg came to receive the princess, and escorted her to Ahmadnagar. The bride was accompanied by her aunt Chānd Bībī, who wished to visit her brother Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah.[64]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah II

After Chānd Bībī's return to Ahmadnagar, Ṣalābat Khan, the Niẓām Shāhī Minister, demanded in 1586, the cession of Shōlāpūr and its dependent districts by Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah was reluctant to surrender. Consequently, Ṣalābat Khan refused to celebrate the nuptials and he did not send back 'Ādil Shah's sister to Bijapur. At this attitude, 'Ādil Shah invaded Ahmadnagar towards the end of 995/1587. Niẓām Shah was unaware of Ṣalābat Khan's diplomacy. But when the reality dawned upon him, he suspended Ṣalābat Khan and appointed Qāsim Bēg in his place, and also effected reconciliation with 'Ādil Shah. The latter retreated from Parēnda to Bijapur. Afterwards, the nuptials were celebrated.[65]

However, no alliance could keep the Deccan Sultans from going back to their mutual quarrels and jealousies. When Ahmadnagar was in utter confusion due to internal dissensions, after the assassination of Ḥusain Niẓām Shah, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, on the ill-advice of Dilāwar Khan thought it an opportunity to annex parts

---

64. Briggs, III, 96; Basātīn, 191 f.
65. Basātīn, 191 f; Briggs, III, 97, 162; Burhān, I.A., February, 1923, 32.

of Ahmadnagar. Thus in 1588, 'Ādil Shah invaded Ahmadnagar. The Niẓām Shāhī army, under Jamāl Khan, marched to meet the Bijapurīs. The two armies faced each other at Ashti, without engaging. At length Jamāl Khan came to the 'Ādil Shāhī camp and prudently sued for peace. Dilāwar Khan consented, on conditions that, Chānd Bībī returns to Bijapur; Khadīja Sulṭānā, sister of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah and widow of the late Ḥusain Niẓām Shah, was also sent back to Bijapur; and that Ahmadnagar paid two hundred and seventy five thousands huns as the war indemnity (nal baha). Jamāl Khan readily fulfilled the terms and the Bijapur army retreated.[66]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Burhān Niẓām Shah II

Burhān Niẓam Shah II, who took refuge for two years (1580-82) at Bijapur was now, in 1590 backed by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and his forces, made second bid to regain the throne of Ahmadnagar. 'Ādil Shah himself with his forces marched to Ahmadnagar. Jamāl Khan marched from Ahmadnagar to meet the Bijapurīs. A pitched battle was fought in which the Bijapurīs emerged victorious. Consequently, Burhān Niẓām Shah II ascended the throne, on 15th May 1591.[67]

Even though Burhān owed the throne of Ahmadnagar mainly due to the military assistance of Bijapur, yet he, very soon forgot the obligation he owed to 'Ādil Shah and did not reciprocate a friendly gesture. Thus, when in 1591 Dilāwar Khan fled from Bijapur to Ahmadnagar, he was favourably received by Burhān, who enrolled him among his nobles, and appointed to reduce the forts of Shōlāpūr and Shāhdurg.[68] 'Ādil Shah sent his envoys, with a letter

66. Briggs, III, 98, 169. Burhān, I.A. September 1923, 259.
67. Briggs, III, 172.
68. Shāhdurg, Nadruga is called Shāhdurg by the Persian Chroniclers.

to Burhān, protesting against the breach of diplomatic etiquette. Contrary to expectation, Burhān ill-treated the Bijapurī envoys and replied arrogantly to his erstwhile benefactor.[69]

Again, 'Ādil Shah sent Mullā 'Ināyatullāh to Burhān, demanding restitution of 300 elephants which Dilāwar Khan had taken with him to Ahmadnagar. Burhān, instead of conceding the demand, and forgetting all that he owned to 'Ādil Shah, prepared for war at the instigation of Dilāwar Khan. Burhān declared war in March 1592. The Niẓām Shāhī forces marched into Bijapurī territories and laid waste the country as they passed.[70]

Again, in 1594, Burhān embroiled himself in the internal affairs of Bijapur. He adopted anti-Bijapur policy by promising to render military assistance to prince Ismā'īl, in deposing Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II. Accordingly Burhān marched from Ahmadnagar towards Belgaum. But, having heard, on his arrival at Parēnḍa, that prince Ismā'īl had been defeated by the Bijapurīs and put to death, he returned to Ahmadnagar. This was a sufficient cause for 'Ādil Shah to take offensive action. He, in turn, resolved to punish Burhān for supporting his rival brother, ordered his army to lay waste the Ahmadnagar frontiers. Burhān further provoked 'Ādil Shah by allying with Venkaṭādri of Penukonḍa for the invasion of Bijapur. Thus to create a double diversion, it was agreed between the allies that the Venkaṭādri would take the fortress of Bankāpur etc., while on the North, Burhān would reduce Shōlāpūr and Shāhdurg. Accordingly, Murtaḍā Khan Injū advanced as far as Parēnḍa,

---

69. Briggs, III, 103 ff.

70. idem.

when finding that the Rāmarāj had not yet began his march, he prudently halted, to effect a proper combination. However, he sent out detachments to lay waste and plunder the adjacent Bijapurī territory. These troops received a severe check from those of Bijapur. This struck the rest of the Niẓām Shāhī army with terror and they stopped their plundering operations. And in March 1595, due to serious illness of Burhān and party dissensions, Murtaḍā Khan retreated to Ahmadnagar.[71]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Ibrāhīm Niẓām Shah

After the death of Burhān Niẓām Shah in May, 1595 and during the minority of Ibrāhīm Niẓām Shah, the Habashīs came to power at Ahmadnagar. These Habashīs behaved insolently towards the Bijapurī ambassador, Mīr Ṣūfī. The latter, who had gone to condole the death of Burhān and congratulate Ibrāhīm in the lineal succession, had to quit Ahmadnagar in disgust. 'Ādil Shah was so much offended at this affront that he resolved to take revenge upon Niẓām Shah. Consequently, on 18th May, 1595, 'Ādil Shah marched with his army to Shāhdurg. 'Ādil Shah was not determined to declare war. He only wanted to have redress of the misbehaviour of the minister. As such, in expectation of apologies, he marched slowly to Shāhdurg, where he fixed his headquarters.[72]

Ikhlāṣ Khan of Ahmadnagar instead of endeavouring to make peace, marched with Niẓām Shah and his army to meet the Bijapurīs. Even at this action of Niẓām Shah, the 'Ādil Shah advised his

---

71. idem.
72. Briggs, III, 113 f.

commander Ḥamīd Khan to not to initiate hostilities, if the Niẓām Shāhīs did not enter Bijapur territory. However, contrary to the expectation of 'Ādil Shah, the Ahmadnagar army crossed the boundary of Bijapur. Upon this invasion, Ḥamīd Khan attacked the invaders. A severe battle was fought, in which the Bijapurīs were saved from a near defeat. After another encounter, the Niẓām Shāhī army had to leave the field and retreat; and the Bijapurīs emerged victorious. During the retreat Niẓām Shah died on 10th May, 1595. However, 'Ādil Shah, not withstanding this signal advantage, and the confused state of affairs at Ahmadnagar, did not consent to invade Ahmadnagar, but he recalled Ḥamīd Khan from the borders and retreated to Bijapur.[73]

Bijapur-Ahmadnagar Coalition against the Mughals

Soon after the Mughal invasion of Ahmadnagar on 16th December, 1595, Miān Manjū unable to cope up with the formidable Mughal army, fled with his protege Aḥmad Niẓām Shah from Ahmadnagar for Owsa, on the Bijapurī frontier, and from there he appealed to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah for help against the Mughals. Chānd Bībī, who was at the helm of the affairs at Ahmadnagar, also sent urgent messages to 'Ādil Shah for help. The latter, realising that due to the civil war at Ahmadnagar, its defences were weak, sent Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī, with messages to various claimants to the Niẓām Shāhī throne and their protectors to shun their rivalries for the present to ward off unitedly the Mughal aggression, and then to decide the successor for the throne. The judicious advice of 'Ādil Shah had the desired effect, and the opposite factions got united with Chānd Bībī to defend the siege of Ahmadnagar.

73. idem.

'Ādil Shah responding to the fervent appeal of Chānd Bībī, detached a contingent for helping the Niẓām Shāhī forces. When the siege of Ahmadnagar was hard pressed and when the Mughals succeeded in causing the breach, the 'Ādil Shāhī envoy Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī at that time in the fort, took charge of artillery and began to fire in defence of Ahmadnagar. The forces of 'Ādil Shah played strategic role and the Mughals had to sue for peace and retreat.[74]

Thus the Mughal invasion brought rulers of Ahmadnagar and Bijapur more closer. And Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī assumed the role of a mediator in the internal affairs of Ahmadnagar. To settle the mutual quarrels, Shīrāzī had to "repeatedly and severely admonish and threatened" the nobles of Ahmadnagar on behalf of 'Ādil Shah. 'Ādil Shah thus succeeded in not only bringing about reconciliation between Bahādur Niẓām Shah and his nobles but also in warding off Mughal aggression of Ahmadnagar. This brought tranquility to the people of Ahmadnagar. Hence, great rejoicings were celebrated and prayers for the safety, long life and prosperity of 'Ādil Shah were recited at Ahmadnagar.

However, the settlement brought about by the intervention of 'Ādil Shah did not last long. Shīrāzī returned back to Bijapur, after having tried in vain for four times, in the space of fourteen months to make permanent settlement between the contending factions.[75]

Above all, earlier Chānd Bībī too requested the assistance of her nephew, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, to quell the internal

---

74. Burhān (Eng. trans. by J.S. King) and I.A., December 1898, 232 ff.
75. Burhān (Eng. trans. by J.S. King) and I.A., December, 1898, 318 ff., November 1923, 338 ff.

commotions of Ahmadnagar. 'Ādil Shah deputed Muṣṭafā Khan with a body of four thousand horse to her aid. At the same time, 'Ādil Shah, addressing a letter to Miān Manjū called him to Bijapur. He succeeded in satisfactorily ascertaining that Aḥmad, son of Shāh Ṭāhir was not a lineal descendant of the Niẓām Shāhī family and as such had no claim to the throne. Further he granted to the Aḥmad a handsome estate for life, and enrolled Miān Manjū among the nobles of Bijapur.[76]

Again in 1597, when the Mughals broke the truce with Ahmadnagar by territorial encroachments, 'Ādil Shah readily joined the anti-Mughal alliance with Ahmadnagar and Golkonda and the allied armies encamped at Sōnpēt. The Bijapurīs fought with the Niẓām Shāhī forces against Mughals in the battle at Ashti, resulting in the defeat of the Mughals in the initial stage; but, later on, the Bijapurī general fled away, and finally the Mughals emerged victorious.[77]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Malik 'Ambar

Malik 'Ambar as a far-sighted diplomat and politician realised the importance and necessity of forming a united front of the Deccan kingdoms against the Mughals. With this foresight, emerged the cardinal principal of his policy to assiduously win support and co-operation of his former master, 'Ādil Shah. The latter too, reciprocated similar gesture by fore-seeing the benefits accruing from such a relationship. 'Ādil Shah with a view to

---

76. Briggs, III, 182 ff.

77. Basātīn, 263 f.; Dr. D.R. Seti : "The Life and Times of Malik Ambar", Is.cl., April 1957, 150 ff.

maintain a barrier or shock-absorber between Bijapur and the Mughals not only encouraged friendly relations with Malik 'Ambar but also did his best, by making concessions to strengthen 'Ambar's power.[78]

'Ādil Shah exercised considerable influence over 'Ambar. In 1607, 'Ambar before deposing Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah consulted 'Ādil Shah. On latter's disapproval 'Ambar did not take the drastic step.[79]

Throughout the struggle with the Mughals, Malik 'Ambar sought help from Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah, ever obligingly extended help both, by men and money. In 1609 'Ādil Shah sent 10,000 horsemen as military assistance. Consequently due to these obligations 'Ambar professed humility towards 'Ādil Shah and acted like his servant. The result of Malik 'Ambar's alliance with Bijapur was the utter failure of the Mughals in 1609-10 and despatch of Prince Parvēz by Jahāngīr to retrieve the situation.[80]

'Ādil Shah had high regards for Malik 'Ambar and wanted to strengthen him as a barrier between himself and the Mughals. As such, when in 1615, 'Ambar sought help from 'Ādil Shah, to avert the conspiracy of the mutinuous soldiers, the latter magnanimously responded the call by sending 20,000 horse under Mullā Muḥammad Lārī to Khaṛkī. In the battle that ensued in February, 1616, 'Ambar and the Bijapurī forces suffered. Afterwards, 'Ambar again with the help of 'Ādil Shah, brought back to his side Adham Khan,

---

78. Futūhāt, 267 a, 271 a, b. To strengthen 'Ambar's power, 'Ādil Shah ceded the fort of Qandhār.
79. Briggs, III, 192, Basātīn, 270 f.
80. Futūhāt, 272 b; Basātīn, 272 f.

Jādhav Rāo, Bālājī Kāyastha and Udā Rām who had deserted him and joined the Mughals. But afterwards when 'Ambar accused Mullā of collusion with the Mughals, and induced 'Ādil Shah to recall, the latter complied with the request. And on return 'Ādil Shah deprived Mullā of his jagir, for two years due to displeasure.[81]

'Ādil Shah not only supported and colloborated with 'Ambar against the Mughals, but he took keen interest in the external affairs of Ahmadnagar, in order to strengthen 'Ambar's position. 'Ādil Shah was instrumental in establishing cordial relations between 'Ambar and the Portuguese at Goa. For this purpose the envoys of both 'Ambar and Portuguese Viceroy came to Nauraspūr (near Bijapur) in October 1615. 'Ambar sent Kāshī Pandit, with a letter dated 18th September, 1615, stating that "whatever agreement is entered into by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah and Shāh Nawāz Khan ('Ādil Shāhī) with the Viceroy (of Portuguese) shall be signed by our Ambassador, Kāshī Pandit, this will be observed by us."[82] This manifest the great influence and confidence that 'Ādil Shah enjoyed among the Deccan rulers and especially Malik 'Ambar.

It seems that the humiliating treaty of 1621 which 'Ambar had to enter with the Mughals, was as a result of the undue pressure, exerted on Malik 'Ambar by 'Ādil Shah (and Qutb Shah) to suit their purpose. Obviously, Bijapur played dual diplomacy, by keeping the Mughals pleased and pacified and at the same time, 'Ādil Shah extended all possible help by way of men, horse and cash to 'Ambar. This caused rupture between 'Ambar and 'Ādil Shah

---

81. Futūḥāt, 276, 277 b, 289; Basātīn, 273 f.

82. B.G. Tamaskar; "Malik 'Ambar and the Portuguese, J.B.R.S., XXXIII (1, 2), 39.

and the former became resentful towards the latter.[83]

The rupture became riped in 1623. 'Ādil Shah was extremely displeased on account of 'Ambar's bad behaviour and inordinate pride and insolence. This gave an opportunity to the Mughals to further alienate 'Ambar from 'Ādil Shah. As such, prince Parvēz sought the friendship of 'Ādil Shah with many gifts. 'Ādil Shah took this opportunity and sent his confidential envoy Mullā Muḥammad Lārī to Parvēz, at Nalcha (a dependency of Māndū). The Mullā was highly honoured by Parvēz and the latter placed all the deserters of 'Ambar, under Mullā's command.[84]

This alarming news of Mughal-Bijapur offensive-defensive alliance greatly perturbed 'Ambar, and he wrote repeated letters to 'Ādil Shah begging him to recall Mullā from the Mughal camp , as there was a settled peace between 'Ādil Shah and himself. But Ibrāhīm did not at all agree. Again 'Ambar in 1624 came to Nauraspur (near Bijapur) and sought in vain to make peace.[85]

Having failed to settle peace 'Ambar retreated towards his dominions. 'Ādil Shah sent a large force under Ikhlāṣ Khan on the heels of 'Ambar. While from behind Mullā Muḥammad arrived with Mughal troops. At this helpless critical juncture 'Ambar shut himself in the fort of Bhatwadī. But soon 'Ambar fled away and was chased by the Bijapur army. After prolonged campaign of several months, the rival armies fought a contested battle, on

---

83. Dr. Radhey Shyam: The Kingdom of Ahmadnagar, 273 f.

84. Futūḥāt, 287 f.;

شاهزاده پرویز خاطر از معاملات صوبه دکن من کل الوجوه فارغ داشته — از بیشتر بیشتر افگندن مکرر مردم کاروان با تحائف و هدایای فراوان بخدمت عالم پناه فرستاده اظهار دوستی و یکرنگی نمودند —

85. Futūḥāt, 288 b.

15th June 1625, in which 'Ambar emerged victorious.[86]

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah II and Ḥusain Niẓām Shah III

Following the death of Malik 'Ambar in May, 1626, the Ahmadnagar Kingdom was thrown in utter confusion and anarchy prevailed. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah, casted longing glances at the adjacent forts and districts of Ahmadnagar. He tried to secure parts of the floating wreckage of the ruined Kingdom by bribing Niẓām Shāhī officers. Most of the Niẓām Shāhī officers entered 'Ādil Shāhī service.[87]

During the Mughal operations against Ahmadnagar, from 1628 onwards, 'Ādil Shah persistently adopted dual diplomacy by allying at the same time both, with the Mughals and the Niẓām Shah. He entered into compact with both of them. When Shāh Jahān threatened 'Ādil Shah, the latter rendered military help to the Mughals. At the same time, he sent financial help to the Niẓām Shāhīs. On the one hand, 'Ādil Shah tried to give lease to the life of Niẓām Shāhī dynasty and save from extinction, while on the other he tried to capture as much as possible the western portions of Niẓām Shāhī Kingdom, upto the port of Dābhol. The Bijapurīs, in the Tal Konkan captured Mahad, Chodegaon, Niẓāmpūr and Chaul. Chaul was later on recovered by the Niẓām Shāhīs.[88]

'Ādil Shah rendered useful help to the Niẓām Shāhī minister, Muqarrab Khan, when the latter fervently appealed to Randaulā Khan

---

86. ibid., 289 ff.
87. Lāhōrī, I(2), 35,135, 140; AU., I, 29 f.
88. Basātīn, 288 f.

to save the Niẓām Shāhī dynasty from extinction. Muqarrab Khan offered to cede the fort of Shōlāpūr as the price of the help against the Mughals.[89]

'Ādil Shah and his commanders Randaulā Khan and Murārī Pandit rendered valuable service in 1632-33 to Shāhjī, in the latter's attempt to revive and give a fresh lease of life to the Niẓām Shāhī dynasty. Murārī was instrumental with Shāhjī in crowning Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah. And when Shāhjī with Murtaḍā was tossed from place to place, 'Ādil Shah and Randaulā Khan supported him by all possible means.[90]

This action of 'Ādil Shah made Shah Jahān to order three pronged attack on Bijapur. Consequently 'Ādil Shah was compelled to restrain his support to Ahmadnagar and safeguard its own interest. But, even then, Shāh Jahān was doubtful of his success. As such, Shāh Jahān deputed his envoy Mo'īnuddīn to 'Ādil Shah for negotiating joint Mughal-Bijapur collaboration for the extinction of Ahmadnagar and partition of its territory between them.[91] Consequently, Shāh Jahān annexed Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1636, and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah was partly responsible for the extinction of the Niẓām Shāhī dynasty.

---

89. Lāhōrī, I, 496; Al-Lubāb, 1, 450 f.

90. Muḥammad Nāmā, 63.

91. Muḥammad Nāmā, 71. The text reads:

شیخ معینا حاجب شاهجهان با جهاز جهان تحف و هدایا خسروانه بدرگاه سلاطین پناه رسید و بشمول عنایات شاهانه گردید - غازی سعادت لباط بوسی اشرف دریافت و معاملهٔ صلح از جانبین برین نهج صورت یافت که نظام شاه را برداشته ولایت او را هر دو بادشاه عظیم الشان بهم تقسیم نمایند -

SEC. II: BIJAPUR-GOLKONDA RELATIONS

Bijapur-Golkonda (Tilang[1]) relations begin from 918/1512 when Quṭbu'l-Mulk seems to have shown signs of independence.[2]

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Qulī Quṭb Shah

In the beginning of his reign, Quṭb Shah remained at peace and friendship with Ismā'īl 'Ādil and the latter reciprocated similar gesture.[3]

The first conflict came up in 1514, when Quṭb Shah joined arms with Amīr Barīd and invaded Bijapur.[4] Again, fifteen years later, in 1529, Quṭb Shah repeated his anti-Bijapur activity by sending Golkonda cavalry to the aid of Amīr Barīd against Bijapur. The Bijapurīs emerged victorious and the Golkonda forces escaped.[5] Now was the turn of 'Ādil Shah. He began to cast aggressive design over Golkonda. And in 1533, at the instigation[6] of

---

1. The popularly known "Golkonda Kingdom" was actually "Tilang" of the Quṭb Shāhī dynasty. Contemporary or near contemporary Persian chronicles - Ferishta, Rafī'uddīn Shīrāzī, Fuzūnī etc., mention the Quṭb Shāhī Kingdom as "Tilang" or "Telangana".
2. Their relations from the founding of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom, in 1489, form part of the study of the Bijapur-Bahmanī relations, as till then Quṭbul-Mulk was the Governor of the Golkonda province, on behalf of the Bahmanī Sultan.
3. Briggs, III, 19, 195.
4. Basātīn, 33; Briggs, III, 27, 195.
5. Briggs, III, 35.
6. For controversy over the 'instigation' please see discussions of Prof. Sharwani, J.I.H., 1956, 18, fn.97

Burhān Niẓām Shah 'Ādil Shah attacked and laid siege to Kalyānī, a fort of Golkonda. Quṭb Shah unable to cope with the Bijapurīs, sent a detachment of cavalry to only cut off their supplies. In the meanwhile, after consultations with the nobles Quṭb Shah ordered a paltry garrison of the fort to defend it. At the same time, he tried to bring about a peaceful settlement, by sending his envoys to 'Ādil Shah, requesting him to desist from any further fratricidal hostilities. But Ismā'īl would not even hear of peace. Thus, there was no alternative left for Quṭb Shah except to fight.[7]

The Bijapurī and Golkonda forces met at Kovilkonḍa. After a prolonged fighting for a year to possess Kovilkonḍa, without any hope of success, Ismā'īl died in vain in September, 1534. Following this, Asad Khan, as a protector of Bijapur, raised the seige of Kovilkonda and moved to Gulbarga. Consequently, Quṭb Shah, by sending an envoy to Burhān Niẓām Shah, succeeded in seeking former's mediation for concluding peace with Bijapur.[8]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Qulī Quṭb Shah

But the peace was not maintained for a long. In the following year 1535, when Quṭb Shah was engaged at Kondavīḍu, 'Ādil Shah I joined hands with 'Alī Barīd and began to lay waste Golkonda territory. On being informed of the further inroads by Bijapur troops, Quṭb Shah advanced westwards and laid siege to Udgīr. The campaign came to an end with the settlement of a treaty between Burhān Niẓām Shah and Quṭb Shah. Quṭb Shah agreed to send 5,000 fully

---

7. Q.S.D., 30 f.; J.I.H., op.cit., 18.
8. ibid., 45, 195.

armed soldiers to Ahmadnagar in order to help Burhān, against the pretentions of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, regarding Shōlāpūr.[9]

From thence, 1534 to 1543, for about a decade 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah maintained peaceful relations.[10]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and Jamshīd Quṭb Shah

During the Bijapur-Ahmadnagar conflict in 1543 Jamshīd Quṭb Shah, at the request of Burhān Niẓām Shah, came to the rescue of the latter, against Bijapur. While the confederate forces were encircling Shōlāpūr, 'Ādil Shah and 'Alī Barīd marched on Parēnḍa, a Niẓām Shāhī fort, by way of diversion. The two armies came face to face at the Village of Khāṣpurī[11] near Parēnḍa. The battle raged the whole day, and when Jamshīd was tired of stalement, he recklessly jumped into the thick of the battle and by sheer hardihood broke the army of Bijapur. The Bijapuris then fled away in the night. Jamshīd pursued them as far as the gates of Bidar and then returned back.[12]

Now it was the turn of 'Ādil Shah to reciprocate the attitude of Jamshīd during the Bijapur-Ahmadnagar conflict. 'Ādil Shah rendered military assistance to 'Alī Barīd against Jamshīd in the latter's conflict with 'Alī Barīd.[13]

And again when hostilities were renewed between Bidar and Golkonda, 'Ādil Shah at the request of 'Alī Barīd, rushed a

---

9. J.I.H., op.cit., 23.
10. ibid., 25.
11. About 18.5°N, 75.4 E
12. Ferishta, II, 54 ; Briggs, III, 56 f., 196 f.; Q.S.D., 86 f.
13. idem.

66Ntingent under Ikhlās Khan Ḥabashī. Prolonged hostilities were disconcerting to 'Ādil Shah, who now at a loss to act, and without confidence in the opinion of his Counsellors, sent for Asad Khan Lārī from Belgaum for advice. Asad Khan exhorted him the futility of fighting a powerful coalition which was heming in the Bijapurī territories from all sides. On Asad Khan's suggestion the coalition of two potent members maneuvered by allowing some concessions. The strategy worked out quite successfully and the coalition broke. But, the intrepid and daring Jamshīd, aware of the ruse Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah prepared, decided to face the challenge single-handed. 'Ādil Shah made Asad Khan sole commander of his army and ordered to march into Golkonda territory. Jamshīd was now compelled to raise the siege of Udgīr and retreat. Asad Khan persuaded the fugitive, and in an encounter, Jamshīd was disfigured for ever. On his return to Golkonda, Jamshīd sent ambassadors to Bijapur and concluded peace.[14]

This established good friendly relations between Bijapur and Golkonda. Ibrāhīm had high opinion and regards for Jamshīd. Even when 'Alī Barīd came personally to poison his mind against Jamshīd and sought an alliance against Golkonda 'Ādil Shah declined the proposal. But when 'Ādil Shah, in order to conquer Bidar, confined 'Alī Barīd at Bijapur, the magnanimous Jamshīd intervened for the latter and sent a warning to the former to refrain from casting envious eyes on Bidar. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah for the good will of Jamshīd forthwith released 'Alī Barīd. As a token of sincerity, 'Ādil Shah sent Jamshīd costly presents, amounting

---

14. Futūḥāt, 69 f.; Briggs, III, 57; Q.S.D., 93.

to one lakh dīnārs and a rare royal horse.[15]

But, in spite of all friendship and cordiality Jamshīd adopted anti-Bijapur policy in 1548 by promising help to 'Abdullāh, in gaining the throne of Bijapur.[16]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah

In 1557, Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah joined an alliance with Ḥusain Niẓām Shah against Bijapur. It was agreed that the former should wrest from Bijapur, Udgīr and the latter, Gulbarga. Thus the allies invested Gulbarga. 'Ādil Shah was greatly perturbed at the turn of the events and sent an appealing letter to Quṭb Shah. At the same time, 'Ādil Shah tried to exercise diplomatic pressure of Rāmarāj of Vijayanagar over Quṭb Shah, as the latter was under the obligation of the former. Consequently, Quṭb Shah tried to adopt neutrality in this conflict and wished to establish peace. As such, the appeal of 'Ādil Shah was held in high esteem; the Bijapurī envoys were given assurances of peace and friendship. Quṭb Shah broke the alliance with Niẓām Shah and returned to Golkonda.[17] This dual diplomacy of Quṭb Shah in favour of Bijapur was indirectly an attempt to maintain the balance of power between the Deccan states.

But, Quṭb Shah soon changed sides, by accepting the offer of Ḥusain Niẓām Shah, to enter into both matrimonial and military alliance. The latter alliance was directed against Bijapur. Consequently, in 1564, the two Sultans marched to reduce the Bijapurī

---

15. Futūḥāt, 71 f.; Q.S.D., 94 ff.
16. Briggs, III, 59.
17. Futuḥat, 87 b; Briggs, III, 198, 73; Q.S.D., 122 f.

fort of Kalyāni. 'Alī 'Ādil Shah had in the meantime, allied with Vijayangar. This strategy proved beneficial; as it compelled the besiegers to raise the siege and retreat. Then 'Ādil Shah and his ally encamped at the town of Urgy, on the Golkonda frontier for nearly six months, during which period they plundered parts of Golkonda. This compelled Quṭb Shah to send an envoy to Bijapur and sue for peace.[18]

In the same year 1564, 'Ādil Shah, to take revenge upon Rāmarāj, sought an alliance with Quṭb Shah, by sending Kishwar Khan. Quṭb Shah eagerly acceded to the proposed alliance and offered to mediate a union between 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah and even promised to obtain for the former the fort of Sholāpūr, which was the bone of contention between Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. Consequently, Quṭb Shah deputed Muṣṭafā Khan to 'Ādil Shah, to negotiate the proposed league. The outcome of Muṣṭafā Khan's diplomatic mission was the confederacy of the Deccan Sultans[19] against Vijayanagar and the battle of Bannihaṭṭi of 1565. Indirectly, its impact was coming closer of Quṭb Shah and 'Ādil Shah with mutual understanding for co-existence.

However, very soon, when the aim of confederacy was achieved, the allies totally forgot the fine principles and benefits accruing from the policy of friendly co-existence. Once again the internecine wars among the Deccan Sultanates was the order of the day. Their mutual jealously once again arose them to form alliances and counter alliances against their own brothern sultans.

---

18. Futūḥāt, 88 f.; Briggs, III, 198 f.

19. Futūḥāt, 93 f.; Briggs, III, 75 f. For the various controversial discussion over the origin of the league; see Prof. Sherwani: J.I.H., op.cit. 1957, 359, 364 and fn.41.

Thus, in 1568 when 'Alī 'Ādil Shah was making territorial gains in the Karnatak, Quṭb Shah getting envious, formed an alliance with Niẓām Shah and 'Imād Shah. The allies attacked Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah, unable to cope up the sudden attack, fled away to the Konkan, leaving a considerable army for the defence of the city. The allies laid siege to Bijapur and laid waste the surrounding country. But soon Quṭb Shah changed his diplomacy when he realised that Niẓām Shah would gain large tract of territory. Thus envious he persuaded the other allies to raise the siege and to return.[20]

In 1569 during the conflict between Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, both the antagonistic parties sought help of Quṭb Shah. The Golkonda forces came to the help of Niẓām Shah but due to the sudden change in the latter's strategy, the Golkonda forces returned back without helping any one.[21]

By 1570, Bijapur had achieved inordinate increase in power and territory. This was the cause of jealousy to Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah. He considered that improportionate increase would upset the balance of Bijapur's power in the Deccan. As such, he joined hands with Niẓām Shah and worked out the strategy against Bijapur. Consequently Quṭb Shah, Nizam Shah and Tirumala met at Krishna. Then the three potentates considered 'Ādil Shah to be their common enemy and decided to march forthwith into the Bijapur territory. However, before the plans of the common strategy, against Bijapur, could materialise, the three allies dispersed, due to depredations arising out of lack of understanding among them.[22]

---

20. Anonymous: Tārīkh-i Quṭb Shāhī (Briggs, III, 250 f.); Q.S.D., 160.
21. Q.S.D., 160 f.
22. ibid., 162.

Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah in his relation with Bijapur had been adopting a policy to maintain balance of power among the Deccan Sultanate. Contrary to his policy of preventing aggrandisement of one ruler at the expense of another, he wished in 1572 to join hands with 'Alī 'Ādil Shah to stop Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah from further territorial conquest of Berar. However, the dream of triparti-alliance of Bijapur, Bidar and Golkonda was shattered to the ground due to Ahmadnagar-Bijapur coalition. On the contrary, Bijapur-Ahmadnagar forces first began attacking Golkonda territory, under the commands of 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah. In spite of the sudden onslaught of the allies, in the end the Golkonda forces were successful in pushing back the invaders. 'Ādil Shah retreated with the fear of Golkonda advance into Bijapurī territory.[23]

In 1573, when 'Ādil Shah was busy making a sweep over the western districts of the Vijayanagar, Quṭb Shah being jealous of Bijapur's inordinate expansion in power, helped Srī Ranga against Bijapur. Thus, Quṭb Shah sent Shāh Muḥammad Injū, with an army across the Bijapur border, in order to weaken 'Ādil Shah's rear guard and at the same time he sent Faḍl Khan to Penukonda to ask Srī Ranga to meet him on the Golkonda borders. Help of Quṭb Shah to Srī Ranga resulted in 'Ādil Shah's defeat, who was compelled to raise the three months old siege of Penukonda in December, 1576.[24]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Muḥammad Qutb Shah

In 1580, the death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah changed the nature of inter-state war-relations in the Deccan. Though his successor,

---

23. Burhān, 458 f.
24. Further Sources, III, 304; Burhān, 461 f.

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II believed more in peace than war, yet in the beginning of his reign, he too followed in the foot-steps of his predecessor.

Quṭb Shah adopted an anti-Bijapur policy in the Bijapur-Ahmadnagar conflict, and supplied re-inforcement to the Ahmadnagar forces which were besieging Bidar in 1579-80. The Golkonda forces laid siege to Naldurg, Bijapurī fort and then they were heading for the capture of Bijapur city. At last, early in 988/1580 the hood-winked Bijapurīs had recourse to new strategy of guarilla warfare, by the help of ten thousand light Maratha cavalry. This machina-sation successfully retrive the position of Bijapur. Thus the Golkonda and Ahmadnagar forces were compelled to raise the siege of Bijapur. While retreating they ravaged, plundered and played havoc at Miraj, Rāibāgh, Satārā, Gulbarga and a number of other places and again laid siege to Naldrug. However, the Golkonda forces, in expectation of the collapse of the military structure of Bijapur, intensified the campaign and petitioned Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah to come to Naldrug and direct the operations. But the whole strategy failed due to the sudden demise of Quṭb Shah in June 1580.[25]

The new Sultan of Golkonda, Muḥammad-Qulī Quṭb Shah, on receiving first hand knowledge of the siege operations at Naldrug proceeded to the scene of operations in person, in 1581. Conse-quently, the campaign was intensified. But when the besiegers came to know about the internal troubles and commotion brewing Bijapur, they decided to leave a small contingent at Naldrug and the main army moved to besiege Bijapur itself. It was defended boldly by

---

25. Burhān, 510 ff.; Abdul Majeed Siddiqui: History of Golconda, 112 f.

a small contingent. It was an ill-omen for 'Ādil Shah, when two of his commanders crossed over to the Golkonda side, with their contingent of eight thousand horse. The Bijapurīs adopted guerilla tactics, and at one stage the besiegers were forced to face near famine situation. A Council of War of Golkonda and Ahmadnagar nobles decided to raise the siege of Bijapur and retreat. Thus, Quṭb Shah, who was thoroughly disgusted and disappointed by the out-come of the year long campaign, returned back to Golkonda, leaving Muṣṭafā Khan to continue the campaign. But later on Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, who loved peace and wished to avoid blood-shed appealed to Quṭb Shah and his ally to renounce hostility and come to peaceful terms. The appeal was welcomed and fully reciprocated by the allies and the siege was lifted forthwith. Peace was concluded, thus putting to an end the age-long conflict between the two states.[26]

The Naldrug episode may be regarded as the last phase of the inter-state conflicts among the Deccan Sultanates. Its outcome was establishment of political equilibrium in the Deccan and peaceful relations between Bijapur and Golkonda for the next twenty-eight years.

Some skirmishes on Bijapur-Golkonda border took place. Hence, Dilāwar Khan, the regent at Bijapur, during the infancy of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, prudently thought that nothing would so effectually preserve the dominions of his master than an alliance with Golkonda. Thus he sent Khwājā 'Alī as ambassador to Golkonda, seeking the matrimonial alliance of Malika-i Jahān, sister of Quṭb Shah for 'Ādil Shah. Quṭb Shah readily agreed. Consequently the bridegroom and the bride came to the fort of Naldrug in 1586.

---

26. Burhān, 535; Briggs, III, 269.

After the celebration of marriage, a treaty of perpetual amity and friendship was settled.[27]

Early in 1626, 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah became Sultan of Golkonda, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II was among the first potentates who had sent a special envoy, Shāh Abul Ḥasan, to condole the death of the late Sultan and to congratulate the new Sultan.[28]

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah

After nearly three decades of friendly and peaceful relations between the two kingdoms, the dynastic union was further strengthen by the marriage of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah to 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah's sister, Khadīja Sultāna in February 1633. These unions were not merely marriages de convenance but were in a way, natural; as both were the only remnants of the five Bahmanī succession states and both were the bulwarks of the Shī'ah persuasion, with the extinction of Ahmadnagar. Further, there was a lateral relationship between the ancestors of the two dynasties. As Chānd Bībī, wife of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, was the direct descendant of Qarā Yūsuf's son, Jahān Shāh, while the Quṭb Shahs traced their descent from his other sons Mīrzā Sikandar.[29]

The extinction of Ahmadnagar and the fear of the Mughal invasion brought Bijapur and Golkonda more closer. And since on previous occasions, they notwithstanding their dissensions and quarrels, had united against common enemy, the Mughals tried to allenate them

---

27. Briggs, III, 271; Q.S.D., 280 f.
28. Q.S.D., 431.
29. Basātīn; 362; Q.S.D., 450.

as far as possible. Thus, in the Inqiyād Nāmā or the "Deed of Submission" of 1636 between the Mughals and Golkonda, Shāh Jahān to control the Bijapur-Golkonda relations, had provided that --"if 'Ādil Shah were to try to conquer the Quṭb Shāhī territory, Quṭb Shah was to seek the help of the Mughal Viceroy to drive him out. But if the Viceroy or any representative of the Mughal Emperor in Deccan did not oblige, then Quṭb Shah was to manage himself. And if he had paid any war indemnity to 'Ādil Shah, then Quṭb Shah could deduct the same amount from pēshkash to the Emperor.[30] Obviously, it meant Mughal-Golkonda alliance against Bijapur. Shāh Jahān had thus sued the seeds of dissensions between the two kingdoms of dynastic relations.

Treaty for the Partition of Karnatak

Both Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and 'Abdullēh Quṭb Shah realised the futility of conquering Karnatak single handed. For its effectual conquest, they wisely thought that, mutual co-operation of the two states was essential.[31] Thus they agreed, mutually in March-April 1646,[32] for the conquest and partition of Karnatak in the proportion

---

30. Lāhōrī, II, 180 ; see Chapter VI Sec. III infra.
واگر با وجود آنکه نیازمند طلب امداد و اعانت نماید و صوبه دار دکن بتغافل بگذراند و عادلخانیه بعنف و تعدی
ازین نیازمند مبلغی بگیرند آن مبلغ درین هشت لک روپیه پیشکش هر ساله مجری باشد -

31. Ābrēzī, 20 f., 28 f.; 37
تسخیر ملک کرناتک ما با عالیحضرت سکندر مرتبت جنت مکانی شیوه مرضیه این دو سلسله علیه است اتفاق فرموده طریقه روابط
یگانگی مقتضی آنست که آثار یکتا دلی و مراسم یگانگی ظهور آید اسباب ارتباط روز بروز آن سلاله در تزاید باشد انشاء الله تعالی
بعد از آنکه ولایت کرناتک بتصرف ما در آید -

32. For the "Date of the Karnatak Partition Agreement": Mīr Jumlā, Appendix A, 298.

of two thirds falling to 'Ādil Shah and one-third to Quṭb Shah.[33] Though the outcome of the partition agreement proved highly satisfactory in the beginning to both the rulers, but at a later stage, misunderstanding and disagreement led to conflict and hostilities. Both Bijapur and Golkonda detached their contingents almost simultaneously in June 1646. Muṣṭafā Khan from Bijapur and Mīr Jumlā from Golkonda started for the campaign of Karnatak. While marching towards Ginji, Madura and Thanjavur, on the way, Muṣṭafā Khan captured some forts.[34] While at the same time, Mīr Jumlā over-ran the entire Coromandel coast and occupied the territory round the fort St. George (Madras). He then took Pulicut and St. Thome. Then the combined forces of Bijapur and Golkonda laid siege to Vellore. The Rāya was defeated and submitted in April 1647, promising payment of 50 lakhs of huns and 150 elephants, as war indemnity. But Bijapur's appropriation of the entire amount proved to be a cause of discord with Qutb Shah.[35]

Again, the interests of both Bijapur and Golkonda clashed for the conquest of Ginji. Both were interested in its capture and

---

33. Tabrēzī, 20 f.; Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar: "A Few Letters of Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla Relating to the Partition of the Karnataka", I.H.R.C., January, 1942, 197 ff. The agreement states:-
"--- It was agreed between us that spoils of war, goods, territory, jewels and cash, 'Ādil Shah was to get two parts and myself one part (thulth wa thulthān)." Quṭb Shah in a letter to his envoy Ṣamad (at the Mughal Court) - Tabrēzī, 21 ff (J.B.O.R.S. XXX (2), 161 f.

34. See Part III, Sec. I of this Chapter for details of Bijapur's Karnatak expedition.

35. Muḥammad Nama: M.R., July 1929, 11; I.H.R.C., op.cit., 1942, 200.

possession. As the Bijapurīs advanced to invade Ginji, its Nāyak appealed to Golkonda forces for protection. With the clash of interests, Quṭb Shah represented to Shah Jahan that the Nāyaks of Ginji and Thanjavur have come under his protection and that 'Ādil Shah should be advised to refrain from invading those places. While to 'Ādil Shah, this coalition of Golkonda with the Nāyaks appeared forboding. He considered that machinasations of Mīr Jumlā with the Nāyaks, as directed against Bijapur and in great wrath he swore to take vengence on Quṭb Shah. To chastise him, Muẓaffaruddīn Khan Muḥammad was called to the court and ordered to plunder the country of Golkonda and demolish its forts. However, the campaign was delayed, due to the representation of Mughal envoy, Muḥammad Ḥusain, to 'Ādil Shah. He expressed that Mīr Jumlā was acting on the directions of Quṭb Shah and the (Mughal envoy) promised to 'Ādil Shah that he would mediate for the adequate compensation to Bijapur and to obtain first hand information regarding the dispute for which purpose he even went to Karnatak. And as a pretention Quṭb Shah immediately settled a compensation, by sending rich and costly gifts and presents to 'Ādil Shah. At the same time, he sought Shāh Jahān's intervention for settling the dispute. Quṭb Shah represented in 1648 to Shāh Jahān that the Nāyaks of Ginji and Thanjavur had sought his help, as such he wanted Shāh Jahān to partition those places in the proportion of one-third and two-thirds as per the 'ahednāmah between the two Sultans. At the same time Quṭb Shah expressed his doubts about the integrity of 'Ādil Shah and requested the Emperor to appoint one amīn to

ascertain the facts.[36] Further, Quṭb Shah requested the Emperor to modify the terms of the agreement, as follows: that the 'Ādil Shah may be allowed to take whatever goods, cash, jewels, elephants and other articles of plunder, seized by his men from the Rāya and zamīndārs of the Karnatak; and that the conquest made by Golkonda forces in the Karnatak may be divided equally between the two Sultans.[37]

---

36. Muḥammad Nāmā, 225 ff.; Tabrēzī, 20 a; I.H.R.C., 1942, 200; Basātīn, 320 ff.

37. Tabrēzī, 5 a ff.; I.H.R.C., op.cit., 1942, 204 Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar is of the opinion that Shāh Jahān did not approve the notification nor was it followed by either of the two Sultans - I.H.R.C., op.cit., 1942, 204, fn.54.

Quṭb Shah considered 'Ādil Shah's complaints to Shah Jahān and latter's orders as "false accusation" and he wrote to to 'Abduṣ-Ṣamad that had there been anything else besides myself and 'Ādil Shah, copies of which are with you, you must have been aware of it. The Emperor know all and may punish 'Ādil Shah for violation of the agreement. The truth is that 'Ādil Shah already knew that without my help, the war with the Rayal cannot be finally won and then agreed with me to partition the Karnatak into 1/3 or 2/3 and thus he made me co-partner in the destruction of the Rayal and other zamīndārs. At present the Rayal and other zamīndārs have already been defeated and in return, 'Ādil Shah wanted to take his stipulated share of 2/3 immediately, but deferred giving any share of 1/3. 'Ādil Shah did not know that I have appealed to the Emperor for deciding this dispute -- " Tabrēzī, 20; J.B.O.R.S., op.cit., XXX (2), 161.

Quṭb Shah agreed to obey Shāh Jahān's orders as if they were divine. Evidently, Quṭb Shah played dual diplomacy to gain a major share in the spoils of the Karnatak on the one hand; and on the other he tried to ally Shāh Jahān to his side by playing false. Each Sultan began to express distrust of its partner in their whinning letters to Shah Jahān.

Race for the Conquest of Ginji and Mīr Jumlā's diplomacy

Both 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah were anxious to occupy Ginji. 'Ādil Shah, on his part, commissioned in January 1648 Muṣṭafā Khan for the invasion of Ginji. For this, he had to tresspass through the territory of Mīr Jumlā, for which he sought permission of Mīr Jumlā. But before he could reach Ginji, Mīr Jumlā was already there. The Nāyak of Ginji came out of the fort and reiterated his allegiance to Mīr Jumlā and joined his army. While the Nāyak of Madura allied with Muṣṭafā Khan. The combined armies of Bijapur and Madura marched to retrieve Ginji from the forces of Mīr Jumlā. In the meanwhile, Quṭb Shah who considered the arrival of Muṣṭafā Khan on the scene to extricate Ginji from the Golkonda forces as a direct violation of the partition-treaty. But both Muṣṭafā Khan and Mīr Jumlā came to an understanding that after the conquest of Ginji, the former would take charge of it, while the latter would possess Gandikota; and both agreed for mutual co-operation and share equally the spoils of the war.[38]

However, Muṣṭafā Khan could not carry out his agreement due to his sudden death on 9th November 1648. Then Mir Jumla boycotting

---

38. Tabrēzī, 69, 79 a; Basātīn, 326; I.H.R.C., 1942, op.cit., 201

the Bijapurīs wished to occupy Ginji himself. But Malik Raihān, who took the command after Muṣṭafā Khan decided to fight, to enforce the agreement. Thus threatened, Mīr Jumlā withdrew away. Obviously Mīr Jumlā tried to avoid direct clash with the Bijapurīs. This helped in reducing the differences between the two states and facilitated in the implementation of the partition-treaty. Consequently, the Bijapurīs conquered Ginji at the end of December, 1649.[39]

On the fall of Ginji to Bijapur, Quṭb Shah, keeping aside all jealousy and animosity, congratulated 'Ādil Shah, through a personal letter and sent along with it, a present of four lakhs huns and four jewels. Quṭb Shah in a letter to 'Ādil Shah, while suggesting that, the forts of Malnad and Karnatak were not yet conquered by the Bijapurīs, sought consent of 'Ādil Shah to conquer and use them as bases for further conquests in the south. 'Ādil Shah readily agreed to Quṭb Shah's request and the fort of Gaṇḍikoṭa and the country of Kokkanūr were left at the disposal of the Golkonda forces for occupation.[40]

Thus the partition treaty worked apparently more to the advantage of Quṭb Shah than of 'Ādil Shah, atleast 'Ādil Shah thought it to be so. The agreement, from its very nature turned out to be unstable, due to the fluctuating Deccan politics, mutual jealousy and uncompromising attitude of the two partner-Sultans.[41]

However, the crack over the possession of Gaṇḍikoṭa could not be averted. Both the Sultans coveted it, due to its strategic

---

39. Muḥammad Nāmā, 367 ff.; Basātīn, 320; I.H.R.C., op.cit., 1942, 201.
40. Muḥammad Nāmā, 374; Nibhandevali, II, 131 f.; I.H.R.C., 1942, op.cit., 201.
41. Mīr Jumlā, 26.

value. Thus, to possess it, Khān Muḥammad, the Bijapurī Minister, made allegations against Golkonda of changed relationship. While 'Ādil Shah complaint to Shāh Jahān that Quṭb Shāhī army had captured Gandīkoṭa without the knowledge of the Emperor. On the other hand Quṭb Shah tried to clear this action by advising his envoy at the Mughal Court that Gandīkota was within his sphere and 'Ādil Shah should have no objection to its capture whatsoever. Quṭb Shah also advised his envoy at Bijapur to impress on 'Ādil Shah the wrong that Siddī Raiḥān had done him by unlawfully attacking the territories of Gandīkoṭa and Guṭṭī and he should be properly warned to refrain from such encroachments in future.[42]

Both the Bijapurī and Golkonda forces were in was array, and direct clash was only to be expected at any time. Khān Muḥammad of Bijapur besieged Guttī but soon abandoned it to pursue Mīr Jumlā at Gandīkota itself, which he had made the centre of his Government. It fell to Bijapurī general Ghōrpaṛe of Mudhōl, who dislodged Mīr Jumlā from it and compelled him to sue for peace. After four long parleys it was agreed that he should pay an indemnity of two lakhs and fifty thousand huns, while on the other hand, Gandīkota and Kokkanūr were to be returned to Mīr Jumlā. The terms were agreed by Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah in January-February, 1652. Then Khān Muḥammad got from the Mīr Jumlā five lakh and fifty thousand huns and four pieces of diamonds, which were sent to 'Ādil Shah.[43]

After this, Khān Muḥammad on his return marched to Ginji, solicited Mīr Jumlā's permission to trespass through his Karnatak territory. Contrary to the expectation, Mīr Jumlā turned down the

---

42. Q.S.D., 454; I.H.R.C., op.cit., 1942, 202.
43. Mīr Jumlā, 30 f.; Q.S.D., 454.

request. He was alarmed at the rapid progress of Bijapur's army As such he tried to animate the Nāyak of Mysore against Bijapur and also made overtures to the Rāya. This dual diplomacy of Mīr Jumlā compelled the Bijapurīs to leave Mysore. To counter-act this dual diplomacy, 'Ādil Shah ordered Khan Muḥammad to attack the Rāya, who was trying to conquer Vellore with the secret help of Golkonda forces and to prevent the junction of the two armies under Mīr Jumla. After long siege the Bijapurīs captured Vellore in 1653.[44]

Cordial Relations to counter Mughal Invasion

In spite of the political conflicts, clash of interest and charges and counter-charges of 'Ādil Shah against Quṭb Shah and vice-versa, the Bijapur-Golkonda relations were on the whole friendly and they pretended to be cordial due to the dynastic relation. Both the rulers maintained active diplomatic correspondences, through their resident ambassadors at each other's court.[45]

Thus, during the rebellion of Mīr Jumlā against Quṭb Shah, during 1652-55, when the former sought asylum in Bijapur and offered to transfer his allegiance to 'Ādil Shah and to hold the Karnatak as his gift, 'Ādil Shah decline to accept the offer as a gesture of good-will toward Quṭb Shah. And when Mīr Jumlā was trying to cross over to the Mughal camp, 'Ādil Shah helped Quṭb Shah, by trying to neutralise Mīr Jumlā's strong diplomatic position, by his counter-intrigues with the Mughals. Thus, the joint

---

44. Mir Jumla, 31 f.

45. Makātīb, 42,92; Ṭalaqānī, 22-95.

intrigues of 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah, with heavy pēshkash to Shāh Jahān, resulted in the latter's refusal to extend protection to the Rāya of Vellore, as manoeuvered by Mīr Jumlā. Further, the counter-intrigues of the two sultans menaced Mīr Jumlā's safety.[46]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah II and 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah

The friendly gesture and assistance in counter-intrigues rendered Muḥammad by 'Ādil Shah to Quṭb Shah was reciprocated by the latter in 1665, during the Mughal invasion of Bijapur. When the Mughal army was camping within twelve miles of Bijapur city Quṭb Shah, on his own initiative wished to help Bijapur by men and material. In a letter to 'Ādil Shah, Quṭb Shah expressed that "I wish to send a posse of cavalry and infantry under one of our officers in whom I have the greatest confidence so that the enemy may be driven out of the Deccan." This letter was communicated through 'Abdul Muḥammad, Prime Minister of Bijapur who had been to Golkonda. 'Ādil Shah, in reply, assured Quṭb Shah that his army was quite capable to meet the challenge poised by the Mughals and there was no need of any help, but if he wished to send any troops he was at liberty to do so. Thereupon Quṭb Shah sent 12,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry under Nēknām Khan, to Bijapur. The united Bijapur-Golkonda forces met the Mughals. Finally, without any major clash, the Mughals retreated in November, 1666, agreeing to status quo ante.[47] The Golkonda forces too returned back.

It is quite significant that Bijapur and Golkonda unitedly opposed the Mughals. Quṭb Shah joined the Bijapurīs even though

---

46. Mir Jumla, 65, 72; Q.S.D., 441.
47. Adil Shahi : 197 f.; Basātīn, 412 f.

when he was not involved in the conflict. To check-mate this colloboration, Jai Singh tried to alienate the two sultans. And, in spite of the precautions,Mughals took to prevent any collobora-tion between the two states, Quṭb Shah was not detered in rendering military help, with men and material to Bijapur. Quṭb Shah did not even care for the wrath of Aurangzeb and its consequences. Obvious-ly, he must have realised the reality that if Bijapur-Golkonda did not put up joint front, then the extinction of both of them was inevitable and only time was the criteria.[48]

Sikandar 'Ādil Shah and Abul-Ḥasan Quṭb Shah

With the death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II in 1672 and succession of infant Sikandar 'Ādil Shah altered the relations between the two states. Abul-Ḥasan too was a changed man. Though in the beginning Abul-Ḥasan and his Minister Mādanna adopted a policy of actively promoting to resuscitate the tottering government of Bija-pur, yet within the next few years they changed the policy and started hobnobing with Shivaji to make territorial gains in the Bijapurī Karnatak.[49]

Thus, by 1676, Quṭb Shah forgetting all friendship, amity, alliance and dynastic relations existing between the two states tried to seize the opportunity, due to civil war at Bijapur to con-quering Bijapurī Karnatak. In this changed policy towards Bijapur, Quṭb Shah was motiviated by his Prime Minister Mādanna, who was dreaming to restore South India of its Vijayanagar times. For

---

48. Q.S.D., 639, 672, fn.100.

49. Dilkushā, 88; Shivaji 293 ff.; see Chapter VII infra.

accomplishing these designs, no better person could be found than Shivaji. Mādanna induced his master to agree to joint enterprise with Shivaji, in which Quṭb Shah, as the sleeping partner, would bear all the expenses and supply the munitions of war, while Shivaji, as the active partner, would do all the fighting with his own troops. Bijapurī Karnatak was to be conquered in the name and for the benefit of Qutb Shah while Shivaji for his pains would get all the spoils of war and the territory in the uplands of Mysore. For this purpose, Shivaji came to Hyderabad early in 1677, and made with Quṭb Shah a secret anti-Bijapurcompact. Quṭb Shah paid to Shivaji a subsidy of 3000 <u>huns</u> a day and sent 5000 men for the campaign.[50]

<u>Quṭb Shah intervenes in the internal affairs of Bijapur</u>

In 1677, the infant Sikandar 'Ādil Shah sent an earnest appeal and sought Quṭb Shah's intervention to resolve the civil strife at Bijapur. Quṭb Shah immediately responded and tried to mediate peaceful settlement of the internal affair of Bijapur. Abul-Ḥasan invited Mas'ūd Khan and Abdul-Karīm, leaders of two Bijapuri factions to Hyderabad, for resolving their differences. He exhorted them to compose their internal quarrels, in view of the Mughal danger looming large against on Bijapur. Qutb Shah was successful in settling the dispute and he imposed conditions on the two parties and granted six lakhs of <u>huns</u>. The salient features of the settlement, from the point of external relations was that, Mas'ūd Khan, Prime Minister of Bijapur should in no case bow before

---

50. <u>Basātīn</u>, 445, 453; <u>Dilkushā</u>, 117 f.

Shivaji and that Akkanna was to be permanent Quṭb Shāhī envoy at the Bijapur Court.[51]

After the agreement was signed by the concerned parties, Quṭb Shah handed over his order for the payment of six lakhs huns to Mas'ūd Khan and ordered about four thousand Golkonda cavalry to accompany the Bijapurī officials as far as the border.[52]

This intervention of Quṭb Shah to resolve the party squabbles of Bijapur shows the influence and position he had attained in Deccan politics and his close relations with 'Ādil Shah. However, the net effect of Quṭb Shah's mediation was neutralised by Mas'ūd Khan's divergent agreement with the Mughals.

Alliance against the Mughals

During Aurangzeb's campaign against Bijapur in 1684, 'Ādil Shah tried his best to come to some definite materialistic understanding with Quṭb Shah, to offer a joint front to the Mughals. Thus, in order to decide upon the future policy, 'Ādil Shah deputed Shāh Ḥaḍrat Qādir to Quṭb Shah in July 1684 for consultations. After his successful mission, Qādir returned back to Bijapur in August, 1684. This greatly enraged Aurangzeb and he issued definite orders to Quṭb Shah to desist from giving any help to Bijapur and to sever all connections with that state. Yet, Quṭb Shah was keen on helping Bijapur against the Mughals. He tried to sent a huge army to Bijapur, but the roads were blockaded by the Mughals. Still Quṭb Shah wished to render help to Bijapur and tried in vain to send another army in 1686, before the fall of Bijapur.[53]

---

51. ibid., 454 f.
52. Basātīn, 526 ff., 532 f.
53. Basātīn, 532 f.; AU., IV, 377 f., 406 f.

SEC. III: BIJAPUR-BIDAR RELATIONS
(1528-1619)

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Amīr 'Alī Barīd

Bidar occupied the most strategic position in the Deccan. It was contiguous with the four kingdoms and maintained the balance of power in the Deccan politics. It acted as buffer between Bijapur and Golkonda.

The Bijapur-Bidar relations from 1528[1] were guided by the bitter animosity that existed between 'Ādil Shahs and the Barīdīs from 1492 onwards. The Bahmanī Ministers, Qāsim Barīd from 1492 and 'Alī Barīd from 1505 utterly disliked the autonomous rule of the 'Ādil Shahs. Hence, each tried to overpower the other. The Barīdīs ruled the tottering Bahmanī Kingdom, with Bidar as its capital. And after the extinction of the Bahmanī rule 'Alī Barīd became independent ruler of Bidar.

Thus, due to the previous discord and bitterness between Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Amīr Barīd, the latter allied with Burhān Niẓām Shah and invaded Bijapur in 1528. However, the allies were defeated in a battle that ensued at 20 kōs[2] from Bijapur.

Again during the same year, Amīr Barīd tried to corrupt the fidelity of the Bijapuri forces to revolt and join him in an attack on Bijapur. He promised them to reward with a share of

---

1. The year in which the last Bahmanī Sultan Kalīmullāh fled from Bidar to Bijapur and Ahmadnagar. And from which date (1528) the Barīdī Minister threw off the Bahmanī yoke and established independent Barīdī rule.

2. Briggs, III, 33; Tadhkirath, 25.

territory. 'Ādil Shah justly incensed at this treachery, resolved to punish Amīr Barīd. Thus, in 1529, 'Ādil Shah after obtaining neutrality of Niẓām Shah in this expedition, arrived before Bidar and blockaded the city from all sides. After some time, a very severe action ensued, in which the Bijapurīs gained a upper hand. Then 'Ādil Shah intensified the siege operations, reducing Amīr Barīd to great distress. Consequently, Amīr Barīd sought mediation of 'Imād Shah of Berar for effecting peace. 'Imād Shah personally came and persuaded 'Ādil Shah to end the hostilities. But 'Ādil Shah was adament for the absolute submission of Amīr Barīd. Amīr Barīd on hearing the failure of 'Imād Shah's peace mission, left for Udgīr and came to the camp of 'Imād Shah again entreating him to effect a settlement. But being informed of 'Ādil Shah's terms for peace actual surrender of the city of Bidar, Amīr Barīd returned in disgust to his own camp. The Barīdī troops were much harassed by the Bijapurīs and became careless at night, so that even the outposts lay down to sleep, while many, following the example of their leader, had recourse to wine.[3]

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah having heard of the arrival of Amīr Barīd, ordered Asad Khan, to surprise Amīr Barīd's camp. Asad Khan went uninterrupted right upto Amīr Barīd's camp and carried him, while asleep, with his cot to Bijapurī camp. Asad Khan presented his important prize to 'Ādil Shah, who was overjoyed at the success of the enterprise. Next day the captive Sultan was again presented at the Court to 'Ādil Shah. Amīr Barīd was placed opposite to 'Ādil Shah, with his head bare and his hands tied behind his back, and

---

3. ibid., 35 ff.; ibid., 276 b.

exposed to a hot sun. When he had stood for two hours in this situation, 'Adil Shah gave orders for his being put to death, and an executor advanced to do his duty with a drawn scimitar.[4]

Amīr Barīd, perceiving his helpless condition, condescended to beg his life and pardon from 'Ādil Shah on promise of surrendering the city of Bidar and the treasures of the Bahmanī rulers. 'Ādil Shah consented to spare his life on these terms. Consequently, Amīr Barīd sent orders to one of his sons, acquainting him with the situation, and the agreement he had made. His son returned for answer, that as he was very old, and the period of his existance drawing to a close, it would be a folly to surrender such a fortress for a few remaining days of life. The object of this message, however was only in hope of getting assistance from the allies. At the same time, the sons sent secret instructions through a confidential person, to agree to the terms of their father if he was in real danger. Amīr Barīd affected to complain of the cruelty of his sons; but 'Ādil Shah who suspected the diplomacy, gave orders for Amīr Barīd to be trampled to death by an elephant. And ordered his army to make assault on Bidar. Amīr Barīd again had recourse to entreaty, and begged that he might be carried before a certain tower of the fort, in order that his sons might behold his condition and he thus moved to save his life. This being done, the sons seeing no other means but submission to save the life of their father, offered surrender on condition that they and their own families would be allowed to depart with the clothes on their persons without search. This being agreed upon, they loaded themselves and their women with as

---

4. log.cit.

many of the valuable ornaments and of the Bahmanī rulers as they were able to conceal and retired with their followers, unmolested, to the fortress of Udgīr.[5]

The Bijapurīs then occupied Bidar. 'Ādil Shah also entered the palace and ascended the throne of the Bahmanī Sultanate.[6]

After the fall of Bidar, 'Imād Shah again interceded for Amīr Barīd. 'Ādil Shah at length consented to enrol him among his officers, for Asad Khan becoming security for his fidelity. Kalyānī, Udgīr and some other districts, together with the revenue derived for the city lands, were allotted for Amīr Barīd's support, on condition of his attending 'Ādil Shah's army with three thousand horse.[7]

This great victory was celebrated by a splendid festival. During this festival, 'Ādil Shah promised to Asad Khan that, on his return to Bijapur he would restore Bidar to Amīr Barīd. But on return to Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah agreed to restore Bidar to Amīr Barīd in six months, provided the latter should, within that period, deliver the forts of Kalyānī and Qandhār to Bijapur. For which purpose, he was permitted to quit Bijapur.[8] When Amīr Barīd neglected to send the keys of the fortress of Kalyānī and Qandhār, 'Ādil Shah resolved, in the year 1531, to reduce them by force and send one of his sons to prepare for the expedition.

In the meanwhile, Amīr Barīd applied to Burhān Niẓām Shah for aid. The latter sent his ambassadors to 'Ādil Shah with a

---

5. ibid., 37 ff.; Tadhkirath, 37.
6. ibid, 39 ff.
7. idem.
8. idem.

request to forego his designs against Bidar. 'Ādil Shah turned down[9] Niẓām Shah's request. In spite of it, Niẓām Shah again sent a message, acquainting 'Ādil Shah to comply with his request for the good of Bijapur and be content to remain at home. 'Ādil Shah having already marched from Bijapur, received this communication at Bahmanhally in the evening. He was so indignant that he moved with only a small force to Naldurg by the next evening. He then dismissed the ambassadors of Niẓām Shah, telling them, he had done all that was incumbent on him to avoid a war. Consequently, due to Bidar, Bijapur and Ahmadnagar came to direct clashes. And Burhān Niẓām Shah along with the Amīr Barīd marched to the frontiers of Bijapur, to meet the challenge of 'Ādil Shah. A great battle ensued in which the Bijapurīs emerged victorious and Amīr Barīd reconciled to 'Ādil Shah.[10]

In 1534 Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and Amīr Barīd in alliance, marched to Golkonda and laid siege to Kovilkonda. Though the campaign was successful but due to the illness and death of 'Ādil Shah it ended abruptly in September 1534.[11]

During the period of political instability at Bijapur from 1534 to 1542, the relations between the two states were peaceful.

In 1542, following a breach between Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and his minister Asad Khan, Amir Barīd and Burhān Niẓām Shah circulated insidious reports, that Asad Khan had promised to deliver up Belgaum to them, whenever they approached. Accordingly they invaded Bijapur, wresting the five districts dependent on Shōlāpūr.

---

9. idem.
10. ibid., 41.
11. ibid., 42f.

After this, they proceeded to Belgaum. Asad Khan, though originally not a party to the invasion, deemed it prudent, in order to save his estates from plunder, to join them on their approach with six thousand horse. The allies, inspired with fresh coverage by this accession of power, spread desolation through the country to the neighbourhood of Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah, conceiving himself unable to oppose them in the field, retired with his family to Gulbarga.[12]

Asad Khan, still loyal to 'Ādil Shah, sought secretly assistance of 'Imād Shah of Berar. The latter promptly complied with the request and moved to Gulbarga. The allies - Amīr Barīd and Niẓām Shah, then lying before the citadel of Bijapur, raised the siege and after devastating the suburbs of the city, marched for the purpose of preventing the junction of Berar army with that of Bijapur. But when the combined armies of Bijapur and Berar got ready to give battle, Amīr Barīd and Niẓām Shah retreated towards Daulatābād. The expedition came to an end due to the death of Amīr Barīd.[13]

After the death of Asad Khan, in 1549, 'Ādil Shah agreeably to his last will, gave the former's daughter Mahtāb Bī in marriage to 'Alī Barīd Shah, with whom he sought an alliance.[14]

In 1549, when Burhān Niẓām Shah effectually blockaded Kalyānī, 'Alī Barīd sought Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah's assistance. The latter marched with an army to retrieve Kalyānī; and encamping

---

12. Briggs, III, 54 f.; Basātīn, 56 f.

13. idem.

14. ibid., 60 f.; Basātīn, 64.

within sight of the enemy, threw up an entrenchment aroung his army, not choosing to risk a battle on the plains. Then the Bijapurī and Ahmadnagar armies came to direct clash.[15]

In 1564 'Alī Barīd joined 'Ādil Shah, along with Quṭb Shah and Niẓām Shah in the battle of Bannihatti against Vijayanagar. After which battle, the rival kingdoms of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda became too much powerful for the Bidar Sultan.

In 1569, 'Alī Barīd, on being persuaded by Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah, joined the confederacy against Bijapur and they, at the instigation of Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah, decided to attack Bijapur. However, this design did not materialise, due to Nizam Shah's sudden desertion.[16]

In the following year, 'Alī Barīd and 'Ālī 'Ādil Shah joined the confederacy, initiated and planned by Qutb Shah, against Niẓām Shah. But the decree of tripartite alliance was never realised due to the advance diplomatic strategy of Niẓām Shah.[17]

In 1572, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah agreed with Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah to allow the latter to have a free hand in the latter's conquest of Bidar.[18]

During the rest of the reign of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and during the early period of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II's reign there was lull in the Bijapur-Bidar relations, as these Sultans were busy in their campaign in the south.

---

15. Briggs, III, 62; Further Sources, III, 254 adds that 'Alī Barīd promised to surrender the fort to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah if he helped him, in the war against Ahmadnagar.
16. ibid., 154; Futūḥāt, log.cit.
17. ibid.; 256 f.
18. Briggs, III, 82, 155.

In 1619 Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II marched against Bidar to punish Amīr Barīd, who had maintained the family tradition of hostility to Bijapur. Bidar fell and was annexed to Bijapur.[19]

SEC. IV: BIJAPUR-BERAR RELATIONS

Fatḥullāh 'Imād Shah, the founder of the 'Imad Shāhī dynasty of Berar, assumed independence in 1490 in concert with Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah of Bijapur.[1]

Since Bijapur and Berar were not contiguous and the question of direct hostility or territorial aggrandisement was non-existent, as such, their relations were friendly and cordial.

In the year 1506, with the introduction of Shīah faith at Bijapur, when Sultan Muhammad Bahmani made a religious war on Bijapur and invited 'Imād Shah to the confederacy, the latter did not join,[2] in view of his good relations with Yusuf 'Adil Shah.

Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, finding his position untenable to oppose the confederacy of the Bahmanī Sultan fled to Berar and threw himself into the arms of 'Imād Shah, who was on intimate terms with him. 'Imād Shah, first reprimanded Yūsuf for his religious innovation, and then advised him to give up the new creed. In compliance with the counsel thus offered, Yūsuf issued a command to his agent at Bijapur ordering him to discontinue the reading of Shī'ah Khuṭbah and reinstate the Sunnī Khuṭbah.[3] 'Imād Shah then,

---

19. Futūḥāt, G. Yazdani, Bidar: Its History and Monuments, 14.
1. Briggs, II, 536; III, 8.
2. Basatīn, 21; Briggs, III, 15.
3. Idem.

apprenhensive of the danger of openly espousing the cause of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, advised him to retire towards Burhānpūr, till some plan could be devised of dissolving the confederacy formed against him. In compliance, Yusuf left for Burhānpūr.[4]

'Imād Shah, on his part, deputed one of his nearest relations to Malik Aḥmad Baḥrī and to Sultan Qulī Quṭb Shah, recommending strongly, to retire, instead of weakening themselves and becoming the dupes of an artful Minister Amīr Barīd.[5] Further he issued a proclamation on behalf of Yūsuf, expressing regret for the Sultan Muḥammad's conduct.[6]

Again, when Amīr Barīd, being unaware of the role of 'Imād Shah, in breaking up the confederacy, approached the latter for alliance against Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, he declined to do join. This led to fleeing of Amīr Barīd.[7]

The Bijapur-Berar relations took a turn with the coming of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah at Bijapur and 'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah at Berar. Thus, when Amīr Barīd sought military assistance from 'Alāuddīn, against Bijapur in 1514, the latter sent a contingent.[8] Again in 1526, 'Alāuddīn, at the call of Burhān Niẓām Shah I, led the contingent of Berar against Bijapur. In the battle field, the forces of 'Imād Shah were opposed by Asad Khan of Bijapur. The former being charged by the latter, fled from the field, without making any opposition, and did not halt, except at night, till he reached Gawilgaṛh in Berar.[9]

---

4. Briggs, III, 16.
5. ibid., 16 f.
6. Basātīn, 21.
7. Briggs, III, 17.
8. ibid., 27.
9. ibid., 32; Basātīn, 36.

Now Ismā'īl instigated 'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah to attack Ahmadnagar territory. The two allies succeeded in capturing Pathri. But being chased by Burhān, the latter fled to Khandēsh.[10]

In 1528, both Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and 'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah realising the consequences of the great power that Ahmadnagar achieved and the frequent aggrandisement made by Burhān Niẓām Shah of their territories, came to an understanding. Thus to strengthen their position, on the adivce of Asad Khan, Ismā'īl gave his sister Khadījā, in marriage to 'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah. The two sultans then celebrated the nuptials.[11]

In 1532, in the Bijapur-Bidar conflict, 'Alāuddīn, at the request of Amīr Barīd, came to mediate peace. Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah went to visit 'Alāuddīn. The latter congratulated the former, on his recent success. 'Imād Shah diplomatically disclosed that he had come to Bidar merely to share the victories of Ismā'īl; but now he wished to mediate terms in Bijapur-Bidar conflict. But finding Ismā'īl adament for Barīd's submission, 'Alāuddīn did not press; and the two rulers, after spending a week together in festivity, parted.[12]

'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah again in 1530, interceded for Amīr Barīd, when the latter was captive in the hands of Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah. The latter at length consented. Then after a week 'Imād Shah joined 'Ādil Shah in alliance and marched to recover Rāidhūr and Mudgal from Vijayanagar. After their success in the enterprise the two rulers held a banquet in festivity.[13]

---

10. Basātīn, 37 f.
11. Briggs, III, 33, 295.
12. ibid., 36.
13. ibid., 39 ff.

In 1542, when Bijapur was attacked and hard pressed by the forces of Ahmadnagar and Bidar, Daryā 'Imād Shah,[14] on being solicitated fervently for help by Asad Khan, came to the rescue and compelled the invaders to raise the siege of Bijapur. After this event, 'Imād Shah, convinced of the integrity of Asad Khan heartily espoused his cause, and conducted him to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, to clear the misunderstandings. Thus by 'Imād Shah's intervention, 'Ādil Shah and his minister were reconciled, which had a profound impact on Bijapur's politics.[15]

In the following year, 1543, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah married the daughter of 'Alāuddīn 'Imād Shah, Rābi'ah Sulṭān and the nuptials were celebrated with great splendour.[16] But in spite of this matrimonial alliance. Daryā 'Imād Shah joined the confederacy of Burhān Niẓām Shah and 'Alī Barīd against Bijapur, in 1548 to enthrone the Prince 'Abdullāh at Bijapur. The three Sultans of the confederacy met at Pathri and enrolled the support of Rāmarāj also. But when the fall of Bijapur became eminent, 'Imād Shah came to its rescue and saved it by deserting Burhān, and thus the confederacy broke.[17]

By 1566, the friendly relations between Bijapur and Berar ceased to exist. 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, at the request of Queen-regent of Ahmadnagar accompanied Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah to invade Berar. The allies advancing as far as Ellichpūr laid waste the territory of

---

14. Ferishta wrongly mentions 'Alāuddin 'Imād Shah who died in 1529. Briggs, III, 54.
15. Futūḥāt, 67 b; Briggs, III, 54 f.
16. ibid., 69 a; ibid., 56. Rābi'ah was the daughter of Khadījā,
17. Futūḥāt, 72 a.

Berar and returned on the approach of the rainy season, to their capitals.[18]

This anti-Berar policy persisted until for 1572, when 'Alī 'Ādil Shah and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah I came to an understanding and the former agreed to the latter's free hand in the conquest of Berar. Consequently, Berar was conquerred by Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah in 1574.[19]

---

18. Briggs, III, 80.

19. ibid., III, 82, 115.

Part 2

Bijapur-Vijayanagar Relations (1489-1672)

Bijapur and Vijayanagar being contiguous, direct relations especially hostile were but eminent. The 'Ādil Shahs tried, on several occasions, to maintain good neighbourly relations with Vijayanagar in order to maintain the balance of power in the Deccan. The causes of the recurring hostilities between the two States were political, economic and geographical.[1] The study of Bijapur-Vijayanagar relations can be made in two phases:

First Phase (1489-1565): Bijapur's relations with the Sāḷuva and Tuḷva Dynasties

Second Phase (1565-1672): Bijapur's relations with the Āraviḍu Dynasty

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1489-1565)

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE SĀḶUVA AND THE TUḶUVA DYNASTIES

Soon after Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah became de facto ruler of Bijapur in 1489, Qāsim Barīd being jealous, called in the aid of

---

1. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "The Raichur Doab in the Deccan History", J.I.H., XXX, 1956, 380 ff., adds "Religion" as one of the causes of hostility between Vijayanagar and Bijapur.

Vijayanagar against Yūsuf, promising as reward the cessation of Nandyāl and Rāichūr, or the country between the two rivers - Krishna and Tungabhadra. Narasimha collected the forces of Vijayanagar crossed Tungabhadra, and after laying waste the country seized the two cities of Nandyāl[1] and Rāichūr.[2]

A few years later, in April 1493, Yūsuf marched to recover the lost territory. He advanced to the river Krishna, but due to illness he halted for about two months. After recovery from the illness the two parties clashed. Though initially Bijapuris suffered reverses, finally they emerged victorious and the Vijayanagar forces fled away. Consequently the disputed territory Rāichūr doāb was occupied by the Bijapurīs. But, it seems from the events of 1502 that Vijayanagar recaptured back the doāb region, some time between 1493 and 1502. Since the Bahmanī Sultan Muḥammad II (along with Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah) recaptured the same region in 908/1502 from Vijayanagar and entrusted it, together with the forts of Rāichūr and Nandyāl[3] to Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah.[4]

In the following years, Yūsuf persistently attempted to extend the boundary of his kingdom at the expense of the Rāya of Vijayanagar.[5] Vijayanagar too adopted a similar policy. Vijayanagar rulers desired to have a port, free from the Muḥammadan control, through which they could get their supplies of arms, amunitions and horses. To achieve this objective, Timoja, governor of Honāwar, belonging to Vijayanagar helped the Portuguese in capturing Bijapurī port of Goa.[6]

---

2. Briggs, III, 5; Further Sources, III, 162.
3. ibid., 6.
4. Durhan, 157; King 137 f.; Further Sources, 179 f.
5. Further Sources, III, 189.
6. K.M. Pannikar: Malabar and the Portuguese, 77; Danvers, I, 120.

In pursuance of the above policy, Krishnadēvarāya, who was in fact waiting for a favourable opportunity to dislodge the ruler of Bijapur from the Krishna-Tungabhadra doāb, readily responded to the invitation of the people of Belgaum, who rose up in rebellion against Bijapur and requested the Rāya to come and occupy the city. The Rāya led his armies against Bijapur in August 1510 and laid siege to Rāichūr. Kamāl Khān, the Regent at Bijapur does not seem to have concerted measures to meet the challenge of Vijayanagar; as he was too busy with the internal problems. Kamāl Khan was defeated by the Rāya. His treacherous design on the throne hastened his fall and was assassinated in May, 1511. Consequently, by May-June 1511 the Rāya captured Rāichūr and moved further north towards Gulbarga.[7]

Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah could not forget the loss of the Rāichūr Doāb. He was determined to recover. As such in 1519, he marched to recover Mudgal and Rāichūr. The Rāya of Vijayanagar on gaining early intelligence of 'Ādil Shah's intentions moved with a large army. The two armies encamped on the opposite bank of Krishna. Though the Bijapurīs gained initial success, eventually, they were defeated.[8] 'Ādil Shah retreated to Bijapur.

During the next decade 'Ādil Shah tried to strengthen his rule and the army, to avenge the defeat. He was awaiting an opportune time. This came with the death of powerful Krishnadēvarāya in 1529. He was succeeded by Achuyūta Rāya, a weak ruler.

---

7. Further Sources, III, 189.
8. Futūḥāt, 536; Briggs, III, 29; R. Sewell: A Forgotten Empire, 138.

So, early in 1530, 'Ādil Shah in alliance with 'Imād Shah of Berar marched against Mudgal and Rāichūr. He laid siege to Mudgal and pressed it hard. Deprived of any outside help, the garrison surrendered. 'Ādil Shah now turned his attention towards Rāichūr and before he made the assault, the picket, for want of outside relief, surrendered the keys of citadel to the Bijapurīs.[9] Thus, Vijayanagar lost the Doāb for ever.

Bhōja Rāya, the ruler of Vijayanagar, on attaining majority, got sick of Rāmarāj's authority who was ruling during the infancy of Bhōja Rāya. When Rāmarāj was away from the capital, the young Rāya sent an ambassador, with a petition and presents of six lakhs of hun and other precious articles to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah. The Rāya wrote: "Your Majesty ('Ādil Shah) may be good enough to direct your auspicious steps to my country and thereby transform it into a paradise. For goodness sake do away with the traitor (Rāmarāj) whose authority lies heavy on me and my country, and let me have a will of my own. Upon my honour, I shall offer you enormous wealth, and shall ever be at your back and call."[10]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah readily agreed to rescue the Rāya and despatched his army towards Vijayanagar. While the Bijapur army was on the move, Rāmarāj too approached 'Ādil Shah and misguided him by saying that now the things at Vijayanagar were set right, he should not take the troubles of sending the army. 'Ādil Shah was

---

9. Basātīn, 44; Sewell, op.cit., 165 f.

10. Futūḥāt, 63 a; Basātīn, 51 f. Ferishta says that the Rāya promised to acknowledge himself tributory of 'Ādil Shah; and pay down a sum of three lakhs of huns for every day's march his army might make - Briggs, III, 50.

pacified by 80 lakhs of huns, which Rāmarāj sent. Since the sole object of 'Ādil Shah was to acquire wealth out of the expedition and set the Rāya at ease, this object having been achieved, he retreated, with his army to Bijapur. When the news about the retrogation of the Bijapurīs reached, Rāmarāj hastened to Vijayanagar. He sent the Rāya to the eternal world and usurped the throne.[11]

On becoming cognisant of the Rāya's death and treachery of Rāmarāj, 'Ādil Shah sent Asad Khan, with a formidable army, against the fort of Ādonī. Asad Khan besieged the fort; whereupon, Rāmarāj despatched his younger brother Venkaṭādri with a heavy detachment against the besiegers. Though, in a battle that ensued, the Bijapurīs were defeated; yet in the final engagement, they were victorious and Venkaṭādri sued for peace. Asad Khan returned to Bijapur with immense booty.[12]

It was as a matter of policy, Rāmarāj concluded peace with Bijapur. But while consolidating his power, he was waiting for an opportunity to avenge and retaliate 'Ādil Shah. This came in 1543, when Burhān Niẓām Shah formed a secret alliance with Rāmarāj, to create a diversion in the south, and to attack Bijapur simultaneously on various fronts. Consequently, Rāmarāj deputed his brother Venkaṭādri to recapture the Doāb. Now 'Ādil Shah being attacked by three powerful adverseries, on three fronts was unable to cope up. Hence, on the advice of Asad Khan, he thought it prudent to make peace with Ahmadnagar by surrendering the five and half districts; and reconciliate Vijayanagar by sending rich presents. And then to deal with Golkonda alone. Thus, 'Ādil Shah

---

11. Basātīn, 52 f.
12. idem., Briggs, III, 51 f.

sent ambassadors to Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar and concluded peace.[13]

However, bitterness and hatred prevailed in the heart of Rāmarāj and he was determined to regain the doāb. Thus in 1544, Rāmarāj instigated Burhān Niẓām Shah to attack Gulbarga. 'Ādil Shah led his forces and emerged victorious in the battle that ensued. Again in 1549, when Niẓām Shah deputed ambassadors to Vijayanagar, 'Ādil Shah got very much annoyed and treated the ambassadors of Rāmarāj with such marked neglect that they became alarmed, and retired abruptly, without taking leave, to Vijayanagar. Rāmarāj was much incensed; and in order to involve 'Ādil Shah in war with Ahmadnagar, wrote to Niẓām Shah, recommending to attack Kalyānī, belonging to 'Alī Barīd, the ally of 'Ādil Shah.[14]

In 1551 Rāmarāj and Burhān Niẓām Shah held a conference at Raichūr and arrived at an agfeement for the recovery of the doāb from Bijapur. For this purpose, Rāmrāj agreed to help Burhān for the recovery of Shōlāpūr from Bijapur. The confederate armies succeeded in taking Mudgal and Raichūr. Then Rāmrāj left Venkaṭādri at Shōlāpūr for assisting Niẓām Shah; and they succeeded in recapturing Shōlāpūr.[15]

After the death of Burhān Niẓām Shah in 1553 'Ādil Shah, in order to recapture Shōlāpūr from Ahmadnagar, came to understanding with Rāmarāj. Obviously it was agreed that Rāmarāj will not attack Bijapur territory while he was busy with Ahmadnagar affair,

---

13. Briggs, III, 56; Sewell, op.cit., 184.
14. ibid., 57; ibid., 185.
15. Futūḥāt, 206; Briggs, III, 62.

and that he would not help Ahmadnagar. However, in the conflict of Ahmadnagar between Ḥusain and 'Ādil Shah was out of running. He thrice met reverses, and was forced to take refuge in the citadel of Bijapur, which was ultimately blockaded by the Ahmadnagar forces. When pressed hard, 'Ādil Shah made a requisition for armed assistance from Rāmarāj. The latter sent army, under his brother Venkaṭādri, to 'Ādil Shah. This made Ahmadnagar forces to withdraw from Bijapur.[16]

Thus 'Ādil Shah in distress forgot all hatred and enimity existed between the two states. And this marked change in Vijayanagar's policy towards Bijapur. Hitherto Rāmarāj had made unsuccessful attempts in alliance with Ahmadnagar, to destroy the power of Bijapur. But from hence forward he supported Bijapur in its wars against Ahmadnagar. The background of this changed relations with Ahmadnagar was overgrown power. Thus, to maintain balance of power, Rāmarāj, transferred his alliance to Bijapur.[17]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj

From the very beginning of his reign, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah showed a desire to continue and further strengthen his father's alliance and friendship with Vijayanagar. He established friendship with Rāmarāj and wished to call upon him. Thus, when one of the princes of Vijayanagar had died, it gave an impetus to 'Ādil Shah for seeking an interview with Rāmarāj and offering him condolences. In spite of the risk and danger that were involved in the enterprise, 'Ādil Shah having put his trust in God proceeded to

---

16. Basātīn, 60.
17. Dr. P.M. Joshi, J.I.H., op.cit., 387.

Vijayanagar. When this information reached Rāmarāj, he deputed nobles of his Court to welcome the Royal guest. A mandate was issued to the effect that the Royal guest should be courteously received at the Krishna and conveyed with due honour to the place appointed for his residence.[18]

When 'Ādil Shah crossed the Krishna, the nobles of Vijayanagar gave him a grand reception and led him towards the capital. In the meantime, Rāmarāj had issued orders for decorating the capital in a marvellous way. A wide plain on the Tungabhadra, noted for its beautiful scenery and secullent climate, was assigned for 'Ādil Shah's rest. The quarters were beducked with costly screens, embossed in gold, velvet etc., and poly-chromatic carpets. Accompanied by the royal family the nobles and the soldiers, Rāmarāj came out of the city to receive 'Ādil Shah. He then took 'Ādil Shah to his capital, with great respect, honour, splendour and solemnity.

A conference was held in the royal palace. At the outset, 'Ādil Shah made Rāmarāj to put on the special robe of honour that he had brought with him. 'Ādil Shah, having put on the mourning costume, offered his condolences to Rāmarāj. Rāmarāj was now in a transport of delight and he conversed with 'Ādil Shah in intimate terms. 'Ādil Shah gave away to Rāmarāj sixteen lakhs of huns in cash, some rare and valuable jewels etc., a few elephants and beautiful horses which were completely dressed, and several other rare presents which dazzled the sight of the beholders. Having accepted these presents, Rāmarāj showed due respect and courtesy to 'Ādil Shah and offered in return a gift of a robe of honour.

---

18. Basātīn, 80 ff.

'Ādil Shah, on invitation of the queen paid a visit to the harem. The queen of Vijayanagar addressed 'Ādil Shah as her son. Consequently, her daughters looked up to him as their brother. Accompanied by all the princesses and the other ladies of the harem, the queen greeted 'Ādil Shah and performed nadhar in his honour. With the motherly affection, the queen had an interview with the Sultan and placed him on the royal throne. She enquired about his welfare and talked with him on other subjects. She secured from 'Ādil Shah a promise of timely help to her husband. Finally she presented the Sultan with a robe of honour.

When 'Ādil Shah returned to his camp, his nobles offered their thanks to God for the Sultan's safe return from the harem of Rāmarāj. At the end, the nobles and the chiefs of Rāmarāj and the public of Vijayanagar offered their homage to 'Ādil Shah. There was seldom any subject of Rāmarāj who was not the recipient of 'Ādil Shah's charity. After this event, harmonious relations between 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj were firmly established and whenever either of them needed any help the other sent it without the least delay.[19]

Soon after his return from Vijayanagar, 'Ādil Shah in 1558 started expedition against Ahmadnagar, for the recovery of Shōlāpūr and Kalyānī. For this, 'Ādil Shah sought help from Rāmarāj. The latter lost no time in marching out with a big force towards Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj sallied forth against Ahmadnagar. The forces of Niẓām Shah took to heels. The fugitives were persuaded by the forces of 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj. The army of the

---

19. idem.

latter plundered and destroyed the Ahmadnagar territory. The vanity of Vijayanagar forces exceeded all limits. They even showed discourtesy towards 'Ādil Shah. It was out of policy that 'Ādil Shah paid no attention to the discourteous conduct of the Vijayanagar army. The Vijayanagar forces raided and destroyed the country extending from Junair to Daulatābād.[20]

In 1561 Rāmarāj played the role of peace maker in the Bijapur-Ahmadnagar conflict and effected a treaty by which 'Ādil Shah got Kalyānī from Niẓām Shah. After the conclusion of the treaty the forces of both Vijayanagar and Bijapur withdrew to their own territory. And in the following year, when Niẓām Shah laid siege to Kalyānī, 'Ādil Shah wought help of Rāmarāj. Rāmarāj immediately sent his infantry, numbering two lakhs and cavalry numbering fifty thousand to the help of Bijapur. The joint forces of Bijapur and Vijayanagar attacked Ahmadnagar. But, on account of his friendship with Niẓām Shah, Rāmarāj had no relish for the contest. He thought of playing the role of peace maker between the two Sultans. 'Ādil Shah on the other hand, had his doubts about Rāmarāj's conduct. He refused to believe that the latter could be both friendly to him and solicitated for the welfare of Niẓām Shah. This sort of dissimulation thought 'Ādil Shah, was unworthy of Rāmarāj. Thus, 'Ādil Shah got distrustful of the Rāmarāj's help and tried to meet the challenge single handed. Ultimately, being suspicious of Rāmarāj's attitude he slackened his efforts and prepared himself

---

20. ibid., 84 ff.

for leaving the battle-field. But in the battle, that ensued, 'Ādil Shah emerged victorious.[21]

'Ādil Shah, on account of the precautionary measures of Rāmaraj, next marched to Shōlāpūr. But as a matter of necessity he put off laying siege. He thought that if he conquered the fort Rāmarāj who had grown insolent and insubordinate might seize it. So he changed the plan and with the Rāmarāj's help he rebuilt the fort of Naldurg, made it impregnable and named it Shāhdurg. Both 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj returned to their capitals in June 1563.[22]

The policy of Rāmarāj to exploit from the enimity of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar and devastate and plunder their territories proved fatal not only for himself but for the entire Vijayanagar. 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, on the testimony of the previous expedition, had, by this time, learnt the futility and danger of inviting the forces of Vijayanagar against the Deccan Sultans. He began to doubt the ulterior motives behind Rāmarāj's help as to establish his supremacy by encouraging the internecine wars among the Deccan Kingdoms, leading to weakening of their power. This led to bitterness between 'Ādil Shah and Rāmarāj. The latter's arrogance knew no bounds; but his pride was the preclude to his fall.[23]

Rāmarāj after taking leave from 'Ādil Shah and reaching Vijayanagar, casted an evil eye on Bijapur and despatched armies to the Bijapur frontiers. 'Ādil Shah was compelled to purchase his forbearance by ceding the districts of Yādgīr and Bagalkōt. A

---

21. idem.
22. idem.; Briggs, III, 148 f.
23. Dr. P.M. Joshi, J.I.H., op.cit., 391.

similar deed was made with the Sultan of Golkonda by which he ceded Kōvilkoṇḍa, Pānagal and Ghanpūrā to Rāmarāj. This peremtory demand, the two sultans, due to their obligation to Rāmarāj, were not in a position to refuse. However, this helped the two Sultans to cement their mutual enimity and unite together for a common cause.[24]

This cession of territory by 'Ādil Shah altered the natural boundary formed by the river Krishna between Bijapur and Vijayanagar. And this acquisition placed Rāmarāj on an advantageous position for regular and direct encroachments into the territory of the Deccan Kingdoms. Further it gave an opportunity for building Vijayanagar empire north of Krishna, at the cost of the Deccan sultans. But Rāmarāj was too harsh and sultans had learnt their lesson. He was trying to become military dictator and the arbitrator of the destinies of the Deccan sultanates. His expedition and alliance borne testimony to his sinster intentions which became apparent to the sultans. His reckless diplomacy and inconsiderate attitude towards the religion of others filled the minds of the sultans with disgust. And out of this was born their hatred towards the Vijayanagar, the source of Rāmarāj's strength, the symbol of his arrogance. To save the Deccan Kingdoms from the menace of this autocrat, the only salvation was in uniting together against him for destroying his military strength and overthrowing Vijayanagar. And this, the Deccan sultans proceeded to do so as a resentment against Rāmarāj's unjust aggression of their dominions. The real cause of the confederacy was the fear engendered in the minds of the sultans of the rapid growth of Rāmarāj's

---

24. Briggs, III, 74.

power to avenge the offended dignity of Islam.[25]

The Battle of Krishna — League of the Four Sultans

Thus 'Alī 'Ādil Shah resolved to curb the insolence and power of Rāmarāj by a league of the Deccan Sultans. For this purpose 'Ādil Shah convened the Majlis-i Kingash or Advisory Council for discussion. Two of the prominent members of the Council, Kishwar Khan Lārī and Shāh Abū Turāb Shīrāzī, while upholding 'Ādil Shah's desire to curb the pride of Rāmarāj, advised that it could not be effected unless all the Deccan sultans joined together. 'Ādil Shah commanded Kishwar Khan to take measures to effect the object of a general league.[26] For this purpose, an ambassador was despatched, to sound Quṭb Shah and to open to him, if prudent, the designed plan. Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah, who had been inwardly stang with indignation at the hauty insolence and usurpation of Rāmarāj, eagerly acceded to the proposed alliance, and offered to mediate a union between 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah.

The preliminaries being over, 'Ādil Shah preparatory to declaring war, and in order to affordhimself a pretence for breaking with Rāmarāj, despatched an ambassador to Vijayanagar, demanding restitution of Yādgīr, Bāgalkōt, Rāichūr and Mudgal, which had

---

25. Basātīn, 89 ff. However, Further Sources (III, 272) asserts that Islam was not cause of the confederacy.

26. Further Sources, III, 272.
For the controversy over the origin of the confederacy, see Prof. Sherwani, JLI.H., 1957, 35, 363 f. However Ferishta and Basātīn seems to be more accurate. They state that 'Alī 'Ādil Shah was the father of this league against Vijayanagar. But Ramarajana Bakhair asserts that 'Ādil Shah did not join wholeheartedly - Further Sources, III, 275; I.H.R.C., VIII, 1925, 54 ff.

been, at different times, wrested from him. Ramaraj, as anticipated, expelled the ambassador with disgrace. This gave, to the Deccan sultans, an opportunity for hastening their preparations to crush the common enemy of Islam.[27]

Thus, in 972/1564, the four Sultans - 'Ādil Shah, Quṭb Shah, Niẓām Shah and 'Alī Barīd, at the head of their respective armies, met at the plains of Bijapur. On the 26th December 1564, they marched towards Krishna.

Ramaraj, though he saw the formidable union of the four sultans against him, but he did not descend in the least from his former haughty language. He treated the ambassador of 'Ādil Shah with scorn, regarding their unity as of little moment. In the first instance he detached his youngest brother Yeltumrāj, with an army to occupy the right bank of the Krishna and secure all the passage to the river. He also sent his second brother Venkaṭādri in another direction; and himself followed up. The armies of the opponents encamped on the opposite bank of the Krishna.[28]

On 5th January 1565[29] a fierce battle ensued between the allies - the Deccan sultans and Ramaraj at a place called Bannihaṭṭi.[30] And finally the allies emerged victorious and

---

27. Briggs, III, 76.
28. Briggs, III, 77 f.
29. For the controversy over the date of the battle see G.H.Khare, Maharashtra Mahodayacha Purva ranga, (Introduction), 53 ff.
30. Hence "the Battle Bannihaṭṭi" (or Banhaṭṭi) and not "The Battle of Tālikōṭa" nor "The Battle of Rakshari Tangadi" as wrongly called by almost all historians. For discussions with a map on the correct site of the battle see Prof. Sherwani, J.I.H., 1957, 368; also Q.S.D., 137 ff.

Vijayanagar was conquerred. For six months the allied army remained and enjoyed at the city of Vijayanagar.[31] Tirumala made peace with the sultans by surrendering to them all the places which Rāmarāj had wrested from them. Except this war, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I never fought with Rāmarāj.[32]

After the battle of Bannihaṭṭi 'Ādil Shah was free to make conquests in the south. Obviously he first tried to subdue southern Bijapur-belt. In 1568, 'Adil Shah led his army to Ānēgondi, to place Timarāj, son of Rāmarāj, on the throne of Penukoṇḍa, the new capital of Vijayanagar and deposed Venkaṭādri with the hope of acquiring for himself a portion of the Vijayanagar territory. Venkaṭādri, when informed of these designs of 'Ādil Shah, appealed to both to Niẓām Shah and his mother for help. The queen of Ahmadnagar came to the rescue, by attacking Bijapurī territory. This created a diversion in favour of Vijayanagar, by compelling 'Ādil Shah to retreat to Bijapur. However, in 1569 Niẓām Shah changed the policy and came to an agreement with 'Ādil Shah that the latter can have a free hand in conquerring the dependencies of the Vijayanagar. While the former to act likewise in regard to Berar. Both the rulers agreed to not to interfere in each other's projects.[33]

SEC. II: SECOND PHASE (1565-1672)

BIJAPUR AND THE ĀRAVĪḌU DYNASTY

'Alī 'Ādil Shah, Tirumala and Srī Ranga

The battle of Bannihaṭṭi did not perish the Vijayanagar

31. H. Heras: Aravidu Dynasty, 228.
32. Further Sources, III, 252.
33. Briggs, III, 80, 82.

Kingdom. The battle simply reduced the extent of the kingdom and shifted its capital to Penukonḍa from Vijayanagar. The kingdom then lingered on, for nearly a century. Tirumala governed the state as a regent in the name of Sadāsiva Rāya. In 1568, Tirumala assassinated his sovereign Sadāsiva and seized the throne for himself.[34]

With the fall of Vijayanagar, Bijapur was free to extend its boundary in the trans-Krishna region. For this purpose, Bijapur and Ahmadnagar came to a mutual understanding. Their agreement for the territorial aggrandisement proved to be fatal for the tottering new dynasty of the Vijayanagar. Accordingly, in 1573, 'Ādil Shah set out to invest Turkal, then in the possession of Venkaṭayasu Rāya, who surrendered it after seven months of strenuous defence. Then 'Ādil Shah moved to reduce Dhārwār, which was under the possession of one of the officers of late Rāmarāj, and who paid annually small tribute to Tirumala. The fortress took six months to subdue. 'Ādil Shah next turned his arms against Bankāpūr. This place was the principal residence of Velapa Rāya, who had rebelled against Vijayanagar, after the battle of Bannihaṭṭi. He prepared to oppose Bijapur army and at the same time, he sent letters to Venkaṭādri, the brother of Rāmarāj, seeking help. Venkaṭādri expressed his inability to render any help to Velapa. The latter, with the help of the neighbouring Rājas was able to defend the siege, which lingered on for one year and three months. At last Velapa Rāya surrendered after the demise of his son, on

---

34. Sewell, op.cit., 212.

condition, of being allowed to depart with his family, to which 'Ādil Shah agreed.[35]

In 1574, four months after the reduction of Bankāpūr, its different chiefs submitted to pay tribute. Soon, 'Ādil Shah despatched Mustafā Khan with a large army to reduce the forts of Jerreh and Chandragutti.[36] Its Rāya resisted the siege for fourteen months, at the end of which, the fort was carried by storm in 1575. 'Ādil Shah then came to Chandragutti from Bankāpūr and stayed there for three months, after which he went back in triumph to Bijapur.[37] He was away from Bijapur for more than three years for the campaign in the south.

Srī Ranga I, who ascended the throne at Penukonda, early in 1572, could not render assistance to his rebel chiefs of the Kanara country[38] whose states 'Ādil Shah conquerred gradually.

In 1575 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, after his short campaign in the Kanara country, joined the troops of Mustafā Khan, and advanced towards Penukonda. At that time Ranga was away from the capital. While returning back, he appealed for help to Qutb Shah. The latter, agreeing to help, detached his general Shah Muhammad, with light force, to skirmish and plunder the borders of Bijapur. This created a diversion in favour of Ranga. Then the forces of Shah Muhammad and Ranga formed a junction and induced 'Ādil Shah to raise the siege of Penukonda and retreat to Bijapur.[39]

---

35. Briggs, III, 82; Heras, op.cit. 257 ff.
36. A strong hill fot in the table land of Mysore. See Heras: Aravidu Dynasty, 56, 178.
37. Briggs, III, 84 f.
38. See infra Part III of this Chapter for the various chiefs of Kanara country.
39. Briggs, III, 86; Heras, op.cit., 269.

In the following year, 1576, 'Ādil Shah again invaded Srī Ranga's territory. Ranga set out from Penukoṇḍa to check this repetition. When the two armies met, a great battle ensued, in the course of which, Ranga fell into the hands of Bijapurīs, who emerged victorious. The immediate result of this victory was the possession by 'Ādil Shah, of the territories to the north of Penukoṇḍa. Ranga was soon released on payment of heavy ransom. However, 'Ādil Shah, in the same year, renewed the attack on Penukonda. Unquestionably 'Ādil Shah's motive was to weaken the foundation of the new capital, Penukoṇḍa. Ranga's forces defended the place and the Bijapurīs, foiled in their attempt, raised the siege and retired.[40]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Venkaṭa Rāya II

Ibrāhim 'Ādil Shah II, continued the aggressive expansionist policy of his predecessor. He sent several expeditions against the Karnatak country. Due to these incursions, Venkaṭa Rāya II entered into an alliance with Burhān Niẓām Shah II against Bijapur. About 1592, 'Ādil Shah laid siege to Penukoṇḍa. Venkaṭa first tried to oppose the Bijapurīs, but on the approach of 'Ādil Shah himself, he handed over the command to one of his general and retired with the treasures, to Chandragiri. 'Ādil Shah besieged the city, investing it closely, for three months. He was determined to remain there, until victory. At the end of three months, when the garrison was about to surrender, Venkaṭa bribed Handiatum Nayak, the chief of the Bergies in the 'Ādil Shāhī army, with twentyfour lakhs of rupees and five elephants, to desert with his followers and harass Bijapurī camp. Accordingly, Handiatum deserted. Con-

40. Heras, op.cit., 270.

sequently, 'Ādil Shah was compelled to retreat to Bijapur, leaving Muṣṭafā Khan to protect the frontiers.[41]

For about a decade the relations between two states were peaceful. In 1604, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II sent an ambassador to Venkaṭa at Chandragiri. However, no information about this legation is available.[42] It seems that the two rulers, though previously irreconcilable foes, became friends.

Taking advantage of the civil war among the rulers of the Āravīḍu dynasty, 'Ādil Shah in 1619 despatched an expedition to Karnūl, in the western Telugu country, under Abdul Wahāb Khan. Gōpalarāja, the chief of that place, under the Āravīḍu ruler offered stout resistance. It seems that Quṭb Shah, being on friendly terms with that chief, rendered some assistance, which compelled 'Ādil Shah to agree for peace and truce was made, in December 1621. However, 'Ādil Shah did not give up his designs upon Karnūl. Again in 1624 he sent Wahāb Khan, who laid siege to it. Gōpālarāja was reduced to great straits and he appealed to the neighbouring chiefs for assistance. With their help Gōpāla gave battle to the Bijapurīs. After prolonged fighting Gōpālarāja realised that it was futile to continue the war further. So, he abandoned the fort, and sought refuge in an unknown place. The fort of Karnūl, with its dependent territory was occupied permanently by the Bijapuris. Srī Ranga, who was taken in adoption by Gōpālarāja became, after this conquest of Karnūl, a subject of 'Ādil Shah.[43]

---

41. Briggs, III, 86; Heras, op.cit., 336 f.
42. Heras, op.cit., 340.
43. Further Sources, III, 333 ff.

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and Srī Ranga

In 1636, 'Ādil Shah, with envious eyes on Penukonda, detached an army under Randaulā Khan, for its capture. Venkaṭa III to provide for the proper defences of the capital, sent in August 1636, his daḷavāy Kōnēṭi Nāyak to Penukonda which was bestowed on the daḷavāy, together with its dependent territory as amaram, and himself retired to Vellore. Randaulā Khan entered into an alliance with Srī Ranga in 1637 and began to prosecute war against the petty chiefs of the Karnatak.[44] The Bijapurīs also invested Bangalore in 1639[45] and Venkaṭa had to buy peace, at the cost of a large indemnity.

Then, again in May 1641, Srī Ranga in colloboration with Randaulā Khan, captured two forts belonging to Venkaṭa. Now the way to the interior of Vijayanagar Kingdom was open for the Bijapuris. They, accompanied by Srī Ranga, marched upon Vellore. But the timely arrival of help from the Nāyaks of Madura, Thanjavur and Ginji, checked the advance of the Bijapurī forces, and gave temporary relief to Venkaṭa. Randaulā Khan collected the moveable booty from the forts and handed over some of the empty forts to Srī Ranga.[46]

However, Srī Ranga did not maintain the alliance with Bijapur for a long. He allied to achieve his own interest. When Srī Ranga learnt that, his uncle Venkaṭa III, who had no children, lay dying among the hills of Narayanavaram, thought it an opportunity

---

44. For the details of the chiefs of the Karnatak, see Part III of this Chapter, infra.
45. Further Sources, III, 340 ff.
46. idem.

to seize the throne for himself. So, he deserted the Bijapurī general and came forward, to defend his ancestoral kingdom. He made himself the King as Srī Ranga III, on the 29th October, 1642.[47]

Srī Ranga, now exploited the rift between Bijapur and Golkonda over the conquest of Karnatak. He sent to 'Ādil Shah a squad of 15 elephants as gift and promised a sum of fifteen lakhs pagodas for his help against Golkonda. 'Ādil Shah detached 6,000 horse and 20,000 foot, in June 1643 for Srī Ranga's help. With this aid Srī Ranga marched against Udayagiri, dislodged the Golkonda forces from the fort, in January 1644 and checked further advances. In the same year, Srī Ranga having exasperated against his insurgent Nāyaks sought help from Rustum-i Zamān of Bijapur to check them. The two agreed that, their forces will undertake the campaign conjointly; and whenever a fort was captured, its moveable property would be the share of the Bijapurīs while the immoveable that of Srī Ranga. Thus, in this way, the latter was able to save his country from passing into the hands of his enemy. This alliance was a strategy to the insubordination of the Nāyaks and it produced the desired effect. Later in 1644, Srī Ranga gave to 'Ādil Shah, a portion of the large sum of money he collected from his vassals - the Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura, as the price of his support against Golkonda. Again, when the Nāyaks of Madura and Ginji reverted to their old ways, Srī Ranga, with the help of Bijapurī army made an attempt to wrest the town of Arani from the Nāyak of Ginji.[48]

---

47. ibid., 348.

48. Further Sources, III 350 f.

However, after some time, Srī Ranga did not strictly observe the terms of the treaty and made common cause with the local Rājas, refused to be coerced by the Bijapurīs and prepared to oppose them. Consequently, Bijapur-Golkonda came to an understanding for the conquest and division of the Karnatak. And their combined armies soon made their appearance in 1644, on the frontiers of Srī Ranga's Kingdom. The latter was unable to cope up with the united armies of the two sultans. Hence, he again implored for peace to Bijapurīs and promised to pay 50 lakhs of <u>huns</u> as indemnity.[49] But Rustum-i Zamān did not pay any heed to this request.

While the campaign of Rustum-i Zamān was in progress, 'Ādil Shah, in June 1646, detached Muṣṭafā Khan to subdue the Kanara country of Srī Ranga. By way of Bakargunḍa he reached the fort of Gutty, on the Mālprabha river, which he took. Thence marching via Gadag and Lakshmēshwar to Honhalli,[50] he met (on 30th October) Asad Khan and Shāhjī, who had gone ahead, by order of 'Ādil Shah, for the defence of the Karnatak frontiers. The next stage was to Sakrapaṭan.[51] At this time the following petty chiefs contingent- Shivappa Nāyak, Ḍaḍ (or Ḍoḍḍē) Nāyak (Rāja of Harpanhalli), Jhujjar and Ābājī Rāo Ghāṭgē (Keng Nāyak's brother) the desais of Lakshmēshwar and Kopal, and Bālājī Haibat Rāo.[52]

Thence in successive marches, Muṣṭafā Khan reached Shivagana. Soon afterwards Venkayya Somājī, envoy of Srī Ranga waited

---

49. <u>Further Sources</u>, III, 351 f.
50. 12 miles west of Basavapaṭam.
51. Near the southern end of the Shimoga District.
52. <u>Muḥammad Nāmā</u>: M.R., 1929, 10.

Muṣṭafā Khan with peace offerings and induced him to stop the invasion. Muṣṭafā Khan refused to be dissuaded from his purpose by the deceitful words of the envoy and hastened towards the Kanvi pass near Vellore. He agreed to stop wherever he would hear that Srī Ranga had withdrawn from the war with the three Nayaks of Tanjavur, Madura, and Ginji, who had rebelled against Srī Ranga and agreed to make peace with them. Sōmājī promised to induce Srī Ranga to return to Vellore within one week. He took leave of Muṣṭafā Khan and was accompanied by Mullā Aḥmad, on behalf of Bijapur to settle the terms with the Rāyal and induce him to visit Muṣṭafā Khan near Nilipaṭan (28 miles from Vellore) in the uplands of Mysore. For Mullā's return, Muṣṭafā halted before a difficult pass. At first he had wished to detain Sōmājī in his camp and send Mullā Aḥmad alone for his peace mission, but on the assurance of Shāhjī Bhosale, who undertook the entire responsibility for Sōmājī, the latter was allowed to go.[53]

Sōmājī immediately on arrival at Vellore, advised the Rāyal to prepare for war and blockaded the pass. On this breach of faith, Muṣṭafā Khan decided to make a detour; and first entered the kingdom of Jagdev Rāo[54] by the Kanvi pass.

The Rāya hastened to defend the Kanvi pass. Muṣṭafā, was near Bangalore and on 21 December, 1646, he sent Asad Khan ahead of himself with a strong force. They forced their way into Jagdev's

---

53. idem., Further Sources, III, 353 ff.

54. A petty rājā under Srī Ranga Rāya. This country consisted of the northern corner of the Salem district and the adjacent part of the north Arcot District.

country slaying the defenders of the pass, and then halted at a tank, five leagues from Masti, for twenty days. The Rāya advanced with a vast army, by way of Guritatan and Krishnadurg,[55] to attack the division left at the tank under Shāhjī and Asad's division. The Bijapurīs were attacked by the Rāya's army and a bloody battle was fought in which the Bijapurīs emerged victorious. Then Mustafā advanced further and reaching Krishnagiri on 30th January 1647, besieged it, which after some time surrendered. Then the Bijapurīs marched to Vīrabhadradurg, the capital of Jagdēv. It was taken after a severe fight. Next the Bijapurīs marched on 7th February 1646 to Dēvdurg which was captured. They then marched, by way of Anandbār, Amrāvati and Goriatam and captured Uranjpūr.[56] From thence the Bijapurīs reached Vellore. Here severe battle was fought in which the Bijapurīs emerged victorious, and the Rāya submitted promising 50 lakhs of huns, and 150 elephants as war indemnity. After a halt of one month at Vellore, the Bijapurīs set out for further conquests. Turning back from Vellore, by way of Gunjatam, the Bijapurīs, under Mustafā proceeded conquerring in March 1647, the following places of Srī Ranga's kingdom.[57] Ambor, Kankuti, Tirupatur, Kaveripatan, Hasan Rāidurg, Rāidurg, Kayakpiri Ratnapri, Melpri, Arjunkōt and Dhalinkōt.

In 1648, Srī Ranga, Rājā of Mysore and Nāyak of Madura allied together and also obtained help of Mustafā Khan (who was

---

55. In Jagadēvarāya's country, south of Bangalore.

56. Rāyal's territory near Vellore.

57. ibid., 11 Dutch Record (I.H.R.C.; January 1942, 24) Swaminathan; Nāyaks of Ikkeri, 89; Further Sources, III, 357 ff.

again detached from Bijapur in January 1648) to meet the Golkonda forces, who were making further conquest in the south. The allies met the Golkonda army at the plainsoutside Wāndiwāsh and in a fierce battle the latter emerged victorious.

Finally, Srī Ranga had to abandon all resistance and seek refuge in Tanjavur. When Ginji and Thanjavur fell to Bijapur in 1649, Srī Ranga repaired to Mysore, where he kept his court, with the aid of the Kēladi chiefs, dreaming the reconquest of Vellore.[58]

In 1652, when war broke out between Bijapur and Golkonda over the division of the Karnatak, Srī Ranga recovered some of his lost possessions from Bijapur. Thus encouraged, in 1654, Srī Ranga returned to Vellore and raised a large army to drive the Bijapurīs out. Khān Muḥammad then proceeded to Vellore to put down Srī Ranga and re-establish the authority of Bijapur. On the approach of Khān Muḥammad, Srī Ranga sought safety in flight. Vellore was compelled to submit, by the hardships of protracted siege in the middle of 1654. However, Khān Muḥammad was obliged to cede the fort of Chandragiri with its dependencies, to Srī Ranga.[59]

In 1656, Srī Ranga, through Mīr Jumlā appealed to Aurangzeb, for help against the hostilities of Bijapur. Pending intervention of Aurangzeb, 'Ādil Shah instructed his governor in Karnatak to chastise Srī Ranga, for attempting to embroil them in a war with the Mughals. What action was taken is not clear due to the confused account of Ẓuhūr.

---

58. Further Sources, III, 361.

59. Further Sources, 365.

In spite of hostile attitude of 'Ādil Shah towards Srī Ranga, some of the Bijapurī officers, especially Shāhjī rendered valuable assistance to Srī Ranga in the latter's efforts to recover the lost possessions.[60] With the death of Srī Ranga, the last ruler of the Āravīḍu dynasty in 1672, the Bijapur-Vijayanagar relations closed.

Part 3

Bijapur's Relations with the Succession States of the Vijayanagar

After the battle of Bannihaṭṭi of 1565 Bijapur was free to persuade its expansionist policy in the trans-Krishna region of the former Vijayanagar Kingdom. As a result of which, the immediate territorial acquisitions were in the southern Bijapurī-belt. Further down south it took a century for Bijapur to conquer almost the entire territory of the Vijayanagar. Obviously the process of conquest was very slow and gradual and Bijapur did not pursue expansion in one particular direction or region. The expansion was three pronged in the three viceroyalties - Telugu Viceroyalty of the North, the Kanarese Viceroyalty of the West, and Tamil Viceroyalty of the East and South into which the former Vijayanagar Kingdom was divided after 1565.[1] These regions comprised various small kingdoms or principalities

---

60. Further Sources, 367; E.F.I., X, 136.

1. Tirumala after the battle of 1565 divided the remaining Vijayanagar Kingdom into three provinces. Heras: Aravidu Dynasty, 253 f.

of the feudatories, called Nāyaks.[2] They were feudatories to the Rāya of Vijayanagar and with the latter's decline in power, some of them, at different times became independent.

The study of the Bijapur's expansion in the trans-Krishna and coastal regions, and its relations with the feudatories and the succession states of Vijayanagar can be made by a division of the former Vijayanagar kingdom into three regions as follows:-

The West Coast of Kanara; the Central Region of Karnatak and the East Coast of Coromandel.

This classification can be further broken down into the principalities of the feudatory chiefs. They were Karnatak-Ikkeri, Basavapaṭanam, Sira etc., Mysore and Bangalore, Malabar and Kanara Coast-Honawar, Bhaṭkal (Baticole); Gersoppa and Ankola and Barcelar (Basrūr), Ginji, Tanjavur and Madura.

Kanara Region: The new government of Vijayanagar, under Tirumala, with the new capital at Penukonda, was too weak to exercise its sovereignty over the far flunged feudatories of Kanara and Malabar coast. As such, several petty feudal chiefs and Governors of the Vijayanagar, fulfilled their ambition by exerting autonomous rule within their principalities. In turn, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah,

---

2. The Nāyak rulers of South India were the by-products of the provincial administrative system adopted by the Vijayanagar rulers. It provided for a feudal type of Government in which the chieftains of small principalities were vassals of the sovereign ruler. They enjoyed the privileges of almost autonomous rule in their own territories. This led to the growth of small dynasties of rulers in small principalities and these rulers were known as the Nāyaks - K.D. Swaminathan: The Nayaks of Ikkeri, 2.

3. Further Sources, III, 295.

taking advantage of the anarchy, marched in 1573 against Bankāpūr, Dhārwār, Jerrah, Chundragutty and Karur. He compelled the feudal chiefs of these places to acknowledge his sovereignty and pay tribute.[4]

Following this, in 1576, the Rāni of Barcelore and several other chiefs of Kanara came to pay respects to 'Ādil Shah and presented offerings of considerable amount and agreed to pay annual tribute.[5]

These southern conquest of Bijapur, after 1565, introduced new dimensions in the external relations. The new conquests and parts of Karnatak were not directly absorbed in Bijapur Kingdom and were not directly governed by 'Ādil Shahi officers. But, 'Ādil Shah left the small kingdoms or principalities to their original feudal chiefs and only compelled them to acknowledge his overlordship and pay annual tribute. Thus in these southern conquests, 'Ādil Shah adopted the policy of 'conquest' only and not of 'consolidation'.

In persuance of this policy, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II, despatched, in 1584, Bahlōl Khan, with twelve thousand horse, to collect the arrears of tribute from the Rajas of Kanara; and in case they refused payment, to reduce their forts. Bahlōl Khan's campaign in Kanara lasted about an year, at the end of which, he returned to Bijapur. On his return, several rajas of the Kanarese country accompanied him to pay their compliments to 'Ādil Shah. These chiefs were, honoured by Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah with robes. Nevertheless this subjugation of the Kanara's petty rulers was

---

4. Briggs, III, 82 f.; Heras, op.cit., 243, 417.
5. ibid., 85.

mainly due to the mighty show of Bijapur's army. For, soon after Bahlōl Khan's retreat in 1585 to Bijapur, no tributory cared to pay the tribute. Consequently 'Ādil Shah again resolved in 1593 to humble the refractory chiefs by despatching Majjhula Khan with a large army. The Khan, on arriving at Bankāpūr, halted for a time and summoned all the Rajas to meet him with their tributes, promising protection to those who obeyed, but threatening the refradtory with vengence. Most of the chiefs prepared to comply with the Khan's demand and evinced intention to visit him. Ganga Nāyak who was one of the principal Rajas of Malabar (Kanara) and had eight or ten thousand horse and foot in his pay, went first to pay his respects. This created jealousy among other chiefs. They suspected Nāyak-Khan conspiracy against them and broke off their engagement and withdrew to the mountains. The Khan considering it prudent to not to follow them into an unknown country, marched with Ganga Nāyak against Jerreh. This belonged to Arsappa Nāyak, who prudently after a short siege, consented to pay tribute; and immediately made an offering of two fine elephants and some valuables for the Khan and 'Ādil Shah respectively. Afterwards, the Nāyak joined the Bijapur army and assisted them in the siege of Mysore.[6]

In 1629 Bhaira Dēvi the Queen of Ancola and Gersoppa, which places were at the borders of Bijapur, became tributory to 'Ādil Shah.[7]

---

6. ibid., 95, 97, 106 f.
   Here Ferishta repeatedly says "Rayas of Malabar" but actually it is Kanara.
7. Mançoes do Reino, No.12, Anode 1629, 448f., I.H.R.C., XI, December, 1928, 108. The queen of Gersoppa allied with 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, in 1570 and rendered military assistance against the Portuguese at Goa - Heras, op.cit. 295.

The Raja of Onore (Honawar) became a tributory of 'Ādil Shah in November 1663 by paying a huge amount of tribute.[8] By 1664, though Kanara was practically conquered, yet 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II invaded it in 1664. Since this expedition was mostly for booty, 'Ādil Shah arranged with the Nayak that the conquered countries would be given back to him on condition of payment of fifteen thousand pagodas, of five guilders each. On receipt of this amount, 'Ādil Shah triumphantly returned to Bijapur in January 1665.[9]

The Bijapurī envoys who usually went to collect annual tributes to various chiefs, also intervened in their internal affairs of the petty kingdoms. Thus in 1672 the Bijapurī envoy, who had gone to Bednūr to collect the arrears of tribute, assisted the weary Chief, who conspired to murder the Raja of Bednūr (Ikkēri). Again, the Bijapurīs assisted Naran Mulla of Bhatkal, who took up arms in favour of one of the aspirants to the rule of Bhaṭkal.[10]

The death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II on 24 November, 1672 was followed by a rebellion of the Raja of Sonde, (in alliance with the Raja of Bednūr). He then invaded Bijapurī territory. After taking Mirjān, they laid siege to Ankola. At this rebellion Sikandar 'Ādil Shah despatched Muẓaffar Khan to suppress the rebel chiefs.[11]

---

8. E.R.S., 60.

9. Dagh Register, 13 August 1664, 322.

10. E.F.I.(Fawcett) I, 308; Dr. B.A. Saletore: "The English and the Indian Civil War in Keledi", I.H.R.C., December 1942, 20.

11. E.F.I., (Fawcett) I, 316.

Karnatak Region

The Ikkēri kingdom comprised at its zenith an area corresponding to the whole coast of Kanara from Goa in the North to Cannore in the South and also parts of the Shimōga district. It had a nebulous beginning from about 1500 under Kēladi Chandappa Nāyak. Venkaṭappa Nāyak was a feudatory to the rulers of the Āravīḍu dynasty till about 1613. He ruled over the Tulū and the Male Rājya. And during his times (1586-1629) Ikkēri became an independent kingdom.[12]

Ikkēri came in contact with Bijapur during the times of Venkaṭappa and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II. Ibrāhīm, hearing about the extended power of Venkaṭappa ordered in 1628 all his ḥawalādārs, commanding the Konkan to march against it. Under the command of Shērul-Mulk, the Bijapurīs reached as far as Candesvara, where Venkaṭappa met them.[13] According to the Kēladinṛapavijayam the Bijapurī forces suffered a reverse and they had to retreat beyond the river Mirju which, ever after remained as the common boundary between Bijapur and Ikkēri. However in spite of the reverses of the Bijapurīs, Ikkēri was subdued and Venkaṭappa was compelled to pay 1,000 pagodas annually to the 'Ādil Shah as tribute.[14]

Bijapur adopted an unfair policy of siding one feudatory of its against another feudatory. Thus in 1629 'Ādil Shah took side with Hanuma, the chief of Basavāpaṭṭaṇam, in the latter's

---

12. I.M. Muthanna: History of Karnataka, 253.
13. K.D. Swaminathan: The Nāyaks of Ikkēri, 44.
14. Monçoes do Reino No.12, 1629, 448 f., text and trs., I.H.R.C., XI, 101. According to Muthanna (op.cit., 154) "in 1608 Venkaṭappa Nayak of Ikkeri was under the Sultan of Bijapur --"

conflict with Ikkēri.[15]

In 1629 when the news of the death of Venkaṭappa and succession of Virabhadra reached Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah sent an ambassador Mira demanding million gold pieces, five elephants 200 Arab horses. Further, he demanded 80,000 pagodas of arrears of tribute which Venkaṭappa Nayak owned for two years; and to evacuate all the territory taken for the Queen (of Bhaṭkal) and the chiefs of the Kanara coast. Virabhadra Nāyak was extremely annoyed at this demand. In order to avoid war with a powerful neighbour he offered 30,000 pagodas on condition that, 'Ādil Shah would help him to supress the revolts of the minor chieftains under him. But this condition was not acceptable to 'Ādil Shah and he anxiously awaited an opportunity to wage war.[16]

Mysore's Chamarājā Woḍēyar brought about Bijapur's invasion of Ikkēri. Kenge Hanuma, a petty poligar of Basavāpaṭṭaṇam was set up against Virabhadra Nāyak of Ikkēri, by other poligars. But Virabhadra put down Kenge Hanuma and other vassals and dispossessed the former of his fief. Thereupon Kenge Hanuma went over to the Bijapur court to solicit the aid of 'Ādil Shah against Ikkēri. Already a similar appeal had been made to Bijapur by another poligar Chennayya of Nagamangala, who had been deprived of his fief by Chamarājā Woḍēyar. 'Ādil Shah taking advantage of the state of affairs, readily accepted the invitation to intervene and undertook

---

15. Monçoes do Reino, I.H.R.C., XI, 111; Muthanna, op.cit., 253.

16. idem.; Swaminathan, op.cit., 68.

the first invasion of Mysore.[17] The Bijapurī army, under Randaulā Khan and Shāhjī marched to Ikkēri and reinstated Kenge Hanuma in 1637. After this restoration, the Bijapurīs took possession of Ikkēri on 3rd December, 1637. Virabhadra finding his position untenable retired to Bhuvanagiri. But the Bijapurīs, with the assistance of Kenge, attacked this fort also. A treaty was concluded, according to which Virabhadra gave up his claims to the conquered forts and he was allowed by 'Ādil Shah to rule over the remaining portions of his kingdom on terms of subordination to 'Ādil Shah.[18] Thus Ikkēri became a tributory to Bijapur.

After the campaign and conclusion of a treaty Randaulā Khan left Kenge Hanuma incharge of the territories acquired by him and returned to Bijapur. Then Virabhadra reported against Kenge to Bijapur, alleging that the latter was disloyal to the Sultan. Thereupon a commission of inquiry was ordered by 'Ādil Shah to investigate into the matter. Thus Virabhadra played a significant role in shaping Bijapur policy towards the Southern feudatories.[19]

---

17. Further Sources, III, 341, 348.; C.S. Srinivasachari: A History of Gingee and its Rulers, 155 f.; Swaminathan, op.cit., 73. The latter author adds, on the basis of Kēladinṛapavijayam that Venkaṭappa, the chief of Tarikere, another feudatory of the ruler of Ikkēri, appears to have induced 'Ādil Shah to invade the Ikkēri kingdom.

18. Swaminathan, op.cit., 73 f.; I.H.R.C., XVI, 50 f.; Sardeasi: A New History of the Marathas, I, 751; Srinivasachari (op.cit., 167 f.) writes that the Bijapurīs occupied not only the capital Ikkēri but also one-half of the Ikkēri Kingdom.

19. Srinivasachari, op.cit., 75 ff., 156. Kenge had not only rebelled against Bijapur but caused a general uprising of the petty chiefs throughout the Kanara country, against Bijapur - Muḥammad Nāmā: M.R., July 1929, 9.

In 1638 Virabhadra, anticipating some trouble from the Bijapurīs, approached the Portuguese Viceroy to exert his diplomatic pressure at Bijapur to check the impending military action against Ikkēri. He sent Rāmappa to Goa with instructions to request the Viceroy to write to the Portuguese ambassador at Bijapur to settle his affair with 'Ādil Shah. The viceroy readily complied by writing a letter to his ambassador at Bijapur recommending the case.

Following this diplomatic move, which was quite successful in bridging the relations and creating a suitable atmosphere, Virabhadra sent Rāma Krishnappa to Bijapur with rich presents in December 1638. The motives behind this mission was to obtain 'Ādil Shah's consent for Virabhadra to join Randaulā Khan, in his expedition against Basavāpaṭaṇam. Obviously to avenge the previous defeat 'Ādil Shah gave favourable consent and sent for a second time, a large army under Randaulā Khan. In this expedition Virabhadra joined with his forces, the army of Bijapur, at Harihara, on the Tungabhadra. The Ikkēri forces were led by Sivappa. Thus, the rebellion of Kenge was put down by the joint efforts of Randaulā Khan and Virabhadra. They besieged Tarikere and destroyed it and then they attacked and captured Basavāpaṭaṇam. Further they captured Bēlūr also.[20]

From thence, the relations between Bijapur and Ikkēri became so cordial that when Randaulā Khan advanced against Bangalore in 1640, he seems to have accompanied by the Ikkēri army. It appears possible that Ikkēri after the conquest of Bangalore and death of

---

20. Further Sources, III, 346; Swaminathan, op.cit., 74, 92; Muḥammad Nāmā: M.R., July 1929; I.H.R.C., XXI, 50 f.

Kenge Hanuma, attempted to press the Bijapurīs to invade Mysore.[21] Thus, Ikkēri played a significant role in the external relations of Bijapur and its conquests in the South.

But all this cordiality and alliance was only a matter of policy and show. As, Virabhadra was never reconciled to himself the loss of territory. Consequently, he stirred up rebellion and concerted measures to overthrow the authority of Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah on hearing the outbreak of this insurrection commanded Randaulā Khan to lead an expedition against Ikkēri and put down the insurgents. Randaulā Khan set out from Bijapur with a large army at Malnad or the Kanara country laid siege to the fort of Ikkēri and captured it. Randaulā Khan appointed Khān-i Jahān as its ḥawālādār. He then proceeded to Shimoga and invested it. In the battle that ensued, the Bijapurīs sustained a reverse and were forced to retreat.[22] Shivappa then re-occupied Ikkēri.

This disaster which befell the Bijapurīs aroused the wrath of 'Ādil Shah, who having put Randaulā Khan to disgrace, collected another army and marched at its head, personally to chastise the Nāyak. 'Ādil Shah reached Bankāpūr on 11th January, 1644, and having made it his headquarters, appointed Muṣṭafā Khan and Muẓaffaruddīn as the Commanders of the expedition, Shivappa Nāyak did not give up the battle, he fortified Ikkēri and retired to the hills. The Bijapurīs proceeded and captured the town of Sāgar, in Ikkēri. They next moved to Kelavur. Virabhadra unable to resist sent Sarajā Rāy, a niyōgi, to Bankāpūr and concluded peace with

---

21. Swaminathan, op.cit., 74 f.

22. Further Sources, III, 349; Basātīn, 318.

'Ādil Shah, through the agency of Sivappa Nāyak. 'Ādil Shah then returned to the capital on 25th March 1644.[23]

Between 1647 and 1652, Sivappa succeeded in acquiring Vasudhara, Mirji, Sakrepatna and other places from Bijapur. Sunda a tributory to Bijapur was also seized by Sivappa. Shortly after the death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, in 1656, Sivappa systematically carried on his aggression. He recaptured the forts of Ikkēri, Soralsa, Udgani, Mahedavapuram and Ambatigolla from Bijapur.[24]

Death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah set in weak administration at Bijapur which was unable to have full control over the far off southern territories. As such the court had to depend on the local governors, who too were lossing power. Consequently, Sivappa Nāyak of Ikkēri acquired Vasudhara, Sakkorepatna and other bordering places from Bijapur.[25]

By 1662 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II found that the power of Ikkēri had increased considerably. So he decided to march against Bednūr. The expedition was a short one. But as it was sudden, Bhadrappa Nāyak was unable to check the tide. The Bednūr forces had to withdraw. In alliance with the king of Sode 'Ādil Shah sent an advance detachment under Bahlōl Khan and Sharzā Khan. A battle was fought near Ambaligolla and the Bednur forces were utterly routed. Bednūr was besieged and captured. 'Ādil Shah himself entered the capital. Sharza Khan then besieged the fort of Bhuvanagiri. Bhadrappa was not disheartened by the reverses, but relied forthwith in forces, blockaded the road and passes and intercepted the line of

---

23. Muḥammad Nāmā, 158; Basātīn, 319; Further Sources, III, 350.
24. Hayavandana: History of Mysore, 151; Swaminathan, op.cit., 94.
25. Swaminathan, op.cit., 90.

communication. Consequently, the Bijapurīs were forced to retire from the battle field. Later on, Bhadrappa sent his envoy Huvayya to 'Ādil Shah to conclude peace.[26]

'Ādil Shah was not very much interested in the conquest, but being out mostly for booty, readily agreed to the peace overtures and a treaty was concluded. 'Ādil Shah agreed to hand over all the conquerred territories to Bhadrappa, provided that he paid war indemnity of 1,50,000 pagods of 5 guilders each. After the treaty 'Ādil Shah returned to Bijapur.[27]

On the death of Bhadrappa in 1664, a civil war broke out at Ikkēri. 'Ādil Shah availing the opportunity to conquer further portions of Ikkēri, came down to the borders. It seems that some of the officials of Bednūr had conspired to deliver the country to 'Ādil Shah. Again in 1668, 'Ādil Shah marched to Somasekhara. The expedition was under the charge of two generals, Sharzā Khan and Bahlōl Khan. The Bijapurīs were able to capture three of the best forts of Ikkēri. And the Bijapurīs collected taxes from five villages.[28]

Sikandar 'Ādil Shah, who succeeded 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, in 1672, followed the same expansionist policy of his predecessor. 'Ādil Shah, taking advantage of the confused state of affairs at Ikkēri, during the closing period of Somasekhara's reign, sent his Wakil Jannopant to the court of Bednūr. Obviously with the intention of conspiring against Somesekhara. Some of the wicked men

---

26. 'Ādil Shāhī , 142 ff. Basātīn, 390.
27. Manumenta: J.B.H.S., 1930, III, 3, 265.
28. Ibid., 268; Swaminathan, op.cit.; 109. Epigraphia Carnatica, VIII, L.I., 98.

in the Kēladi Kingdom joined with the Bijapurīs and conspired to kill Somesekhara. However, Cannammajī was able to thwart their plans and assert herself with courage and ability and prepared to challenge the diplomacy of Bijapurī Wakīl. In the meanwhile the allies of Bijapur took up arms against Cannammajī and one of them was Kenge Hanumappa Nāyak of Tarikere. Further Thimmanna and Krishnappayya joined hands with the Bijapurī Wakīl. However, later on, peace was concluded.[29]

It seems that during the campaign of Cannammaji against Mysore, she was assisted by the Bijapurī forces in the Karnatak under Husain Khan and Bahlōl Khan. The Bijapurīs assisted in 1672 the people of Nagara, who rebelled against Cannamaji when she being issueless, adopted one Basavappa son of Mariyappa Setti.[30]

Evidently Bijapur was always having envious eyes on Ikkēri and was ever looking to take advantage of the weak state of affairs. Further, with a show of arms and after initial conquest, they were prepared to withdraw, on payment of indemnity, regular tribute and acknowledgement of sovereignty.

Bijapur and Mysore came in contact for the first time in 1638 during the reign of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and Kanthirava Narasarāja Wodēyar I, the ruler of Mysore.[31]

Before the Bijapurīs could reach Bangalore and Mysore they had to traverse considerable territory of Northern Karnatak.[32] Thus

---

29. Swaminathan, op.cit., 116; E.F.I., (Fawcett) I, 308 ff.
30. ibid., 118, 12.
31. C. Hayavandana: History of Mysore, I, 118 f.
32. The Northern Karnatak was later on formed the Karnatak-Bijapuri Balaghat out of the districts of Bangalore, Kolar, Dod Ballapur, Hoskote and Sira, while the Karnatak Bijapur - Payanghat consisted of the territory below the ghats almost conterminous with the southeeast frontiers of Mysore - Lewis Rice: Mysore, I, 359; Hayavandana, op.cit., 50.

in the initial stage of the Karnatak campaign in 1637, the Bijapurī generals Randaulā Khan, Shāhjī Bhōsale, Afẓal Khan etc., captured Basavapaṭaṇam, Sīrā, Chiknayakanhalli, Bellur, Tumkur, Belapur Kulihal etc.[33] These forts, after their capture by Afẓal Khan, were handed over to Srī Ranga according to the agreement with him.[34]

Further by the time the Bijapurīs reached Bangalore and Mysore, several Karnatak chiefs were reduced to acknowledge Bijapuri sovereignty and they contributed levies for the army of Bijapur which marched to Mysore. These Karnatak chiefs were of: Harapanahalli, Sondur, Gudigota, Rayadurga, Hatti, Kundurape, Dodderji, Hariyur, Turuvekare, Belur, Palupare, Narasimhapura (Hole-Narsipur), Chikbellapur, Bijjavara, Kolala, Holavanahalli, Bavalur, Hosur, Hosakote, Surabable, Kaggondi (Kongondi), Masti, Devanahalli and Sidlaghatta.

The Bijapurī army under Randaulā Khan and Shāhjī Bhosale after the conquest of Ikkēri, Basavapaṭaṇam and Sīrā marched upon Bangalore and took possession of it in 1048/1638. At that time Bangalore was under Immadi-Kempe-Gauda. The Bijapurīs then laid siege to Mysore and Srīrangapaṭaṇam where they unexpectedly met stiff resistance. Eventually, the Bijapurīs had to end the campaign in a treaty, by which the Bijapurīs got war indemnity of six lakhs of huns and possession of the entire country to the North of Kāvērī, including Bangalore and Sīrā. After this conquest Randaulā Khan posted Kenge Hanuma as incharge of these territories. And he

---

33. See supra, Part II, Sec. of this Chapter.
34. Muḥammad Nāmā, Nibhandavali, II, 97 ff.; M.R., July 1929, 9; Further Sources, 341 f., 344, 346.
35. Hayavandana, op.cit., 120 f. fn. 28.

permanently posted Shāhjī at Bangalore, with the sanction of 'Ādil Shah. Shāhjī made Bangalore his seat of administration for the southern territories of Bijapur.[36] Although exaction of tribute from Mysore or annexation of Srīrangapaṭnam to Bijapur was, according to the general programme, the objective of Randaulā's advance thither to Mysore, had been in the main was directed by the intrigues of Channaiya of Nāgamangala, a turbulent feudatory. But before commencing operations, Randaula Khan had sent word to Kanthirava Narasarāja Wōḍēyār, demanding payment of tribute to Bijapur. However, Kanthirava refused to comply. On this, the Khan advanced on Srīrangapaṭnam and invested it for a month. But on receiving an indemnity of five lakhs of huns from Wōḍēyār, he raised the siege and returned to Bijapur. But soon after the conclusion of truce and return of Randaulā Khan, Kanthirava Narasarāja of Mysore was not at all anxious to fulfil the treaty obligations to Bijapur and continued to give troubles to the Bijapurīs.[37]

After the conquest and truce, the Bijapurīs were administrating the revenues of Mysore. And when the revenues of Bijapur territories in Mysore, fell in arrears, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, agreebly with the respresentatives (Niyogis) for the Court of Ikkeri, sent in 1640 four of his officers to Kanthirava Narasarāja Wōḍēyār renewing his demand for dues. Wōḍēyār having refused to comply, Randaulā Khan was directed to collect the amount and reattempt the acquisition of Srirangapaṭnam.Randaulā Khan in turn, deputed

---

36. Muḥammad Nāmā, Nibhandavali, II, 99; Further Sources, III, 343; Basātīn, 346.

37. Further Sources, III, 343 ff. Hayavadana, op.city; 119, 123.

Channaiya of Nāgamangala to Hanumanthappa Nāyak demanding by him satisfaction of the terms of truce of 1639. The latter refused to comply and rebelled.[38]

In the meanwhile, in 1640, Wōḍēyār, repudiating, opposed the Bijapurī forces under Afẓal Khan and acquired Turuvekra (Tirugara) and Nonavnikere. This prevented Bijapur from having a permanent foothold in the vicinity of Kāvērī. Outside this fringe of the disputed area was Bijapur's sphere of influence. This comprised Bangalore, Dodballapur, Tumkūr, Kunigal, Chiknayakananahalli and other places, which were directly included in the Bijapurī province under the management of Shāhjī.[39]

In December 1640, Bijapur renewed attempts to recapture Srīrangapaṭnam of Kanthirava. On arrival near the borders, Muṣṭafā Khan sent word to Timmarājiya, through niyogi, Nuvaiya, demanding payment of dues under the truce of 1639, and in default, he threatened to lay siege to Srīrangapaṭnam. But Kanthirava did not comply with the demand. On the contrary he marched to give battle to the Bijapurīs. The latter were defeated. Consequently, Muṣṭafā Khan returned back to Bijapur without gaining anything.[40]

The conquest of Srīrangapaṭnam became a problem for Bijapur. Vēdōjī Pant was next detached with a contingent under Afẓal Khan. The Pant started his campaign in March 1641 by raiding the neighbouring places of Srīrangapaṭnam. But, in the end, he failed to accomplish anything and returned back to Bijapur.[41]

---

38. Hayavandana, op.cit., 125.
39. Hayavandana, op.cit., 127.
40. idem.
41. idem.

In May, 1642, Delavai Nanjarajaiya of Mysore acquired Turuvekere from Afzal Khan. This restricted the sphere of influence of Bijapur. Since then Turuvekere remained a bone of contention between Bijapur and Mysore.[42]

In 1644, the Bijapurī forces, backed up Narasimha Nāyak of Hole-Narsipur to withheld payment of tribute to Wōḍēyār. When the latter sent forces against Narasimha Nāyak the Bijapurī forces came to the rescue of Hole-Narsipur, but later on, they had to retreat.[43]

The Bijapurīs allied with Nanjunda Raja, the Changalva Chief of Piriyapaṭna, a refractory of the Raja of Mysore. Consequently, when the Mysore army laid siege to Priyapaṭna in January 1645, a Bijapurī contingent of 8,000 horse and 15,000 foot came to the assistance of the refractory chief. In a battle between the Bijapuris and the Mysorians the former were forced to retreat with great loss, while the latter occupied Piriyapaṭna.[44]

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah was closely watching the changed political trends in the Karnatak. The loss of Piriyapaṭna drew considerable attention towards Mysore and 'Ādil Shah resolved to reduce it. Thus, in June 1646, Muṣṭafā Khan was detached from Bijapur with special purpose of subduing Karnatak. Muṣṭafā Khan's army was reinforced by the contingents of Sivappa Nāyak of Ikkēri, Ḍodda Nāyak of Herapanahalli and Bālājī Haibat Rāo and several other chiefs. On the way to Mysore, Muṣṭafā Khan conquerred Gunti, and tried to recover Tiruvekere, at the northern limits of Mysore Kingdom and which was lost by the Bijapurīs in 1642. On receipt of

---

42. ibid., 132.
43. ibid., 134.
44. idem.

the information, Wodeyar sent Dalavai Nanjarajanya to grapple with the situation created by Muṣṭafā Khan. The Mysorians made a multi-pronged attack. Consequently the Bijapurīs were defeated and had to retreat from Turuvekere. Thus, Bijapur successfully failed in her attempts to gain a foot-hold in the northern limits of Mysore. Bijapur's sphere of influence in Mysore was thus restricted to parts of Bangalore, Tumkur and Sīrā. Consequently, Muṣṭafā Khan had to divert his campaign into the eastern parts of the Rāyal's Karnatak. It seems that Wōḍēyār had allied with Bijapur in the defeat of Srī Ranga in 1643.[45]

In 1647, Muṣṭafā Khan on his return journey, after the conquest of Vellore, conquerred Jagadēvarāya's territory, on the north of Srīrangapaṭnam, which consisted of Tirupatur, Kaveripaṭam, Ḥasan-Raidurg, Raidurg Kanakgiri, Ratnagir, Melgir, Arjunkōṭ and Dhalinkōṭ. Asad Khan and Shāhjī were left to govern this territory.[46]

Hostilities between Bijapur and Mysore continued unabated till 1654. In 1653, while Khān Muḥammad was busy at Vellore, the Nāyak of Mysore allied with Siddī Raiḥān and other Bijapurī officers who had resolved against 'Ādil Shah. They took all the forts of that country conquerred by Muṣṭafā Khan, in the preceding years. The news of these developments reached Khān Muḥammad, who was on his way to Bijapur at Badkōṭ. He immediately changed the direction,

---

45. ibid., 138 f., 140 f.; Dr. S.K. Aiyangar: "Kanthirava Narasaraja Wodeyar of Mysore and the last Emperor of Vijayanagar", I.H.R.C., January 1942, 23.

46. Muḥammad Nāmā, M.R., July 1929, 11.

marched against the Raja of Mysore, who, having by this time completed the subjugation of the country of Jagadēvarāya, attacked the strong fort of Krishnagiri. This place, Khān Muḥammad reached and expelled the Raja of Mysore and captured four other forts, which the Raja had recently wrested from the Bijapurīs.[47]

At this juncture, the Raja of Mysore, in mortal terror sent his envoy to Khān Muḥammad, with an offer of submission, asking pardon for his offences and praying for safety. He promised to pay treasure beyond calculations, as offerings to 'Ādil Shah and urgently delivered tribute. Then by the orders of 'Ādil Shah Khān Muḥammad left Mysore with the pēshkash from the Raja for 'Ādil Shah.[48]

During the absence of Ekōjī from the Karnatak from 1675, the Bijapurī possessions in Tumkur district, dontinued to beheld by Jahāngīr Khan and Ḥusain Khan. The menace of Bijapur (in alliance with Golkonda) in the northern Mysore seemed serious to affect the position of Chikkadēvarāja of Mysore. The latter was therefore obliged to proceed personally in that direction. And about the middle of 1675, he succeeded in wresting, Handelekere, Gutir, Tumkur, Chiknayakanahalli, Hannavalli, Saratavalli and Turuvekere, situated in the Karnatak of Bijapurī-Bālāghāṭ.[49]

Consequently, the power and authority of Bijapur was slowly waning in the south and Mysore exerted its authority.

---

47. Further Sources, III, 365.

48. Hayavandana, op.cit., 149.

49. ibid., 272 f.

SEC. II: THE COROMANDEL REGION

Relations with the Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura

Following the partition treaty between Bijapur and Golkonda for the conquest of the Karnatak and the grand success the former achieved in the enterprise, naturally induced Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah to effect the conquest of the Coromandel coast. This coast, at that time, was divided, besides the Madras-Karnatak, among the three Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura. The Nāyaks, until 1644, were the vassals of Srī Ranga III of the Āravīḍu Dynasty.[1]

For 'Ādil Shah to implement his desire of territorial aggrandisement, the opportunity came in 1645 when Srī Ranga sought Bijapur's help against the rebellion of the three Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur and Madura. 'Ādil Shah immediately complied with the request and despatched an army. When the Bijapurī army under Muṣṭafā Khan, reached Bangalore to the help of Srī Ranga, the three Nāyaks offered to Muṣṭafā Khan their submission to 'Ādil Shah. This diplomacy changed the whole course of the campaign. The Nāyak of Ginji sent an ambassador to Muṣṭafā Khan soliciting help against Srī Ranga. He further diverted the attention of Muṣṭafā Khan from the invasion of Ginji by persuading him to invade Vellore for rich booty. Consequently, Muṣṭafā Khan, attacked and captured Vellore. After this dual success of the Nāyak and the Khan, the former further persuaded the latter to effect more conquest of the Srī Ranga's country and to not to abandon the campaign abruptly. He was prevailed upon to besiege Penukonda. For this purpose, the Nāyak of

---

1. Further Sources, III, 351.

Ginji promised to pay the Khan a sum of 20 lakhs of Pardoes to meet the expenditure. The Khan readily accepted the proposal and marched to Kōlār to take possession of Kokantiwara.[2]

Initially Muṣṭafā Khan marched to help Srī Ranga. But due to the overtures of the three Nāyaks, he successfully organised the confederacy of the Nāyaks of Ginji, Thanjavur Madura, Harapanhalli and Ikkeri against the determined efforts of Srī Ranga.[3]

In 1648, when Ginji was invested by Mīr Jumlā of Golkonda, Tirumala Nayak of Madura sought help from Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. But Muṣṭafā Khan and Mīr Jumlā came to an understanding. The latter allowed the former to take possession of Ginji. But, being unaware of the Bijapur-Golkonda alliance, the Nāyak of Ginji sought the assistance of Golkonda against Bijapur.[4] At the same time, he played dual diplomacy and offered his submission to Bijapur. While the investment of Ginji was in progress, Shāhjī, the Bijapur general found that his troops instead of helping Tirumala Nāyak of Madura, who had repented for his short-sighted policy and sought an alliance with the Bijapurīs for the defence of Ginji, were actually in league with the Golkonda forces. But when Muṣṭafa Khan and Mīr Jumlā came to an understanding, Tirumala could not effectively help the defence of Ginji.[5]

---

2. Muḥammad Nāmā, M.R., July, 1929, 10. Further Sources, III, 355.
3. C.S. Srinivasachari: A History of Ginjee and its Rulers, 171.
4. ibid., 169 f.; Mir Jumla, 18, 20.
5. Srinivasachari, op.cit., 169, 173.

Due to the demise of Muṣṭafā Khan (on 9th November 1648) and due to the dissensions among the Bijapurī generals, the campaign against Ginji was prolonged for an year. Ultimately, Rūp Nāyak of Ginji was forced to surrender the fort to the Bijapurī general Khan Muḥammad on 28th December 1649.[6] This brought to Bijapur a vast amount, of accumulated riches of the rulers of Ginji, amounting to four crores of huns.[7]

The Bijapurīs then took possession of Ginji and also Tegenapatan near Cuddalore.[8] After capturing Tegenapatan, Shāhjī then conquered Porto Novo.

Flushed with the conquest of Ginji, Khan Muḥammad advanced into the territories of Madura and Thanjavur. Both the weak minded Nāyaks of these places, shut themselves up in accessible forests and allowed the Bijapurīs to plunder their country. Ultimately, they opened negotiations and submitted, early in 1649 to 'Ādil Shah's suzerainty. The Khan collected huge ransom from the Nāyaks.[9]

Bijapur-Madura Alliance against Mysore

In 1654, Khan Muḥammad, after his victory over Vellore, demanded tribute from Tirumala Nāyak of Madura. The latter, due to his long-standing prejudices negotiated with the former an alliance against Mysore. The Khan was urged by the Nāyak to declare war against the ruler of Mysore, Kanthirava and begged him to expect

---

6. Basātīn, 328 f.
7. Muḥammad Nāmā, M.R., July, 1929, 11; Basātīn, log.cit.; Mīr Jumlā, 22; Srinivasachari, op.cit., 184, while quoting an extract from Basātīn, wrongly adds 20 crores of rupees, while Basātīn, p.329, mentions only 4 crores huns.
8. Srinivasachari, op.cit., 165. 9. Further Sources, III, 362.

the invading troops of Mysore from his dominions. In compliance with this request, the Khan marched out of Vellore for the invasion of Mysore. On the way he pillaged and burnt the territory of Mysore. In a battle that ensued, the Bijapurīs routed the Mysoreans.[10]

After this victory and considerable gain of power, the Khan did not spare his own ally - the Nāyak of Madura. The Nāyak was not immense from the Khan's attack. The Khan, after collecting large amount of ransom from the Nāyak of Madura, returned to Bijapur.[11]

Muttu Virappa Nāyak of Madura shortly after his accession in 1659, defied the suzerainty of Bijapur. He strengthened the fort of Trichinopoly and prepared to meet any invasion from Bijapur. He urged in vain, the Nāyak of Thanjavur to join him against Bijapur. On the contrary, the Nāyak of Thanjavur commenced negotiations with Bijapur against Madura, but were not heeded.

In the meanwhile 'Ādil Shah sent a large army under Shāhjī and Mullā Aḥmad with the object of conquering the dominions of Nāyak of Madura and Thanjavur. Shāhjī won over the Nāyak of Thanjavur to Bijapur's side and against Madura. Consequently, early in December, 1659, the Bijapurī forces decided to lay siege to Tiruchirapalli (Trichinopoly) belonging to Madura. However, due to the strong fortifications, Shāhjī withdrew. But, forgetting the alliance with the Nāyak of Thanjavur, he suddenly attacked Thanjavur on

---

10. Muḥammad Nāmā, M.R., November, 1929, 502.
11. Hayavandana: History of Mysore, 149; Aiyer: Nayaks of Madura, 129; I.H.R.C., January 1942, 25.

19th March 1659. Thanjavur fell to the Bijapurīs. This was followed by the surrender of other towns of Mannorkovil and Vallam.[12]

To realise the peshkash, Shāhjī held one of the 'Guru' of Thanjavur as hostage and demanded the arrears of four lakhs Chakra.[13]

At the end of the campaign, Mullā Aḥmad tried to open negotiations with the Nāyaks of Madura and Thanjavur. The former was confident of his strong position and the latter was aware of his weakness. But both of them realised the adverse situation in the Bijapurī camp. Hence the peace overtures of the Mullā failed. Consequently, the Mullā was compelled, due to famine and contagion, to leave Thanjavur. He then besieged the Trichinopoly, belonging to the Madura Nāyak, But soon realised the futility of his attempt due to the limited sources. Consequently in despair, he opened negotiations for peace with the Nāyak. He proposed that he would leave the court of the Nāyak, if he paid him the tribute of three years. Due to the negative response of the Nāyak the hostilities prolonged. After some time, the Mullā was obliged to accept a moderate sum of tribute from the Nāyak and ceased the hostilities and retired.[14]

Chokkanatha Nāyak succeeded Virappa Nāyak in July 1659. He reversed the policy of his predecessor and adopted the anti-Bijapur policy like Tirumala Nāyak. He made preparation for the restoration

---

12. Aiyar, op.cit., 151 f.; Fr. A. Saulier: "Madurai and Tanjore (1659-66)", J.I.H., December, 1966.

13. Arddāsht of Shāhjī to 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, Document No.5120, State Archieves. Chakra was a gold coin of Mysore.

14. Fr. A. Bertered: "La Mission Du Madura III" (Aiyar, op.cit.).

of the Vijayanagar dynasty to its former glory. He also tried to recapture Ginji from Bijapur.[15]

With the conquest of Madura, Thanjavur and Ginji and the territory depending on them, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II in 1661 entrusted the administration of these territory to Shāhjī and authorised him to collect the pēshkash from these feudatories. As such 'Ādil Shah directed Chokal Nayapa (Chokkanathan) Nāyak of Madura to remit his pēshkash to Shāhjī and Ḥasan 'Ambar Khan.[16]

These conquest of Shāhjī, Khan Muḥammad, Mullā Aḥmad etc., were great acquisition of territory and power for Bijapur. The Bijapurī kingdom now extended from Arabian Sea to Bay of Bengal. The acquisition of important ports on the Coromandel coast - Pondicherry, Tegenapatan, Porto Novo etc., brought Bijapur into contact with the French, and gave new dimensions to the Bijapur's diplomacy towards other European settlements on the Coromandel coast.

---

15. R.S. Aiyar, op.cit., 272 f.; J.I.H., December, 1966, 778. It seems that in 1649 Ginji was "annexed by Bijapur" while Thanjavur and Madura were not annexed but they only accepted the suzerainty of 'Adil Shah" - Tappan Ray Chaudhry: Jan Company and the Coromandel, 46; R.S. Aiyar, op.cit., 155.

16. Farmān of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah dated 13th January, 1661, Document No.5087, State Archives.

CHAPTER V I

MUGHAL-BIJAPUR RELATIONS (1535-1686)

The study of the political and diplomatic relations between the Mughal Empire and the Bijapur Kingdom can be conveniently made in six phases:

First Phase (1526-35):	Period of oblivion and passing Contact.
Second Phase (1535-72):	Period of no Contacts.
Third Phase (1572-1636):	Period of Verbal Strategy and Diplomacy.
Fourth Phase (1636-56):	Period of peaceful Political Relations
Fifth Phase (1656-80):	Period of perturbed Political Relations and Military Strategy.
Sixth Phase (1680-86):	Period of Vassalage - Mughal Suzerainty over Bijapur.

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1526-35)

Period of Oblivion and Passing Contact

Babur and Humayun were mainly pre-occupied in establishing the Mughal rule in India and in the affairs of the northern India.

They were practically oblivious of the Deccan and had no territorial incentive in this direction. However, the first passing-contact was established under Humāyūn.

In 1535, Humāyūn, after annexing Gujarat, invaded Khāndēsh; and marched upto Burhānpūr. On Humāyūn's demand, Sultan Muḥammad Shah meekly submitted. Apprehensive of Mughal conquest of the Deccan Kingdoms, Burhān Niẓām Shah, 'Imād Shah and "the other sovereigns (obviously, 'Ādil Shah, Quṭb Shah and Barīd Shah) of the Deccan wrote submissive letters to Humāyūn, tendering their allegiance."[1] At the same time, Muḥammad Shah exhorted 'Ādil Shah, Quṭb Shah and 'Imād Shah to establish a joint front of the Deccan Sultans against Humāyūn.[2] Though Bijapur was in no way involved in the Mughal invasion of Khandēsh, yet Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah joined the alliance. But, on Humāyūn's return to the north the alliance remained only in theory. Humāyūn had no political ambitions in the Deccan.

SECOND PHASE (1535-72)

Period of no Contacts

During this phase there were no diplomatic contacts between the Mughal Emperors and the 'Ādil Shahs. In the beginning Akbar having no territorial incentive in the Deccan left aloof the Deccan Kingdoms to quarrel among themselves.

SEC. II: THIRD PHASE (1572-1635)

Period of Verbal Strategy and Diplomacy

Akbar and Bijapur (1572-1605)

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations under Akbar

The evolution of the Mughal—Bijapur relations, during

1. Ferishta, I, 402; Briggs, II, 81.
2. Ferishta II, 558.

Akbar's reign was based on Akbar's Deccan policy,[3] which guided the course of the relations.

The conquest of Malwa in 1562 by the Mughals removed the barrier between the Mughal empire and the Deccan, and conquest of Gujarat in 1572, brought the Mughals face to face with Ahmadnagar.

In 983/1574-75 Akbar, aware of the bad state of political conditions, arising out of the internesine and incessant wars among the Deccan kingdoms, desired that his army should proceed with all expedition to the Deccan, in order to restore peace and justice.[4] Again in October 1583, when marching to Allahabad, Akbar expressed that "should peace be produced there by the reverberation of the August expedition, he would proceed to the Deccan and take possession of that country which was longing for a just ruler. Should that wide country be civilized by means of obedient vassals he would proceed to Tūrān.[5] It was Akbar's intention to proceed towards "the Deccan and introduce order there."[6] Abul Fadl further adds that Akbar's "sole idea was to give tranquility to the feeble ones of the Deccan, and to improve the rulers there of."[7] This

---

3. For discussions on the Deccan policy of Akbar, see: Frederick Augusts (Count of Noer): The Emperor Akbar, II, 310 ff, 316; R.P. Tripathi, Rise and Fall of Mughal Empire, 312 ff; V.A. Smith, Akbar - the Great, 224, 246, 264; Bamber Gasiogne, The Great Mughals, 82 ff; Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan, "The Deccan Policy and Campaigns of the Mughal," Is.Cl., July 1944, 301 ff.
4. Akbar Nāmā, III, 280
5. ibid., 616.
6. ibid., 626.
7. ibid., 701

clearly bringsout Akbar's Deccan policy and indicates in precise and concrete terms that Akbar wished to restore law, order and tranquility in the Deccan and nothing more than this. He did not wish to "conquer" and annex, but wanted to reduce the Deccan rulers to be "obedient vassals" only.[8]

With this background Akbar initiated and established diplomatic contacts with Bijapur. But the policy underwent a change by the turn of the century. In 1600, the "sole idea of the Shahinsha was to clear the territory of Ahmadnagar and of the weeds and rubbish of that rebellion and then to prevail over Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar, so that the rulers of these places should make binding treaties of obedience."[9] This further indicates that Akbar had no intention of annexing Bijapur. He only wished to reduce it to vassalage. And this he desired to a chieve by verbal strategy and show of military strength. Akbar wanted to achieve for India peace and order among her mutually warring States, a well planned

---

8. These four passages of Abul Faḍl, reflect the mind of Akbar as the main basis of his Deccan policy. However Dr. D.R. Seth who discusses "the Origin of Akbar's Deccan Policy" in his paper "Akbar and the Deccan" (Is.Cl., April 1956, 126 ff) quotes and uses only the last passage (of fn.7, supra) and does not cite the other three passages. And he arrives at a wrong conclusion that Akbar was motivated by the ambition of imperialistic territorial conquest of the weaker kingdoms. Had this been the motive, then Akbar would not have sent his wise and able noble Fatḥullah Shīrāzī "to guide Rajah 'Ali the ruler of Khandes" and other able men "to give advice to the other rulers of the Deccan" -- Akbar Nāmā, III, 701. Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan rightly observes -- "Confused affairs of the Deccan invited Akbar's interference" (Is.Cl., 1944, 301). Dr. Yusuf Husain Khan further adds, that Akbar considered the Deccan "to be traditional dependency of the North Indian Mughal rulers from the time of Timur."

   Further, Akbar did not adopt imperialistic policy only through wars but through peaceful means also. Akbar's three favourite ways of enlarging his empire were through conquest, treaty and harem-Bamber Gasionge, op.cit., 82.

9. Akbar Nāmā, III, 1183.

and uniform system of paramountcy for the whole country, religious toleration and cultural understanding among the various communities and progressively enlightened and strong foreign policy. These motives led him inevitably towards the Deccan. The Deccan policy of Akbar was not a display of mere personal ambition or lust for conquest, but an expression of the enlightenment of a great monarch.[10]

Akbar and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I (1573-80)

The first diplomatic move was made in 980/1573 when Akbar sent Mīr Moḥsin Riḍvī, on a diplomatic mission to the Deccan kingdoms. The purpose, according to Abul Faḍl was that Akbar considered it necessary to send an able man to the ruler of Deccan to give him good advice and guide him to path of obedience, so that he should not shelter the rebel, Muḥammad Ḥusain Mirza of Gujarat.[11] All the three authorities - Abul Faḍl Badāonī and Niẓāmuddīn mention about this embassy of 18th Regnal year. But it is significant that only Abul Faḍl mentions as "ruler of Deccan" and implies thereby the Niẓām Shah of Ahmadnagar; whereas Badāonī says - "Mīr Muḥsin Riḍvī returned from an embassy to the Dakhin and brought suitable presents from the rulers of that country."[12] Badāonī is corroborated by Niẓāmuddīn who says "Mir Muḥsin Riḍvī who had been sent on a mission to the rulers of Deccan returned, bringing with him the presents they had sent to his Majesty."[13]

---

10. Tripathi, op.cit., 318; The Count of Noer (op.cit., II, 316) is also of the similar opinion. He writes that "Akbar regarded himself as the redeemer of the people from the bondage of war and oppression; in this too a mystic breath passed over his spirit."
11. Akbar Nāmā, III, 108
12. At-Tawārīkh, II, 174, The text reads: از حکام آن دیار اوراد
13. Ṭabaqāt, II, 478.

The term "rulers of Deccan" implies - Niẓām Shah of Ahmadnagar, 'Ādil Shah of Bijapur, Quṭb Shah of Golconda, Rājā 'Alī of Khandesh, Barīd Shah of Bidar and 'Imād Shah of Berar. It is not known why Abul Faẓl mentions only "ruler of Deccan."[14] Probably due to fact that in the incident only Ahmadnagar was involved.

In 983/1574-75 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I sent wakīls to Akbar. Reciprocating this gesture, Akbar sent in 1575, Ḥakīm 'Ainul-Mulk Shīrāzī, on an embassy to Bijapur. Through him, 'Ādil Shah sent elephants and other valuable gifts for Akbar. 'Ainul-Mulk was in Bijapur for more than one year; and he returned to the Mughal Court in 985/1577-78 along with the envoy of 'Ādil Shah to Akbar.[15]

The purpose of 'Ainul-Mulk's embassy, says Abul Faẓl was "to guide 'Ādil Khan of Bijapur."[16] Obviously, it implies that Akbar wanted 'Ādil Shah to follow a policy favourable to him. As such, he wanted 'Ādil Shah to refrain from sheltering and helping the rebel or enemies of the Mughals. This has reference to Rājā 'Alī Khan, the ruler of Khandesh. He was being "backed up by the other rulers of Deccan" (Niẓām Shah and 'Ādil Shah) and was remiss in obedience and service. This necessitated despatch of Mughal army to Deccan to awaken the Deccanis from slumber.[17] Thus Akbar's diplomacy in sending 'Ainul-Mulk to Bijapur was to ally 'Ādil Shah on the Mughal's side and prevent any assistance to Khandesh. This

---

14. The text has حاکم دکن
(Text Akbar Nāmā, III (1), 77).
15. Al-Tawārīkh, II, 253, III, 229.
16. Akbar Nāmā, III, 291.
17. ibid, 279.

verbal strategy of Akbar asserted Mughal supremacy and influence over Bijapur. Consequently, 'Ainul-Mulk on return to Akbar, "tendered 'Ādil Khan's supplications."[18]

From thence, it became a regular feature for 'Ādil Shahs to send diplomatic envoys, with rich presents in cash and kind, to the Mughal Court. Abul Faḍl says that 'Ādil Shah always sent prudent men and choice presents and kept himself known to the august court.[19] Though Abul Faḍl does not give the frequency of the diplomatic missions, but according to Niẓāmuddīn, the envoys were sent every year, with presents etc., to the Mughal Court. All Bijapurī envoys were treated well and were duly honoured at the Mughal Court. They were presented with robes, cash, in'āms etc.[20]

In 986/1578-79[21] 'Ādil Shah sent Khwājā 'Abdullah and Shāhī Beg as his Wakīls to the Mughal Court with rare presents.[22] Akbar "granted the desires of the ambassador" of 'Ādil Shah and sent Ḥakīm 'Alī "as the bearer of salutary advices and to warn him ('Ādil Shah) that if he did not hearken to them, he would be made war."[23] This was Akbar's third embassy to Bijapur.

The sending of salutary advices and warning to 'Ādil Shah implies that, by this time (1579), Akbar's verbal strategy was partly successful in asserting his overlordship over Bijapur. Yet, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I did not submit fully, nor he obeyed in tauto orders of Akbar.[24]

---

18. ibid., 296; Ṭabaqāt, II, 87.
19. Akbar Nāmā, III, 388.
20. Ṭabaqāt, II, 93.
21. Niẓāmuddīn records this embassy in the year 988/1580 - Ṭabaqāt, II, 93.
22. At-Tawārīkh, II, 276.
23. Akbar Nāmā, III, 388.
24. Akbar Nāmā, III, 388, 400.

The Bijapurī envoys always protested to Akbar that their ruler was not given any opportunity of serving the Emperor and showing his loyalty.[25] Obviously, 'Ādil Shah aspired to do some service for Akbar in order to please and pacify him.

In February 1580, when Akbar appointed an army to capture the European ports in India, the rulers of Deccan were directed to cooperate with the Mughal forces, in order to remove the stumbling-block in the way of the pilgrims to Mecca. The rulers of Deccan were bidden to regard this as an opportunity for showing their loyalty to the Mughal emperor. Obviously, 'Ādil Shah must have been apprehended and encouraged to attack Goa. However, the outcome of this expedition is not known; and Akbar did not succeed in extirpating the Portuguese.[26]

In 988/1580, when Ḥakīm 'Alī Gīlānī reached Bijapur 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I went out of the city to welcome him and brought him into the city with great pomp.[27] 'Ādil Shah sent him back with rare presents for Akbar. However, the other Mughal envoy, Ḥakīm 'Ainul-Mulk continued to stay at Bijapur and was present on 'Ādil Shah's death on 10th April 1580, and he went back to the Mughal Court without any presents.[28]

Akbar and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1580-1605)

The accession of Ibrāhīm brought the Mughals and Bijapur more closer. It was during his reign that matrimonial alliance with the Mughals was formed. A great scholar, Syed Mīr Fatḥullāh Shīrāzī, who was residing at the court of 'Ādil Shah, was summoned

---

25. Akbar Nāmā, III, 410.
26. ibid., 409 f.
27. Ferishta, II, 98. According to Ma'āthir, I, 181; Ḥakīm 'Alī went without presents.
28. Ferishta, II, 98.

through a farmān, by Akbar to his Court. He left Bijapur in May 1582 and went to Fatehpūr.[29]

In Shawwāl 999/1590-91 Akbar sent Mīr Muḥammad Amīn,[30] as ambassador to Bijapur.[31] The Mīr returned back from Bijapur in 1002/1593.[32] In 1600, Ibrāhīm sent an envoy to Akbar with a ruby and "used supplications." 'Ādil Shah requested that some person from the Mughal court be appointed at his court to sooth his mind. Akbar consented to Ibrāhīm's request and sent in 1009/1601 Sharīf Sarmadī, as an envoy to Bijapur. Through him, Akbar communicated excellent counsels both, in writing and verbally.[33] What were the counsels are not known. But, according to Zubairī, on hearing the message of Akbar, 'Ādil Shah's ears became deaf. Akbar must have given severe warning for Bijapur's collaboration with Ahmadnagar in the battle of Supa in 1596. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah very cooly agreed for peace, "pēshkash"[34] and friendship.[35] Sarmadī's mission was to allay the fear of the 'Ādil Shah and to assure him that Akbar had no aggressive designs against Bijapur.[36]

---

29. Al-Tawārīkh, II, 325; III, 216.
30. Badāonī and Ferishta (I.267) mention this name, whereas Abul Faḍl (Akbar Nāmā, III, 909) say as Mīr Muḥammad Riḍvī.
31. Al Tawārīkh, II, 390.
32. Ṭabaqāt, 155.
33. Akbar Nāmā, III, 1171.
34. Pēshkash - In context to the Mughal-Bijapur relations means 'present', 'gift' in the sense of "Nadhrānā", And does not mean a 'political tribute', paid by a vassal state to the suzerain. Dr. Riazul Islam too mean it "present"/"gift": Indo-Persian Relations, 233, fn.1.
35. Basatin, 254 f.
36. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "Asad Beg's Mission to Bijapur", Potdar Commemoration Volume, 185, f.n. ; Dr. Nazir Ahmad: Kitab-i Nauras, 7, fn.5.

However, inspite of profession of loyalty to Akbar, Ibrāhīm extended protection and hospitality to Malik 'Ambar. According to Fuzunī, after the fall of Ahmadnagar on 19th August, 1600, Malik 'Ambar lived for considerable period at Bijapur.[37] Obviously, 'Ādil Shah abetted and encouraged the attempts of Malik 'Ambar to restore the Niẓām Shāhī dynasty, a political step with a view to maintaining a buffer between the Mughal empire and Bijapur.

Another outcome of Sarmadī's mission was the matrimonial alliance between the Mughals and Ibrāhīm. Abul Faḍl says that 'Ādil Shah "wished to make over his daughter to the herem of prince Sultan Daniel,"[38] But Zubairī and Ferishta hold that the marriage proposal originated from the Mughal's side.[39] There was no cause or reason for the Mughals to propose such an alliance. Obviously, 'Ādil Shah, in order to pacify Akbar and to establish firm relationship, must have proposed the matrimonial alliance.

Consequently in 1601 Akbar sent Mīr Jamāluddīn Ḥusain Injū to Bijapur with bridal presents.[40] At Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah treated

---

37. Futūḥāt, 216(b).
38. Akbar Nāmā, III, 1176; In Ain-i Akbarī (II, 500 Abul Faẓl says that 'Ādil Shah King of Bijapur wished to enter into a matrimonial alliance with Akbar and offered his daughter to Prince Dānīyāl."
39. Basātīn, 255; Briggs, II, 279; Kitāb-i Nauras, 8, fn.3.
40. Akbar Nāmā, III, 1176; Abul Faẓl clearly states that Jamāluddīn was sent with bridal presents. That means, that before the sending of Jamāluddīn, proposal,negotiations and acceptance of the marriage were finalised. As such Dr. Nazir Ahmad's conclusion that Jamāluddīn "was sent off to Bijapur for asking the hand of 'Ādil Shah's daughter"(Kitāb-i Nauras, 8) is not tenable. Again had the age of the bride was the criterion (as Dr. Nazir Ahmad thinks) then neither of the parties would have put forth the proposal nor would have considered it; and further, it would not have materialised, however strong the Mughal pressure might have been.

him with great respect. Injū stayed at Bijapur for three years.[41] However, the marriage was delayed considerably. In 1603, when Jamāluddīn was till at Bijapur, Akbar, aware of his (Injū's) craftiness, issued orders to prince Danīyāl and Khān-i Khānān to awaken the slumbering of Ibrāhīm. The Prince sent 'Ināyatullah Kitābdār to 'Ādil Shah with a letter of advice.[42]

The prolonged stay of Jamāluddīn Injū at Bijapur, with lame excuses, annoyed Akbar. One of the causes of his stay was royal and lavish hospitality of Ibrāhīm. In addition, he got annually three to four hundred thousand pagodas as bribe from Bijapur and Golkonda. On receiving reports of Jamāl's further stay, Akbar got enraged and appointed Asad Beg to fetch him immediately "without giving him time to eat or drink."[43]

In 1603, Asad Beg started for Bijapur. When he reached Mangalvedha[44] he was received by 'Ādil Shāhī nobles with great honour. When Beg came near Bijapur, he was advised to have audience with 'Ādil Shah only after Shab-i Barāt, that is, after waiting for thirteen days.[45]

It seems that Ibrāhīm developed some wrong notion about the contents of Akbar's farmān, which was issued on the former's request. As such, he was hesitant to receive it and procrastinated audience to Asad Beg. Besides the farmān, Akbar also sent verbal

---

41. Tārīkh-i Mughal of Asad Beg, I.H.R.C., XVII, December 1940, 89.
42. Akbar Nāmā, III, 1234.
43. Aḥwāl-i Asad Beg, 50 a; Dr. P.M. Joshi is of the opinion that Asad Beg has exaggerated the figure of pagodas, Potdar Volume, op.cit., 186 fn.
44. 17.5°N., 75.5°E., S.W. of Sholapur, about 52 miles north of Bijapur.
45. Aḥwāl-i Asad Beg, 50 a.

message through Beg which was to be considered as authentic and reliable as a part of the farmān. Ibrāhīm was to act according to the message communicated by Beg. When Asad Beg was reading the farmān, Ibrāhīm wished to listen it by standing, as a mark of respect. The message seems to be about the return of Inju and marriage of Sulṭānā Begum. In compliance to Akbar's directive, Ibrāhīm issued a farmān in the name of Injū and other Bijapurī officials regarding Injū's return to the Mughal Court. Asad Beg himself dictated the Bijapurī farmān. Finally, Asad Beg left Bijapur on 24th January, 1604 accompanied by Jamāluddīn Injū, bridal party of Dānīyāl, whose marriage was celebrated with the Bijapurī princes, early in 1604. Bijapurī Wakīl Muṣtafā Khan accompanied the bride.[46]

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah - the Spiritual Disciple of Akbar

During the course of discussions Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II addressed Asad Beg as "Gurūbhāi"; thus suggesting that, like Asad Beg, he too had become a spiritual disciple of Akbar. To affirm his faith in Akbar's spiritual leadership, Ibrāhīm took the "Shast-i Murīdī", from the turban of Asad Beg and hung it to his head-dress and declared that he (Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II) was a murīd of Akbar and requested Asad Beg to give the Shast to him. Further, Ibrāhīm claimed that, by virtue of his having worn the Shast he had become a spiritual devotee of Akbar (Ḥaḍrat) and requested Asad Beg to send one Shast for him, after going back to the Mughal Court.[47] This behaviour of 'Ādil Shah proves his blind acceptance of Akbar's spiritual leadership and his submission to latter's political power.

---

46. idem.
47. Dr. Joshi, op.cit., 186.

Just before Akbar's death in 1605 Ibrāhīm sent Lākhū Pandit as his envoy to the Mughal Court.[48]

Jahāngīr and Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II (1605-26)

In 1605, on the death of Akbar, Ibrāhīm sent Ferishta, as an ambassador to condole with Jahāngīr and to congratulate him on his accession. 'Ādil Shah sent rich gifts with best wishes and prayers for Jahāngīr's complete happiness.[49] This embassy was besides that of Lākhū Pandit, who came in Akbar's time and was still at the Mughal Court. After five years of stay in 1610, Lākhū Pandit was granted leave by Jahāngīr to depart. Again in the following year, as usual, along with annual offerings, Ibrāhīm sent an Arab horse to Jahāngīr, which the latter liked it very much and raced it.[50]

Jahāngīr, on accession, adopted Akbar's aggressive Deccan policy in all respects, and with more vigour. However, Jahāngīr's policy being stultified by week leadership, proved to be failure; as it did not alter or extent the Mughal frontier in the Deccan. In pursuance of this policy, Jahāngīr ordered, in 1609, prince Salīm, Khān-i Khānān and Mān Singh to march to Deccan, with a large army, to "invade all the kingdoms from hence to the south, even to Cape Comori -"[51] This caused great terror in Bijapur. Consequently, to cenciliate Jahāngīr early in 1610 Ibrāhīm sent a petition to Jahāngīr with a request that "if one of the trusted ones of the court could be appointed there to whom he could tell his desires and

---

48. Tozuk, I, 110, 162.
49. J.S. Hoyland and S.N. Banerji: The Empire of the Great Mogul, 172; "The Dutch Chronicle", J.B.O.R.S., 1946, 217.
50. Tozuk, I, 110, 162.
51. William Finch: Purchas: His Pilgrim, IV, 25.

claims so that the envoy might convey them to him (Jahāngīr), he hoped that it might become the means of affording profit to this slave"[52] (Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II). Simultaneously he also wrote letters to various Mughal nobles, stationed in Deccan, for recommending his case. In a letter to Mīrzā 'Azīz Kōkā, Ibrāhīm proposed the name of Mīr Jamāluddīn Injū as an envoy to him.[53]

Jahāngīr immediately complied with the request of Ibrāhīm and appointed Fidāi Khan as his ambassador to Bijapur. However, on the representation of 'Azīz Kōkā and others, instead of Fidāi Khan Jahāngīr appointed Mīr Jamāluddīn Injū as ambassador "to dispel the fear" in the minds of the Deccanis and 'Ādil Shah, and to assure him of royal favours. Jahāngīr remarks that "'Ādil Khan - had chosen the way of loyalty and service."[54]

In response to Ibrahim's letter, 'Azīz Kōkā replied to him that Jamāluddīn was being sent to him on a mission to reassure him and to put an end to "the hostile activities which were on the increase" He advised Ibrāhīm "to give up activities which would adversely affect the desire of the Emperor to grant him pardon." The cause of pardon is not known; however, 'Azīz Kōkā warned Ibrāhīm against severe Mughal action, in case of non-compliance. This assurance, coupled with threat, had the desired effect; and Ibrāhīm gave the necessary undertaking. As such, 'Azīz Kōkā wrote to Jahāngīr that Ibrāhīm has become "loyal and obedient."[55]

---

52. Tozuk, I, 161.
53. K.N. Hasan and Mansura Haider: "Letters of 'Azīz Kōkā to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah, II" - from Gulshan-i Balāghat (of Abdul Wahāb Māmūrī), P.I.H.C. 1965, 163.
54. Tozuk, I, 162, 176.
55. Gulshan-i Balāghat, op.cit., P.I.H.C., 1965, 163.

Jamāluddīn left Burhānpūr, along with the Wakīls of 'Ādil Shah, who were at Mughal Viceroy's camp at that time. On his arrival near Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah sent his Wakīls forward for 20 kos and himself received the Mughal envoy at a distance of 2 kos and took him to his own palace.[56]

In his third letter, 'Azīz Kōkā advises - rather gives a very vague hint that Ibrāhīm should, with the consent of Jamāluddīn enter into a matrimonial alliance between his daughter and the Mughal prince Parvēz. On these grounds 'Azīz Kōkā tried to convince 'Ādil Shah that he would be able to clear his doubts and fear about the Mughals and may be able to achieve his desires.[57]

'Ādil Shah's Dual Diplomacy and Dillusion of the Mughals

While Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II was busy in conciliating the Mughals by sending envoys to him, Malik 'Ambar appealed for military assistance against the Mughals. Ibrāhīm heedless of the Mughal reaction and consequences promptly responded to Malik 'Ambar's request; and despatched 4000 of his special troops and 1000 Marathas. From thenceforward, forces of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar fought in collaboration to the defeat of the Mughals and the fall of Ahmadnagar fort to Malik 'Ambar in October 1610. Further, two years later in 1612, Bijapur joined anti-Mughal alliance with Ahmadnagar and Golkonda.[58]

In February 1611, Khān-i A'ẓam informed Jahāngīr that Ibrāhīm had given up his evil ways and had become penitent and was more loyal than ever. Thus, by the end of the following year

---

56. Tozuk, I, 178, 182.
57. Gulshan-i Balāghat, op.cit., P.I.H.C., 1965, 164.
58. Basātīn, 340.

1612, Ibrāhīm who had embraced the robe of loyalty, prayed to Jahāngīr that, if the affairs of the Deccan were entrusted to him, he would recover and restore the lost districts to the Imperial territory. When the Mughal nobles represented to Jahāngīr the exigencies of the time, he agreed to Ibrāhīm's proposal and "a settlement of some kind was arrived at and the Khān-i Khānān undertook to settle the matter."[59]

However, this settlement was only an eye wash and Ibrāhīm adopted dual diplomacy with the Mughals. Notwithstanding the active military collaboration with Malik 'Ambar against the Mughals, Ibrāhīm simultaneously made protestations of devotion and loyalty to the Mughal Emperor. And the Mughals under dillusion, or as a matter of policy, considered him to be loyal to them. Further, Ibrāhīm afraid of the Mughal invasion, tried to bring about diplomatic pressure on Jahāngīr, by sending his envoy Mīr Khalīlullah to Shah 'Abbās I of Iran. The Shah interceded in the Deccan politics, and tried to influence Jahāngīr, through a personal letter, to preserve the independence and entity of Bijapur. Thus, in spite of Ibrāhīm's anti-Mughal policy, Mughals tried to conciliate him as they "attached a great deal of importance to winning over 'Ādil Shah and detaching him from Malik 'Ambar."[60] Obviously, the Mughals considered that without this diplomacy they cannot conquer Ahmadnagar. This was in persuance of the Mughal policy of dealing with one kingdom at a time. And the letters of 'Azīz Kōkā to 'Ādil Shah bring out this underlying policy of the Mughals towards Bijapur. However, at the same time, the Mughals suspected Ibrāhīm.

---

59. Tozuk, I, 203, 234.
60. Gulshan-i Balāghat, op.cit., P.I.H.C., 1965, 166 ff.

Following the Mughal reverses in the Deccan in 1610 at the hands of Khān-i Khānān, Khān-i Jahān, along with many other nobles too joined in accusation against Khān-i Khānān. And Khān-i Jahān proposed to Jahāngīr that, if he is given command of the Deccan forces, he promised to conquer Ahmadnagar and Bijapur within two years. Jahangir fell in with this proposal and appointed Khān-i A'ẓam ('Azīz Kōkā) to assist Khān-i Jahān.[61]

Jahāngīr and Khān-i Jahān encouraged Bijapurī nobles and commanders to desert their master and join Mughal service. Honour was bestowed and jagirs were granted by Jahāngīr to 'Ādil Shāhī deserters. The case of Abul Fatḥ of Bijapur is one such example. On desertion, Jahāngīr presented him a jewelled dagger and a sword, a robe, a horse, and enrolled him into the Mughal service and allotted him a jagir in Nagpur.[62] All these grants and honours were meant, as a matter of policy, to tempt other Bijapurī commanders to follow Abul Fatḥ; and thus to weaken the military strength of Bijapur.

In 1614, Bakhtar Khan Kalawant who was closely related to Ibrāhīm, appeared at the Mughal Court. Jahāngīr honoured and presented to him 10,000 rupees in cash, 50 piece of cloth etc. According to the report of Mīr Jamāluddīn,[63] resident Mughal ambassador at Bijapur it appears that Ibrāhīm sent Kalawant to find out the Mughal designs on Bijapur. Ibrāhīm reciprocated this gesture of Jahāngīr by bestowing honour and presents on the Mughal ambassador, Injū. After Bakhtar Khan (also called Tahayyur Khan), was in attendance at Mughal Court for four months, Jahāngīr gave him

---

61. Tozuk, I, 179, 183; Ma'āthirul-Umarā, II, 79
62. Tozuk, I, 180 f, 192, 228 f.
63. Mīr Jamāluddīn came to Bijapur as Mughal Ambassador in 1610 and was there till 1616, Tozuk, I, 298.

leave to depart with a message to Ibrāhīm. Jahāngīr impressed on him "the profit and loss of friendship and enemity and under an agreement (with Tahayyur Khan) that all these words should be repeated to 'Ādil Khan and he should bring him back to the path of loyalty and obedience."[64] This implies that, even nearly a decade after his accession, Jahāngīr was trying his utmost to conciliate Ibrāhīm and allay him to suit Mughal motives in Deccan - the conquest of Ahmadnagar. And to achieve this, the Mughals wanted to alienate Bijapur from Ahmadnagar. Their coalition would have made impossible the Mughal conquest of Ahmadnagar first and, then other parts of Deccan later on.

In January, 1615, when Mir Jamāluddīn returned back to the Mughal Court, he was accompanied by Sayyid Kabīr Khan Ibrāhīm's envoy to the Mughal Court. Through him, Ibrāhīm sent various rare presents as offerings to Jahāngīr. Jahāngīr presented Kabīr one Nūrjahānī Mohar. Jahāngīr says Kabīr was sent by Ibrāhīm to beg pardon for his offences and with a promise for the restoration of the fort of Ahmadnagar etc., to the Mughals.[65]

At Jahāngīr's request, the 'Ādil Shāhī Ambassador fetched for him one Bijapurī wrestler, Sher 'Alī, who was greatly honoured and a jagir was awarded to him.[66] But according to Sir Thomas Roe,[67] Jahāngīr did not treat well the Bijapurī Ambassador.

While the Mughal army was camping on the outskirts of Bijapur, threatening any moment attack on Bijapur even by 1616, 'Adil Shah tried to sue for peace. On 10th October, 1616, two

---

64. ibid., 271 f, 477, 288.
65. Tozuk, I, 98, 300.
66. Tozuk, I, 335.
67. Sir Thomas Roe: The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India, (ed. W. Foster), 89.

'Ādil Shāhī ambassadors waited on Jahāngīr. The Emperor refused them audience; and directed them to meet Khurram with the remark: "if he (Khurram) would have peace or war it is left to him." After negotiating with the ambassadors Khurram took them to Jahāngīr with their representation. And since both the parties were willing for a peaceful settlement peace was made. 'Ādil Shāhī ambassadors were then, after an audience with Khurram at Ajmēr (in October 1616), were given leave to go back. They were accompanied with Mughal ambassadors, Afẓal Khan and Rāy Rāyān (Rājā Bikramājīt), with definite offers of peace, on payment of tribute and restoration of the lost territory.[68]

When the Mughal ambassadors reached Bijapur in 1616, Ibrāhīm came out seven kos to receive the order and litter of the Prince, and performed duties of salutation and respect,[69] which were customary at Court, showed marks of servitude and obedience. At the same meeting, Ibrāhīm professed greatest loyalty and promised that he would restore all those provinces that Malik 'Ambar had taken from the Mughals. Ibrāhīm presented 15 lakhs of rupees; and further agreed to send to the court, with all reverence a fitting offering with his ambassadors. Ibrāhīm immediately sent one ambassador to Malik 'Ambar with a special message on the Mughal-Ahmadnagar conflict.[70] Thus, through the mediation of 'Ādil Shah peaceful settlement was brought about between the Mughals and Malik 'Ambar, and the latter ceded to the former all the seized

---

68. Tozuk, I, 336, 368.
69. In this regard Iqbāl Nāmā Jahāngīrī (68) goes to the extent of saying that 'Ādil Shah knocked the ground with his head (Zamīn bōsī). This seems to be hyperbolic exaggeration. 'Ādil Shah must have done only Taslīm.
70. Iqbāl Nāmā Jahāngīrī, 68; Tozuk, I, 368. Ma'āthirul Umarā, I, 57, 149, 413.

territory and handed over the keys of the Ahmadnagar fort.[71]

'Ādil Shah - Farzand of Jahāngīr

Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II in the year 1617 sent ambassadors to the court of Khurram with special offerings. At this, Khurram wrote to Jahāngīr, expressing gratitude for the services and loyalty of Ibrāhīm and requested Jahāngīr for the issuance of a farmān, bestowing on Ibrāhīm the title of farzand and for other favours, which had never been vouchsafed in his honour. Jahāngīr to gratify Khurram, ordered for the issuance of a farmān in the name of Ibrāhīm conveying very kind affection, favour and addressing him as a farzand. In the farmān, given in the Guldasta,[72] Jahāngīr advises Ibrāhīm to "manifest greater zeal in the performance of feudal duties." Obviously, he considers Ibrahim not as a sovereign ruler of an independent State, but as a Mughal vassal.

In September 1617, Ibrāhīm sent his ambassadors to Burhānpūr with valuable offerings for Khurram and Jahāngīr. They gave complete satisfaction to Jahāngīr about the affairs of Bijapur and assured him of 'Ādil Shah's loyalty. Again, in October 1617, Wakīls of Ibrāhīm came to Jahāngīr; and had the honour of kissing the ground and presenting a letter for him. Jahāngīr bestowed elephants and dresses of honour on Sayyid Kabīr and Bakhtar Khan, the Wakīls of 'Ādil Shah. They were given leave to go in 1618.[73]

---

71. idem., In a letter to Jahāngīr Prince Khurram wrote regarding 'Ādil Shah as follows: باستشفاع عادلخان که از قدیم باز رابطهٔ بندگی باین درگاه والا دارد زبان اعتذار و استغفار گشود و از کمال اضطرار و درماندگی باذیال عفو و جان بخشی تمسک نمود مجملا بان همه سرکشی و فضولی قبول اطاعت و بندگی را بطوع و رغبت گردن نهاد و کلید قلعه احمدنگر در کهپای تخت مذکور بود.

72. Tozuk, I, 387 F, K.K. Basu: "The Bijapuri Court letters", J.B.O.R.S., XXVII (2), 1939, 256 ff.

73. Tozuk, I, 393, 399, II, 36; Iqbāl Nāmā Jahāngīrī, (70), records that 'Ādil Shah submitted offerings of total value of 15 lakhs of rupees which included 50 elephants, 50 Arab and Irāqī horses, 150,000 huns in cash and other jewellery and ornaments.

After Malik 'Ambar's defeat in 1617, some of the military commanders - Ādam Khan, Jādhav Rāo, Bābū Rāo Kayath, Udā Rām etc., joined the Mughals; but, on the persuation of Ibrāhīm they deserted Mughals.[74] This was an anti-Mughal act of 'Ādil Shah and he failed to keep up his commitments to the Mughals.

On Ibrāhīm's request, Jahāngīr in 1617 sent his own portrait, one ruby of great value and a special elephant to the former. Further, Jahāngīr issued a farmān granting Ibrāhīm the right to possess whatever territory of Niẓāmul-Mulk or Quṭbul-Mulk he might conquer. The Mughal commander, Shah Nawāz Khan was directed to render any military help or assistance that Ibrāhīm may require. Jahangir appointed the 'Ādil Shah as the 'Guard' and 'Leader' of the whole country of the Deccan.[74] Khurram sent Ḥakīm Khushhāl with the Wakīls of 'Ādil Shah to convey to him the good news of Jahāngīr's favours.[75]

These unusual favours bestowed by Jahāngīr on 'Ādil Shah are diplomatic move for Mughal-Bijapur military alliance against Ahmadnagar and Golkonda. In order to prevent any coalition of the three Deccan Kingdoms, specially with a view to alienate Bijapur from Ahmadnagar, for the latter's conquest, Jahāngīr gave a free hand to 'Ādil Shah to conquer whatever territory he wished from the two neighbouring kindgoms. It was a policy of divide and conquer. Thus, to conquer Ahmadnagar Jahāngīr tried his utmost to conciliate and ally with 'Ādil Shah beyond the usual limits. This policy materialised, to the benefit of the Mughals, a few years later, in 1623.

---

74. Tozuk, I, 402, 406.
75. Ibid., II, 36 f.

Bijapur-Mughal Alliance

No sooner had Jahāngīr and Khurram turned their backs on the Deccan, Malik 'Ambar resumed his anti-Mughal activity. He formed a league with Bijapur and Golkonda against the Mughals; and broke his treaty with the Mughals. Aftertwo years (1620-22) of skirmishes and wars, peace was concluded between the Mughals and Ahmadnagar. Following this, Bijapur being one of the party to the league against the Mughals, had to pay 18 lakhs of rupees to Khurram as war indemnity.[76]

However, politics soon changed; and Ibrāhīm who at one time allied with Malik 'Ambar against the Mughals now changed the camp and tried to ally with the Mughals against his former ally. In October, 1623, both, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II and Malik 'Ambar sought Mughal alliance, through Mahābat Khan, one against the other. Ibrāhīm offered homage and promised to send a contingent of 5000 cavalry under Mullah Muḥammad Lārī for permanent service under the Mughals, as the price of Mughal support against Malik 'Ambar.[77]

Mahābat Khan, in persuance of the Mughal policy and as an astute diplomat, favoured alliance with Bijapur, which Jahāngīr confirmed through a farmān. To receive the Mughal farmān and robe of honour, sent through Lashkarī Khan, Ibrāhīm came 4 kos out of the City and showed profound respect by salutations and prostrations for the royal gifts. He then sent Bijapurī contingent of 5000 cavalry under Mullah Muḥammad Lārī to join Mughal service. Mahābat Khan sent a strong contingent of his own to escort the Bijapurī contingent, safely to Burhānpūr, in order to avoid any

76. idem.; Beni Prasad, op.cit., 282 ff.
77. Futuhat, 287 ff.; Tozuk, II, 296 f., 288.

interception by Malik 'Ambar.[78]

Consequent to Mughal-Bijapur alliance, Malik 'Ambar formed an offensive-defensive alliance with Golkonda and then laid siege to Bijapur. Ibrāhīm retreated in the fort of Bijapur which was at once closely besieged by Malik 'Ambar. At this critical juncture, Ibrāhīm sought Mughal assistance and recalled Mullā and his contingent from the Mughal service. Mahābat Khan promptly responded by not only sending Mullā and his contingent, but also sent a Mughal contingent under Lashkarī Khan. This large reinforcement to the rescue of 'Ādil Shah compelled Malik 'Ambar to raise the siege and seek peaceful settlement. But the Bijapurīs and the Mughals declined all offers of peace and persuaded him in to the territory of Ahmadnagar. However, Malik 'Ambar, by his guerilla tactics, made a sudden attack on the armies of the allies and emerged victorious in a battle of Bhaturī. He followed up by laying siege to Ahmadnagar and Bijapur. But, with the arrival of Parvēz and Mahābat Khan, Malik 'Ambar withdrew.[79]

Khurram during his stay at Junair in 1622, maintained a friendly correspondence with 'Ādil Shah, who occasionally sent money, provisions and stores etc., to the former.[80] However, to the same prince, during his rebellion, early in 1623, 'Ādil Shah apparently turned a deaf ear to his request for help and treated his envoy Afẓal Khan with insult.[81]

---

78. Tozuk, II, 296; Beni Prasad, op.cit., 330.
79. Ma'āthirul-Umarā, I, 269; Beni Prasad, op.cit., 332 ff.
80. Futūhāt, 294; Saxena, op.cit., 152.
81. Tozuk, II, 290.

How far back have we to go to trace this ?

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, on his accession in 1627, received messages of congratulations from Khurram, through Afẓal Khan.[82]

Shah Jahān and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah (1628-56)

Shah Jahān mediates peace in Bijapur-Ahmadnagar conflict

Deccan policy of the Mughals took a turn after the death of Jahāngīr in October, 1627. The prince Shah Jahān, who at one time, allied with Bijapur against Ahmadnagar, now instead of taking sides and allying with either of the conflicting parties, tried to bring about peace between them. When Shah Jahān heard of the crushing defeat inflicted on Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah by Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah II, he sent Shaikh Mu'īnuddīn to bring about peace. The representatives of the two kingdoms met at the house of Muṣṭāfa Khan, in Bijapur; but the conference came to a deadlock and the mission of Shaikh Mu'īnuddīn failed.[83] The background for Shah Jahān to intercede between Bijapur-Ahmadnagar affairs was that Shah Jahān says, that he called the three Sultans of the Deccan as his sons (farzand ghuftaim)[84] and therefore he wished that there must be mutual love and friendship between them.

In 1039/1629 Shah Jahān came to Deccan, in persuit of the rebel, Khān-i Jahān, Niẓāmul Mulk gave refuge to the rebel at Daulatābād.[85] Consequently, Shah Jahān ordered for an attack on Ahmadnagar. This, Muṣṭafā Khan of Bijapur, considered it a proper

---

82. Futūḥāt, 297 (b); Basātīn, 41.
83. Futūḥāt, 32 (b); Saxena, op.cit., 157.
84. idem.
85. Al-Lubāb, I, 424.

opportunity, to ally with the Mughals for the extinction of Ahmadnagar. But Randaulā Khan, the leader of another party at Bijapur Court, was not in favour of Muṣṭafā Khan's proposal. However, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah had his own decision and ordered Randaulā Khan to march to the frontier in readiness for helping the Mughals in case of a call.[86]

Soon after the fall of Dhārūr Randaulā Khan and his father Farḥat Khan, who were camping near Dhārūr, sent a message to A'ẓam Khan. The Bijapurīs pleaded, apprehensive of the probable Mughal invasion, that since 'Ādil Shah was prepared to submit and accept obedience (iṭā'at) etc., then the Mughal army should be for fighting the enemies and should attack Niẓām Shāhī territory.[87] Though this was not the motive of the Mughals, yet A'ẓam Khan gave a diplomatic and conciliatory reply to Randaulā Khan. The latter told to A'ẓam Khan that Shah Jahān was gracious (mehrbān) on 'Ādil Shah; and, as such, he had granted to him five forts including the fort of Dhārūr, now conquered by the Mughals. These forts Randaulā Khan demanded from A'ẓam Khan who declined to surrender on the grounds that the Bijapurīs had not fulfilled the conditions laid down in the farmān, to help the Mughals. And on the contrary, A'ẓam Khan complained that the Bijapurīs were not co-operating with the Mughals in chasing the Niẓām Shāhī army in the Bālāghāṭ and Painghāt, in spite of repeated requests from the Mughals to do so.

---

86. Basātin, 292 f.; Saxena, op.cit., 153.
87. Qazvīnī: Pādshāh Nāmā, 212 (a); Al-Lubāb, I, 450 ff. This point of 'Ādil Shah's iṭā'at etc., and the proposal of Randaulā Khan is not mentioned by Dr. P.B. Saxena neither at 133 nor at 154 of his book - The Shah Jahān of Dihlī.

Further, A'ẓam Khan declined, on the grounds that Dhārūr was solely captured by the Mughals, without any assistance from Bijapur. However, A'ẓam Khan recommended in a report to the Emperor for the transfer of the fort.[88]

While A'ẓam Khan and Randaulā Khan were planning the reduction of Ahmadnagar and chasing the Niẓām Shāhī army in Bālāghāt and and Painghāt secret communications were in progress between other 'Ādil Shāhī Commanders with their Niẓām Shāhī counter part.[89]

Anti-Mughal Bijapur-Ahmadnagar Alliance

The delaying tactics of Bijapurīs to assist the Mughals was in reality beneficial to the cause of Ahmadnagar. Thus, when Muqarrab Khan of Ahmadnagar became aware of the non-co-ordination between the Bijapurī and the Mughals, he wrote to Randaulā Khan, pleading him to save the Niẓām Shāhī dynasty from extinction.[90]

When A'ẓam Khan was appraised of the underhand dealings of Muqarrab Khan and Randaulā Khan, he complained to Randaulā Khan that his action was against the agreement (Qarārdād) with the Mughals. To this, Randaulā Khan maintained silence and did not respond. Meanwhile, he gained time to arrive at a decision and he sent a special messenger to the 'Ādil Shah to make him agree to the proposal of Muqarrab Khan.[91]

Sequel to the Bijapur-Ahmadnagar secret alliance, A'ẓam Khan requisitioned reinforcement from the Mughal Court. After the arrival of the reinforcement the Mughals not only attacked the Bijapurī

---

88. Qazwīnī, 212 f.
89. idem.
90. idem.
91. ibid., 214.

forts of Parenḍā and Nāndēṛ but plundered and set to fire the towns and buildings. The Bijapurīs gave strong resistance to the Mughals. In the initial stages the Mughals were successful in capturing a part of the lower area of the fort. After a prolonged siege of one month, A'ẓam Khan was obliged to raise the siege, due to famine and shortage of provision and retire to Dhārūr.[92]

After Fatḥ Khan's return to power in Ahmadnagar, Muqarrab Khan submitted to A'ẓam Khan and joined Mughal service. Consequently, the alliance of Randaulā Khan and Muqarrab Khan became obsolete. Randaulā Khan was forced to sue for peace with the Mughals and he sent a message to A'ẓam Khan to the effect that "if by your instrumentality a pardon is obtained for the faults of 'Ādil Shah I shall guarantee that he will never be disobedient again." He further offered to allow the Mughal envoy, Shaikh Mu'īnuddīn, who was detained earlier, to leave Bidar with the presents for Shāh Jahān. However, the proposal did not fructify; as, Randaulā Khan himself, on the offensive, made a surpirse attack on the Mughals, near Bhālkī.[93] A'ẓam Khan was compelled to retreat. Consequently Mughal-Bijapur relations were further strained.

Shāh Jahān orders Invation of Bijapur

Randaulā Khan's decisive action arosed Shāh Jahān's wrath. He commissioned Yamīnud-daulā Aṣaf Khan to awake Khawāṣ Khan (who was ruling at Bijapur, during the minority of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah) from his slumbar. Aṣaf Khan was empowered to demand from Khāwaṣ Khan a return to obedience and payment of tribute, failing which,

---

92. Lāhōrī, I, 356; Al-Lubāb, I, 436.
93. 'Amal-i Ṣāliḥ, I, 441; Ma'athirul-Umarā, I, 317, Lāhōrī, I, 379.

Bijapur was to be invaded and conquered as much as possible and the rest of the territory to be laid waste.[94]

Aṣaf Khan started his operations against Bijapur in 1041/1631 and captured Bhālkī. This alarmed Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. He sent Rizqullah, as an envoy, to Aṣaf Khan with a letter of submission. 'Ādil Shah expressed repentence of his deeds and requested for pardon, with a promise to pay war indemnity. However, Aṣaf Khan did not pay any attention to Rizqullah on the grounds that the latter was not an accredited messenger of 'Ādil Shah.[95]

Aṣaf Khan then marched towards Gulbarga; but did not attempt to reduce the forts instead, they plundered whatever they could. They advanced to the vicinity of Bijapur and encamped near Nauraspūr and Sholapur.[96]

Negotiations for Peace

The camping of the Mughal army in the vicinity of Bijapur caused great alarm in Bijapur. Khawāṣ Khan deputed one Shaikh Dabīr to Aṣaf Khan with overtures of peace and offers of pēshkash. But, Aṣaf Khan not relying on the overtures rejected the proposal of peace. Then, Muṣṭafā Khan, who was having considerable influence and was already in correspondence with Aṣaf Khan was prevailed upon to mediate for peaceful settlement. Consequently, Muṣṭafā Khan and Khairiyat Khan negotiated with Aṣaf Khan for the settlement of the terms. It was agreed that 'Ādil Shah should send pēshkash to the value of 40 lakhs of rupees in cash, jewels, valuables, elephants etc., and he should hereafter remain faithful to his allegiance to the Mughals. A treaty embodying these terms

---

94. Lāhōrī, I, 404 f.; Shāh Jahān Nāmā 378. Further adds that Shāh Jahān demanded surrender of the fort of Parenḍā.
95. Qizwīnī, 242 b; Lāhōrī, I,(1) 403.
96. idem.

was drawn up. The two negotiators returned to Bijapur. Shaikh 'Abdur Raḥīm went with them to obtain signature of 'Ādil Shah on the treaty.[97]

In the meanwhile, when Khawaṣ Khan became aware of the shortage of provision in the Mughal camp and other difficulties experienced by them, he resolved to have recourse to artifice and procrastination, expecting that Aṣaf Khan would be compelled to raise the siege and retire baffled. Thus, to gain time, Khawaṣ Khan first refused to accept the treaty. The Shaikh was detained for two days, and then Khawaṣ Khan communicated that the treaty, duly signed would be sent through 'Ādil Shāhī envoy. This policy of Khawaṣ Khan was quite successful. The Mughals were compelled to retreat from Bijapur to Rāibagh and Miraj. And, as they were making purchases of grain in the town, Khawaṣ Khan broke the draft-treaty and ordered his army to attack the Mughals. The Mughals were forced to retreat to Bīr. While doing so, they took revenge, by plundering and devastating the Bijapurī territory.[98]

Eventually, Aṣaf Khan's campaign proved to be a dismal failure. The treaty was not signed; and 'Ādil was neither defeated nor any settlement was made. Shāh Jahān being tired of his residence at Burhānpūr returned to the capital in 1041/1632 while doing so, he appointed Mahābat Khan as Viceroy of the Deccan, to manage and set right the bad state of affairs.[99]

During the siege of Daulatābād in 1632 by the Mughals, the Bijapurīs, in compliance of a compact, assisted the Niẓām Shāhīs

---

97. idem.
98. idem.
99. Lāhōrī, I (1), 421.

in defending the fort. The covering army of Bijapur was defeate and chased by Khān-i Zamān, son of Khān-i Khānān Mahābat Khan. During the siege, Murārī Pandit of Bijapur sent Farhād Khan to Khān-i Khānān, with overtures of peace. But the latter, aware of Bijapurī artfulness and perfidy; refused to listen to them. The Bijapurīs in despair, returned back to Daulatābād; and after the investment of the fort fought the Mughals. However, the Bijapurīs retreated, at the march of Mahābat Khan himself to Daulatābād. [100]

Mahābat Khan's conquest of Daulatabad flared up his ambition to effect the conquest of Bijapurī territory, in particular, Parenḍā. As Mahabāt Khan's ambition coincided with Shāh Jahān's imperialistic policy, he readily acceded to the former's request and despatch Prince Shujā' for the Deccan. When Shujā' came to Burhānpūr, with an imposing army, Mahābat Khan waited upon him, and advised him to undertake the reduction of Parenḍā. Shujā', without entering Burhānpūr, straight away marched towards Parenḍā, and started preparations for its siege. Many clashes and skirmishes between the Mughals and the Bijapurīs took place. But the mutual jealousy between Khān-i Khānān and Khān-i Daurān resulted in the retreat of Shujā'. Consequently, the campaign failed. During this, campaign Shujā'being an ally of 'Ādil Shah, tried to hinder the Mughal line of operations at Zafarnagar, in favour of Bijapur. [101]

Khawāṣ Khan tries to placate Shāh Jahān

With the failure of Shujā' and Mahābat Khan and the latter's death, Shāh Jahān decided to march himself to the Deccan. This

---

100. ibid., 496 f.
101. Lāhōrī, I (1), 537 (2) 36; Futūḥat, 332 f.

greatly alarmed Khawāṣ Khan. The latter in order to placate Shāh Jahān, sent an envoy Shaikh Dabīr, with presents including one sapphire valued at 30,000 huns. But when Shāh Jahān came to know about the duplicity and high handedness of Khawāṣ Khan, he refused to give audience to the Bijapuri envoys.[102]

Further, Shāh Jahān issued a farmān to revitalise the Bijapur campaign, with re-inforcement and he himself came to the Deccan. This created great alarm and tension in Bijapur. At a council of nobles, it was decided to send another envoy to Shāh Jahān for reconciliation. Shāh Dāwūd was sent to Burhānpūr as 'Ādil Shah's envoy. When Shāh Dāwūd submitted his credentials, the latter did not pay any attention to the former. However, Khawāṣ Khan did not loose heart; he made a third attempt, when he came to know of a big intending Mughal campaign against Bijapur. This time, a wise and more learned envoy was appointed to mediate.[103]

It seems that Shāh Jahān was so much annoyed with Khawāṣ that he not only refused to see his envoys and receive the presents, but at one time, in wrath, he hinted for the murder of the envoys.[104]

Shāh Jahān demands Recognition of Mughal Suzerainty

The murder of Khawāṣ Khan and Muṣṭafā Khan's appointment as Pēshwā of Bijapur, changed the whole course of Mughal-Bijapur relations. With this change, Shāh Jahān deputed Mukramat Khan, to Bijapur, in 1045/1635, as special envoy, carrying his personal

---

102. Futūḥāt, 332 (b).
103. idem.
104. ibid., 349.

letter and a farmān demanding recognition of the overlordship of the Mughal Emperor by Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah.

In the letter[105] Shāh Jahān expressed the desire to introduce his name in the Khuṭbah, coins and measure (dara) in Bijapur. That is, 'Ādil Shah was directed to accept the overlordship of the Mughal Emperor. The letter was insulting, as an analogy was drawn, between 'Ādil Shah and a bird named hud hud. Shāh Jahān threatened to conquer Bijapur if, 'Ādil Shah did not acknowledge his suzerainty. But in spite of humiliating remarks coupled with warning, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah was un-nerved, and he retorted a fitting reply, in the same arrogant tone to Shāh Jahān. However, he agreed for peaceful settlement and offered to send peshkash.[106]

Besides the letter, which Mukramat Khan carried[107] he also brought a special farmān from Shāh Jahān to 'Ādil Shah. The motives of the letter and the farmān are slightly different and the farmān gives more elaborate details of the desires of Shāh Jahān and his favours towards 'Ādil Shah. The farmān reveals a curious mixture of threat and courtesy, persuasiveness and warning. It vividly depicts the circumstances which shaped Shāh Jahān's policy towards Bijapur, how he was willing to grant concessions (and granted Sholapur with its maḥals) to the 'Ādil Shah and how he was

---

105. Bashīruddīn Aḥmad: Farāmīn-i Salāṭīn, 54 f.; Basātīn, 302 f.
106. idem.
107. Since in both the letter and the farmān of 1045/1635 name of Mukaramat Khan as an envoy of Shāh Jahān to 'Ādil Shah is mentioned and that the motives of that letter and the farmān are almost same, it is quite obvious that Mukaramat Khan carried in 1045/1635 both the letter (a confidential - probably) and the farmān simultaneously. There is no mention of two different embasies of Mukaramat Khan.

equally ready to enforce his will by arms, should need arise.[108] The motives behind the issue of the farmān at a time when there was lull in Mughal-Bijapur relations seems to be partly same, as given in the letter, and partly due to Shāh Jahān's anger for 'Ādil Shah's assistance to Ahmadnagar during the Mughal campaign of Ahmadnagar.[109]

Now 'Ādil Shah was left with two alternatives - either to obey the farmān and to be loyal to the Emperor or to disregard it, leading to hostilities. Considering the advantages accruing from accepting the farmān, 'Ādil Shah wisely adopted the path of obedience and loyalty to the Mughal Emperor. As such, when Mukaramat Khan was in the vicinity of Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah came out to a village Arkhedia (about ten miles from Bijapur), to receive the farmān, and accorded an honourable reception to the Mughal envoy.[110]

In the meanwhile, soon after Muṣṭafā Khan became minister of Bijapur, he despatched his son-in-law Mīr Abul-Ḥasan, along with Qāḍī Abū Sa'īd to apologise to Shāh Jahān and beg his pardon for the past misconduct of both Khawāṣ Khan and 'Ādil Shah. Shāh Jahān did not give audience to the Bijapurī envoys. They were directed to first meet and discuss the matter with Aṣaf Khan. Later on, on the recommendation of Aṣaf Khan, the two envoys were admitted to the audience of Shāh Jahān.[111] But, the efforts of Muṣṭafā Khan to reconciliate the Emperor and obtain a

---

108. Saxena, op.cit., 164.

109. Al-Lubāb, I, 517. The farmān does not mention anything about the introduction of Shāh Jahānī Khuṭbah-sicca and dara in Bijapur, as given in the letter cited above. The motives (regarding Khuṭbah etc.) of a farmān which Khāfī Khan, I, 517 mentions are not found in the actual farmān (Lāhōrī, I (2), 126 ff.). It seems that Khāfī Khan has mixed up the contents of the letter with those of the farmān. However, Khāfī Khan does not mention anything about the letter.

110. Lāhōrī, I (2), 144.

111. Futūḥāt, 349.

pardon failed miserably, due to the unfavourable report of Mukaramat Khan. The latter reported that though 'Ādil Shah and his minister profess loyalty and obedience, yet on finding suitable opportunity, they are liable to drift away from the loyal path. This altered the whole course of Mughal-Bijapur relations. Shāh Jahān got wild, and in wrath, he ordered the army to invade and destroy Bijapur.[112]

Anti-Mughal Policy of 'Ādil Shah

In the meanwhile, 'Ādil Shah unmindful of his allegiance for the Mughals, adopted dual diplomacy and secretly sent money to the qil'ādārs of the forts of Udgīr and Owsā, when they were besieged by the Mughals. Further, he despatched a force under Khairīyat Khan to defend the fort and he commissioned Randaulā Khan to support Shāhjī. Consequently Shāh Jahān appointed Khān-i Jahān, Khān-i Daurān, and Khān-i Zamān to march into Bijapur territory from three directions, to prevent coalition of Randaulā Khan with Shāhjī; and to ravage the Bijapur territory. But in spite of this order Shāh Jahān still had a soft corner for 'Ādil Shah. He directed his generals that if 'Ādil Shah submitted, then they should stop hostilities. Otherwise make every exertion to crush him ('Ādil Shah).[113]

---

112. Lāhōrī, I (2), 144; Al-Lubāb, I, 523. The order of Shāh Jahān reads:
بعد از وصول عرضداشت بدرگاه معلی فرمان شد کہ افواج قاہرہ بتاخت مضافات بیجاپور بیش از پیش ساعی بود
و بقتل و غارت بپردازند -

Khāfī Khan says that Shāh Jahān despatched an army of 48,000 to destroy by fire and sword and invade Bijapur - Al-Lubāb, I, 520.

113. Al-Lubāb, I, 520 ff; Lāhōrī, I (2), 135.

Then, Muṣṭafā Khan and Randaulā Khan, the two rival and powerful nobles of Bijapur, realising the severe consequences, came together in a bid to settle the Mughal-Bijapur differences and to make peace. The Bijapurī envoys (Abul Ḥasan and Abū Sa'īd) who were already at the Mughal Court, were directed by 'Ādil Shah to submit a petition on his behalf, to the Emperor for reconciliation. Shāh Jahān bitterly complained to the envoys the relentless and flatering attitude of 'Ādil Shah.[114]

Treaty of 1636—'Arḍdāsht of 'Ādil Shah and Farmān of Shāh Jahān

In the petition (arḍdāsht) Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah submitted that he has joined the band of Emperor's obedient and loyal people. He wrote: "I have worn the ring of slavery and request that for my satisfaction, one agreement ('aḥednāmā) be issued so that his country (Bijapur) and his dynasty will be safe from the terror and troubles of the Imperial army."[115]

Abul Hasan, the Bijapuri envoy, by his unabated exertions, succeeded in placating the wrath of Shāh Jahān, and brought about a peaceful settlement. But it was really the letter of Muṣṭafā Khan, addressed to Abul Ḥasan, which was instrumental in pacifying Shāh Jahān and making him to agree to peace treaty. The letter, incidentally, and due to the mischief of the news-reporter, reached Shāh Jahān. However, he could not read and make out its contents; as, it was written in code. Hence, he called Abul Ḥasan,

---

114. Shāh Jahān Nāmā, 389; Lāhōrī, I (2), 143.

115. Qazwīnī, 350 b.

the addressee of it, to decipher the code. It contained details of the kindness and generosity extended to prince Shāh Jahān by 'Ādil Shah, during the former's rebellion and stay in Deccan. Shāh Jahān confirmed the authenticity of the facts mentioned in the letter and remarked: "Our brother 'Ādil Khan helped us in our days of trouble. He was kind and generous to us. There was one agreement ('ahed) between us; by which, he gave us some well-known villages etc."[116] Thus recollecting the past relations with 'Ādil Shah and his kindness towards him, Shāh Jahān pardoned him and issued a farmān - in fact a treaty ('ahed). But it was a unilateral treaty; as, it was imposed on 'Ādil Shah by the command of Shāh Jahān and its terms were not first negotiated and agreed mutually. The text of the farmān reads:[117]

"'Ādil Khan should know that, the 'arḍdasht which he sent, has been perused. From it and from your another petition, ('arḍī), submitted through Khān-i Khānān and the letter of Mukaramat Khan it is evident that you have adopted the path of obedience and loyalty. Hence, we pardon all your misdeeds (taqsīrāt) etc.

"Since we do not wish to harm you, in view of late 'Ādil Khan's appreciative loyalty etc., and also due to the fact that you have now adopted right path, we confer/give you the entire country of the late 'Ādil Khan and also give from Niẓāmul-Mulk's country the maḥal of Wanko and its fort, Sholapur fort and its maḥals,

---

116. Futūḥāt, 350; Saxena, (op.cit., 166) fails to mention this background of the Treaty. Shāh Jahān's own words in this regard one: برادر ما عادل شاه ما را در ان ایام مدد بسیار کردند و مهربان گردیدند و صحیفه صلح را درمیان آوردند -

117. Lāhōrī, I(2), 167 ff., Futūḥāt, 349 ff.; Qazwīnī, 381 ff.

which were taken from 'Ādil Khan and were given to Niẓāmul-Mulk and Malik 'Ambar. Parenḍā and its maḥals, parganā Bhālkī, parganā Jeet Kobar, wilāyat Kokan of Niẓāmul-Mulk and its forts, parganā Chakan[118] (having 50 parganā). These parganās and mahals have annual revenue of 20 lakhs huns[119] and they are awarded to you, to your successors; subject to the condition that this farmān, which is like a treaty, is adhered to and obeyed. And from us, or our successors or from our army, there will be no trouble to you. This treaty will be made stronger by our and your successors."

The farmān carried the following conditions (sharāiṭ) of the treaty:-

"Whatever we have said you must obey and should not make any changes in the farmān issued in this regard. And should regularly pay the pēshkash (lawāzim). Should not do anything against us."

"Ther should not be any person of Niẓāmul-Mulk; but all should be 'Ādil Khaniand the former territory (maḥalats) of Niẓām-ul-Mulk are now merged into Mughal empire and you should have no objection to it nor you should create any trouble in those areas. The territorial boundaries now demarcated should not be trespassed. Pēshkash[120], fixed at 20 lakhs rupees in cash and kind, should be immediately remitted, through Mukaramat Khan.

---

118. Though in the farmān only Pargana Chakan is mentioned and "Puna" is not at all mentioned, however Sarkar (Au. I, 33) mentions "Puna".

119. The farmān has clearly 20 lakhs (huns; Faruqi: Aurangzeb and His Time,(321)wrongly mentions as "rupees" (one hun equals four rupees), Saxena (166) too wrongly mentions as "rupees".

120. Here the text (170) has "rupees" whereas the farmān has "Huns".

"In the matters which Quṭbul-Mulk has agreed are - Sunnī faith, reading of the Khuṭbah has been changed (at Golkonda) in the name of Caliph (Khulfā-i Araba') and name of Shah Jahan has been included in the Khuṭbah and coins of Golkonda.

"Since you are raīs of Deccan and elder brother of Quṭbul-Mulk, hence you should not enter into the Golkonda territory and should not demand any money or elephants etc., from Quṭbul-Mulk.

"Raiḥān Bijapurī, who has done misdeeds, and, as per your request (in the 'arḍdasht) we will not shelter him.

"And regarding other persons, who have been mentioned by 'Ādil Khan, we nor our servants shall entertain them, nor shall make any agreement with them. If some one desserts us and comes to you, you should arrest him.

"Since Sahu (Shahji Bhonsle) has no shelter, it is probable that he will come to you; and by becoming obedient he may join your service. Then, in that case, you should ask him to first vacate and surrender to the Mughals the following forts: Junair, Tarbank and Raj deo hair, Tarnakalwadi, Beemgaṛh. Shahu has been ordered to take all his movable artides and his relatives from these forts. If, supposing, Sahu did not join your service, you turn him out of your country. If even after this, he comes, you arrest and send him to us for destroying (Istiḥsāl) him. You need not worry about Sahu (Mufsid).

"Likewise, in the case of the qila'dārs of the forts of Owsa and Udgīr, who are Niẓāmul-Mulki, if they become obedient to you, you direct them to hand over all the arms and ammunition in those forts to the Mughals, after which they are at liberty to go anywhere. In case these qila'dārs do not obey you, then inform us, so that, the Mughals shall capture them forcibly.

"Write these terms in a 'ahednāmā (treaty) and put your seal and take an oath on the Qur'ān. Send this 'ahednāmā, with one 'arḍdāsht and pēshkash to us, through Mukaramat Khan."

Political Implications and Consequences of the Treaty

From a critical analysis of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah's 'arḍdāsht and Shāh Jahān's farmān, the following facts emerge:

The treaty ('ahednāmā) was issued by Shāh Jahān, at the request of 'Ādil Shah himself.[121]

In the text of the farmān (treaty), it is not mentioned that "'Ādil Shah the King of Bijapur must acknowledge the overlordship of the Emperor ---".[122] In fact, neither the farmān[123] (draft 'ahednāmā) and the actual 'ahednāmā[124] (Treaty of 1636) does not

---

121. This request of 'Ādil Shah (Qazwīnī, 350 b) for the issuance of 'ahednāmā is neither mentioned by Saxena (166) nor by Sarkar (AU., I, 32).

122. AU., I, 32; Saxena, 166.
Shāh Jahān demanded recognition of Mughal suzrainty over Bijapur vide letter cited above in 1045/1635. From the contents of the farmān of 1635 and from the report of Mukaramat Khan of 1635 it is quite evident that 'Adil Shah accepted obedience and loyalty of the Emperor in 1635 itself and sent his envoys with pēshkash to the Mughal court. The farmān/treaty reveals previous acceptance of this fact at an earlier date (1635) and the farmān/Treaty of 1636 has no provision for the acknowledgment of suzerainty. As such the statements of Sir Jadunath Sarkar and that of Saxena are not tenable. However, contrary to his own statement (at AU., I, 32), Sarkar makes correct statement (at AU., I, 237) that "Bijapur was not a Vassal State but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal Emperor." This is an absolutely tenable statement; but without any critical examination of the terms of the Treaty. Dr. Yar Mohammad tries to disprove this latter statement of Sarkar: Pakistan History Conference, 1958, 178. Dr. Yar Mohammed's opinion is untenable.

123. Lāhōrī, I (2), 168 ff.

124. ibid., 203f.

mention anything about the main requisite of the recognition of the Mughal Emperors suzerainty - viz., the issuing of coins and the public reading of Khuṭbah in Shāh Jahān's name. Nor there is a mention of them in the letters of 'Ādil Shah written in response to the farmān and treaty.[125] Thus, 'Ādil Shah did not accept the suzerainty of Shāh Jahān and Bijapur did not become a vassal or tributory state by the Treaty of 1636,[126] as was the case of Golkonda, which accepted all these conditions. 'Ādil Shah only accepted obedience and loyalty of Shāh Jahān, which does not imply acceptance of suzerainty. And the pēshkash, which 'Ādil Shahs paid to the Mughal Emperors was only a usual practice of the medieval times.

It was due to this reason that made the same Emperor (Shāh Jahān) the signatory to the Treaty of 1636, to demand in 1657, from 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, the recognition of the suzerainty of the Mughal Emperor.[127] Had Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah accepted the suzerainty of Shāh Jahān in 1636, then the same precedence would have continued and Shāh Jahān would have had no ground to demand the same in 1657. Further, there is no numismatic evidence to show that Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah issued coins with Shāh Jahān's name. On the contrary 'Ādil Shah had his 'own name' on Bijapur coins.[128]

The treaty does not say "the pretence of a Niẓām Shāhī Kingdom should be ended and all its territories divided between the Emperor and the Bijapur king."[129] The territory of the Niẓām

---

125. ibid., 203 f.
126. Hence the inferences and statements of all modern writers seems to be baseless.
127. AU, I, 237.
128. G.P. Taylor: "On some copper coins of the 'Ādil Shāhī Dynasty of Bijapur", J.A.S.B., December 1910, 679, 684.
129. AU., I, 32.

Shāhī Konkan (on the sea-shore) were granted by Shāh Jahān to 'Ādil Shah as a favour (marhamat farmudan)[130] on the latter's request and that too, in exchange for certain 'Ādil Shāhī territory near Daulatābād.[131]

Bijapur kingdom was granted to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and his successors to rule as if, Shāh Jahān and his successors were the real owners or overlords of it. But, this arrangement was sought by 'Ādil Shah himself in his 'arḍāsht, for the future security of the kingdom from the Mughal invasions. This confirmed the Mughal supremacy over Bijapur, which was established earlier, and acknowledged by 'Ādil Shah in 1636.

Parts of the Niẓām Shāhī territory was granted to 'Ādil Shah for the services he rendered in the reduction of Ahmadnagar and in defeating Shāhjī; but, subject to the condition of 'Ādil Shah and his successors remaining loyal and obedient to the Mughal Emperor.

The terms of the Treaty were to be adhered and obeyed, without any modification, by the 'Ādil Shah. Thus, it was an imposition of the terms, and a unilateral Treaty. Though 'Adil Shah accepted it, but without any right to modify it. So, it was not a treaty in its true sense. The two parties never negotiated the terms, on the basis of equality. But, it was issued as a farmān of a superior ruler to a subordinate ruler. However, still Mughal suzerainty over Bijapur was not established.

'Ādil Shah was to pay the pēshkash regularly. Though mention of annual payment or any time period is not mentioned for its

---

130. Lāhōrī, I (2), 169; Al-Lubāb, I, 532f.

131. Al-Lubāb, I, 537 f.; 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 575.
Regarding the exchange of the territory between the Mughals and Bijapur is neither mentioned by Saxena nor Sarkar nor by Faruki.

payment. But the lumpsum of 20 lakhs of huns/rupees was fixed, as pēshkash; to be paid both in cash and kind. However, later on, it became a regular feature (but the amount was not fixed) and as it fell in arrears Shāh Jahān sent strongly worded letters.[132] However, 'Ādil Shah did not become a 'tributory' to the Mughal Emperor, as, the word pēshkash implies here, in this context, only a present and not in the sense of "tribute".[133]

The Mughal Emperor encroached in the internal affairs of Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah was ordered to not to interfere in the affairs of Golkonda, nor to invade it, nor demand any help in any way.

Though it was not mentioned in the Treaty, yet, the study of several Shāh Jahānī documents divulge the fact that the Mughal Emperors appointed a permanent officer to reside at 'Ādil Shāhī Court, who kept up the Emperor informed of the happenings in Bijapur and safe-guarded the interest of the Mughals. For the conveyance of the news-reports, the Mughals established postal stations and routes and appointed regular staff, within the jurisdiction, of Bijapur Kingdom.[134] Obviously it was on infringement within the jurisdiction of Bijapur and it was probably a unique political arrangement.

The Treaty of 1636 altered the whole course of Mughal-Bijapur relation and changed the Deccan policy of the Mughals. From 1572 to 1636, the Mughals were trying to ally and conciliate 'Ādil Shah, in order to alienate Bijapur from other Deccan Kingdoms to prevent

---

132. Basātīn, 302; AU, I, 230 fn.

133. For this interpretation of pēshkash see Dr. Riazul Islam, op.cit., 233 fn.

134. Siyāhā Huḍūr, dated June 1644. Shāh Jahānī Document No.60, Dastak, dated April 1666. 'Ālamgīrī Document No.5003. Qabḍul Waṣūl, dated October, 1666, 'Ālamgīrī Document, No.712.

their coalition, against the Mughals, and thus to facilitate conquest of the Deccan Kingdoms one after the other. So far, the Mughal-Bijapur relations were guided by the Deccan policy of the Mughals and since Bijapur was not involved directly, the Mughals tried to maintain friendly relations with 'Ādil Shah. But the conquest of Ahmadnagar and the Treaty of 1636 introduced new dimensions in the Deccan policy of the Mughals and in the Mughal-Bijapur relations. Until 1636, the Mughal Empire and Bijapur were not contiguous neighbours. Ahmadnagar was the buffer state between the two. The extinction of Ahmadnagar brought the Mughal Empire and Bijapur in direct contacts face to face, the common boundary was demarcated by the Treaty of 1636. And the removal of the buffer State made possible the Mughal invasion of Bijapur. In fact, this opportunity was one of the causes for the Treaty of 1636. And in the same year, the Mughals made a three pronged attack on Bijapur through Sholapur, Indāpūr and Bidar.[135]

In spite of the Treaty of friendship and mutual co-operation between the Mughals and Bijapur, yet the Mughals in the same year, 1636, foreseeing possibility of a coalition, in the future, between Bijapur and Golkonda, tried to ally with Golkonda against Bijapur. In the Treaty, though Shāh Jahān advised 'Ādil Shah to consider himself as an elder brother of Quṭb Shah, to maintain peaceful, friendly relations with him and not to have any aggressive designs on Golkonda, yet simultaneously with the Treaty, he sent another farmān to Golkonda, in which he tried to ally Quṭb Shah. In the farmān to 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah, Shāh Jahān laid down a condition

---

135. Lāhōrī, I (2), 151.

in case of aggression by Bijapur on Golkonda, the Mughal subēdār of the Deccan shall help Golkonda both, by men and material. And, in case of non-compliance by the subēdār to such a request of Qutb Shah, the latter was to petition to the Emperor for exemption of remittance of the pēshkash to the value of two lakhs of huns.[136]

Thus, consequent to the Treaty of 1636, with both Bijapur and Golkonda, Shāh Jahān tried to prevent their coalition and tried to maintain the balance of power in the Deccan. Obviously, Shāh Jahān had fears of Bijapur gaining power and strength and then again adopting anti-Mughal policy.

SEC. III: FOURTH PHASE (1636-56)

Period of Peaceful Political Relations

Caliphal Relations

On receipt of the draft treaty, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah submitted one petition expressing his gratitude and thanks to the Emperor. In the 'arḍī, 'Ādil Shah addressed Shāh Jahān as Caliph (Khalīfa-i Zamān), while to himself, 'Ādil Shah represented as an humble slave ('abūdīyat); and expressed his absolute faith (ikhlāṣ) in Shāh Jahān (bandagān-i ānhaḍrat).[137] But this caliphal relationship was only theoritical.

Thenceforward, for twenty years (1636-56), till the death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, Mughal-Bijapur relations were peaceful and cordial; except on two occasions, when Shah Jahan was displeased with 'Ādil Shah.

---

136. Lāhōrī, I (2), 167 ff.; Al-Lubāb, II, 178; K.K. Basu: "The Golconda court Letters", J.B.O.R.S., XXVI 1940 (v), 281 f.

137. Shāh Jahān Nāmā, 398.

In 1052/1642-43, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah resenting the overgrown power of Muṣṭafā Khan imprisoned him. This displeased Shāh Jahān; as Muṣṭafā Khan was a partisan of the Mughals. Consequently, Shāh Jahān detained Mīrzā Rajab, the 'Ādil Shāhī envoy at the Mughal Court, and sent Mīrzā Muẓaffar Ḥusain with orders to 'Ādil Shah to release Muṣṭafā Khan. 'Ādil Shah obeyed the orders and re-instated Muṣṭafā Khan to Ministership.[138] This was an infringment of the Mughal Emperor in the internal affairs of Bijapur.

Again, due to the increase in power and territorial expansion of Bijapur, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah became haughty and adopted audacious practices. Such practices, exposing vanity, were disliked by Shāh Jahān. Consequently, he sent a letter of admonition to 'Ādil Shah and directed him to discontinue such practices.[139]

After the settlement of 1636, 'Ādil Shah was free from the danger of any aggression on its frontiers from the north. Thus, he was able to concentrate on the conquest of southern India. In fact Shāh Jahān commanded 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah to conquer and partisan Karnatak between themselves.[140] Consequently Bijapur Kingdom extended from Arabian sea to the Bay of Bengal, across the entire South Indian peninsula. Thus, in recognition of his achievements, Shāh Jahān conferred the title of "Shah", in 1648, on Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah.[141]

---

138. Futuḥāt, 399; Saxena, 166 f.

139. AU., I, 256 ff.

140. Inshā-i Tabrēzī, Letters of Quṭb Shah to Shāh Jahān, 58b
Dr. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar: "A few Letters of Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla relating to the partition of the Karnatak", I.H.R.C., January 1942, 204.

141. Basātīn, 324 f; AU., I, 230.

During this period of peaceful political relations, 'Ādil Shah almost regularly sent pēshkash direct to the Emperor or to the Mughal Viceroy in Deccan. There was no fixed amount for the pēshkash, as for instance:

In Shawwāl 1047/1638 'Ādil Shah sent one pair of elephants, decorated with jewels and ornaments to Shāh Jahān as peshkash;[142] in 1048/1639 'Aṭaullāh was sent by 'Ādil Shah to Shāh Jahān with a special elephant named 'Maqbūl', as pēshkash; in 1049/1640, Qāḍī Beg the 'Ādil Shāhī envoy, presented to Shāh Jahān pearls and ornamented goods worth rupees 20 lakhs as pēshkash;[144] in 1053/1643 'Ādil Shah sent, through Muẓaffar Ḥusain for Shāh Jahān pēshkash of two elephants, three horses, one golden ring, one golden Turrah and Dhug Dhugi, while for the Viceroy (Prince Aurangzeb) he sent one golden ring and one ashrafī;[145] in 1053/1643 'Ādil Shah sent pēshkash through Ghāzī Beg Wakīl for Shāh Jahān, one pearls' mālā and one ring; while for the Prince Aurangzeb (Sultan-Jiv) he sent one golden chain and one turrah;[146] and in 1059/1650, Muḥammad Ṣūfī, the retiring Mughal envoy brought forty elephants and other gifts as pēshkash worth 100 lakhs from Bijapur.[147]

Such presents, in the form of pēshkash, was sent almost every year. And from the above instances it is evident that pēshkash was submitted whenever any 'Ādil Shāhī envoy or Wakīl had

---

142. Lāhōrī, II, 23.
143. ibid., 95 f.
144. ibid., 177.
145. Shāh Jahānī Document An, 382/370.
146. ibid., Document No. 396/389
147. Qāzwīnī: Pādshāh Nāmā, 444.

an audience either, with the Emperor or with the Mughal Viceroy. In the latter case, separate pēshkash[148] for both the Emperor and the Viceroy was submitted.

SEC. IV: FIFTH PHASE (1656-80)

Period of perturbed Political Relations and Military Strategy

Shāh Jahān and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1656-58)

Aurangzeb's plot to invade Bijapur

Though Shāh Jahān's relations with 'Ādil Shah were cordial and peaceful and both tried to maintain the same, yet Aurangzeb, as a Viceroy of the Deccan, secretly nurtured plans to invade Bijapur, with the expected death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, who was lingering on the bed of illness.[149]

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah died on 4th November, 1656. He was succeeded by 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II, a youth of eighteen years and the only son of the late 'Ādil Shah. Immediately on hearing this news on 10th November, Aurangzeb wrote to Shāh Jahān urging sanction for the invasion of Bijapur, on the plea that 'Alī was not really a son of the deceased Sultan; but, a boy of obscure parentage, whom Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah had brought up in the harem. And in anticipation of Shāh Jahān's orders, Aurangzeb massed Mughal troops on the Bijapur frontier and proposed to go himself to Ahmadnagar to direct the operations.[150]

---

148. Lāhōrī, II, records presentation of pēshkash by 'Ādil Shah at 216, 334, 336, 352, 423, 491, pt.(2) 167 etc.
149. Ādāb, 88 a.; AU., I, 233.
150. Ādāb, 88 b; Al-Lubāb, II, 115; Basātīn, 340, 347.

Taking advantage of the mutual jealousy, and rivalries among the Bijapurī nobles and commanders, Aurangzeb exploited the situation through intrigues with them; and succeeded in corrupting most of them.[151] Regarding this policy, Aurangzeb expressed himself to Mīr Jumlā to the following effect: "I am trying my utmost, to win the Bijapur army over, for then the chiefs of that country will join us of their own accord." Further, Aurangzeb distributed cash among the desserters. Every Bijapurī captain who brought a hundred men to the muster was awarded Rs.2,000, out of the Mughal treasury. The Governor of Ahmadnagar was ordered to welcome and conciliate every arrival from Bijapur, even when he was not a captain of known position and importance.[152]

Breach of the Treaty by Shāh Jahān

On 26th November, 1656, Shāh Jahān sanctioned the invasion and gave Aurangzeb a free hand to "settle the affair of Bijapur in any way he thought fit." Shāh Jahān's instructions to Aurangzeb were, first to march with Mīr Jumlā to the Bijapurī frontier and conquer the whole of the Kingdom, if possible; otherwise, to annex that portion of the old Ahmadnagar Kingdom which had been ceded to Bijapur by the Treaty of 1636, and to spare the territory of Bijapur proper, on payment of indemnity of one and half-crores of rupees and the recognition of the Emperor's suzerainty - viz., the issuing of coins in his name and the public reading of his titles in the Khutbahat Bijapur.[153]

---

151. For the number of Bijapurī desserters to the Mughal camp see Dr. Ather Ali: Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, 27 f.
152. Ādāb, 91, 145, 146 b; AU., I, 235 f.
153. ibid., 90, 96 b.; AU., I, 236 f.

The war thus sanctioned by Shāh Jahān was wholly unrighteous and was in breach of the Treaty he made with Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah in 1636. Bijapur was "not a vassal" state, but an independent state; and 'Ādil Shah was an ally of the Mughal Emperor. As such the Mughals had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. The Treaty had no such provision to enable the Mughal Emperor to interfere in the internal affairs of Bijapur. The true cause of the Mughal interference was the exploitation on their part of the bad state of affairs at Bijapur, helplessness of the young 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II and discord among the nobles. These factors collectively contributed to the weak defences of the kingdom, which presented a favourable "opportunity for annexation", as Aurangzeb himself expressed it.[154]

Thus, the maker of the Treaty of 1636, Shāh Jahān, himself directly violated the Treaty and solemn agreement, assurances and guarantee he gave to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah.

Military Operations -1657

After Mīr Jumlā's arrival in June 1657, Aurangzeb began his operations against Bijapur with the siege of Bidar, on 2nd March 1657. After the fall of Bidar, Aurangzeb sent forces under Mahābat Khan to punish the army of Bijapurīs which had assembled near Gulbarga and to ravage the Bijapurī territory upto Kalyānī. The Bijapurīs first offered stiff resistance, which later on faded out they fled away.[155]

In the meanwhile, Shāh Jahān repeatedly sent orders to Aurangzeb to patch up peace and end the war with Bijapur. Yet, Aurangzeb pressed hard for four months the siege of Kalyānī which

154. Ādāb, 8 a, 91 b; AU., I, 237.
155. Basātīn, 348.

eventually fell to the Mughals.[156]

Now the road to Bijapur was clear. The Mughals could have easily walked up to the city of Bijapur. But, suddenly Aurangzeb received orders from Shāh Jahān to close the war. Negotiations for peace were initiated. The Bijapurī envoy Ibrāhīm Bichittar Khan, agreed to pay war indemnity[157] of one and half crore of rupees (as originally ordered by Shāh Jahān) and to cede not only Bidar and Kalyānī but, also the fort of Parenḍā, with its dependent territory, all the forts in the Niẓām Shāhī Konkan, and the district of Wango. 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II in helpless condition, was compelled to accept these unreasonable terms of the Mughals, and sent letters to his officials to deliver the said forts to the Mughals. A Treaty, embodying these unjust terms, was concluded. Shāh Jahān ratified the Treaty, remitting half a crore from the war indemnity and sent a gracious letter to 'Ādil Shah.[158] This settlements, Muḥammad Kāzim of 'Ālamgīr Nāmā interprets as pēshkash which 'Ādil Shah accepted to pay as thanks-giving for the departure of Aurangzeb from Bijapur.[159]

However, before the settlement could practically materialise Dārā Shikōh, who was holding power at the Mughal Court, during the illness of Shāh Jahān interfered in the Bijapur affairs and altered the whole situation. Dārā, due to enemity with Aurangzeb played mischief by writing several letters to 'Ādil Shah not to

---

156. AU., I, 239 f., 244 f.
157. Adab, 68.
158. AU., I, 250 f.
159. 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 83, the text reads:

برای تحصیل مبلغ صد لک روپیه پیشکش عادل خان کرنکرانه مراجعت موکب اقبال بقبول آن منت پذیر شده بود

fulfil the settlement. Consequently, due to the misguidance, the Bijapurīs adopted delaying tactics in fulfilling the settlement. The circumstances became so precarious that at one stage Aurangzeb had no means at his disposal to enforce the treaty, recently concluded with Bijapur. And even Dārā recalled Muʿazzam from Deccan to weaken Aurangzeb's strength.[160]

Taking advantage of the Mughal weakness the Bijapuris instead of fulfilling the terms of the settlement, harassed the Mughals and refused to hand over Parendā to Mīr Jumlā and declined to pay the war indemnity. Aurangzeb then tried to make a friendly settlement with 'Ādil Shah. He agreed to make relaxations in the settlement earlier agreed upon and promised to disown the claims to the territory recently ceded by Bijapur and to remit 30 lakhs of rupees out of the one crore promised by 'Ādil Shah. In lieu of these concessions, Aurangzeb wanted 'Ādil Shah to send a contingent of 10,000. However, 'Ādil Shah being aware of Aurangzeb's dual diplomacy and predicament, declined to render any military assistance. Consequently, Aurangzeb was forced to retire to Aurangabad in January 1658.[161]

While retiring, Aurangzeb left Mu'azzam within the territory of Bijapur, with a small contingent, for exacting the pēshkash. The latter in turn, sent Qāḍī Niẓām to 'Ādil Shah with a farmān ('ahednāmā) for the collection of pēshkash. Through the retiring Mughal envoy, 'Ādil Shah returned the 'ahednāmā, with his consent and sent one petition expressing thanks to Aurangzeb. However,

---

160. 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 83; Faruki, op.cit., 331; AU, IV, 118.
161. AU., IV, 118; Faruki, op.cit., 331;

'Ādil Shah did not fulfill the terms of the treaty of August, 1657.[162]

Aurangzeb and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II (1658-72)

Emperor Aurangzeb's relations with 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II were based on the former's relations and attitude towards the latter as prince Aurangzeb and subēdār of the Deccan.

At Aurangzeb's coronation, Bijapur's ambassador, Syed Muḥammad 'Alī presented eight and half lakhs of rupees, 21 elephants, rare articles, and jewels etc., towards the part fulfilment of the pēshkash, agreed upon by the treaty of August 1657. Aurangzeb was pleased with this pēshkash. From thence till 1665 'Ādil Shah regularly submitted pēshkash. But the total amounted to only a small fraction of the total indemnity and 'Ādil Shah still delayed the delivery of the promised forts and territory. Earlier, in 1660, tne Mughals had no doubt gained possession of Parenḍā, but it was affected in despite of 'Ādil Shah and only by bribing its qil'adār Ghalib. Even after taking Mughal help against Shivaji, in 1660 'Ādil Shah declined to pay the promised subsidy. On the contrary, 'Ādil Shah, now claimed that it was he who assisted Shā'istā Khan by creating a diversion in favour of the Mughals, by sending the Bijapurī army into the Konkan against Shivaji, on promise of remission of ten lakhs of rupees from the total indemnity of the treaty of 1657.[163]

During Jai Singh's campaign against Shivaji in 1665, the Mughals solicitated help from Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah did not obey

---

162. Ādāb., 68 b; AU, IV, 118.
163. 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 396; AU., IV, 118 ff.; Ādāb f.229 a; Basātīn, 398. See infra Chapter VII on Maratha-Bijapur Relations.

Aurangzeb's farmān to attack Shivaji's possession. He only made a show of obeying his orders by sending a small contingent against Shivaji.[164]

Jai Singh's Strategy and Intrigues

Jai Singh opened the campaign against Bijapur in November 1665; and, through his diplomatic intrigue the same Shivaji, on whom 'Ādil Shah was fawning, joined the Mughals and fought against Bijapur. This, the veteran Jai Singh achieved through the treaty of Purandar of 1665, by which he alienated Shivaji from the Bijapurī camp.

Further, the old policy of seducing the nobles and officers of Bijapur was followed vigorously and with lavish disregard of expenditure. Mullā Yāḥyā of Konkan was instrumental, as an intermediary, in corrupting many Bijapurī officers. The most eminent of the deserters was, Yāḥyā's elder brother, Mullā Aḥmad who held the second place at the Bijapur Court. Aḥmad worked for the Mughal cause by influencing 'Ādil Shah to break off his friendship with Shivaji, expel Shivaji's agent from Bijapur Court and send an army into Konkan to fight the Marathas. Aḥmad secretly offered to quit 'Ādil Shah's service and guide the Mughal operations against Bijapur, if the Emperor gave him a high post. Aurangzeb agreed to make him a commander of 6,000 and summoned him to the audience. To take out Aḥmad and his family from Bijapur without exciting the suspicion and incurring the vengeance of 'Ādil Shah. Jai Singh, cunningly wrote to 'Ādil Shah that as per the orders of the Emperor, he has to investigate and settle the disputes of Mughal-Bijapur relations and as such 'Ādil Shah should send Aḥmad personally and refusal to do so would tantamount to 'Ādil Shah's contumacy

164. Haft Anjuman, 16; Faruki, op.cit., 334.

and provocation to the Mughal invasion of Bijapur.[165]

'Alī 'Ādil Shah II fell into this diplomatic trap of Jai Singh; and himself being desirous of peace, sent Ahmad to Jai Singh to negotiate and settle all the outstanding disputes. Ahmad met Jai Singh at the camp near Purandar, on September 1665. Ahmad was at once created a Mughal mansabdār of 6,000 rank, was given two and half lakhs of rupees for his expenses and two months, later he was sent to Delhi. However, he could not digest bribery; he fell ill and died on the way in December 1665.[166]

Jai Singh was not satisfied with the alienation of Shivaji from 'Ādil Shah and dessertion of Bijapurī nobles, Zamīndārs, and officers to the Mughal camp, he even tried to win over Qutb Shah to the Mughal side. His aim was to completely isolate Bijapur and then strike the blow. Jai Singh recommended to Aurangzeb that it was highly expedient to show excessive favours to Qutb Shah of Golkonda for the "purpose of putting him off his guard and inducing him to give up the idea of joining the Bijapuris." Jai Singh did succeed in achieving his goal.[167]

Besides all these diplomatic intrigues, Jai Singh also employed diplomatic trickery to trap 'Ādil Shah into a sense of false security. Thus, to 'Ādil Shāhī envoy in his camp he pretended that he had received no orders to invade Bijapur; but, only to settle the outstanding problem of unpaid pēshkash. Besides making this false declaration, he sent Rāmā (a man of Mullā Ahmad) and Govind Pandit to lull 'Ādil Shah to sleep by means of enchanting

---

165. Haft Anjuman, 84, 91; 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 925; Dilkushā, 41 f.
166. Haft Anjuman, 95.
167. Ibid, 84, 94, 106 f.

words and false stories of peace.[168]

Finally, before initiating the military operations, he tried to find an excuse to invade Bijapur. When 'Ādil Shah sent his envoys to Jai Singh, soliciting peace, the latter haughty and proud of his 70,000 forces and numerous infantry, turned a deaf ear to the former's request and invaded Bijapur.[169]

Jai Singh's Campaign

Sequel to diplomatic web having been subtly woven, Jai Singh collected sinews of war. The Mughal forces numbered 70,000. To this were added 2000 troops from Shivaji and 7000 of Shivaji's son. These were commanded by Netājī Palkar. With these contingents and other auxilaries, Jai Singh made a surprise attack on Bijapur.[170]

During the first month of the campaign Jai Singh's march was an uninterrupted triumph. From Purāndhar to Mangalvēda about 52 miles north of Bijapur, the Mughals advanced without meeting any opposition. The Bijapurī forts, on the way, were either evacuated in terror or surrendered at the call of Shivaji's forces. It seems that the Bijapurī forces were disunited and were quarrelling among themselves; the fort of Bijapur too had no protective works, no materials or provisions for standing siege. Thus, they were compelled to adopt defensive tactics and 'scorched earth' policy, while the Mughal onslaught was on the offensive. The first and second battles took place on 27th and 28th December, 1665 respectively, six kōs from Bijapur, where the Mughals were outmanouvred

---

168. ibid., 71 f., AU., IV, 125.
169. Basātīn, 405, Dilkushā, 46 says Jai Singh had 15000 cavalry and Dilēr Khan had 12000 horse.
170. Al-Lubāb, II, 192 ff.

by the Bijapurīs. The Mughals totally lost the initiative and were in a besieged camp. Meanwhile, the Bijapurīs collected more troops, by virtue of which the fort of Bijapur was now in a strong posture of defence. Thus, the Mughals were compelled to retreat from 5th January, 1666, as Jai Singh's dream of capturing Bijapur by a coup de main collapsed.[171]

The third stage of Jai Singh's campaign began in February, 1666 and at the end of Dhīqa'dah 1076/June 1666 the siege of Bijapur had gone on for seven months, during which neither cavalry nor infantry had rested. All round Bijapur for 40 to 50 kōs not a trace of grass or fodder was left. No supplies arrived; so the Mughal armies were reduced to great straits. Jai Singh and Dilēr Khan therefore deemed it advisable to remove to the neighbourhood of Dhārūr. When Aurangzeb became aware of the prevailing war conditions, he issued peremptory orders to Jai Singh to cease operations against Bijapur. Consequently, Jai Singh raised the siege of Bijapur and retreated.[172]

Thus, the defensive strategy of Bijapur proved most successful in warding off the Mughals and extending the life of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty by another two decades.

Aurangzeb and Sikandar 'Ādil Shah (1672-86)

Aurangzeb's strategy

The infancy of the 'Ādil Shah and the incapacity of the regent Khawāṣ Khan threw the 'Ādil Shāhī monarchy into a decline.

---

171. Haft Anjuman, 109 f.; AU., IV, 130.
172. Al-Lubāb, log.cit.

As far the Mughal Emperor, the regent tried to propitiate him by offering presents worth four lakhs of rupees, as a sort of succession fee on 11 January, 1673. However, they could not satisfy Aurangzeb, who was having longing eyes on Bijapur. Aurangzeb thought that so far all efforts to conquer Bijapur failed and now with the infancy of 'Ādil Shah and depleted defences of Bijapur, due to the party factions, he saw an opportunity to achieve his long cherished goal. For this purpose, Aurangzeb appointed more energetic and seasoned general, Bahādur Khan Kokaltāsh, as ṣubēdār of the Deccan, replacing the weak ineffective and supine ṣubēdār Mu'aẓẓam by a dashing ṣubēdār, to follow an offensive and forward policy towards Bijapur. And soon after Bahādur Khan's arrival in the Deccan, Aurangzeb began to send him "repeated orders for invading Bijapur."[173]

Bahādur Khan's strategy was to conquer as much of the Bijapur territory he could by unfair means and not by military operations. Thus, on Bahādur Khan's direction, the Mughal envoy Malik Barkhurdār at Bijapur started seducing the 'Ādil Shāhī nobles in favour of Mughal policy. Khawāṣ Khan himself fell into the trap, and he thought that to save 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty the only alternate was to make peace with the Mughals. Thus, he proposed a matrimonial alliance between Sikandar 'Ādil Shah's sister with one of the sons of Aurangzeb, and promised military alliance for the campaign against Shivaji. This attracted Aurangzeb very much; and to achieve this goal he was prepared to settle terms liberally with Khawāṣ. However, the negotiations were abortive, due to the overthrow of

---

173. Ma'āthir-i 'Ālamgīrī, 76; Basātīn, 442; AU., IV, 159 f.

Khawāṣ Khan. But the Mughals were more eager for an alliance with Bijapur against Shivaji. For this, suppression of Afghan faction at Bijapur was essential. Hence Khawāṣ Khan and Bahādur Khan had consultations on 19 October, 1675, in order to devise means for the pacification or extirpation of the Afghans, led by Bahlōl Khan.[174]

The Mughals having thus failed to form an alliance with Bijapur against Shivaji, started hostilities with Bijapur itself in May 1676, by championing the cause of Bijapur's Deccani party against Bahlōl Khan, the regent of Bijapur. After a bloody battle between Sharzā Khan of the Deccani party and that of the Regent's army. Sharzā Khan took refuge with Bahādur Khan at Sholapur and denounced Afghan rule at Bijapur. The combined army of the Deccanis and their ally (the Mughals) marched to Bijapur at the end of May 1676. On 13th of June, a fierce battle took place, about 30 miles north-east of Bijapur, in which the Bijapurīs emerged victorious. Then taking advantage of the initial gains, the Bijapuris took to offensive. Consequently, Bahādur Khan himself had to escape in a perilous condition by pleading and making terms with the Bijapuris. However, in spite of defeat, Bahādur Khan did not give up hostilities. While retreating he laid siege to Naldrug, in August, 1676. Bahlōl Khan himself marched with the relieving army to Naldrug, gave battle to the Mughals and forced Bahādur Khan to raise the siege.[175]

In spite of having failed for the second time, against Bijapur, Bahādur Khan did not loose hopes to make yet another attempt. He marched to Halsangi, (about 35 miles north of Bijapur) where he

---

174. Basātīn, 447; AU., IV, 161 f.
175. Al-Lubāb, II, 236 ff.

assembled a vast force and also bribed the Golkonda army, which had come to the rescue of Bijapur, to retreat. He allied with the discontented Bijapurī nobles and made friendship with Shivaji, to guard against diversion in his rear. By this huge demonstration of armies Bahlōl Khan lost his spirits and conspired with Bahādur Khan for the sake of his own life. Bahlōl Khan agreed to not to hinder the Mughal conquest of certain Bijapurī districts. Consequently, Bahādur Khan easily took possession of Naldrug on 14th May 1677 and Gulbarga on 7th July 1677, through bribery. However these successes of Bahādur Khan were uncrowned by the counter-conspiracy of Bahlōl Khan and Dilēr Khan the Mughal commander.[176]

Mughal-Bijapur Alliance against Golkonda

Dilēr Khan and Bahlōl Khan wrote to Aurangzeb accusing Bahādur Khan of hindering Mughal interests in the Deccan. Bahlōl Khan now allied with the Mughals and offered his services against Shivaji and Golkonda, provided, the Emperor guaranteed his position and property. Aurangzeb accepted the proposal of Bahlōl Khan. Bahādur Khan was recalled, and Dilēr Khan officiated as subēdār of Deccan till 1678. In September 1677 Bahlōl Khan led the Mughal army to attack Golkonda. Though at first the combined Mughal-Bijapur action triumphed, but later on the Golkonda forces with reinforcement arriving, put the Mughals to flight to Gulbarga. Thus the Mughal-Bijapur alliance failed.[177]

Treaty of 1677 and breach by Bijapur - its consequences

At Gulbarga, Siddī Mas'ūd, Regent of Bijapur made peace treaty with the Mughals. It was agreed that Siddī Mas'ūd was to be

176. Basātīn, 454 f.; AU., IV, 166 f.
177. Dilkushā, 115 ff.; Al-Lubāb, II, 247.

the Wazīr of Bijapur but must obey the orders of Aurangzeb; and he shall not make any alliance with Shivaji and shall help the Mughals against Shivaji. Further, Shaher Bānū Begum (Pādshāh Bībī), the sister of 'Ādil Shah was to be sent to the Mughal Court to marry one of the sons of Aurangzeb.[178]

But when Mas'ūd Khan returned to Bijapur, he refused to comply with the terms of the Treaty. He would neither pay the arrears of 'Abdul Karīm's troops nor he sent 'Ādil Shah's sister to the Mughal camp. On the contrary, Mas'ūd Khan, ignoring the pact with the Mughals, began to seek alliance with Shivaji. Dilēr Khan wrote to Mas'ūd that intriguing with Shivaji and seeking his alliance would be fatal for him, and that it would serve no purpose. Malik Barkhurdār, Mughal envoy at Bijapur, also gave him advice; but, Mas'ūd paid no heed and formed a conspiracy with Shivaji.[179]

This breach of faith on the part of Mas'ūd Khan absolved Dilēr Khan for the Treaty of Gulbarga of 1677, respect for which alone had so long kept him back for the invasion of Bijapur. Besides, Aurangzeb ordered an attack, as the time was opportune to conquer Bijapur, due to the death of Bahlōl Khan, dispersion of Afghan soldiery and civil war among the Deccani nobles. Dilēr Khan began the task in the approved Mughal fashion, by seducing the Bijapurī officers with promises of rank and jagir under Aurangzeb. The deserting chiefs were granted six annas daily as cash salary for every trooper under them, pending grant of jagirs. In this way a force of 20,000 Bijapurīs was enlisted by Dilēr Khan,

---

178. Basātīn, 456; AU., IV, 173.
179. Basātīn, 467, 469 f.

who then started for the invasion of Bijapur. Mas'ūd Khan played dual diplomacy by allying with Shivaji against the Mughals and then in greater fear of his own ally Shivaji, sought protection of Dilēr Khan. A Mughal force was invited to Bijapur and royally welcomed and then sent with the Bijapurī auxiliaries against the Marathas.[180]

Meanwhile, Dilēr Khan made a successful diversion, in favour of Bijapur, by capturing and destroying Shivaji's possessions. But at last Mas'ūd's duplicity wore out Dilēr Khan's patience and he wrote to Mas'ūd that "your words and acts are all deceitful, your real aim is to remain united to Shiva at heart and profess lip friendship for us (Mughals). Otherwise, why have you failed to keep your promises?"[181]

Dilēr Khan followed this message by marching upto Halsangi. Bijapur was in no position to offer resistance, due to civil war and anarchy. The Mughal troops co-operated with Mas'ūd Khan in the feud with Sharzā Khan. Soon Sharzā Khan appealed to Dilēr Khan to do justice between them, and offered to enter Mughal service. Dilēr Khan took this opportunity of getting control over the leaders of Bijapur. By a shameful breach of faith, Dilēr Khan arrested Sharzā's wife and children who had come to the Mughal camp, under his solemn promise of protection and then sent them to Aurangzeb to be held as hostages for the blind obedience of Sharzā Khan.[182]

Thus, Dilēr Khan, the Mughal subēdār, emerged as a sole arbitrator of the warring party factions of Bijapur. Mas'ūd Khan

---

180. Basātīn, 468 f.; AU., IV, 175 f.
181. Basātīn, 477; AU., IV, 176 ff.
182. Basātīn, 481 ff; AU., IV, 179 ff.

sent his son and 5,000 Bijapurī troops to Dilēr Khan, who contemplated to arrest by treachery all the Bijapurī commanders then at his camp and then to swoop down upon Bijapur and capture it without a blow, as it was under civil war and anarchy. However, Dilēr Khan's plan was abortive, and when leaked out, he had to beg pardon of Sharzā Khan, through large bribes. By desertion, 10,000 troops of Bijapur, joined the Mughal service under Dilēr Khan. Consequently, Mas'ūd Khan was left with only three to four thousand starving troops.[183]

In the meantime, Prince Mu'azzam came as a new ṣubēdār of Deccan and soon complaint against Dilēr Khan to Aurangzeb. Mu'azzam wrote to Aurangzeb that it was impossible to reduce Bijapur. Aurangzeb censured Dilēr Khan for not having exacted the terms of the treaty of Gulbarga from Mas'ūd Khan. Consequently, Dilēr insisted on Mas'ūd for the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. One of the terms — marriage of Shaher Bānū, sister of Sikandar 'Ādil Shah, with one of the Mughal princes was implemented, when on 1st July, 1679, the princess left Bijapur for the Mughal Court.[184]

Mughal invasion renewed - 1679

The matter did not end with the departure of Shaher Bānū from Bijapur. Mughal greed was insatiable, and Mughal State Craft knew no generosity or fidelity to plighted words. Dilēr Khan illegally demanded resignation from Mas'ūd and transfer of power

---

183. ibid., 487; ibid., 181.
184. Basātīn, 490. According to Dilkushā, 124, Sikandar 'Ādil Shah wrote a letter to Aurangzeb professing loyalty and suggesting that "he would feel quite honoured if his sister got married with one of the prince."

to Ḥakīm Shamsuddīn and then desired Mughal-Bijapur joint venture against Shivaji. Obviously Mas'ūd rejected the proposal as a stratagem of the Mughals for putting an end to the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty.[185]

On the pretext of open defiance by Mas'ūd Khan, Dilēr Khan declared war over Bijapur and marched upto Dhulkher[186] in August 1679. Mas'ūd did not wish to put up a fight. He therefore, to avert the hostilities, made overtures of peace, through his envoys. These were haughtily and scornfully rejected by Dilēr Khan. But due to several problems and differences among the Mughals, Dilēr Khan was brought to a halt at the very outset of the campaign. This gave Bijapur time to take defensive measures and to form an alliance with Shivaji.[187]

The Mughals took possession of Mangalvēda and the country between that fort and Bhīma in September 1679. Dilēr Khan then marched upto Halsangi[188] and halted there for about three weeks. During which time, Mas'ūd still tried in vain, to effect peaceful settlement, and sent his envoys to Dilēr Khan at Halsangi. However, the repeated palavers did not bear fruit.[189]

The prolonged campaign of Bijapur from 1676 to 1679 by Dilēr Khan, caused much anxiety and suspicion to Aurangzeb, who again censured Dilēr Khan. The latter's plans met opposition by the subedar, Shāh 'Ālam, who repeatedly wrote complaints to the Emperor. Ḥakīm Shamsuddīn and Malik Barkhurdār, the Mughal envoys at Bijapur also wrote to Aurangzeb that Bijapur was utterly defenceless and

---

185. Basātīn, loc.cit., AU., IV, 182.
186. About 40 miles north of Bijapur.
187. Basātīn, 492 ff.; Dilkushā, 124 f.; AU., IV, 182-87.
188. About one mile east of Sholapur.
189. Basātīn, 502 ff.; AU., IV, 187 ff.

could be easily captured. While Shāh 'Ālam, in a contrary strain, wrote the capture of Bijapur is impossible. Mas'ūd may even deliver the city to Shivaji for defence against Dilēr.[189] True, Mas'ūd's strongest weapon of defence was Shivaji; the latter on the former's request arrived at Selgar with a new division of his forces in October 1679. Shivaji created a diversion in Bijapur's favour, by raiding the Mughal territory from all directions.[190] Thus, Dilēr Khan's dream of capturing Bijapur by fair or unfair means was shattered to the ground. In despair, he started to ravage the Bijapur territory, as far as twelve miles close to Bijapur city and finally laid siege of Bijapur itself in December 1679. Though Bijapur was not in a position to stand the siege; as it was denuded of all its old commanders and was left with only a small garrison of 5,000 and they too were not having sufficient strength to stand the siege, being half starved. In spite of Bijapur being unable to defend yet God willed it that the Mughals should not take it this time. Dilēr in utter disappointment sought for peace; but Mas'ūd declined, being aware of the disentions among the Mughals.[191]

The mutual jealousies between Shāh 'Ālam and Dilēr Khan led the former to ally with Mas'ūd Khan. Shāh 'Ālam sent a secret message to Mas'ūd, offering to induce Aurangzeb for a peaceful settlement with Bijapur in return for a bribe of 25,000 huns. Consequently, Dilēr Khan's palpable failure too had its effects, and Aurangzeb ordered Diler to raise the siege of Bijapur. While Shāh 'Ālam gave instructions to his officers to not to co-operate with Dilēr in the siege of Bijapur and to not to obey his orders to

---

190. Idem.
191. Idem.

attack Bijapur. Thus Dilēr was compelled to raise the siege of Bijapur and retreat in January, 1680. While retiring he took vegeance by ravaging Bijapur territory.[192]

SEC. V: SIXTH PHASE (1680-86)

Period of Vassalage

Mughal Suzerainty of Bijapur

In the meantime, while Dilēr was ravaging Bijapur territory, Shāh 'Ālam sent his agents to 'Ādil Shah to make peace. The enemity between Shāh 'Ālam and Dilēr Khan was instrumental in establishing peace between the Mughals and Bijapur. In the following two months (February and March 1680), Shāh 'Ālam succeeded in exercising great control over the moribund government of Bijapur. As a result of which, he caused the Khuṭbah to be read, in March 1680 in Bijapur, in the name of Aurangzeb and got Bijapurī coins stamped in gold and silver in the Mughal Emperor's name.[193] This was the greatest achievement of Shāh 'Ālam as a Viceroy of Deccan. He succeeded in establishing Mughal suzerainty over Bijapur, which Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb himself, could not achieve even, through military strategy. Whereas, Shah 'Ālam achieved it through peaceful diplomacy. The causes which led to the acceptance of the Mughal suzerainty by 'Ādil Shah was his hopelessness, weak administration due to party factions at Bijapur, and desertion of able nobles to the Mughal camp.

Following the establishment of Mughal suzerainty over Bijapur, there was lull in the Mughal-Bijapur relations, for four

---

192. idem.
193. Ma'āthir-i 'Ālamgīrī, 119, AU., IV, 192, 196.

years 1680-83. The 'Ādil Shah got a respite to breathe. During this period a Mughal-Bijapur matrimonial alliance materialised. Shaher Bānū, 'Ādil Shah's daughter who reached the Mughal court was married to Muḥammad A'ẓam, on 26th July, 1681. Aurangzeb himself tied sahrā to the bride and the bridegroom.[194]

Anti-Mughal policy of Bijapur

During the Mughal operations in 1681 against Sambhājī, Aurangzeb sought help from Bijapur, through a friendly letter dated 17th July 1681, to Sharzā Khan. Shaher Bānū too wrote a personal appeal to Sharzā Khan on 18th July, 1681, requesting to help the Mughals for the good of Bijapur.[195]

However, irresponsive to Aurangzeb's request the Bijapurīs considered alliance with the Marathas more profitable than the Mughals. The Bijapurīs secretly assisted the Marathas against the Mughals. This caused rupture in the Mughal-Bijapur relations. Visualising this anti-Mughal attitude of the Bijapurīs, Aurangzeb as a strategem, despatched in January 1682, a division of forces under Ruḥullāh Khan to only ravage the Bijapuri territory.[196]

On 13th May, 1682, Yādgār 'Alī, envoy of 'Ādil Shah and Shaikh Ḥasan, envoy of Mas'ūd Khan waited on Aurangzeb, at Aurangābād, with the pēshkash. But Aurangzeb refused to accept the peace offerings. However, the two envoys were presented with robes and awarded cash and then dismissed by Aurangzeb.[197] The rupture of Mughal-Bijapur relations could not be cemented; and Aurangzeb decided on military strategy to hem 'Ādil Shah.

---

194. Ma'āthir-i 'Ālamgīrī, 117, 129.
195. Basātīn, 520 ff.; AUG IV, 362 f.
196. Ma'athir-i 'Ālamgīrī, 133.
197. ibid., 134.

Languid Campaign and the End of Bijapur (1682-85)

On 14th June 1682, Muḥammad A'ẓam was given leave by Aurangzeb to invade Bijapur. The Mughals, after ravaging northern frontiers of Bijapur, captured the fort of Dhārūr and tried to march to the Bijapur itself but they could not do so and the campaign dragged for several months. Then, in June 1683, A'ẓam was recalled to the Court, and he returned in August 1683 to resume the campaign. Again in October 1683 A'ẓam left for Nasik, Bijapur got respite from the desultory attack of the Mughals.[198]

However, vigorous campaign against Bijapur was initiated in 1684 by Aurangzeb himself. For this purpose Aurangzeb came to the Deccan in November 1683 and till February 1684 he worked out the strategy. The first strategy of the Mughals, before commencing war, was to establish a number of outposts in the Bijapur territory. But the enterprise was not taken up seriously until 1685.[199]

In the meantime, on 30th March 1684, Aurangzeb sent a farmān to 'Ādil Shah, with some unreasonable demands -- to supply provisions to the Mughal army; to keep open the roads for the Mughal army to march through; if need arises, to send five or six thousand cavalry to help the Mughals against the Marathas; to keep aloof from intriguing overtly or covertly with Sambhājī; and to oust Sharzā Khan from Bijapur, due to his disobedience to Aurangzeb.[200]

These unreasonable demands of Aurangzeb were based on the consideration that Bijapur as a vassal state, bound to supply the

---

198. ibid., 135, 144; AU., IV, 365 f.
199. Basātīn, 523 f.; AU., IV, 386.
200. Basātīn, 530 f.; Farukhi, op.cit., 343; AU., IV, 369 f.

requirements of the Mughals, and refusal to obey the orders would be an strategical pretext to invade Bijapur; as there was no reason at all for invasion. And Aurangzeb's strategy did prove successful; as 'Adil Shah instead of blindly submitting made counter demands to Aurangzeb, in a spirited letter.[201] The counter demands were: remission of the amount taken by Dilēr Khan; pardon of Sharzā Khan; restoration of Sharzā's jagir, now occupied by the Mughals; the Mughals were not to establish outposts in the Bijapur territory; restoration of Bijapur territory so far occupied by the Mughals; the Mughal army to pursue the Marathas via Chakan and Poona and those of the 'Ādil Shah will proceed via Miraj; Mughal reinforcement to be sent to 'Ādil Shah whenever need be; all the Bijapurī territory now occupied by the Marathas to be restored to him ('Ādil Shah); after its recapture by the Mughals; and if peaceful settlement was made with Shambhājī, then his territory was to be taken away first. These counter proposals did not fulfil the requirements of Aurangzeb's strategy. Obviously 'Ādil Shah suspected the motives of Aurangzeb, when he desired free passage of Mughal army through Bijapur. And the price of the alliance which 'Ādil Shah demanded was very unfavourable to Aurangzeb. Thus the counter prosals of 'Ādil Shah displeased Aurangzeb and it did not work harmoniously with his plan of strategy in the Deccan both, against the Marathas and Bijapur.[202]

Now the rupture between the Mughal-Bijapur relations further widened. "The show of friendship which Aurangzeb had so long

---

201. idem.

202. idem.

kept up with 'Ādil Shah was now dispelled", as the Emperor became convinced of Sikandar's unalliable determination to support Sambhājī.[203] Thus Sambhājī proved to be the cause of growing strained Mughal-Bijapur relations and finally for the fall of Bijapur itself. 'Ādil Shah after giving counter proposals, did not act on any way of the proposals of Aurangzeb. Further when the Mughal line of communications was daily hampered, Aurangzeb was convinced of the secret conspiracy of 'Ādil Shah with Sambhājī. Consequently, in great wrath he ordered for establishing outposts in Bijapur territory.[204] He despatched Prince A'zam Shah for reducing Bijapur.

A'zam Shah began the campaign early in 1685 and actual siege of Bijapur on 1st April 1685. The siege dragged on for several months, eventually Aurangzeb himself had to move to the scene of operation in 1686. The operations were languidly carried on and the Mughals were slow and clumsy in taking forts by siege.[205] The siege dragged on for nearly one year.

In the meantime, when 'Ādil Shah saw no chance of survival and with no hope of getting any relief, he tried to patch up with Aurangzeb, by raising his religious sentiments. 'Ādil Shah sent some distinguished theologians to Aurangzeb, with a message to the following effect: "You style yourself a righteous King, strictly an orthodox believer, versed in Cannon Law and doing nothing without the warrant of Qur'ān and the decrees of theologian. Tell us, how you justify this unholy war against brother Muslims like us, wherein the shedding of Muslim blood allowed?" Aurangzeb replied

---

203. Basātīn, 532; AU., IV, 369.
204. idem.
205. Al-Lubāb, II, 317 f.; Basātīn, 534; AU., IV, 376.

"what you have said is quite right and there is no need for correction. I have no concern with you or your city or your country and have no mind to have a bloody struggle with you." Aurangzeb further says that his only intention in leaving the capital and coming to the Deccan was to chase Sambhājī who was "under your ('Ādil Shah's) protection and your help, . . I demanded him from you. The moment he falls into my hands I shall return back."[206] This proves that Sambhājī was one of the main causes for the fall of Bijapur.

By September 1686 the siege of Bijapur had dragged on for eighteen months with no decisive result. 'Ādil Shah and his nobles considering the hopeless condition of the monarchy and the government's grim and dark future of Bijapur, decided on capitulation as the only means of preventing useless bloodshed. Thus on the night of 9th September, the secretaries of the two Bijapuri leaders - 'Abdur Raūf and Sharzā Khan waited on Fīrōz Jung and discussed the terms of surrender. Next night the leaders held negotiations on behalf of 'Ādil Shah; and on the following day they were introduced to Aurangzeb. On Sunday 12th September 1686, the Bijapurīs surrendered.[207] Thus ended the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty. Sikandar 'Ādil Shah was taken as captive by the Aurangzeb; the former died on 3rd April 1700 under Mughal custody, near Satara.

SEC. VI: RECOGNITION OF 'ĀDIL SHAH'S STATUS BY THE MUCHALS

From the very beginning of the Mughal-Bijapur relations or even before that, the Mughal Emperors did not recognise the 'Adil Shah as independent "Sultan" or "King". Even though the Mughals

---

206. Basātīn, 542 f.; Faruki, op.cit., 344 f.; AU., IV, 386.
207. Basātīn, 540 f.; AU., IV, 388.

addressed the Sultans of Ahmadnagar as "Niẓāmul-Mulk" but they never called the Bijapurī Sultan as "'Adil Shah". They were usually called as "Khan", an heirarchical rank of a Mughal mansabdār or a title of a noble. Various nomenclature of 'Ādil Shahs in the Mughal sources of history reflect the mind of the Mughal Emperors as to the political status they assigned to the Sultans of Bijapur. The different nomenclatures were:

"'Ādil Khan Marzabān-i Bijapur[208]

"'Ādil Khan[209]

"Ḥākim or Ḥākim-i Bijapur[210]

"Dunyā dārān-i Dakan[211]

"Farzand[212]

"Murīd"[213]

Feudal Lord — When Jahāngīr in a farmān[214] exhorts Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah to "manifest greater zeal in the performance of feudal duties, he considered 'Ādil Shah as a feudal lord, or a vassal.

Shāh Jahān compared 'Ādil Shah to a bird - "hud hud"[215]

"'Umdah Ikrām-o'izzām"[216]

---

208. Akbar Nāmā, Text II (2), 782.
209. All Mughal sources of history both Ms. or printed write "'Ādil Khan"; 'Amal-i Ṣwāleḥ, I, 441 etc. Bādshāh Nāmā, I(2) 126 etc.
Farmāns of Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān too contain the same nomenclature.
210. Al-Tawārīkh (Text) II, 171.
211. Jahāngīr Nāmā, 164; Lāhōrī, I (2), 199.
212. Tozuk, I, 387 f.
213. Qazwīnī, 382; Lāhōrī, I (2), 174.
214. Tozuk, I, 387 f.
215. Bashiruddin Ahmad: Farāmīn-i Salāṭīn, 55; Basātīn, 302.
216. Lāhōrī, I (2).

The title of "Shah" was granted to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah in 1058/1648 by Shāh Jahān.[217]

The correspondences of the 'Ādil Shahs to the Mughal Emperors was mainly based on Persian style of writing letters as found in various contemporary Inshās. As such their correspondences were full of bogus flattery, fictious honourific titles, unnecessary analogies etc., and were woven in ornate form. In view of the supreme political position of the Mughal Emperors, the 'Ādil Shahs, much against their will and their actual status were constrained to consider themselves as subordinate to the Mughal Emperors.

Thus, the 'Ādil Shahs, following the Persian epistology, adopted the following nomenclature to address the Mughal Emperor:

"Ḥaḍrat"[218]

"Bandegān-i ānḥaḍrat"[219]

"Khalīfa-i zamān"[220]

"Guru"[222]

While to themselves, the 'Ādil Shahs represented "Bandah Fidwī" or "Fidwī"[223], "'Abūdīyat"[224], "Shast Murīd"[225], etc.

It was this position, forcibly imposed on 'Ādil Shahs, that they used to address their correspondences both, before and after

---

217. Basātīn, 325.
218. Aḥwal-i Asad Beg, 50a
219. Lāhōrī, I (2).
220. Shāh Jahān Nāmā, 398.
221. Lāhōrī, I (2), 174.
222. Basātīn, 325.
223. 'Amal-i Ṣwaleḥ, II, 186; Lāhōrī, I (2), 204.
224. Shāh Jahān Nāmā, 398.
225. Aḥwāl-i Asad Beg, 50 a.

the Treaty 1636 as 'petitions' ('arḍī or 'arāiḍ, ʂarḍdāsht). These petitions were in the nature of a one subordinate officer writing to a superior or supreme authority. While the Mughal Emperors issued farmāns, orders (aḥkāms, irshādāt) in the name of 'Ādil Shah.

It was this position which rendered 'Ādil Shah to be obedient and loyal to the Mughal Emperors. The Treaty of 1636 was not the outcome of mutual negotiations by both the parties, on equal terms but it was unilateral affair and was imposed to 'Ādil Shah, to blindly obey it without any deviation. Further the Mughal Emperors asserted the supreme right to pardon the 'Ādil Shahs for their misdeeds (taqsīrāt).[226]

Through out, from Akbar to Aurangzeb (upto 1680) the political status of 'Ādil Shahs (irrespective of the above mentioned nomenclature) was that of an independent ruler of a state. What the emperors tried to assert was making the 'Ādil Shahs as their obedient and loyal ally, to suit their strategy in the Deccan. And, the 'Ādil Shahs did play a distinguished role in the Deccan policy of the Mughals. In 1635 Shāh Jahān tried in vain to establish Mughal suzerainty over Bijapur, but later on, he was satisfied with the Treaty of 1636. Both Akbar and Shāh Jahān failed to make Bijapur a vassal state. It was prince Shāh 'Ālam as ṣubēdār of the Deccan established Mughal suzerainty over Bijapur in 1680 and rendered the political status of 'Ādil Shah to that of a vassal.

---

226. Lāhōrī, I (2), 167.

SEC. VII: THE MUGHAL POLICY TOWARDS BIJAPUR

Until 1630 the question of the conquest of Bijapur did not exist; as Ahmadnagar was the barrier between the Mughal Empire and Bijapur. When this barrier was partly removed in 1630, Shāh Jahān in the following year ordered the invasion of Bijapur. From then on (1631) to 1686 the Mughals adopted "halting policy" towards Bijapur. They did not had a definite policy of its conquest nor they wished its extinction, at least upto 1685. It was this reason that several times when Bijapur could have been easily captured or would have fallen, the Emperor suddenly ordered to cease its operation or raise the siege and patch-up peace on payment of war indemnity, or surrender of the portion of the territory. And by these gains they were satisfied. The "halting policy" of the Mughals is evident from the following instances which came down from father to son and so on. That is the "halting policy" was an hereditary policy of the Mughal Emperors from Akbar to Aurangzeb.

During the first invasion of Bijapur in 1631 Aṣaf Khan was quite successful in his operations and he marched upto the vicinity of Bijapur. He could have easily proceeded further or effected the complete conquest of Bijapur, but due to the overtures of peace by the Bijapurīs peace treaty was concluded, when 'Ādil Shah agreed to pay 40 lakhs of rupees and other valuables etc., as pēshkash.[227]

Shāh Jahān ordered second invasion of Bijapur in 1656, soon after the death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. But he ordered Aurangzeb to recover only the Ahmadnagar territory, which was ceded to Bijapur and not to invade the territory of Bijapur proper

---

227. Qazwīnī, 242; Lāhōrī, I (1), 403.

on payment of indemnity of one and a half crores of rupees. But during the campaign, when the Mughals were successful, Aurangzeb received repeated orders from Shāh Jahān to patch-up peace and close the war. But when Aurangzeb continued the campaign after the fall of Kalyānī and when the road to Bijapur was clear, he received sudden orders to close the war.[228]

In 1666 during the third stage of Jai Singh's campaign, when the siege of Bijapur had gone for seven months, and with little pressure, the fort could have been conquerred, Aurangzeb issued orders to raise the siege and stop the war.[229]

In 1673 during the infancy of Sikandar 'Ādil Shah when Bijapur was in the depleted condition, Aurangzeb found an opportunity to conquer it. As such Bahādur Khan was sent with repeated orders to invade Bijapur. But peace treaty was concluded with matrimonial alliance and when the Bijapurīs promised to help the Mughals against Shivaji.[230] Again in 1677 when Bahādur Khan succeeded in capturing the strong Bijapurī fort of Naldrug and Gulbarga, Aurangzeb recalled him, due to the conspiracy of Dilēr Khan and Bahlōl Khan.[231]

After the languid and prolonged campaign of Dilēr Khan for the conquest of Bijapur from 1676 to 1679, Dilēr laid siege to

---

228. Ādāb, 68.

229. Al-Lubāb, II, 192.

Jadunath Sarkar quotes Jai Singh from a despatch to Aurangzeb "the conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest of all Deccan and Karnatak", in order to bring out the aims of the Mughal Emperors in the conquest of Bijapur (AU., IV, 120 f.). However, this aim is shattered to ground when Aurangzeb recalled Jai Singh from Bijapur's campaign. That is, the opinion of Jai Singh though correct, need not necessarily be that of Aurangzeb himself.

230. Basātīn, 447.

231. Basātīn, 455.

Bijapur. Bijapur could have been easily captured, as at that time it was not at all in a position to stand the siege and resist the Mughal invasion. However, through the intrigue of prince Shāh 'Ālam, Aurangzeb ordered Dilēr to raise the siege and return to the Court.

All these instances of ordering the army to march and invade Bijapur and then after the show of arms recalling in the midst of the siege or campaign goes to prove that the Mughal Emperors were neither sincerely nor genuinely interested in conquering the Kingdon. This was a peculiar "halting policy" adopted by the Mughals for the conquest of Bijapur. Had they any sincere interest in capturing it they could have done at any time; but they always showed their superiority and might of the arms.

That is, the Mughal Emperors, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb adopted the policy of merely "conquest" (simple recognition of overlordship) upto 1685; and they did not aim at consolidation and centralisation. Obviously they wanted to preserve the entity of Bijapur; but desired obedience, loyalty, alliance and vassalage of 'Ādil Shahs. Lastly, the close association of the Bijapurīs with the Marathas was one of the main causes which was responsible for the extinction of the Bijapur Kingdom in 1686.

X as a possible ally against the Marathas

CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS OF THE 'ĀDIL SHAHS OF BIJAPUR WITH THE MARATHAS

SEC. I: BACKGROUND

At the time of the establishment of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom in 895/1489 there did not exist any Maratha State. Most of the Maratha chieftains, holding hilly forts, were already absorbed in that territory of the Bahmanī Kingdom which later on constituted the Bijapur Kingdom. Those who were outside the jurisdiction of the original Bijapur Kingdom were gradually brought under the suzerainty of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and his successors. Consequently the Bijapur Kingdom extended over almost the entire Maratha country. And hence, the demographic factors and the social structure which was prevailing in the Deccan necessiated the establishment of cordial social relations between the Bijapurī rulers and the Marathas for peaceful co-existence and the integration of the Kingdom.

Thus, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah from the very beginning - within two years after the founding of his Sultanate, adopted the policy of reconciliating the Maratha chieftains in his kingdom by granting them jagir and mansab. And in order to establish intimate relations with the Marathas, it is said that he married the sister of

Mukund Rao, and gave her the title of "Bībī Khānum". Her son was Ismā'īl 'Ādil, second ruler of 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty; and her three daughters were married to the three Sultans of the Deccan Kingdoms.[1]

Likewise, following into the foot-steps of the founder of the dynasty, his successors showed a greater preference for the Marathas, both as men of business and as soldiers. Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I improved the system of keeping accounts in Marathi and introduced the system of writing important documents both in Persian and Marathi(Modi Script).[2] And it seems that the bilingual official documents sometimes had the invocation of Saraswati, the Hindu goddess of learning.[3] Further, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I introduced the practice of enlisting Maratha troopers, known as 'Bargirs'. Consequently, many Maratha chiefs rose to a high position not only in the army but enjoyed position of eminence in the 'Ādil Shahi Court.[4] Further, the Marathas had equal opportunities with the Muhammaden nobility, to distinguish themselves as military leaders.[5]

As such, it may be argued, that the Sultans of Bijapur (and Ahmadnagar) indirectly helped the Maratha nation by educating the

---

1. Briggs, III, 18.

2. G. Duff: History of the Marathas, I, 61; Dr. Tarachand: Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, 250 f.

3. Dr. A.R. Kulkarni: Social Relations in the Maratha Country (Medieval period), Presidential Address, 1970, I.H.C.

4. Duff, op.cit., I, 68; Gribble: A History of the Deccan, I, 206; Duff, I, 68 gives a detailed list of leading Maratha Chieftains and families who served the Bijapur army and rose to prominence.

5. Dr. P.M. Joshi: "Position of Hindus in the 'Adil Shahi Kingdom of Bijapur", D.H.C., 1945, 310.

Maratha chieftains in the art of administration and warfare.[6] Throughout the history of Bijapur, the Sultans patronised Maratha chieftains and vassals. They reciprocated the gesture by faithfully and sincerely serving their ruler. The sincere Maratha chiefs fought against their own kinsmen, just because of their loyalty to the 'Ādil Shahs. As such, it has been rightly observed that "the Marathas were to the 'Ādil Shāhī Sultanate what the Rajputs were to the Mughal Empire. Their loyal support was essential for the existence of the kingdom".[7]

Bijapur's Early Relations with the Family of Shivaji

In pursuance of the policy outlined above, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II in 1625, offered the post of Sarlashkar of the Bijapur army to Shāhjī Bhonsale. Shāhjī at that time after the battle of Bhaṭwadī, which he fought against the combined forces of 'Ādil Shah and the Mughals, and in which he lost his brother Sharīfjī, was dissatisfied with Niẓām Shāhī service. During the same year of joining 'Ādil Shāhī service, Shahji undertook expeditions against Phaltan, into the Karnatak and Malnad. And from the very beginning of his career under 'Ādil Shah, he exercised considerable influence and respect. Once on his simple request Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah granted the "desagata" of Talebid and some rights of the fort of Panhala to Sambhājī and Dhārōjī Mōhitē, who were relatives of

---

6. Gribble, op.cit., I, 207; M.G. Ranade: Rise of the Maratha Power, 306.

7. Dr. P.M. Joshi: The Kingdom of Bijapur, 204 (Thesis, unpublished)

Shāhjī's second wife.[8]

But with the changed political conditions due to the deaths of Malik 'Ambar in 1626 and that of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II in 1627, Shāhjī preferred to go back to the Niẓām Shāhī service in 1628. He served under the Niẓām Shah until 1630, when he, at his own request, entered Mughal service. Shāh Jahān made him mansabdār of 6,000 zat and 5,000 sawār and awarded royal robe etc., and two lakh rupees in cash. Further the Mughals granted safety and security to Shāhjī of his jagir of Poona and Chakan.[9] However, Shāhjī soon seized the opportunity of disturbed political conditions in Ahmadnagar to make himself great by imitating the example of Fatḥ Khan. He left Mughal service in June 1632, and seized the districts of Nasik-Trimbak-Sangamnēr and Junnār, as well as parts of northern Konkan.[10]

Shāhjī then (about the middle of 1632) crossed over to Bijapur and allied with 'Ādil Shah against Ahmadnagar. 'Ādil Shah sent an army to the assistance of Shāhji, for wresting Daulatābād from Fatḥ Khan's possession. Then early in 1633, Shāhjī as a 'Ādil Shāhī lieutenant, played a conspicuous role on many occasions during the joint action of Bijapur and Ahmadnagar against the Mughals.[11]

After the failure of the Bijapur and Ahmadnagar armies against the Mughals, Shāhjī retired from Daulatābād to Bhīmgaṛh

---

8. Shiva Charitra Sahitya (SCS 1:23) Shivakalin, I, 53. Letter of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah,II to the Kārkun of Panhala.
9. Sarkar (House, 40), does not mention about the 6,000 zat Rank of Shāhjī's manṣab.
10. Basātīn, 304; House, 42.
11. House, 43 f.

in July 1633, and seized all the Niẓām Shāhī dominion from Poona and Chakan (which later on became his jagir) to Bālāghāṭ and the environs of Junnār, Ahmadnagar, Sangamnēr, Trimbak, and Nasik and collected a force of seven or eight thousand cavalry, with which he plundered on all sides. Then, Shāhjī after declining the offer of the Mughal commander Irādat Khan, to join Mughal service, intrigued with the Bijapurī Wazīr, Khawāṣ Khan. Consequently Khawāṣ Khan sent a large army from Bijapur under Murārī Pandiṭ to assist Shāhjī, in becoming king-maker, and to restore Niẓām Shāhī Sultanate. Thus, Shāhjī crowned Murtaḍā as the new Sultan of Ahmadnagar, in September 1632 and began to rule himself in the name of the infant Sultan. Murārī left a contingent of five/six thousand Bijapurī troops under 'Ambar Khan for the assistance of Shāhjī, the regent of Niẓām Shah and himself returned to Bijapur.[12]

With the extinction of Ahmadnagar Kingdom in 1636 and conclusion of a settlement between the Mughals and Bijapur Shāhjī joined the 'Ādil Shāhī service.[13] Soon, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah appointed him as second-in-command to Randaulā Khan, for the expedition in Karnatak. He was given the command of twelve thousand horse and to meet its expenses of four lakhs rupees, Poona etc., were granted to him[14] as jagir/ saranjam/ mokassa.[15] The territorial extent of

---

12. Muḥammad Nāmā (Nibhadavali, II, 86); Basātīn, 303 ff.; House, 45 ff.

13. See supra, Chapter VI, for the details of the peace settlement for the circumstances which led to Shāhjī joining 'Ādil Shāhī service.

14. Sardesai, I, 64, 69.

15. Basātīn (369) mentions as Jagir; Jedhe Kareena (Souvenir, 49) as Saranjam while Rajwade (XVIII 44) as Mokassa.

Shāhjī's jagir was between the rivers Bhīma and Neera; that is, the territory of Indāpūr, Supa, Poona and Chakan.[16] About the nature of Shāhjī's jagir, Parmanand, in Shiva Bharat, makes a significant remark which deserves some attention. Visualising the imminent extinction of the Ahmadnagar kingdom, Shāhjī diplomatically agreed to a truce with the Mughals and 'Ādil Shah. He transferred the territory of Niẓām Shah to the Mughals and the 'Ādil Shah, but excluding his own jagir.[17] However, according to the farmān of Shāh Jahān, fifty parganas of Konkan, including pargana of Chakan etc., of Shāhjī's jagir were transferred to Bijapur as an award to 'Ādil Shah.[18] It is therefore, difficult to decide whether Shāhjī had absolute control over his jagir, and whether his jagir was an independent sovereign entity. Parmanand's statement however, helps to explain the indepdnent attitude of Shivaji against the Deccani powers.

SEC. II: BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH SHIVAJI (1642-80)

The study of the relations of 'Ādil Shahs of Bijapur with Shivaji can be conveniently made in four phases, during which the

---

16. 91-Qalmī, Article 19.

17. Shiva Bharat, Canto 9: 20.

18. Lāhōrī, I (2), 169; See Supra Chapter VI, for the farmān of Shāh Jahān.

position and status of Shivaji was changing. The history of the rise of the Maratha power is in fact the history of the relations of Shivaji with the 'Ādil Shahs. In other words, the history of the rise of Maratha power is the history of the fall of 'Ādil Shāhī power. For, it was mainly from the 'Ādil Shāhī territory that Shivaji carved out the Maratha Kingdom.

The four phases of Shivaji's glorious career for the study of his relations with the 'Ādil Shahs can be classified as follows:

Shivaji as a Mokassadar and Jagirdar of Bijapur and founder of Swarajya (1642-62)

Shivaji as a de facto independent Ruler (1662-65)

Shivaji as a Mughal Mansabdār and Raja (1665-74)

Shivaji as Chhatrapati (1674-80)

First Phase: Shivaji as a Moqāsādār and Jāgīrdār of Bijapur

Transfer of Mokassa (Moqāsā)

When Shāhjī left for the Karnatak expedition in 1637, Shivaji succeeded to his father's jagir as "Zamīndār".[19] But due to the infancy of Shivaji, Dādōjī Kondadēv was appointed as "Manager" of the Jagir.[20] When Shivaji was twelve years old, he was invested by Shāhjī with the powers of mokassadar and was sent

---

19. The text in the Basātīn, 369 reads:

دو محل ازان یکی پونه دیگر صوبه بجاگیر شاهجی بهوسله مقرر نمود — به تسخیر کرناٹک نام زد فرمود شاهجی هم متعین آنصوب شد لهذا شیواجی به نیابت پدر متصرف آن دو محل می بود -

20. 91-Qalmī, S.M.H., 44.

to Poona in 1642 along with Dādōjī.[21] This transfer of the mokassa necessiated due to the great inconvenience experienced for the issue of sanads and other official letters under the signature and seal of Shāhjī, who was residing mainly at Bangalore. Thus, to prevent any inconvenience, to both the administrators and owner of the jagir, Shāhjī, must have thought it expedient to transfer the mokassa or jagir of Poona to his son Shivaji. The actual transfer of Jagir in the name of Shivaji in the records of Bijapur, with the consent of 'Ādil Shah, must have taken some time. As such, Shāhjī continued to issue sanads till 1644 and perhaps later still. There exist sanads issued from Shāhjī's court so late as 2 January 1646, bearing his seal. Thus, Shivaji was nominally "an independent jagirdar under Bijapur with separate ministers, seal, banner etc.,"[22] as the administration of the jagir was in the hands of Dādōjī, until his death. Shivaji was thus initiated into the administration of the jagir by Dādōjī Kondadev.[23]

Though, the land of Poona, Supa and Indāpūr, which Shivaji originally got was in its nature a "Jagir", yet it is often spoken of as mokassa in Marathi sources. Shāhjī originally got the land of Poona as mokassa[24] and mokassa was resumable, and was constantly resumed. However, Jagir was not resumable.

Eventhough Shivaji was the jagirdar of the parganas of Poona Supa and Indāpūr etc., yet the forts of Kondana and Purandar in the Poona district were under the officers appointed by the Government of Bijapur. Thus, the important forts in Shivaji's jagir were under the direct control of Bijapur court and Shivajī had no jurisdiction in their administration. For instance, the two major forts namely,

---

21. Rajwade: Marathyanchy Itihasachi, Sadhane (M.I.S.) XVIII,44, Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati), I, 3.
22. Vaidya: Shivaji - The founder of Maratha Swarai, 41 f.
23. Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati) I, 4.
24. Rajwade, M.I.S., XVIII, 44.

Kondana (Sinhgaṛh) and Purandar, were in Shivaji's jagir but not under his control. He had to capture them, when he became the sole administrator of his jagir after the death of his tutor, Dādōjī in 1647.

Evolution of Shivaji's Chiefdom and Bijapur's Policy

The way in which Shivaji was brought up, as well as his early activities indicated that he was a man of independent nature. And "as early as 1645 Shivaji had cherished the desire of founding an independent state."[25] But Bijapur was the greatest obstacle in

---

25. Dr. A.R. Kulkarni: Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji, 20. The following extracts from the writings of Shivaji elucidate his desire for the founding of an independent Maratha State:

(1)"He (Raireshvar) gives us power enough to establish Hindawi Swarajya. We are mere instruments in divine hands" (Shivaji's letter to Dadoji Naras Prabhu dated 16 May 1645) Sardesai I, 100.

(2)"They (Sawants) should -- fight against the Turks(Muslims) for the establishment of Swarajya." (Treaty between Shivaji and Sawants, dated 5 March 1659), Balkrishna I (2), 586 (Appendix IV)

(3) "You (Shāhjī) are aware of the critical situation in which I (Shivaji) found myself a few years ago in the Bijapur Darbar, on account of Bājī Ghōrpaṛe of Mudhōl 'having deserted the cause of religion and truth' and 'having treacherously joined the wicked Turkish party.' By the grace of God, I got over the difficulty, kind providence having given you the strength 'to fight for swaraj and religion...." (Shivaji's letter to Shahji, 1664) - Souvenir, 144.

(4) "It is my duty to guard my land."(Shivaji to the officers etc. of Aurangābād 1664) House, 100.

(5) This is not the time for fighting between ourselves since a grave danger faces the Hindus. "Our Children, our country, our wealth, our God, our temples and our holy worshippers are all in danger of existance owing to his machinations and the utmost hint of a pair that can be borne, has been reached." (Shivaji's letter to Jai Singh 1665) Souvenir, 175.

(6) "--I may in the meantime with the aid of these and other lance bearing heroes, make away with the other two emperors (Sultan of Bijapur and Golkonda). So that from one end of the Deccan to the other, I may wash out the name and very vestige of Mahommadonishm." ibid., 175.

(7) You (Maloji Ghorpare) know how keen I have been in 'consolidating' the Maratha power' by bringing together all the scattered elements for a united action." - Shivaji's letter to Maloji Ghorpare, dt. March 1677, Souvenir, 148.

The above writings of Shivaji himself reveals that he cherished the desire to establish a Swarajya in place of Muhammaden rule in the Deccan. Though Shivaji originally contemplated to form a Hindu Swarajya, but later on his political ideals changed to given his subjects "peace, universal toleration equal opportunities for all Castes and Creeds" (House, 115).

realizing his ambition. There were several Bijapurī officials in and about Poona to represent the 'Ādil Shāhī court. Dādōjī himself was the subēdār of Kondana and several other mahals. Qāzī 'Abdullah was the judge. Gōmājī and afterwards Siddī 'Ambar were ḥawāladār of Poona up 1647. Naro Pant was majumdār and Viṭhōjī Shitōlē was the dēshmukh. Thus, in the presence of these officials, Shivaji was not fully independent to act as he wished in his own jāgīr; as these officials constantly watched the interest of the 'Ādil Shāhī Government in the territories of the jāgīrdārs or feudatories.

However, Shivaji's strong will power and firm determination did not deter him from making attempts at his master-plan and he resolved to establish "Swaraj" "outside the limits of the original jāgīr but based upon it."[26] He only awaited a proper opportunity to initiate the scheme. Quick to discern opportunity during the period of the decline of political power of Bijapur from 1646 to the death of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah in 1656, Shivaji slowly "broadened his father's jāgīr at Poona into a chiefdom of which he was practically the independent ruler, though yielding a nominal submission to the Bijapur Monarch."[27] Further, the expansionist policy of Bijapur in the South also gave an opportunity to Shivaji. The Bijapur Government neglected to garrison the majority of the forts with the Government troops and left them in the hands of local hereditary feudatories. Shivaji exploited this situation and began to act like an autonomous ruler in his jāgīr.

---

26. Sardesai, I, 96.

27. E.F.I., IX, 3.

After Shivaji's return from a visit to Bangalore he began to execute his dream by capturing the twelve Mavaḷs and the fort of Sinhgaṛh in 1644. However, Bijapur did not pay much attention to these activities of Shivaji. On the contrary, the blame was thrown on Dādōjī Kondadēv, who was not only Shahji's agent in the jagir, but also a 'Ādil Shahi ṣubedār of Poona. A farmān of 'Adil Shah, dated 1st August, 1644, addressed to Kanhōjī Jedhe of Kari, states that Shāhjī's "agent Dādōjī Kondadēv has commenced rebellious activities at Kondhana." Consequently, to nip in the bud, the Sultan commissioned Khandōjī and Bājī Ghōrpaṛe to proceed with their forces, to Poona, Kanhōjī Jedhe was commanded through a farmān to join the Ghōrpaṛe with his full contingent.[28]

The farmān of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah addressed to Kanhōjī Jedhe in an important document, which throws light on 'Ādil Shah's policy of using Maratha chieftains to suppress another Maratha Chief. Obviously, this policy was guided by the motive of discouraging other Maratha Chiefs from joining Shivaji and thus minimising the problem by adopting the policy of divide and rule. The text of the farmān reads:[29]

> "---- Shāhjī Bhosale has disobeyed us and he, in alliance with Dadoji Kondadev was going towards Kondana (text has Wandana) to suppress and capture that country. Khandōjī

---

28. Sardesai, I, 98 f.

29. G.H. Khare: Selected Articles, 162. In the text of the farmān the date is given as "Arba' Arba'īn Alf" which works out to 1044/1633, whereas, at the bottom of the farmān the date given is 1054/1644. Obviously 1044 is wrong.

and Bājī Ghōrpaṛe have been appointed to check them, along with other Bijapurī commanders. You also should join them with your entire army to capture Dādōjī Kondadēv and to recapture the country for your good name."

It is significant that Shivaji has been screened from these events and Dādōjī has been mentioned as the agent in these anti-Bijapur activities. Shivaji's name nowhere occurs. Although he was suspected, he was then too young to be separately noticed. Though the name of Shivaji first appears, in this connection, in farmān of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, dated 30 March 1645, to Kanhōjī Jedhe and Dādōjī Naras Prabhu. In the farmān 'Ādil Shah threatened to get Prabhu killed if he cooperated with Shivaji and paid revenue to him.[30]

After capturing Kondana by assault, Shivaji took Purandar, Torna etc., He raided Kalyān and Bhiwandī in the Konkan and took the fort of Mahuli. He went on enlisting the Mawels. He built Rajgaṛh.[31]

What was first started in secrecy took now the form of an open challange. However, in spite of these anti-Bijapur activities Shivaji still outwardly professed loyalty to 'Ādil Shah. And in a letter to Dādōjī Naras Prabhu, Shivaji wrote, on 16 May 1645 that "the ('Ādil) Shah is entirely misinformed. Neither you nor, I have turned disloyal ----"[32] When 'Ādil Shah made enquiries from Shāhjī regarding the fortification of Rajgaṛh by Shivaji, he replied that

---

30. Sardesai, I, 88, 99, 102.

31. Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati, 5)

32. Sardesai, I, 100.

"Shivaji found some outside trouble brewing on Torna", so he made bandobust there. This perhaps pacified the Sultan. Thus, Shāhjī tried to patch up the activities of his son; and at the same time he wrote expostulatory letters to Shivaji and Dādōjī to behave properly. But Shivaji paid no heed to the advice of Shāhjī and Koṇḍadēv.[33]

Again, the activities of Shivaji soon drew the wrath of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. He again wrote to Shāhjī to check his son. But Shāhjī's advice had no effect on the son. Consequently, Shāhjī was arrested on 25th July 1648, by the orders of the Sultan and was brought to Bijapur. This action of the Sultan was in order to refrain Shivaji from the territorial encroachments which he was making outside his Jāgīr, in the Bijapur kingdom. Though this policy was successful, as it suddenly checked the activities of Shivaji, yet the Sultan issued orders for capturing Shāhjī's jāgīr of Bangalore and Poona. However, this could not be done without a war with his sons. Fatḥ Khan with several distinguished nobles marched into Poona. He took Belsar, and encamped there; while Bālājī Haibat Rao captured Shirwal. Shivaji sent his forces at the approach of which Haibat Rao, instead of giving a battle, shut himself up in the fort and gave hand-to-hand fight. Finally Shivaji's victorious forces possessed themselves of the whole bag and baggage of the Bijapurī forces and retired to Purandar. However, after an encounter with Fatḥ Khan, Shivaji's soldiers fled away in all directions. The Bijapurīs then laid siege to Purandar fort, but were defeated.[34]

---

33. Chitnis, as quoted in S.M.H., 48.
34. Shiva Bharat, Canto 11 (S.M.H., 12 f.).

Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma. He could only resort to diplomacy for rescuing his father. He thought that the Mughal Emperor was hereditary enemy of 'Ādil Shah and every rebel against Bijapur was sure to gain the Emperor's patronage; if he could hold forth the chance of strengthening the imperial cause in the Deccan by the adhesion of his followers. Shāh Jahān alone was strong enough to intimidate 'Ādil Shah. Thus, Shivaji first wrote to Prince Murad Bakhsh, Viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him to secure the Emperor's pardon for Shāhjī and offered to join Mughal service. To this Murād replied favourably and obtained the assent of Shāh Jahān also. However, whether Shāh Jahān really consented to put pressure on 'Ādil Shah to release Shāhjī is doubtful and no historian mentions it. It seems that the release of Shāhjī on 16 May 1649, was due to the friendly mediation of Sharzā Khan and the bail of Randaulā Khan, the two leading nobles of Bijapur.[35]

At the time of release of Shāhjī, just for the face saving purpose, 'Ādil Shah imposed the condition for the surrender of the two forts Sinhgarh (which had strategic value) and Bangalore. Bijapur did not ask for the surrender of all the forts till then captured by Shivaji, but were satisfied by the surrender of only two forts. It implies that the right of Shivaji to possess the remaining Bijapurī forts between Chakan and Neera which were captured by him has been recognised by 'Ādil Shah. Thus by adopting the policy of reconciliating Shivaji, by surrendering something,

---

35. Shivaji, 36 ff. Letters of Murād to Shivaji dated 14th March 1649, 14th August 1649 and 31st October 1649 and 30th November 1949 - House, 118 ff.

'Ādil Shah diplomatically avoided the enmity of three powerful adversaries - Shāh Jahān, Shāhjī and Shivaji.

The policy of total reconciliation with the Marathas at a loss, and the desire to maintain not only peaceful but cordial relations is further proved when 'Ādil Shah again took back Shāhjī into his service. Shāhjī was granted the jāgīr of Bangalore and his previous dignity was restored. He was now styled as "Mahārāj" and "farzand" of 'Ādil Shah, in a Bijapurī Sanad of 5 September 1649.[36]

For the next six years (1650-55), after Shāhjī's release, Shivaji strictly abstained from any act of hostility against Bijapur; and was engaged in consolidating and organising the small Swarajya created upto that time.

During this interval of inactivity, Shivaji had in vain attempted to induce the Raja of Jāvli,[37] to unite with him against the Sultan of Bijapur. Chandar Rao, although carried no war against Shivaji, but paid no heed to his messengers and with civility, refused to join in rebellion against 'Ādil Shah.[38] For Shivaji, the conquest of Jāvli was of prime importance. Sabhasad records that Shivaji considered that unless Jāvli is destroyed Swarajya cannot be founded.[39] Consequently, Shivaji thought Jāvli

---

36. Jedhe Chronology (S.M.H., 28; Shiva Kalin, 566; Another farmān (of a later date) of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II to Shāhjī dated 26 May, 1659 too have similar titles, House, 84.

37. The Raja of the twelve Mavals of Jāvli was a vassal of Bijapur and paid tribute (Horse-Shoe-money) to the 'Ādil Shah - 91-Qalmī (S.M.H. 54).

38. Chitnis (S.M.H. 54).

39. Sabhasad (S.M.H. 53).

cannot be conquerred unless Chandar Rao was killed. Thus, by a strategem and murder of Mōrēs, Shivaji conquerred Jāvḷi and Shringarpūr and other neighbouring forts in 1656. Then a new fort of Pratapgaṛh was erected.[40]

Conquest of Jāvḷi had great strategic importance. It was the first step towards territorial expansion taken by Shivaji. And it marked the first grand link in a chain of achievements of Shivaji in Konkan for rapid extension of his territory. Further he got the forts of Pratāpgaṛh and Rāigaṛh. And the annexation of Jāvḷi brought a very important accession to his strength, in the form of many thousands of Māvḷe infantry men from among the subjects and former retainers of the Chandar Rao.[41]

Confirmation of conquests and Mughal-Maratha Alliance

The occupation of Jāvḷi brought Shivaji to the inescapable notice of the two great powers then ruling in the Deccan, 'Ādil Shah and the Mughals. At this stage, he was unable to make any pretentions to the Sultan for conquering so boldly his territory. And Shivaji very wisely thought that at any time Bijapur would demand restitution of the territory, conquerred by him; or may send expeditions for their recovery; or may even put pressure on Shāhjī for the surrender of the jāgīr at Poona etc. Consequently, to disown the right of 'Ādil Shah from any such claim on the territory occupied by him, Shivaji, diplomatically approached the Mughal Emperor for the confirmation of his rights over the conquerred territory.[42]

---

40. Sabhasad (Shiva Chhatrapati, 507)
41. Shivaji, 46.
42. Duff, op.cit., I, 127.

Shivaji found an opportune time when Aurangzeb began active preparation for the invasion of Bijapur, after the death of Muḥammad ʻĀdil Shah, on 4 November 1656. Now Shivaji professing friendship entered into correspondence with Multafat Khan, the Mughal Governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the Imperialists, if his desires were granted. To this, conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with Aurangzeb's instructions to "Keep the same path of correspondence with Shiva open and continue to write to him words of reassurance and conciliation ---". Shivaji also wrote directly to Aurangzeb. His envoy Sōnājī reached the latter's siege-camp before Bidar in March 1657. Sōnājī was assured that the Mughals would grant all the prayers of Shivaji - viz., formal recognition of his right to all the Bijapurī forts and villages actually in his possession and the annexation of the fort of Dābhol and the territory pertaining to it. Aurangzeb readily assented to these requests and he replied to Shivaji on 22nd April 1657, that: "---all the forts and mahals pertaining to Bijapur that are in your possession have been confirmed in you as before. I also leave to you the revenue of the fort of Dābhol and its dependencies, as desired by you."[43]

From thence, the Deccan policy of the Mughals played a major role in shaping the relations of the Marathas with the ʻĀdil Shahs. Both were equally desirous of playing the other off against their common enemy, Bijapur. Aurangzeb adopted a consumate diplomacy by playing a policy of alternately patronizing the two parties - Shivaji and ʻĀdil Shah. Before he became Emperor, he tried

---

43. House, 121 ff.; AU, IV, 33 f.; Shivaji, 49.

to patronize Shivaji and encouraged him to occupy Bijapurī territory. This was guided by the policy of alienating Shivaji from Bijapur to avoid their possible coalition against the Mughals. But at the time of his departure from Deccan, for the war of succession, he advised 'Ādil Shah to be careful about Shivaji and to not to take him into Bijapurī service. Simultaneously he gave instructions to Naṣīrī Khan, ṣubēdār of Ahmadnagar, to be in readiness to meet any move by Shivaji.[44]

Simultaneously, with the dual diplomacy of the Mughals, "the Maratha diplomacy of fanning the fire of animosity between the two rival Muslim powers and thus double-crossing them,"[45] was operative, successfully against their common enemy, Bijapur. Consequently, this policy gradually paved the way for rapid extention of the Maratha sphere of political influence; of course, at the expense of Bijapur. Eventhough it was Shivaji who first wished to join the Mughals against Bijapur, yet, soon he changed his policy. Shivaji "considered it more profitable to make a diversion in favour of Bijapur" by raiding the south-western corner of Mughal Deccan, while Aurangzeb's forces were concentrating at the siege of Kalyan, a Bijapurī fort. For Bijapur, this action of Shivaji was a blessing in disguise; as it diverted the full concentration of the Mughals from conquer-ing Bijapurī forts. Further, this brought Shivaji in league with Bijapur against the Mughals; though without any formal treaty or an alliance. From thence, both Bijapur and Shivaji were depending on each other for checking Mughal

---

44. Shivaji, 54.

45. Devare, 120.

invasion of the Deccan. In fact, when in September 1657 "his liege-lord, the King of Bijapur made peace (with the Mughals) Shivaji found it useless and even ruinious to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed."[46]

Consequently, Shivaji suddenly changed his policy to suit his purpose, according to the circumstances. He wrote to Naṣīrī Khan offering submission, with certain conditions adverse to 'Adil Shah. He demanded the grant of 'Ādil Shāhī territory of Konkan, after the Mughal conquest of these parts. This diplomacy of Shivaji proved to be successful. Aurangzeb wrote on 24th February 1658 in favourable terms to Shivaji, as follows:

"You write a promise should be given to me that my hereditory territory and forts, in Konkan as well as up - country, except Nagar which are under the Khan ('Ādil Shah) of Bijapur, would (should) be made over to me when that country is conquerred---", — "as regards this you should act as you suggest---"[47] And at the same time Shivaji sought approval from Aurangzeb to acquire all the territories of Konkan with all the forts situated therein for his Swarajya. Sōnājī returned with the confirmation of this request and Shivaji atonce invaded the Konkan.[48]

Factors leading to further conquests by Shivaji

Inefficiency, amnesty, slackness and a policy of negligence both, on the part of Bijapur Court and Bijapurī nobles was one of

---

46. Ādāb-i 'Ālamgīrī, 156 b; Shivaji, 40, 53; Sabhasad says that Shivaji plundered Junnar and Ahmadnagar - S.M.H., 60.

47. Rajwade, M.I.S., VI, 8, (S.M.H., 60).

48. Sardesai, I, 120.

main causes of the loss of the territory. Consequently, Kalyān was lost due to such a policy. Mullā Aḥmad Nawāyat, a leading noble and subēdār of Kalyān was detained at Bijapur for a long time, due to the protracted illness of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah. Thus, during his absence, the defences of his jāgīr had grown slack and inefficient.[49] And, a considerable amount of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed among the petty chieftains of the Kalyān district. This facilitated Shivaji to easily seize the rich town of Kalyān and Bhiwandi on 24th October, 1657. By this Shivaji acquired much wealth, costly merchandise, etc. Further at the same time, Shivaji employed one part of his men to make a sudden dash and carry away the treasure of Bijapur, which were being transferred from Kalyān to Bijapur.[50]

After establishing firm footing in the northern Konkan Shivaji advanced southwards and easily captured the forts of Mauli Sūrgaṛh, Birwadi, Tala, Ghosalgarh, Bhurap or Sudhagaṛh, Kangori, and the most impregnable fortress of Rāiri (which later on became Shivaji's capital as Raigaṛh). And the eastern half of the Kolaba

---

49. 'Alamgīr Nāmā, 576.

50. Sabhasad (Mankar's trs.) 5; Here it may be pointed out that Jedhe Karsena wrongly states that Shivaji undertook the expedition "against the Portuguese at Kalyān and Bhiwandi" in 1657 (Souvenir 52). Kalyān and Bhiwandi were not the Portuguese possession at that time. They were under Bijapur; and Mullā Aḥmad was the Bijapurī Governor ruling over them. This territory became part of Bijapur, under the Treaty of 1636 with Shāh Jahān. Along with them, by a separate agreement of 1636 Shāh Jahān granted Tal-Konkan, Cheul, Dabhol, Danda Rajpuri and Chakan in exchange to other Bijapuri territory, near Aurangabad - Al-Lubāb, I.

district was also captured from the Siddis of the Janjira.[51]

These acquisition, by the year 1659 had extended Shivaji's dominions in the upland or desh to the southern limit of the Satārā district and in Konkan from Mauli to near Mahad.[52] Further these conquests gave Shivaji a firm footing in the Bijapuri Konkan. The capture of Kalyān was the "the signal for a general uprising," and "fort after fort opened its gates", welcoming Shivaji. The Konkan, as far as the borders of Sāvantwadi, under mutual treaty with the Savant on 5th March, 1659, was soon in the hands of the Marathas.[53]

It implies that the emergence of Shivaji as a founder of Swarajya must have raised the feelings and aspirations of the Marathas for their own independent rule. Consequently, the bulk of the population of Bijapur kingdom which constituted the Marathas co-operated and helped Shivaji in all respects to achieve his goal. Shivaji's movement released the disruptive forces of Maratha nationals, the inherent weakness of a multi-national or racial State. This gradually resulted in the tottering of the Bijapur Kingdom, which was not sufficiently strong with cohesive forces. Maratha expansion resulted in gradual shrinkage of the Bijapur kingdom.

Bijapur's Policy of Compromise fails

With the loss of Kalyān etc., the revenues of the Konkan were lost. But still "the Bijapuri Darbar hesitated,"[54] to take any action against Shivaji. However, the activities of Shivaji

---

51. Shivaji, 56 f.; Sardesai, I, 115 f.
52. Shivaji, 57.
53. Rawlinson: Shivaji the Maratha, 37 f.; Sardesai, I, 121 f.
54. idem.

and the rumours that were circulated about his future projects caused great consternation and raised the out-cry against the lethargy of the Bijapur Government. Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah apparently suspected Shivaji's rising to be instigated by Shāhjī. As a despotic Government seldom trusted its most successful officers and as such, Shāhjī's extraordinary success in the Karnatak,[55] evidently became a cause for suspicion. But for some time 'Ādil Shah could do nothing than nurse his suspicion in secret. The Sultan was a bit hesitant to declare open hostilities against Shāhjī while, at the same time, it was considered inexpedient, under the circumstances, to despatch a force against Shivaji.

At this critical juncture, a policy of silent peaceful compromise, without any hostility, was adopted. For, it was wisely considered that any overt act of hostility against Shivaji, would possibly precipitate the growing ambition of Shāhjī into an active defiance. And such a defiance between the Mughals on the north and the rebellious chieftains in the south, might have jeopardised the very foundations of the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom.

However, the growing portent acts of Shivaji could not be neglected for long by the Bijapur Court. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah instead of dealing directly with Shivaji, initially adopted an indirect policy of checking him. Thus, the Queen-regent of Bijapur wrote to Shāhjī at Bangalore to the following effect — "Although you are servant of this Government, you have committed treachery by sending your son Shivaji to Poona and upsetting the authority

---

55. It seems that Shāhjī became virtual ruler of Karnatak -- "Shahji and his achievement in the Carnatic" - Rao Sahib C.S. Srinivasachari, A.I.O.C., 1937, 782.

of the Bādshāh there. He has captured some forts belonging to the Bādshāh, conquered and plundered several districts and provinces, overthrown one or two principalities and killed some chiefs submissive to the Bādshāh. Now keep your son under proper control or your Jagir will be confiscated." To this Shāhjī professed loyalty to 'Ādil Shah and frankly repudiated all responsibility of the activities of his son and left the matter at the discretion of the Court to deal without any regard to his own feelings.[56]

It was a wrong policy adopted by Bijapur at this juncture. Knowing fully well that peaceful compromise or reconciliation failed on previous occasion. And yet, once again the hopes of Bijapur to mend Shivaji through his father were shattered to the ground. However, still the Queen-regent of Bijapur did not take any repressive measures against Shāhjī. This is evident from a farmān of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II to Shāhjī, dated 4th Ramaḍān 1068/ 26th May 1658, in which Shāhjī has been addressed as farzand and was assured that for the activities of Shivaji, he will not be reprimanded and his (Shivaji's) offences will be imputed on him only.[57]

Bijapur having failed in this indirect policy to impress on Shāhjī to mend his son, now made direct efforts, in order to patch-up and reconciliate with Shivaji. Thus, 'Ādil Shah wrote to Shivaji that "his unruly conduct was not to respond to the benefits that had been conferred on his grandfather and were still being shown to his father himself. He should desist from such courses and repair to the Court, where an office would be given to him." However, again Bijapur's diplomacy failed, as Shivaji paid no heed to it.[58]

56. Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati, 8 f.)

57. House, 84.

58. Niccolao Manucci: Storia Do Mogor, II, 27.

Bijapur take action - Further conquests of Shivaji - Truce and Peace

'Ādil Shah was very much vexed; that a young boy, the son of his vassal, should sack his capital and make himself master of the Sultan's territories. Now the only alternative left was to send an army against him. Consequently, Bijapur resolved to settle, by one supreme effort, their account with Shivaji, who had defied them far so many years.[59]

During the monsoon of 1659, preparations were made at Bijapur, with feverish activity, and a formidable army at the head of Afḍal Khan was despatched. Through a farmān,[60] in which this campaign was termed "maslehat-i Shivaji Bhōsalē,"[61] 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II commissioned all the Maratha chiefs, such as Ghōrpaṛe, Panḍhare, Khōpaḍē, Mambājī Bhōsalē and others with their contingents, to join the army of Afḍal Khan. Further, Afḍal Khan addressed letters to various Maratha chieftains - Kanhōjī Jēdhē and his son

---

59. 'Ādil Shāhī, 78.

60. Original farmān - D.V. Potdar: "Afzal Khan's Invasion Affects Vishalgad", I.H.R.C., XVI, 1939, 41 ff.

61. "Maslehat-i Shivaji Bhōsalē", means "Problem or affair of Shivaji." It may imply that the Sultan considered Shivaji's activities or affair as only an internal problem - like an internecine war -- and not a foreign or external invasion. Further from the text of the farmān, it is evident that 'Ādil Shah tried to strengthen the various neighbouring forts, visualising spread of the conflict and made an all out effort to hem Shivaji from all sides.

Viṭhōjī Haibat Rao etc.[62]

Afḍal Khan's movements were being closely watched by Shivaji from Rājgaṛh. When the Khan learnt that Shivaji was at Pratāpgaṛh, he came straight against him to Wai and camped there in October 1659. And at this stage, though all the companions of Shivaji advised him to make a peaceful settlement, yet Shivaji prepared to give battle to the Khan. As such, he started with his army for Pratāpgaṛh.[63]

Afḍal Khan, however, prudently tried first to settle the matter through peaceful negotiations. As such, Afḍal Khan sent his envoy Krishna Rao to Shivaji to Pratāpgaṛh[64] with the message[65] that Shivaji should submit to the royal orders of 'Ādil Shah and should stop at once his anti-Bijapur activity.

This policy of the Khan was probably under instructions from the Queen of Bijapur; as "she knew with that (10,000 horse and foot) strength, he (the Khan) was not able to resist Sevagy, she consulled him to pretend friendship with his enemy; which he did ---"[66]

This proposal of the Khan was turned down by Shivaji, who was fully prepared to give battle. And a fierce battle between the two armies ensued in which, Afḍal Khan and his army recaptured many forts which were under the possession of Shivaji. Shivaji

---

62. Rajwade, M.I.S., XV, No.336.
63. Sabhasad (S.M.H., 75 f.).
64. Jedhe (S.M.H., 31).
65. 'Ādil Shāhī, 78.
66. E.F.I., IX, 250.

then went inside the fort and shut himself up. When the Khan was quite successful in his enterprise, Shivaji then diplomatically tried to sue for peace by sending his envoy to Afḍal Khan,with a letter stating that "Due to the negligence on the part of my father (Shāhjī) my eyes were closed -- and now, due to the action taken by the Bādshāh ('Ādil Shah), my eyes have opened -- Hence, I want to forget past deeds and wish to live, whole of my life, under the royal patronage of the Bādshāh. I will be obedient to the Bādshāh and will always be in his company. But my previous deeds are on my neck and they do not allow me to face the Bādshāh. Through you, I wish to wash away all my deeds, by the generosity and kind blessings of the Bādshah. So, if you come down to Jāvḷi, I will be much happy and satisfied."[67]

Eventually, the Khan consented to accept Shivaji's proposal for a meeting, to settle the terms of the truce, when Shivaji expressed that "the Khan is to me in the place of an elder, just like Shāhjī." Then Shivaji sent his envoy Peṇṭojī Pant to the Khan, to settle certain conditions for the meeting.[68] The Khan agreed to Shivaji's terms and honoured the envoy.

The momentus meeting between Shivaji and Afḍal Khan came up on 10th November, 1659. Soon after the meeting Afḍal Khan was put to death, after a brief struggle by Shivaji.[69]

---

67. 'Ādil Shāhī, 78; Basātīn, 370 f.; Dilkushā, 16.
68. 'Alī Nāmā, 45 ff.; Sabhasad (S.M.H., 76 f.); Siva Chhatrapati, 16 f.
69. Shiva-Bharat, (S.M.H., 73 f.); Jedhe (S.M.H., 31). Sabhasad (Mankar, trs.) 16 f. As there are several controversies over the murder of Afḍal Khan, I have followed the above sources and the version of Sarkar (Shivaji, 66), without venturing into the discussion on the issue. As "God alone knew what was in the mind of fate and in the minds of the two heroes, while people knew peace was being arranged" - Shiva Bharat (cited by Vaidya: Shivaji- the Founder of Maratha Swaraj, 96). For various controversies see Duff, I, 136 fn. Shivaji, 72.

Now, Shivaji emerged as an indomitable hero like a "born strategist." Soon the entire army of Bijapur took to the heels. Shivaji took back the possession of the forts. He came to Wāi and decided to annex more Bijapurī territory. He laid siege to Chandan and Vandan and eventually conquered them.[70]

This completely broke the power of Bijapur in the Central Deccan and correspondingly increased the power and prestige of Shivaji. Taking advantage of this signal victory Shivaji tried to extend his dominions further. Now, on the offensive, he despatched Annājī Dattō with a large force and captured Panhala, the capital of the Western district of the Bijapur Kingdom. And then, Kolhāpūr, Vasantgaṛh, Rangana, Khēlna etc., were quickly captured.[71] He further captured "several port towns, including Dābhol; and following up these successes he marched upon Bijapur at the same time, sending a small force to occupy Rājāpūr. These troops arrived early in January 1660."[72] Shiva Bharat adds that the Maratha troops marched upto the gates of Bijapur, plundering as they went and rapidly retreating with their booty.[73] Jedhe further adds that Shivaji raided Bijapurī territory and collected tribute along the banks of the river Krishna upto Gadag, Lakshmēshwar.[74]

This overwhelming success of Shivaji may be partly attributed to the disloyalty and inefficiency of Bijapurī commanders.

---

70. Shiva Bharat (S.M.H., 83).
71. Full list of about three dozen Bijapurī forts and towns that were subjugated by Shivaji and his men is given in Shiva Bharat (S.M.H., 84).
72. E.F.I., IX, 353 f.; Monuments, J.B.H.S.
73. Shiva Bharat (S.M.H. 83).
74. Jedhe (S.M.H., 32).

Tārīkh-i 'Ādil Shāhī mentions that while Shivaji was recapturing the fort of Panhala, the Bijapurī general Rustum-i Zamān, was enjoying himself at his jāgīr near Panhala. Though he had 3,000 forces at his command, he did nothing to oppose Shivaji and his men, besides just putting up a show of preparations. Obviously Rustum-i Zamān was in secret alliance with Shivaji, under some beneficial terms.[75]

When the Bijapur Government, overwhelmed by a battalion of disasters, recovered from the effects of the shocks inflicted by the Marathas, great anxiety and tension prevailed at the court. In his extremity, the 'Ādil Shah accepted the petition of Siddī Jauhar, the Governor of Karnūl and appointed him in 1660 to oppose Shivaji with the title of Ṣalābat Khan.[76]

In his expedition, Jauhar was assisted by many Maratha captains, like the chiefs of Pali, Shringarpur etc., and Vyānkōjī - Shivaji's half-brother. Further, to create a diversion in favour of Bijapur, the Siddī of Janjira and the Savant of Wadi were induced to work against Shivaji.[77]

However, Shivaji unable to face such a large force in the open field, left Nētājī Pālkar with his cavalry division to harass the Bijapurīs in the open country and himself fell back on Panhala. But this proved to be an strategical error. In May 1660, Panhala was invested by the Bijapurīs. The investment was continued with

---

75. 'Ādil Shāhī, 81; Dagh Register, 17 Bebruary 1661 - Balakrishna, I (2), 69.
76. 'Alī Nāmā, 48 f.; 'Ādil Shāhī, 82 f.
77. Sardesai, I, 313; Shiva Bharat (S.M.H., 85) mentions only Bājī Ghōrpaṛe, the Maratha Chief that accompanied Jauhar.

greater vigour, even in the rainy season, under orders from Bijapur. The siege lasted for four months.[78] The European gunnery, supplied by the English from Rājāpūr to the Bijapuris created havoc among the defenders of Panhala and Shivaji's position altogether was untenable.[79]

When hard-pressed, shut up in the fort, Shivaji was compelled to make his choice between surrendering the fort or trickering the Bijapuris once again. He decided to try the second course. Shivaji by sending a Brahman envoy named Gangādhar, opened negotiations with Ṣalābat Khan for settling the terms of the truce and peace. A Dutch letter further adds that Shivaji "was willing to meet the said General personally and hand over all his possessions to him for His Majesty, the King of Visiapur, if the said lord agreed to pardon him."[80]

Another cause of Shivaji agreeing to truce was the march of Shāistā Khan, Mughal Ṣūbēdār of the Deccan, to attack Maratha possession. Thus Shivaji was unable to fight at two fronts. Consequently, Shivaji wrote a letter to Ṣalābat Khan saying that:

"I have hope in your goodness and as such I hope that you would give me an opportunity to have interview with you to express my desires and feelings. S ince a long time, I had cherished the desire to present myself to 'Ādil Shah and express my sincerity towards him and seeking pardon. If you permit me to your presence it will be my good luck."[81]

---

78. Shiva Bharat, S.M.H., 85.
79. E.R.S., 20. Letter of Revington to Fort St. George dated 5 June 1660, from Rajapore-Sardesai, I, 132.
80. Nibhandevali, I, 85. Dutch letter from Vingurla dated 15th September 1660.
81. 'Ādil Shāhī, 86; Basātīn, 375.

Since Ṣalābat Khan was already having feelings of disloyalty he was happy at heart to meet Shivaji. Next day the two had a meeting in which they agreed for an alliance of mutual friendship and help to each other.[82] However, their motives of this secret alliance are not known. Obviously both of them wanted to defy 'Ādil Shah's authority and harass the Bijapur Government by their anti-Bijapurī policy.

After the meeting, it seems that Shivaji pretended to give up the fort to the Bijapurīs the next day. But, when the vigilence was relaxed, that same night of 13th July 1660, he slipped to Khēlna,[83] with a few followers under the cover of rain and darkness. But the Bijapurīs, after a hot pursuit invested Shivaji in Vishālgaṛh. However, the Bijapurīs were attacked and routed by Shivaji's troops,[84] who again emerged victorious.

The secret alliance of Shivaji and Ṣalābat Khan was soon shattered to the ground, when the news-reporter informed the whole affair to 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II. In great wrath, 'Ādil Shah himself took up the field and marched to Murtaḍābād (Miraj). From here, the Sultan deputed Shāh Abul Ḥasan to Ṣalābat Khan, in order to bring him to loyal path by noble advice. Abul Ḥasan tried in vain to correct him. In the meanwhile, Shivaji, on knowing the arrival of the Sultan himself, with a huge army, vacated the fort of

---

82. The text of the agreement reads:
سیوا — ملاقات گرفت صلابت خان در اعزاز و احترام او کشیده به خوشحالی و صاف دل مجلس آراست و
حجت باهم باتحاد و یکتائی انجامید درمیان یکدیگر عهود و مواثیق در اتفاق باهم و جانب داری یکدیگر شرط و تاکید
پذیرفت سیوا —

83. Jedhe Kareena (Souvenir, 58); Pradip (S.M.H., 87).

84. Shiva Bharat (S.M.H., 87).

Panhala and went away towards the mountains.[85] It seems that Ṣalābat Khan too ran away towards the mountains; and 'Ādil Shah recaptured Panhala without any fighting. But he failed to pursue neither Shivaji nor Ṣalabat Khan.[86] Thus Bijapur Maratha hostilities ceased for some time.

Grant of Tal-Konkan as Jagir to Shivaji

'Alī 'Ādil Shah was pained to hear about the plundering of Rājāpūr. But he could do noting to check Shivaji, being engaged in crushing the revolt of Ṣalābat Khan in Karnūl. In the meantime, he directed Surya Rao, the chief of Shringārpūr to deal with Shivaji; but he failed after besieging Shivaji's army at Sangameshwar.[87] The Sultan having no other alternative in distress, considered wisely to reconciliate with Shivaji; and according to a Dutch letter dated 20th April 1661, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah concluded peace with Shivaji. Consequently Shivaji was granted a "farmān from Bijapur for Rājāpūr with the places he had conquered in Konkan ---".[88] This is further corroborated by another document dated 3rd August, 1601 according to which - "at present Tal-Konkan had been granted to Saheb"(Shivaji).[89] Implying that 'Ādil Shah saw no other alternative but to come to terms with Shivaji by granting

---

85. 'Ādil Shāhī, 90ff; 'Alī Nāmā, 69.
86. Basātīn, 376.
87. Shiva Bharat (S.M.H., 94)
88. E.R.S., II, 47.
89. Rajwade, M.I.S., 21 Letter No.2 dated 3rd August, 1661, addressed to Pilanji Nilkant Rao, Ṣubēdār Namjad, for the information of Dēshmukh etc.

his demands. And, in spite of his anti-Bijapur activities from 1642 to 1661, he was still considered a 'Ādil Shāhī jagirdar; hence, further addition to his jagir was made, by the grant of Tal-Konkan. This policy of compromise must have been clearly with a vision that due to the ever increasing intestine wars, the destruction of Bijapur would be imminent.

Second Phase: Shivaji as a de facto Independent King (1662-65)

Peace Treaty of 1662 and Recognition of Independence

'Alī 'Ādil Shah, after seizing sole power from the Queen-regent in 1660 and during her absence (May 1661-June 1662) abroad, realised in despair the futility of prolonged conflict and hostilities with Shivaji. This was considerably due to the great power which Shivaji had achieved and simultaneously, failure on the part of Bijapur to check him. Thus, under the circumstances, 'Ādil Shah thought it prudent to "befriend Shivaji by calling upon Shāhjī to act as a peace maker."[90]

Shāhjī went personally to Maharashtra in 1662, to reconciliate Shivaji and urged him to "not to molest Bijapur any more." To this request of the father, the son not only agreed but promised that he would not make any wanton aggression against Bijapur. But, subject to the conditions that "no wanton provocation was given to him,"(obviously by Bijapur). Further, Shivaji agreed to form a confederacy of the Deccan powers against their common enemy, the

---

90. Sardesai, I, 149.

Mughals.[91] The terms of the settlement made by Shāhjī implies that "the Bijapur Government granted all Shivaji's demands and he was left in possession of his conquests from Kalyān in the North to Phonḍa in the south and from Dābhol in the west to Indāpūr in the east and his complete independence was acknowledged."[92]

Consequently, it laid the foundation for the emergence of an independent Maratha kingdom. Though 'Ādil Shah recognised Shivaji as an independent ruler of the Maratha kingdom, yet it was not openly or formally declared by either of them. It was a secret recognition; probably due to the fear of the Mughal Emperor; as one of the terms agreed upon were to form a confederacy against the Mughals. However, without declaration from 1662, onwards Shivaji became an independent de facto king. From thence, the relations of 'Ādil Shah and Shivaji were as that between two independent sovereigns; and Shivaji was no longer a jagirdar of Bijapur.

Conquest of South Konkan and Kanara

However, nothing could prevent Shivaji from his aggressive designs of conquering more and more Bijapurī territory. He now started his expedition in the north-western part of the Bijapurī Kanara district. By way of Kolhāpūr and Kudal, he marched to Vingurla in May 1663. On his march, all the way he went he gave

---

91. ibid., 82. The peaceful settlement and reconciliation brought about by Shāhjī is considered by Grant Duff as " a secret compact" and is attributed to the Bijapurī Minister 'Abdul Maḥmūd - (Duff, I, 148). Sarkar also attributes it to have been brought about by the 'Ādil Shāhī Ministers - AU., IV, 9.

92. E.F.I., X, 230.

his qaul or assurance promising them that neither he nor his soldiers shall in the least do any wrong to anybody who takes his qaul, which promise he maintained. His march caused much alarm, and all the Bijapurī Governors fled away. Shivaji could easily possess the ports of Rājāpūr, Kharēpaṭan, Kārwār. And by 1664 the war extended to the Kanara country.[93] He reached Kudal at the end of August 1664. In spite of this, 'Ādil Shah maintained peaceful relations with Shivaji as the power of Bijapur was on the decline and he himself was busy in crushing the rebellion of the refractory Bahlōl Khan at Bankāpūr. However, 'Ādil Shah could not bear the direct affront to his power for a long; and after a few months, he deputed Maḥmūd Khan and Faḍl Khan to recover Kudal and the port towns from Shivaji. At the same time he sent reinforcement under Khawāṣ Khan. Further he directed Bājī Ghōrpaṛe of Mudhōl and Ekōjī to proceed to Kudal.[94]

'Ādil Shah's plan came to a head during the autumn of 1664; and Shivaji, as a born strategist, struck the first blow most unexpectedly in November 1664, by suddenly falling upon Mudhōl, the seat of his cousin and inveterate enemy Bājī Ghōrpaṛe. A stiff battle ensued in which Bijapurīs were repulsed.[95]

It seems that Shivaji being fed up with the prolonged and continuous hostilities with Bijapur, in the south Konkan and the Kanara country, and in order to devote fully to the Mughals, tried to reconciliate 'Ādil Shah. Shivaji made a present to 'Ādil Shah of thirty thousand pagodas, two elephants and eight horses, with a

---

93. Shivaji, 231 ff.
94. Sardesai, I, 151.
95. idem.; E.R.S., I, 57, 91, Taylor's letter from Kārwār to Surat dated 29th October, 1664; Shivaji, 229, 235.

request "to slacken the war against him a little." He further advised 'Ādil Shah, "with many persuasive words to revolt against the Mogal and offered him 30 thousand pagodas yearly if he would do that. They say that a more close and secret alliance has been made between these two rulers."[96]

Shivaji's proposal to pay thirty thousand pagodas annually to 'Ādil Shah like a tribute, implies that he was prepared to accept the vassalage of 'Ādil Shah. It also means that Shivaji was prepared to sacrifice any thing to meet the Mughal challenge posed to the Deccan rulers.

However, the secret alliance of the 'Ādil Shah and Shivaji became apparent to Aurangzeb and he suspected Bijapur's support to Shivaji, in the latter's raid of Surat. Consequently, Aurangzeb demanded from Bijapur an indemnity for the sack of Surat by Shivaji, on the ground that Bijapur (along with Golkonda) "protected Sivasi"(Shivaji).[97]

In spite of all the friendship, assistance and concessions to Shivaji by 'Ādil Shah, the former during December 1664 continued "destroying by fire and sword all that he can of the King of Vizapores (Bijapur's) country.[98] Further, Shivaji repulsed successfully the Bijapurī forces which were sent against him; and he made more encroachments in the Bijapurī Kanara.[99]

---

96. Monuments, J.B.H.S., III (3) Q.1930, 276 f. A Dutch letter letter dated 19th October, 1664.

97. ibid., 278.

98. E.F.I., X, 350, 359; E.R.S., I, 91 (letter No.59).

99. Monuments, J.H.B.H.S., IV, (1) March 1931, 64.

Third Phase: Shivaji as Mughal Manṣabdār and Raja (1665-74)

Treaty of Purandar

The advent of the Mughal general Mīrzā Raja Jai Singh into Deccan, early in 1665, at the head of large army altered the whole course of politics in the Deccan and it had not only profound but far reaching impact on the Bijapur-Maratha relations.

As mentioned above, 'Alī 'Ādil Shah made a show of loyalty and service to the Mughal Emperor; but in reality he thought it more expedient to help Shivaji; both in cash and in kind as security to his own territory.[100] But, on the contrary, when Jai Singh was camping at Pabal, for the conquest of the Maratha kingdom, Shivaji to turn the tide on the Bijapur wrote a diplomatic letter to Jai Singh stating that "---if the Mughal army turns to the invasion of Bijapur, such a course would be better than undergoing the many hardships (of campaigning) in this hilly region (i.e. Konkan) of difficult paths and stony soil". This proposal, Shivaji reiterated in the interview with Jai Singh when he offered to conquer Bijapur on bahalf of the Mughals.[101]

'Ādil Shah's relations with Shivaji were guided by the objective of using him as a tool against the Mughals.[102] Consequently, to remove this buffer, Jai Singh, planned to use Shivaji as a lever against Bijapur in consonance with the eternal principle of diplomacy. Jai Singh was easily successful in alienating Shivaji

---

100. 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 812 f.; Basātīn, 398.

101. Haft Anjuman, 49, 52; Dilkushā, 46.

102. E.R.S., 107.

from Bijapur through the memorable Treaty of Purandar, signed June 12, 1665. According to this Treaty, Shivaji as a mansabdar.[103] of the Mughal Emperor and as an ally of the Mughals, undertook to co-operate in the intended campaign against Bijapur. He further agreed to pay forty lakhs of hun to the Emperor in return for a share of the conquered territory.[104] The actual terms of the 'conditional agreement' -- Mughal-Maratha Agreement for the partition of the Bijapur kingdom are:- "if lands yielding 4 lakhs of hun a year in the low lands of Konkan and 5 lakhs of hun a year in the uplands (Bālāghaṭ Bijapur) are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an Imperial farmān that the possession of these lands will be confirmed on me after the expected Mughal conquest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 lakhs of hun in 13 yearly instalment." Further Shivaji was expected to wrest these lands from the Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops.[105]

Aurangzeb very much appreciated Jai Singh's diplomacy towards Shivaji and 'Ādil Shah. Approving Shivaji's offer of collaborating with Mughals against Bijapur, Aurangzeb addressed the following farmān to Shivaji on 25th December, 1665.":

---

103. The mansab rank granted to Shivaji was 5,000 zāt, 5,000 sawār House, 152.

104. Haft Anjuman, 8, 15. According to Basātīn (376) "Shivaji, despairing of help from Bijapur (against the Mughals) during the siege of Purandar made peace with Jai Singh." Zubairi further states that Shivaji did not ask for help from Bijapur, due to his past anti-Bijapur activities. Moreover 'Ādil Shah (At the beginning of the campaign) in a bid to conciliate Shivaji to his side, offered the grant of Konkan - Haft Anjuman, 78. So, under the circumstances, 'Ādil Shah could not have refused help, had Shivaji really asked for it.

105. Haft Anjuman53 AU, IV, 95.

"Whereas I have learnt from the despatches of Mirza Raja Jai Singh that you are, at the head of a good force, firmly engaged in my service and have exerted yourself greatly in the conquest of forts Phatten and Thathvada belonging to 'Adil Shahi kingdom, and in punishing the Bijapuri army which was in Tal-Konkan — Therefore I graciously praise you and send you a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger along with this farman."[106]

Thus, the shrewed diplomacy of Jai Singh not only alienated Shivaji, from Bijapur but both the allies became bitter enemy of each other; as Jai Singh threw a bone of perpetual contention - Konkan, between the two. Thus, the confederacy, which Shivaji and 'Adil Shah contemplated in 1662 against the Mughals was raised to the ground. Now, Shivaji no longer remained a partner of 'Adil Shah for the preservation of the independence of the Deccan kingdoms. But, he was now championing the Mughal cause for the destruction of his erstwhile partner. However, even at the last moment, when the Treaty was being finalised at Purandar, the perplexed 'Adil Shah, in despair, tried in vain to reconciliate Shivaji with a tempting offer, to cross-over him to his camp. Jai Singh, in a despatch to the Emperor writes that "Adil Khan has been very earnest in his requests to him (Shiva) to send his brother's son to his service, as he had sent his son to the Emperor's service. He promised to give Tal-Konkan to Bijapur and the 'Adil Khani (Shahi) Balaghat to him. Relying on the faith of the servants of His Majesty and thinking that whatever was granted by the Emperor was a boon - he did not agree to send his brother's son

---

106. Dingal Letters, House 131 (3rd ed.)

to him."[107]

Obviously, 'Ādil Shah must have presumed that Shivaji was allying with the Mughals with the expectation of the grant of Konkan to him, after its conquest. Thus 'Ādil Shah visualising the fact that by the Mughal - Maratha collaboration not only Konkan will be lost, but the friendship of Shivaji also; so he wisely prepared to sacrifice it in advance to Shivaji, in order to attract him to his side. It was an attempt in vain to prolong and save the indepdndence of both the Bijapur and the Maratha Kingdoms. Shivaji could not be reconciliated; as he found more glamour and benefit by being on the Mughal side. Probably, there was more temptation for Shivaji- the Viceroyalty of Deccan or the grant of the title of "Rajgi" (Raja) by the Mughal Emperor.[108] More so, because by this grant, he would have been a recognized sovereign of the Maratha kingdom as till then he was only a de facto independent king, and that too, by the secret recognition of 'Ādil Shah only.

Shivaji Helps the Mughals in the Invasion of Bijapur

During the Mughal invasion of Bijapur from November 1665, to June 1666, Shivaji not only co-operated with Jai Singh, but "rendered distinguished service on behalf of the Mughals."[109] In fact from the very beginning of the expedition, he rendered good

---

107. Haft Anjuman, 78. This translation of Dr. Jagdish Narayan Sarkar differs with that of Sir Jadunath Sarkar. The latter has translated as "--- But Shiva in reliance on the sanctity of my promises and in hopes of the Emperor's liberality, declined ---" - House 118, (3rd ed.)

108. ibid., 181.

109. ibid., 11.

service by devastating and overthrowing the 'Ādil Shāhī army then present in Bijapurī Tal-Konkan.[110] Shivaji deputed his general Nētājī Palkar (regarded by the Deccanis as second Shivaji) to assist the Mughals. The Maratha contingent under Shivaji and Nētājī, numbering nine thousand constituted the left centre of the Mughal army.[111] Again, when the Mughals were hardpressed, early in 1666 and began to retreat from Bijapurī territory, Shivaji at his own request and initiative detached a contingent to make a diversion in favour of the Mughals by attacking Panhala. But he met with a dismal failure. And it was aggravated by the desertion of Netaji to 'Ādil Shah; as the former accepted the Bijapurī bait of four lakhs of hun and raided the Mughal territory with great vigour and effect.[112]

However, in spite of this failure, Aurangzeb again tried to ally Shivaji to his side and he encouraged him to conquer more and more territory from Bijapur. Aurangzeb sent a communique to Shivaji advising him that "he was at liberty to seize as much of Bijapur territory as he could, or else he should remain firm in his own place and obey the Emperor's son (Prince Mu'azzam)".[113] Thus, Aurangzeb, for the conquest of Bijapur, wanted Shivaji's collaboration or else neutrality.

Interrugnum amd Partial Peace

During Shivaji's visit to Agra (from March to November 1666) and after his return to the Deccan, for a period of three years

---

110. ibid., 102. For full details see 'Ālamgīr Nāmā, 988 ff. Basātīn, 400 f.
111. Haft Anjuman, 100, 126 fn.4.
112. ibid., ; AU. IV, 135 ff.
113. From an Akhbār dated 6th May 1667 - House 153 (3rd ed.)

there was apparently peace in the Deccan. During this period Shivaji lived quietly at home; as he wanted respite and peace to consolidate and extend his power on the western coast "at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddīs of Janjira."[114] However, immediately after his return, Shivaji had to chase two Bijapurī officers - Pīr Miān and Tāj Khan, who were from the Konkan territory of Deorukh[115] were occationally making incursions into Maratha territory. Later on, in May 1667, Bahlōl Khan and Ēkōjī besieged the fort of Rangna.[116] Shivaji attacked them and raised the siege. Thus, 'Ādil Shah's attempt to regain his hold in south Konkan was defied. 'Ādil Shah eventually saw the futility of fighting with Shivaji and concluded peace.[117] By which arrangement "Shivaji promised to pay yearly a sum of six lakhs of rupees to Bijapur by way of tribute for South Konkan.[118] This peace was made in August/September 1667.[119] This treaty and the payment of tribute by Shivaji to 'Ādil Shah brings back to the

---

114. Shivaji, 163 f.

115. Jedhe.S.M.H.

116. Jedhe, S.M.H., 35, ibid. In the light of these two incidents, Sarkar's (Shivaji 165) statement that during 1667-1669 Shivaji's relations with Bijapur were "pacific", is not tenable. Further, the English Factor's report that "yet both ('Ādil Shah and Shivaji refrained committing any act of hostility against one the other"-- (E.F.I., XIII, 110; E.R.S., 124) is also not correct.

117. Jedhe (S.M.H., 35); Sardesai I, 182.

118. Batavia Dutch Letter Bk. 1668-69, dated 8th October 1668, Shivakalin, I, (letter No.1221), 340.

119. Jedhe (S.M.H. 35) says it was made in Bhadrapad 1589 (10th August to 8th September 1667) Sardesai I, 182, places it in places it in September 1667.

relations they had earlier in 1662. Following the Treaty it seems that Shivaji appointed Babaji Naik Punde as his ambassador at the Bijapur Court.[120]

The conclusion of this treaty between 'Ādil Shah and Shivaji was in contravention to the Treaty of Purandar 1665, which Shivaji made with the Mughals. Moreover, Shivaji was still a mansabdār of the Mughals, according to the treaty of Purandar and in March 1668 this position was ratified by the conferring of the title of "Raja" on Shivaji by Aurangzeb. Yet, Shivaji maintained both hostile as well as peaceful friendly relations and concluded treaties with Bijapur. When Aurangzeb acknowledged Shivaji as "Raja", 'Ādil Shah began to deal with him as an independent king.[121]

In 1670, when Aurangzeb sent an ambassador to 'Ādil Shah threatening and demanding help of 12,000 horses against Shivaji, 'Ādil Shah did not oblige Him. This policy of 'Ādil Shah was obviously guided by the desire to maintain friendly relations with Shivaji. At the same time, to please Aurangzeb he made a show of hostile relations with Shivaji.[122]

Renewal of Hostilities in 1672.

Their relations took a turn with the death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah II on 24th November 1672. The virtual peace was disturbed.

---

120. Jedhe, (S.M.H., 37).

121. Sardesai, I, 183 f. This title for Shivaji was originally recommended in 1665 by Jai Singh to the Emperor as "Rajgi" (Raja) - Haft Anjuman, 81.

122. E.F.I. (Fawcett) I, 294 f.

Bābājī Naik Punde, Shivaji's ambassador at Bijapur was recalled.. Shivaji seems to have considered "his compact with Abdool Mohummed ceased with the death of 'Ali 'Adil Shah," as such "he instantly prepared to take advantage of the disturbances which prevailed at Bijapur."[124] This was an opportunity for Shivaji to recapture the fort of Panhala.[125] Thus, he concerted measures for its recovery. On 6th March 1673 two of Shivaji's captains Kondājī and Annājī Dattō marched against Panhala. Under the cover of the night, the Marathas secretly scaled the walls and the latter took possession of it easily. On hearing about this grand success of Shivaji, Khawās Khan, the Bijapurī Minister in power, at once despatched Bahlōl Khan with armies and provision for wresting back Panhala. When Shivaji came to know this move, he decided to encounter the Khan before he could reach the destination. He sent Pratāp Rao Gujar and Anand Rao Makaji to oppose him. The two armies came in contact near Umrānī, about 36 miles west of Bijapur. The Marathas hovered round the Bijapurīs and starved them. Finally, in an open action on 15th April 1673, the Bijapurīs gave a tough fight and intense battle raged all the day in which the Bijapurīs held their ground with desperate tenacity.[126]

---

123. Jedhe (S.M.H., 37). It seems that after the death of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, "Shivaji wished to take possession of his territory" - Dilkushā, 103.

124. Duff, I, 200; Shivaji, 199.

125. According to Duff. (I, 200) the "main object was an attack on the rich mercantile town of Hooblee" of Bijapur. It is not tenable.

126. Sabhasad, S.M.H., 116; Sardesai, I, 201 f.; Shivaji, 200.

At night fall the two forces separated. Bahlōl Khan came to a secret understanding with Pratāp Rao on the former's pretext that he was making only a show of hostility, in order to satisfy his Government. Therefore he desired that each side should spare the other. Pratāp Rao agreed, and withdrew his troops, allowing the Bijapurī to fall back. Shivaji sharply censured Rao for letting Bahlōl escape when he could have crushed him. To avenge the folly, Pratāp Rao immediately made a dash into Bijapurī Kanara sacking many forts and rich cities. Hubli was raided. Muẓaffar Khan came to the rescue of Hubli and saved it from total destruction. The Marathas fled away with rich booty. Then in June 1673, Bahlōl Khan avenged the heavy losses of Umrānī by holding Kolhāpūr and defeating the Marathas in several encounters; thus compelling their roving bands to vacate Kārwār and its surroundings.[127]

While the hostitlities were in progress, Shivaji, in order to weaken the strength of Bijapur, excited successfully several vassals of Bijapur to rebel and at the same time, he endeavoured to conciliate the Mughal Viceroy, Khān-i Jahān in order to isolate Bijapur from any help. Thus, Shivaji with the sanction of the Mughal Viceroy, obviously, with the understanding of non-interference by the Mughals in his affairs with Bijapur, started more vigorously conquest of Bijapuri territory. In April 1673, a detachment of Mawales surprised Parli and then captured Satārā in July. This was followed by the capture of Chandan, Wandan, Pandugarh, Nandgiri, etc.[128]

---

127. Shivaji, 201 f., 245 f.

128. Jedhe (S.M.H., 37); Duff, I, 202; Shivaji, 247.

Thus, within four years from 1670 to 1674 from the renewal of hostilities, Shivaji succeeded in not only regaining all the lost possessions but also in greatly extending his conquests in all directions, both by sea and land; a course at the cost of Bijapur.

Fourth Phase: Shivaji as Chhatrapati (1674-80)

When Shivaji ascended the throne and the royal umbrella was held over his head as Chhatrapati on Friday, 5th June 1674[129] his relations with Bijapur entered into a new phase. After the coronation Shivaji emerged as the protector of the Deccan from the Mughal aggression. Though hostile to Bijapur very often, yet in 1676, Shivaji considered the Mughals and not Bijapur as his country's true foe. When Shivaji was enthroned, it seems Sikandar 'Ādil Shah did not show any displeasure. Probably, 'Ādil Shah might have felt happy; as the coronation alienated Shivaji from the Mughal as he ceased to be a Mughal mansabdār. With this developments 'Ādil Shah tried to ally Shivaji into his camp.

Languid Wars

After the coronation the state of war with Bijapur continued, though languidly. Shivaji found an opportunity when Bijapur Court was plunged deep into party factions and had little time to think anything else. Consequently, he planned the conquest of Bijapurī Kanara. To undertake the expedition with full strength, concentration and success, Shivaji initiated false negotiations with Bahādur Khan, in order to secure himself from the Mughal hostility in the

---

129. Jedhe Shakavali (S.M.H., 38).

war.[130]

In March 1675, Shivaji began executing his plan to annex the Kanara coast, with a huge army started for Phonda (near Goa) marching through Rājāpūr and Kudal. Reaching Phonda, he laid siege to it on 8th April, which fell after a prolonged defence. While the siege was in progress, another division of his army plundered Itigiri in 'Ādil Shāhī territory. Then, Ankola, Shivashwar, Kārwār and Kadra all capitulated to Shivaji. Thus by the 25th May, the entire Bijapurī territory as far south as the Gangāvati river had been annexed by Shivaji.[131]

Since Bijapur was now in the grip of a civil war, the 'Ādil Shāhī kingdom was hastening to a dissolution, Shivaji's possession of South Konkan and the north Kanara districts remained unchallenged till after his death.

Maratha-Golkonda Alliance and Karnatak Expedition (1677-78)

After the coronation, Shivaji's mind was now directed towards the rich territory of the Karnatak. He wished to conquer the Karnatak from the Tungabhadra valley to the Kāverī.[132] He had claim

---

130. Shivaji, 222, 249. However, it seems that it was Bahādur Khan who made friendly terms with Shivaji, who despatched four thousand horsemen for the help of the Mughals against Bijapur - Dilkushā, 111.

131. ibid., 251; To relieve the siege of Phonda Bijapur sent Bahlōl Khan. But it seems that he was bribed by Shivaji and thus he remained inactive. And local Governor of Kanara aided Shivaji - Shivaji, 249, 252, 241.

132. Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati, 119)

to the jāgīr of his father in the eastern Karnatak. The time too was opportune due to the internal discord among the Bijapurī Karnatak. In his plans, Shivaji was not only greatly encouraged by Raghunāth Pant, an old loyal servant of Shahjiḳ but he also masterminded the expedition. Raghunāth through his shrewed diplomatic manoeuvre reconciliated Madana Pant and secured full co-operation of Golkonda in this expedition. A meeting between Quṭb Shah and Shivaji was arranged to be held before the latter marched to the Karnatak.[133]

Shivaji visited Hyderabad in March 1677 and met Abul-Ḥasan Quṭb Shah, who received him very cordially. It was mutually decided that both of them would join hands and would fight against the Mughals and would capture the Bijapurī territory of Tanjavur, including the fort.[134] It seems that they agreed for the equal division of the Bijapurī territory between them.[135] This they planned to do so by reducing the power of Bahlōl Khan and destroying him.[136] The main clause of the compact was that Quṭb Shah should pay three thousand hun daily to defray the expenses of the Maratha army and that five thousand Golkonda troops should join the Marathas under Mīrzā Muḥammad Amīn for the conquest of the Bijapurī Karnatak. A train of artillery with material was also supplied by Quṭb Shah and probably a large sum of money as advance.[137]

---

133. Siva Chatrapati, 223 ff.

134. Dilkushā, 88.

135. Sardesai, I, 232; Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati, 119).

136. Shivaji's letter to Mālōjī Ghōrpaṛe - See Appendix at the end of this chapter.

137. Shivaji, 294.

As a precautionery measure, Shivaji before proceeding to Golkonda, secured the neutrality of the Mughals by a truce. Shivaji obtained this secret amity by sending Nīrājī Pant to Bahādur Khan with costly presents etc.[138]

Thus, intent on seizing the Bijapurī Karnatak, Shivaji, joined by a strong contingent from Golkonda, marched towards the destination in April 1677. On reaching Gingi, in May 1677, he besieged it. Rauf Khan and Nasir Muhammad Khan, the Bijapurī officers were in the fort. They were by diplomacy and assurance of safety were induced to come out. Thus, the impregnable fort was captured on 13th May, 1677.[139] It seems that the fort was captured more by gold than by arms.[140] However, according to French record the fort was voluntarily given over by Nasir Muhammad; as he had entered into a secret treaty with Golkonda for its cession.[141]

From Ginji, Shivaji turned back to Vellore, where he arrived about 23rd May. At that time Vellore was held by a Bijapurī officer 'Abdullāh. He gave obstinate defence to the Marathas for fourteen months, after which it capitulated in August 1678. During which period, Shivaji left Narahari to continue the siege and himself left, in June 1677 for further south, to meet Shēr Khan Lōdī.[142]

---

138. Sabhasad (Siva Chhatrapati, 119); S.M.H., 125.

139. ibid., 124, Shivaji, 298.

140. H. Heras: "The Marathas in Southern India - "(According to Jesuit Sources) Historical Miscellany (B.I.SM.), 12.

141. F.B.S., 264, 275.

142. F.B.S., 240; Shivaji, 299; I.H.R.C., VI, 1924, 22, "Shivaji in the Madras Karnatak"; M.R., 1924, 150 f.

The treachery and pusillanimity of Naṣīr Muḥammad did not daunt Shēr Khan Lōdī, the Paṭhān Governor of the Southern part of Bijapurī Karnatak. He boldly advanced to stem the tide of the Maratha army and awaited their approach at Tiruvedi (near Cuddalore) about 20th June, 1677. Shivaji arrived near Tiruvedi, on 6th July, at whose sight Shēr Khan put his men in battle order and advanced to attack. The Marathas did not move at all, but waited for the shock. It seems that Shivaji hesitated to attack Shēr Khan and that it was only when he was assured of the French neutrality that he attacked Shēr Khan.[143] Their attitude made Shēr Khan realise that he had taken a false step, and he ordered a retreat. Shivaji, who had been expecting a battle, perceived confusion in the opposite camp and set his own troops in motion. Then the Bijapurīs started retreating into a short flight. The Marathas charged and the Bijapurīs disappeared. Shēr Khan with his son Ibrāhīm fled to the fort of Banagirapaṭnam. The Marathas chased them and blockaded the fort. On the 9th July, Valdaur, Tevenapaṭam (Cuddalore)[144] and several other forts of Shēr Khan fell to the Marathas.

Shēr Khan was forced to sue for terms on the 15th July ceding to Shivaji all the Bijapurī territories of his province and agreeing to pay twenty thousand pagodas in cash, for which he left his eldest son as hostage. Shivaji, on his part, promised a free suit to Shēr Khan and the delivery of his property in Gondelur fort.

---

143. Martin's Memoires, II, 120.

144. Martin's Memoires (trs.) by Sir J.N. Sarkar as "Shivaji in the Madras Karnatak." M.R., 1924, 150 f.; F.B.S., 289, 276 ff., 306.

After the treaty was signed on the two sides, Shēr Khan came out to meet Shivaji, who received him very kindly and expressed sympathy for his distress. Then Shēr Khan returned into the fort of Ariyalur. Shēr Khan was too poor to pay indemnity. So, at last after many months in February, 1678, the local chiefs of that province, out of friendship and pity for Shēr Khan, voluntarily raised 20,000 pagodas from among themselves and secured the release of his son Ibrāhīm Khan. No reinforcement for the help of Shēr Khan came from Bijapur, as the Court was in the midst of civil war between the factions of the nobles.[145]

Thus, almost the whole coastal territory of the eastern Bijapurī Karnatak from Tungabhadra to the Kāvērī came into Shivaji's possession; and 'Ādil Shah's empire was on the brink of dissolution.[146] Consequently the territorial link between Bijapur and Tanjavur(Bijapurī town under Ēkōjī) was broken.[147]

Shivaji and Ekōjī on their Bijapurī Patrimony

According to a Marathi chronicle of a later period Shivaji wrote to Ekōjī, from Ginji requesting him to send some of the principal men of his Court. The latter obliged by sending about six of his men, to whom Shivaji counselled about his share in Shāhjī's Jāgīr in Karnatak. The envoys went back to Ekōjī with the message and a letter from Shivaji. They went to Ekōjī and conveyed the demand. But Ekōjī had no intention of relinquishing the share.[148] But the

---

145. idem.
146. Sardesai, I, 237.
147. Dagh Register, Balkrishna, II (1),
148. Chitnis (Siva Chhatrapati, 227-29); See also Aitihasik Sadhane, Ed. S.V. Avalaskar, Letter No.18, 19 ff.

entire episode is based on doubtful evidence, and hence it cannot be said, with certainty whether Shivaji sent a letter to Ekōjī demanding his share.

Another motive behind Shivaji's demand was his need to have a political lever in the Karnatak. Since this could not be had by peaceful means, obviously conflict was inevitable. Consequently, the logic of the situation demanded action.[149] It is very likely that Shivaji might have demanded his share to exert his authority. A great battle was fought on 26 November, 1677 between the two brothers. It was Ekōjī who initiated hostilities. Finally, they concluded peace. Shivaji, like an elder brother delivered back to Ekōjī a good part of the conquered country.[150]

Shivaji and Party-factions at Bijapur Court

As a result of the successful Karnatak campaign of Shivaji, the Bijapurī Minister Bahlōl Khan and the Mughal General Dilēr Khan effected a close friendship; and the two formed fresh plans to subjugate both Shivaji and Quṭb Shah. Shivaji entertained bitter hatred for Bahlōl. Consequently, Dilēr Khan attacked Golkonda in September 1677 to punish Quṭb Shah for the help he rendered to Shivaji.[151]

With the death of Bahlōl on 23rd December, 1677, Jamshīd Khan found himself capable of holding the reigns. Hence, he agreed to deliver the fort of Bijapur and the person of Sikandar 'Ādil

---

149. Detailed terms of the treaty offered by Shivaji to Ekōjī are given in Shiva Digvijaya, 232 f.

150. Martin's Memoirs, M.R., op.cit., 152. Sardesai I, 242, 244.

151. Basātīn, 468; Sardesai, I, 247, 249.

Shah to Shivaji for a price of 6,00,000 pagodas. However, Siddī Mas'ūd came to the rescue of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty and himself became Minister of Bijapur.[152]

With this change, Dilēr Khan attacked Bijapur. Due to party factions, Bijapur was unable to meet the Mughals single handed. So Mas'ūd in sore need, implored Shivaji for help in a pathetic letter, which ran thus:

"We are neighbours. We eat same salt. Sympathy and agony for the welfare of the 'Adil Shahi Government is same in your and my heart. The enemy (the Mughals) are trying to ruin it. Now, we should join together by keeping aside our enemity, to expel the foreigner between us."[153]

Shivaji was very much moved by this pathetic appeal and felt happy also. He soon prepared to meet the Mughals. He despatched an army of seven thousand to Bijapur. He wrote to Mas'ūd assuring him safety and promising to encounter the Mughals himself.[154] While at the same time it seems, Shivaji entered into a secret alliance with Dharmājī, Janoanand and other Bijapurīs for the murder of Mas'ūd Khan. However, the plot was exposed and the Bijapurī conspirators were crushed.[155]

Then the Marathas instead of marching towards the borders of Bijapur to repell the Mughals, they were advanced towards the city of Bijapur and reaching the gates demanded shelter within the fort. Obviously, they had different motives. When the Marathas

---

152. Shivaji, 317.
153. Basātīn, 468.
154. Basātīn, 472 f.
155. Aḥwāl, 46 a.

started pouring in large number, Mas'ūd got suspicion and he wisely declined to permit them to enter the City. Contrary to this directive they further came closer to the city and started moving freely with the Bijapurī army. Simultaneously, they were found to smuggle arms in the bags of grains. This raised the alarm among the Bijapurīs. When exposed the Marathas threw the mask and began plundering and devastating the City. At this juncture, Mas'ūd changed side and by making peace with the Mughals he invited them against the Marathas. Consequently, the Marathas withdrew. For this Mughal help Mas'ūd agreed to help Shāh 'Ālam in his campaign against Shivaji.[156]

Following the agreement between Mas'ūd and Dilēr, hostiles began between Bijapur and the Marathas. Soon Sharzā Khan took Athni and Rāibāgh and the Marathas were driven from there in June 1678.[157]

With the desertion of Sambhājī from the Marathas, Mas'ūd and Sambhājī became friends and enemies of Shivaji, through the diplomacy of Dilēr Khan. Now Dilēr Khan under orders from Aurangzeb advanced on Bijapur and laid siege in October 1679. Mas'ūd had no recourse; so he sought help from Shivaji against the impending Mughal invasion. Shivaji sent his wakīl Shāmjī Naik to Bijapur on 26th August 1679 to settle the treaty. After prolonged discussions a treaty was settled in November, 1679 by which Shivaji and Mas'ūd formed an alliance against the Mughals. As a price of his help, Shivaji demanded cession of the tract around Kopal and

---

156. Basātīn, 472 ff.; Aḥwāl, 46 a.

157. E.R.S., 11, 325.

Bellary (a tract conquered on an earlier occasion, by Shivaji and his general Hambīr Rao and Janārdhan Pant). He also demanded cessession to Bijapur's claim of sovereignty on his conquered territory in Ginji and Tanjavur and Shahji's jagir districts - (Kolar, Bangalore etc.).[158] All these demands were conceded by Bijapur.

Consequently, Shivaji started on the plundering expedition in the Mughal territory in order to creat a diversion in favour of Bijapur. This defeated Diler Khan's attempt on Bijapur. It was a priceless service of Shivaji to Bijapur. Following this success, he went to the City of Bijapur and had an interview and secret consultations with Mas'ūd. Shivaji wanted to meet 'Ādil Shah. Mas'ūd permitted him to come with a escort of 500 men only. But, on the persuation of Trimbak, Shivaji cancelled the idea.[159]

SEC. III: BIJAPUR AND THE DECCAN POLICY OF SHIVAJI

After long struggle of several decades when Shivaji could not achieve his objective, he adopted a new diplomacy of allying Quṭb Shah of Golkonda and the Maratha chiefs under Bijapur to his side. The motive was the extinction of 'Ādil Shahi Kingdom and extension of Maratha rule.[160]

The intention of recruiting more and more Maratha chiefs and allying with them was to create a general upheaval or a

---

158. Aḥwal, 46; Basātīn, 493 ff.

159. Basātīn, 496 f.

160. Shivaji's letter to Mālōjī Ghōrpare. See Infra Appendix at the end of this chapter.

revolt throughout the kingdom was beyond the control of Bijapur Government. Consequently, leading to an early dissolution of the kingdom and in turn laying the firm foundation of Maratha kingdom - the ultimate aim of Shivaji. Thus, to achieve this objective, Shivaji allied with Quṭb Shah; and tried his utmost to induce leading Maratha chiefs in Bijapurī service to desert their master. This he did by inducing them with tempting offer of providing same and better status and jagir under him or under Quṭb Shah.[161]

Bijapur and the General Diplomacy of Shivaji

From the study of the relations in four phases, it is evident that, both 'Ādil Shah and Shivaji, were attempting (at one time or the other) to exterminate each other. Neither of them were consistent in their policies. Both were opportunists and changed the policy suddenly, to suit the exigencies of time and their motives. They were dictated by the circumstances and call of the situation. But, finally one incontravertible fact emerged out, which was recognized by both of them that they were bound to be neighbours, for good or evil. However, they never adhered strictly to their commitment or treaties.[162] They failed occasionally to redeem the promises. Since their treaties were merely solemn oaths and were not written documents no treaty negotiated between them has come down to us. Obviously both of them, as a general practice, forgot the oaths -- very soon or in course of time. On every encroachment of Shivaji, Bijapur resented; but at

---

161. idem.

162. But Cosme Da Guarde is of the opinion that Shivaji was noted for his adherence to treaties - "Life of the Celebrated Savagy", F.B.S., 85.

last, they were compelled to maintain friendly terms with him by granting privileges.

Though Shivaji intrigued with Mughals and Golkonda against Bijapur, yet to maintain the balance of power in the Deccan and to safeguard it from the Mughal invasion, Bijapur, tried again and again to reconcile and ally with Shivaji.

The history of Shivaji is intimately related in one way or the other to the history 'Ādil Shahs; and it is rightly observed that Shivaji "could raise his head or expand his dominion only at the expense of Bijapur." Further "Rebellion against his liege lord was the necessary condition of his being."[163] It implies that for the rise of Shivaji and for the formation of Maratha Kingdom, their relations were of absolute necessity. But even though he carved out the Maratha State from the Bijapur territory yet, in the hour of need, he gave his sincere help to 'Ādil Shah to defend his state from the Mughal invasion. Thus at times, Shivaji emerged out as the protector of Bijapur Kingdom; and also as a champion of the independence of the Deccan Kingdom. Consequently, at the time of his death, on 5th April 1680 he was in a commanding position to dictate terms to the decaying 'Ādil Shāhī Sultanate.

SEC. IV: BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH SAMBHĀJĪ (1680-86)

Following in the foot-steps of his father, Sambhājī after his accession on 20th July 1680, continued the policy of friendship

---

163. Shivaji, 403.

with 'Ādil Shah, though occasionally allied with the Mughals also.[164]

Before starting the Mughal expedition against Sambhājī (who had given assylum to the Mughal Prince Akbar), Aurangzeb sent on 13th July, 1681 a farmān to Sharzā Khan, the leading General of Bijapur, to co-operate with Khān-i Jahān Bahādur in exterpating the Marathas and in recovering the Bijapurī territory he had usurped. Further, Shahr Bānū, the Bijapurī princess recently married to the Mughal Prince A'ẓam, also sent a personal letter to Sharzā Khan, on 18th July, to the following effect - "you should help the Mughals loyally for the good of the Bijapur Kingdom."[165]

The request of Aurangzeb had no effect on Sharzā Khan. The Bijapurīs preferred to ally with Sambhājī and did not wish to help the Mughals against him. Thus, the Bijapurīs who "would not leave the side of Shambhu"[166] maintained silence and tried to pretend neutrality in the Mughal - Maratha conflict. On the contrary, the Bijapurīs extended their help in whatever way they could. This attitude of Bijapur drew the wrath of the Mughal Emperor. So he decided to invade Bijapur and started preparation.

In the meanwhile, he sent a farmān to Sikandar 'Ādil Shah in March 1682, solicitating supply of food grains etc., for the Mughal army camping in the Deccan and for ousting Sharzā Khan who had disobeyed him. To the six proposals of Aurangzeb, 'Ādil Shah made nine counter proposals; but saying nothing about the help which Aurangzeb had requested.[167] Obviously, 'Ādil Shah could not help both the contenting hostile parties.

---

164. Basātīn, 513.

165. Basātīn, 520 ff.; Faruqi: Aurangzeb and His Times, 342.

166. ibid., 528.

167. ibid., 531 - for full details of the contents of the farmāns see Chapter VI on Bijapur's relations with the Mughals.

Neither 'Ādil Shah nor Sharzā Khan obeyed the orders of Aurangzeb. Neither provisions nor reinforcement of troops was sent. Further, the hampering of the Mughal line of communications convinced Aurangzeb of the secret conspiracy between 'Ādil Shah and Sambhājī.[168] Consequently, he ordered A'ẓam Khan to reduce Bijapur.

In the meanwhile, the Bijapurīs were secretly helping the Marathas against the Mughals. Implying that the Bijapurīs preferred the friendship of the Marathas than that of the Mughals; and in Sambhājī they gained "their only friend in day of need."[169] All efforts of Aurangzeb to detach Bijapur from Sambhājī failed. But, its consequences were very far reaching and it finally led to the extinction of Bijapur in 1686.

---

168. Faruqi, opcit., 344.

169. AU., IV, 364.

Already published? why repeat?

APPENDIX

LETTER OF SHIVAJI TO MĀLŌJĪ GHŌRPAṚE*

Dated March 1677.

To Malojiraje Ghorpade, from Shivaji Raje:

(After compliments). You are already aware how my late lamented father left the Nizamshahi state and entered Bijapur service during the regime of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah and with what confidence Ibrahim Adil Shah treated him. My father's uppermost idea at the time was that whatever power he possessed should be utilised in raising the status of those Maratha Jagirdars who were scattered about in search of livelihood that they should attain distinction and power in managing the affairs of the State. With this object in view, my father brought your father Baji Ghorpade for an interview with the Adil Shah and raised him to t he status of an imperial commander. I know what great deeds you, and your father did since then. The kings of Bijapur looked after your interests during three regimes. It is to be regretted, however, that your father forgetting all the good that my father had done him, sided with Mustafakhan in capturing him (my father). It was your father, Baji Ghorpade, who undertook the hazardous enterprise, and gave over my father as a captive into Mustafa's hands, a consummation which for years caused bitter enmity between your house and mine,

---

*Reproduced from Shivaji Souvenir (ed.): G.S. Sardesai, 148.

resulting in open battle and bloodshed on both sides. My people killed your father in a fight. Thus the enmity continued for a number of years; but now has arrived the occasion for rectifying the past mistakes, and I write to you to explain the present political situation and to advise you how to use it to mutual advantage. You are aware that there have been three Mohammadan states in the South, the Nizamshahi, the Adilshahi and the Kutbshahi. Upon the first being destroyed by the Moghuls, its great nobles came into the service of the Adil Shah of Bijapur, after personal consultations and conferences. This Adilshahi, however, has now been captured by Buhalolkhan, a Pathan. The Adil Shah is a minor child, having only the name of a king, but virtually under the Pathan's restraint. The throne, the umbrella and the fort of Bijapur are captured by the Pathan, a result altogether detrimental to the interests of the Deccanis. If the Pathan is allowed to become powerful, he will surely ruin one and all Deccani nobles. He will not let them rise. For these reasons, I have entered into a friendly understanding with the Kutb Shah, with whom I had purposely kept amicable intercourse from the beginning, and who recently called me for a personal interview, in an autograph-letter impressed with his own palm. I respected this invitation and met the Kutb Shah, who upon learning that I had already declared myself an independent king, excused me the usual Mohammadan ceremonials, which he used to exact from one and all, namely, touching the ground before them with the head. The Kutb Shah and I met on equal terms, both coming halfway for the meeting. He received me most honourably and with sincere greetings. Holding me with his hand, he seated me by his side and showed various marks of respect, thereby cementing a

mutual relationship. Then we entered into a discussion of political matters in which the Kutb Shah's minister Madanpant and I unitedly made certain proposals, which were at once granted by the Kutb Shah. Whatever I proposed, he at once agreed to. He has placed such a high confidence in me that I am in a very favourable position which I can well utilise to enhance the interests of the Marathas and to reduce the power of the Pathan of Bijapur. As soon as an agreement was reached on both sides, my uppermost idea was to take into confidence all the great Maratha nobles, to bring them for an interview with the Kutb Shah, to offer them fresh prospects of service and with their help extend the dominion of the Kutb Shah on the one side and that of all the Maratha nobles on the other. You know how keen I have been in consolidating the Maratha power by bringing together all the scattered elements for a united action. Inspired with these motives, I have arranged with the Kutb Shah that he should employ you into his service. For this, we must at once lay aside our hereditary enmity you must throw away all your suspicicion about me; take my honest word that I am anxious to promote your interests; and promptly respond to the formal letter of invitation which I have obtained from the Kutb Shah and sent to you herewith. You are born of a high family; you must trust me and immediately on receipt of this letter must contrive to get away from the service of the Pathan and by rapid stages come and m meet me at Bhaganagar. I am sure, you will not lose this splendid opportunity, and by way of an assurance in advance, you must send, ahead of you, an envoy of your confidence to settle matters before hand, atleast four days before you can personally arrive so that I shall be able to convince the Kutb Shah of the sincerity of our plan and obtain from him his autography order and dresses

of honour which can reach you before you arrive for an actual interview. Thus when all arrangements are made, I can take you for the Kutb Shah's interview, as soon as you arrive. I am just now in such a strong position to promote your interests that, I am sure, you will ever afterwards remember my good offices. Nay, your sons and grandsons also will remember them with gratitude. Here is a rare opportunity for you to profit yourself at the hands of the Kutb Shah. Do not hesitate on any account. Do not hesitate to give up your loyalty to the Adil Shah, which you might think has lasted for two generations. Nor should you allow any distrust about me to come in your way. Where is the Bijapur State now in reality? When Khawaskhan was captured when the Pathan took possession of the Bijapur forts and imprisoned the child king, the Bijapur kingdom came to an end. It is no more in existence and there is no more justification for you to serve that state. You can no longer think it your own. The Pathan himself may offer you inducements which might deter you from taking this new step, but you must remember that the Pathan will never look to your interest. The Kutb Shah, I and the various Maratha nobles are all ready to swallow the Pathan up. You Marathas are my kith and kin. Your interest is uppermost in my heart. That is why I write to you so plainly. The Kutb Shah and I can give you double of what the Pathan may promise you. Nay, whatever more is possible will surely be done by way of rewarding your services. I have cast away all my suspicions about you. I swear by my Goddess Bhavani on this score. I will not fail to keep my word. Flying away all suspicion come to me at once, and send your trusted envoy in advance with an oath in the name of your family God that you on your part

are as sincere as I am on mine. Send a similar oath in writing with your envoy. I shall never, never, fail to advance your interests. What more shall I write?

CHAPTER VIII

BIJAPUR'S RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS IN INDIA

Part I

Bijapur-Portuguese Relations

The Portuguese owe the foundation of their colonial empire in India to Bijapur. The Portuguese rise to power in India is attributed to their capture of the Bijapuri port of Goa and its cession to them by 'Adil Shah. The study of the Bijapur-Portuguese relations, beginning from 1508 to 1686, can be conveniently made in five phases, from the Portuguese point of view:

First Phase:	Period of Exploration and Portuguese Struggle for Survival on Bijapur Territory (1508-45)
Second Phase:	Period of Consolidation and Treaties (1545-79)
Third Phase:	Period of Peaceful Relations (1579-95)
Fourth Phase:	Period of Portuguese Domination (1595-1655)
Fifth Phase:	Period of Quiet Relations (1656-86)

SEC. I: FIRST PHASE (1508-1545)

PERIOD OF EXPLORATION AND PORTUGUESE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL ON BIJAPUR TERRITORY (1508 - 1545)

The Portuguese were the first European nation to establish overseas commercial intercourse with India during the Medieval period of Indian History. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Portuguese were keenly desirous of bringing Christianity to "vast tribes lying under the wrath of God."[1]

Inspired by the religious fervour and fired with the crusading spirit, the Portuguese commanders took chief care during the closing year of the Fifteenth Century in an attempt to drive all Muhammadan shipping from the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in order to ensure the carrying of all Indian products in Portuguese vessel. The next hundred years were therefore occupied in establishing factories on the West Coast of India and in waging wars with the Indian rulers.[2] Thus with the landing of Vasco da Gama on 17th May, 1498, near Calicut, the Portuguese became the first Christian nation of Europe to acquire powers in India, and they maintained it

---

1. Sir Denison Rose says that the original motives of the Portuguese for coming to India, was principally to find spices and Christians - C.H.I., V, 2.
   Whiteway states that it became the settled policy of the Portuguese to promote marriages between the captives of different countries with the people of Portugal. Obviously they were converted to Christianity before or after the marriage - The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 17.

2. C.H.I., V, 2.

by the policy of "devide et impera" - by playing off one Indian State against another.[3] They succeeded in achieving their goal and in obtaining foot hold in western India, only after several determined naval attacks on Muhammaden traders, their fleet and their States.

In 1508, Bijapur and Portuguese came indirectly in contact for the first time.

A new phase in Luso-Indian relation began from 1508 with the despatch of D. Francisco de Almeida with the title of Viceroy and authorisation by the King of Portugal, to consolidate Portuguese commerce with the East on imperial lines. Almeida was instructed to conclude alliances with the Indian rulers and to interrupt Muhammaden spice trade by the control of the Red Sea. This was to be assured by the erection of the fort near its mouth. Portugal thus pitted herself against the whole commercial organisation of the Muhammaden world. Then, by a system of licences (Cartaz)[4] he sought to control all oriental trading-ships. This system threatened immediate ruin to his commercial rivals and it was not long before the struggle began, specially after the conquests of Socotra by the Portuguese off the Red Sea.[5]

Consequently, the Muhammaden rulers of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Calicut were hastir, and they were induced

---

3. B.D. Basu: The Rise of Christian Power in India, 20.
4. Cartaza - it was a passport or license issued by the Portuguese as permit for shipping by Indian rulers or their subjects - C.R. Boxer: A Glimpse of Goa Archives, 316.
5. H.V.L. Livermore: A History of Portugal, 233.

to take a concerted action. The allies gave a crushing naval battle to the Portuguese, off Chaul, on the Western Coast of Konkan in 1508. Bijapur joined the allies in fear of the loss of its trade, revenue and monopoly over the seas. However, the Portuguese, with a re-inforcement retaliated and gave a crushing defeat to the allies on 2nd February 1508, off Diu.[6] This assured the Portuguese of sea power in the Indian Ocean.

It was only the commercial motive that incited Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah to join the allies in ejecting out the Portuguese; however, the Egyptians tried to give a religious colour to the struggle. But there was neither any political nor diplomatic reason for Bijapur to join against the Portuguese. Moreover, till then, the Portuguese on their part had not done any hostile act against Bijapur. Thus, this was the first indirect contact between the two States.

This involvement of Bijapur gave an opportunity to the Portuguese to decalre hostilities against Bijapur. And according to Barbosa, the Portuguese suspected that Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah was trying to reconstruct the confederacy recently vanquished at Diu.[7] This furthered the cause of the Portuguese, as they could hardly expect better justification, to declare open hostilities, against Bijapur with a possibility of making some gains.

Thus, in December 1508, on his way to Diu, Almeida took "revenge at Dabhol (a Bijapurī port) for the assistance which had

---

6. Fatḥ al-Mubīn, Stanza 126
   Tuḥfat-i Mujāhidīn, 56. M. Longworth Dames: "The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century", J.R.A.S., January 1921, 5.
7. Dr. P.M. Joshi:"Relations between the Adil Shahi Kingdom of Bijapur and the Portuguese at Goa during the sixteenth century". I.A. (New), September 1939.

been given there to the Egyptian fleet."[8] At Dabhol the Portuguese were quite successful. The Bijapurīs were driven out and the Portuguese occupied the harbour on 30th December 1508. Almeida himself slept in the principal mosque of the town that night. Next morning the victors set the buildings of the town on fire and returned to their ships.[9] However, the Bijapuris did not retaliate. This action of Almeida was only a reprisal and he did not desire to establish a factory at Dabhol nor he wished for any territorial gains. This policy of Almeida was guided by the directions laid down for him (by the king of Portugal) to the extent of hindering the Arab trade and of assuring Portuguese commercial preponderance in India. He had decided that the continuance of this preponderance would depend entirely on sea power and held the opinion that numerous fortresses would be a source of dispersion and weakness ...[10]

The beginning of direct relations - The first contest

The appointment of Afonso de Albuquerque in 1509 as Viceroy of Portuguese-India by King Emanuel ushered in a new era in Luso-Indian Politics. In contrast to Almeida, Albuquerque, being holder and more independent envisaged not only Portuguese sea-power, but imperial dominion throughout the known Orient. This policy necessitated a metropolis and Albuquerque choose Goa, which by its island position half-way down the coast of India, best fulfilled the strategic requirements of the capital of a

---

8. Longworth Dames, op.cit., J.R.A.S., January 1921, 9.

9. Dr. P.M. Joshi, log.cit.

10. Livermore, op.cit., 234.

maritime empire.[11]

Timoja, a famous pirate, tried to ally with the Portuguese. He gave the intelligence that the time was opportune for the Portuguese to make a sudden assault on Goa and capture it. As at that time the Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah was far away in the interior on a expedition and the Bijapurī governor of Goa Malik Yūsuf Gurji was powerless to resist.[12] Thus, Albuquerque, having collected a fleet, started for the proposed conquest of Goa. He had the fortune to find its armies absent on an expedition and captured it with little effort,[13] On 3rd March 1510.[14] The Bijapurī governor of Goa and his soldiers fled with such haste that many fugitives were drowned while crossing the river. Soon Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah returned with a large army. But before attacking Goa, he made overtures, in vain, to Albuquerque through messenger, for a peaceful settlement of the issue. Subsequently, he sent Muṣṭafā Khan and again endeavoured to arrive at a peaceful settlement with the surrender of Cintacora with its islands and revenue to the Portuguese instead of Goa. But

---

11. ibid., 235. K.M. Pannikar attributes Albuquerque's conquest of Goa due to the defeat of the Portuguese at Cochin, which rendered it necessary to find another and more convenient base for naval operations - Malabar and the Portuguese, 77. It was not due to Chchin's defeat, but the capture of Goa was preplanned well in advance. Albuquerque in his letter to King Emmanuel of Portugal wrote - "I captured Goa because your Highness ordered me to do so - " Albuquerque (Stephens)

12. Albuquerque (Stephens), 75; Purchas - His Pilgrims, II, 82.

13. Livermore, log.cit.; Albuquerque (Stephens), 76.

14. The date of the first capture of Goa are given differently: The Commentaries of Albuquerque (II, 88 ff.) gives March 3, 1510; Correa (Lendes da India) as 1st March; Decade Barros (II, Book V, Chapter 3) Constanheda (III, 30). Faria-e-Sousa-Asia Portuguese (I, 2), all fix 17th February, 1510. Tuḥfat-i Mujāhidin places it in March 1510.

when Albuquerque declined this offer, then Muṣṭafā Khan suggested that Goa itself would be surrendered, if Albuquerque handed over Timoja to the Bijapurīs. This proposition was also rejected by Albuquerque and he challenged the conquest of Goa. Eventually, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah's army made its way into the island of Goa on 17th May 1510 and reconquered it.[15]

The policy adopted by Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah in the conquest of Goa needs special mention as he exhibited quite unusual and surprising attitude towards the enemy. It seems that the Portuguese fleet remained at anchor at the mouth of the harbour of Goa for nearly three months. During this period the Portuguese in the fleet suffered heavily from sickness and starvation. When this was brought to the notice of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah by the deserters, he, with true chivalry, offered to send provision to the Portuguese fleet, stating that he wished to conquer them not by starvation but by the sword. Albuquerque resolved to receive no such assistance from the enemy and made a show of enough food and wine in front of the 'Ādil Shah's messenger. Throughout the siege the two generals vied with each other in generosity.[16]

Another fact, particularly of notice, is that Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah at the request of Albuquerque refused to allow the Portuguese deserters, who had joined him, to continue going down to the banks of the harbour to invite other soldiers and sailors to desert.[17] This honesty of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah, in war, conclusively proves that

---

15. Albuquerque (Stephens), 76; Danvers: The Portuguese in India, I, 201. Cintacora, situated south of Goa in the Kingdom of Onor (Honavar) - Danvers, I, 187.
16. Albuquerque (Stephens), 79, 82.
17. idem.

he wanted to defeat his enemy by fair means and not by unfair means.

After the defeat, Albuquerque was forced to retire to Cochin. But as the Portuguese were seized with great indignation, they made great preparations and attacked Goa again. The time was also more opportune. Timoja gave information to Albuquerque that 'Ādil Shah had left Goa for Bijapur, and that there was people's insurrection at Goa against the Bijapurī army. He therefore pressed him for a second attack. Thus on 25th November, 1510, the Portuguese assaulted Goa successfully in three columns. The Bijapurīs fought desperately but the Portuguese recaptured and sacked Goa.[18]

Soon after the capture of Goa by the Portuguese Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah died on 5th December, 1510. He was succeeded by an infant boy Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah; and the Regency fell on Kamāl Khan. The new government was not powerful enough to fight back the Portuguese. Moreover, some of the Bijapurī generals deserted to the Portuguese.

Meanwhile, Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah received a personal letter directly from Albuquerque. It was a surprising diplomatic move on the part of Albuquerque to extend an offer of peace and friendship to 'Ādil Shah after capturing the latter's territory. The letter was both curious and characteristic. It throws flood of light on the Albuquerque's policy which he was to adopt in future in relation to Bijapur. And it laid the foundation of Portuguese empire in India. Albuquerque wrote to 'Ādil Shah: "---I wish most sincerely that your father had been living, that he might know me to be man of my word; out of regard for him, I shall be ever your

---

18. Livermore, log.cit.; Tuḥfat, 59; Albuquerque (Stephen), 83 ff.

friend, and I will assist you against the king of the Deccan and against your enemies, and I will cause all the horses that arrive here to be carried to your stations and your marts, in order that you may have possession of them. The merchants of your land bring their merchandize to this port, and take to yours in exchange merchandize of the sea, and of the land, and horses, and I will give them a safe conduct. If you wish for my friendship, first, your messengers come to me with your communications and I will send you others on my part, who shall convey to you my communications; if you will perform this which I write into you, by my aid shall you be able to gain possessions of much land and became a great Lord among the Moors. Be desirous of performing this, for thus, it shall be well with you, and you shall have great power; and for all that the Sabio (Yusuf 'Adil Shah), your father, be dead, I will be your father and bring you up like a son."[19]

The following points of diplomatic strategy emerge out from the above letter:

that this move of Albuquerque was dictated by the fear of an attack by Bijapur to dislodge them from Goa;

that to pacify the young 'Ādil Shah and to prevent him from taking any military action, he offered friendship of the Portuguese and terms of peace;

that Albuquerque desirous of gaining the goodwill of 'Ādil Shah offered terms relative to an alliance;

that he induced 'Ādil Shah to agree to his terms by extending tempting offers of help against Niẓām Shah of Ahmadnagar;

---

19. Commentaries, III, 20 f.

supply of imported articles and territorial gains and increase in power due to the alliance of the Portuguese;

that peace and friendship with Bijapur meant the foundation of the Portuguese power on the Indian soil and for that he was prepared to do anything in his power; and

that Albuquerque offered his guardianship to the infant Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah and promised to bring him up like his son.

Under the circumstances, Kamāl Khan considered wise and expedient to accept Albuquerque's offer of peace and friendship at the cost of Goa. Kamāl Khan agreed to cede Goa to the Portuguese on condition of their not mobsting other surrounding Bijapurī territory. Accordingly, since that time, the Portuguese, observing the treaty, did not make any further encroachments on the 'Ādil Shāhī territory.[20] Obviously, the Regent, Kamāl Khan had analysed the situation from the face of Albuquerque's letter and did not imagine the deep diplomacy behind the cession of Goa and its political consequences.

Bijapur's attempt to recapture Goa (1512)

Bijapur did not abandon the idea of recapturing Goa. It was only for an opportune time that they were waiting. This came when Albuquerque left Goa for Malacca. Soon Kamāl Khan despatched a force under Faulād Khan to drive out Malhar Rao, who was carrying on the administration of the main land district on behalf of the Portuguese. He was ordered, if possible to capture Timoja, who was with Malhar Rao.[21] Faulād Khan defeated the forces of

---

20. Briggs, III, 19.

21. Danvers, I, 242.

Timoja and Malhar Rao and then invaded the island of Goa and established himself in the fortress of Banestarim. The Portuguese captain Rodringo Rebellow, under-rating the Bijapurīs, who marched out and retaliated, met defeat.[22]

Faulād Khan, having thus gained possession of the main-land territories of Goa - forgetful of the instructions, he had received from the Regent, which were, that in the event of his success he was to await instructions as to his further proceedings - desired to follow up his Victory. So he crossed over to the island of Goa without meeting any resistance. He at once fortified himself in Banestarim, which commanded the principal passage from the main-land to the island of Goa. Since, Faulād Khan's actions were beyond the scope of the instructions given to him, it arose the suspicion of the Government. As such, the Regent sent Rasūl Khan, with a contingent to supplant the former. Faulād Khan got indignant at another officer being sent to supersede him in the siege of Goa and more so because, he was not on friendly terms with Rasūl Khan. Thus, he refused to obey him. Rasūl Khan doubtful of his ability to coerce Faulād Khan, appealed to Portuguese for help on the following grounds - Rasūl Khan sent a false message to Diogo Mendes, declaring that the 'Ādil Shāhī Government greatly desired peace and friendship with the King of Portugal and was much annoyed at what Faulād Khan had done. As such he had been sent with a force to restrain him and check his rebellion. Rasūl Khan requested help from Mendes to turn Faulād Khan out. Diogo Mendes was foolish enough to comply the request of Rasūl Khan.

---

22. Albuquerque (Stephens), 111.

The combined forces drove Faulad Khan out of Banestarim. Naturally, Rasūl Khan having assumed power, safe in the island of Goa, demanded the surrender of the city itself from the Portuguese.[23]

Rasūl Khan commenced the siege of the city of Goa and closely invested it during the whole winter, so that those within the walls were subjected to great hardships and starvation. Meanwhile, news reached about the departure of a great fleet of Turks[24] from Suez to help 'Ādil Shah against the Portuguese. This greatly distressed Albuquerque who had returned to India from Malacca. In September 1512, he came to the rescue of Goa with a reinforcement. On arrival at Goa, Albuquerque commenced attack on Banestarim. Instead of driving out Rasūl Khan, he blockaded him and cut off his retreat and finally made entry into Goa. Rasūl Khan being helpless held out the white flag for peace. The terms which Albuquerque demanded were that the fort to be surrendered with all its artillery, ammunition and horses and that the deserters in Rasūl Khan's camp to be given to him. Rasūl Khan consented only one condition that the lives of the deserters should be spared. Banestarim was accordingly evacuated and it was reoccupied by the Portuguese.[25]

It was foolish policy adopted by Bijapur Court. When Faulād Khan was victorious against the Portuguese there was no need to send Rasūl Khan. The latter played false tricks and tried to drive out his own man. Thus weakening Bijapur's strength. The representation of Rasūl Khan that Bijapur desired peaceful and

---

23. Danvers, I, 243 ff.; Commentaries, III, 191 f.

24. Though according to the Portuguese sources a Turkish fleet was sent from the Suez, but its collaboration with the Indian fleet is rather doubtful.

25. Albuquerque (Stephens), 115.

friendly relation with Portuguese and had no intention of waging war were proved to be false when a reinforcement was despatched by Bijapur. This dual diplomacy of Bijapur in general and Rasūl Khan in particular was erroneous and proved false on Bijapur itself.

Naval Blockade of Dabhol by the Portuguese (1513)

After the recapture of Banestarim, Albuquerque ordered, in May 1513, Garcia De Sousa to take certain ships and cruse off Dabhol and not to permit a single vessel to go into, or out of, the port. This action was with an object of making war upon Bijapur, wherever he was able to prevail. For Bijapur, this created a serious problem. Now Bijapur had no other alternative but to sue for peace. As such, Kamāl Khan sent an ambassador to Goa to propose peace. To the Bijapurī ambassador, Albuquerque professed friendship and peaceful relations, but demanded certain rare articles and deputed his own ambassador to Bijapur to fetch them. However, on the request of the Bijapurī ambassador, Albuquerque ordered to open the naval blockade of Dabhol, with free ingress to the ships, pending negotiations of the Treaty. This was a gesture of Albuquerque to establish friendly relations. Consequently, ambassadors were exchanged between Bijapur and Goa. Diogo Fernandez was the Portuguese ambassador, who accompanied the Bijapurī ambassador, to Bijapur. The former was accompanied with over two dozen persons.[27]

---

26. Commentaries, III 243; Albuquerque (Stephens), 125.

27. Commentaries, III, 244; Albuquerque (Stephens), 126.

Hostile diplomacy of Albuquerque

Though Albuquerque himself offered, earlier, in a letter to Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah that he would allow free import of horses into Bijapur, but he soon changed his mind on receipt of a proposal from the ruler of Vijayanagar. The Rāya proposed to Albuquerque to join in a war against Bijapur. To this proposal, Albuquerque first gave a diplomatic reply; but upon being again pressed on the matter he agreed to join the Raya in a war against Bijapur.[28]

The news of this projected alliance perturbed Kamāl Khan at Bijapur. He sent an ambassador to Goa with instructions to say that Bijapur desired to maintain peace and friendship with the king of Portugal and to arrange the trade in horses and that the Portuguese ought not, therefore to favour the Rāya of Vijayanagar in that respect. Albuquerque however, preferring the friendship of the Rāya, delayed giving reply to the Bijapurī ambassador. He was expecting confirmation of the Rāya's genuinness about the alliance. Albuquerque temporised for some time with the Bijapurī ambassador; but, as he had no reply from Vijayanagar he hastened to change his mind again, this time in favour of Bijapur. He dispensed with the Bijapurī ambassador and sent with him Jao Goncalves de Castillo Branco as his ambassador to Bijapur. Through him, Albuquerque expressed that out of a desire to maintain friendship he would let Bijapur have all the horses that arrive at Goa; but, on condition of Bijapur surrendering the mainland adjacent to Gao as far as the ghauts, in order to render the military position of Goa more secure. Albuquerque also promised that the king Dom Manoel of Portugal

---

28. Danvers, II, 300.

would give all assurances of no war with him, nor thwart his policy to the advantage of Vijayanagar. Albuquerque further demanded surrender of some Portuguese personnel. By the time the ambassadors returned, with replies from Bijapur, Albuquerque was dead.[29]

Hostile Relations (1516-45)

Early in 1516 Bijapur and Goa clashed due to some petty quarrel between one Monroy and Ankus Khan, the Bijapurī General at Ponda. The Bijapurīs besieged Goa. Consequently the inhabitants were reduced to great straits. But with the arrival of reinforcement, the Bijapurīs raised the siege and a formal treaty of peace was concluded.[30]

The Portuguese, contrary to the peace treaty with Bijapur assistend Krishnadēvarāya of Vijayanagar in the latter's conflict with Bijapur. Taking advantage of the defeat of the Bijapurī forces, Ruy De Mello, who was commanding at Goa, occupied a part of the mainland opposite to Goa.[30]

Dom Duarti De Menzes assumed the office of the governor of the Portuguese India on 22nd January 1522. He appointed Simao De Andrade as commander of Chaul. The blockade of Dabhol was resumed. It seems that Andrade gained a victory in Dabhol. Consequently, the governor of that city was compelled to pay war indemnity.[31] Bijapur was never reconciled by the loss of Goa and its surrounding territory. They were only waiting for an opportunity to recapture back what all they could. This came when Dom Duarte Menezes was away to

---

29. Danvers, I, 337.
30. idem.
31. ibid., 353.

Ormuz and Bijapur succeeded in regaining the mainland opposite to Goa which Ruy De Mello had annexed in 1520. Francis Pereira offered some resistance to the Bijapurīs and eventually the latter were successful. Finally a peaceful settlement was made, by which, the Portuguese ceded the territories of the main-land.[32]

Again in 1535 when 'Ādil Shah was busy in a war with Golkonda, Nunoda Cunta seizing the opportunity, occupied the Bijapurī territory of the main land opposite to Goa. For the protection of which, a fort was also erected at Rāchol by the Portuguese. But not without opposition by the Bijapurīs. Sulaimān Aghā tried in vain to prevent its construction. Asad Khan was very much pressed by 'Ādil Shah to declare war against the Portuguese and demand demolishing of the fort of Rāchol. Asad Khan sent his captain, Sulaimān Aghā, with a large army. Dom Joaso Pereira opposed the Bijapurīs, in February 1536, with a large army. In a battle the Portuguese emerged victories and the Bijapurīs retreated.[33]

Soon after this the governor arrived at Goa, whereupon Asad Khan sent him a message requesting that the territories of Rāchol might be returned to him, and that the fort should be demolished. Nunoda replied that he had no objection to return back the territories, but he could not think of demolishing the fort without the sanction of the King of Portugal, who had only given his authority to build forts but not to pull them down and that he need not therefore trouble himself about sending any more messages. On this, Asad Khan immediately declared war. He gave time of ten days to

---

32. ibid., 356. Please see Map No.7.

33. ibid., 414 f.

all Portuguese in his territories to leave. The Portuguese within the specified time took refuge in the fort and Asad Khan on the tenth day, marched against them with a large army. A pitched battle took place in which the Bijapurīs were once again defeated with heavy losses.[34]

Asad Khan being still pressed by 'Ādil Shah to carry on the war until he demolished the fort of Rāchol, he despatched a large army which invaded Bardes. The Portuguese under Antonio da Silveira routed the Bijapuris. Since the generals of Asad Khan were defeated by the Portuguese, he determined to conduct the next war himself. He cut off all communications with the fort of Rāchol. The Portuguese made several unsuccessful sorties with heavy losses. Asad Khan treated well the wounded prisoners of the Portuguese and sent them back saying that he was anxious to cease hostilities, if the fort was demolished. Asad Khan desired friendly relations with the Portuguese. The Portuguese reciprocated the gesture and ceased hostilities. They agreed to the terms of Asad Khan and demolished the fort.[35]

SEC. II: SECOND PHASE (1545-79)

PERIOD OF CONSOLIDATION AND TREATIES

Portuguese Conspiracy against 'Ādil Shah

The success of the Portuguese arms, especially in Cambay, caused doubts in Bijapur. As such, 'Ādil Shah at once sent an

---

34. idem.
35. ibid., 415 f.

ambassador to Goa to ratify the previous treaties of peace.[36]

Until 1545 Asad Khan did not give up hopes of instituting the Sultan of his own choice to the throne of Bijapur. Asad Khan having entertained designs to depose Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I, prevailed upon, by means of presents, the Portuguese governor to espouse the cause of 'Abdullāh, brother of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I. Whereupon, 'Ādil Shah was very indignant, but endeavoured to gain the Portuguese governor to his side by liberal offers. Martin Affonso de Sousa, the governor was not interested in who was rightful successor to the throne; but he was interested in, who offered greater advantages to the crown of Portugal, in return for sponsoring the cause. From this point of view, de Sousa was disposed rather to favour Asad Khan who offered the kingdom of Konkan, the revenue of which was over a million; and he prepared to support 'Abdullāh by force of arms. However, at the instance of Pero de Faria, who pointed out the gross injustice of such a course of action, de Sousa changed his policy and secured the person of 'Abdullāh. But soon with the death of Asad Khan, the prime mover of the intrigue was removed from the scene. Still Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I fearing lest the conspiracy should again break out against him he offered to make over the lands of Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese, if de Sousa would deliver 'Abdullāh to him. Not withstanding how to act in such a treacherous manner towards the man whose cause he had so recently proposed to support, de Sousa promised that in consideration of those lands being made over to him, he would send 'Abdullāh away where he should not again disturb 'Ādil Shah. To

---

36. Danvers, I, 443.

this, the latter agreed and having fulfilled his part of the contract by making over Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese, de Sousa sent 'Abdullāh to Cananore. But shortly afterwards brought him back openly to Goa. This was a breach of the agreement by the Portuguese. As 'Ādil Shah in addition to making over Salsette and Bardes to the crown of Portugal, had also gifted de Sousa with the vast treasures, estimated at one million of ducats which Asad Khan had collected for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy.[37]

Being thus deceived, 'Ādil Shah pressed de Sousa either to fullfil his promise of sending 'Abdullāh away, or to restore what had been made over to him on that condition. The governor, however, endeavoured to temporise and sent Joso Fernandez de Negreiros as an ambassador to treat with him on the subject. But 'Ādil Shah seized him and all the Portuguese personnels that accompanied him and put them in prison. They were retained as hostages for the due fulfilment of the agreement by the Portuguese. De Sousa was thus forced to comply and gave an assurance that as soon as the season should permit he would send 'Abdullāh to Mallacca.[38]

De Sousa did not keep up his promise instead, he sent Galvao Viegas to 'Ādil Shah, demanding payment of a sum of 50,000 parades in gold in exchange for which he undertook to hand over 'Abdullāh, who was then at Goa.[39]

In the meanwhile, De Sousa was succeeded, in 1546, by Dom Joao de Castro as governor. The new governor did not agree to the

---

37. P. Pissurlancer: Agentes de Diplomacia Portuguese na India, 12 f.; Danvers, I, 464 f.

38. idem.

39. Whiteway, op.cit., 303; Danvers, I, 474.

contract made by de Sousa with 'Ādil Shah. Due to these differences, when 'Ādil Shah duly sent for 'Abdullāh, de Castro refused to oblige. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah broke off friendly relations with the Portuguese. De Castro feared lest matters might culimnate in hostilities, he made his soldiers go through their drills in sight of the 'Ādil Shah's forces on the main land. He greatly increased and improved the army and sent a message to 'Ādil Shah to the effect that if he was determined to come against Goa, he would have the roads cleared and have bridges constructed in order that his passage might be facilitated.[40]

Peace Treaty of 1546

'Ādil Shah, seeing that the preparations that were being made against him, and finding that the Portuguese governor was not to be reconciliated by costly presents, sent for the terms of peace. Accordingly, on 26th February 1546, a treaty was concluded[41] reaffirming friendly relations.

The Treaty was very deceptive and was totally in favour of the Portuguese. It does not provide any condition for the release

---

40. idem.

41. Danvers, I, 475. In the text of this Treaty ('Contract') Danvers writes "Adil Khan". It is highly doubtful that 'Ādil Shah being a Sultan of an independent sovereign State could have written himself as "Adil Khan" in the text of the treaty. Obviously, the translation of Danvers is defective. Moreover, throughout his two volumes he has used similar nomenclature - evidently with a prejudice to show the superiority of the Portuguese. However, to be factual, suitable modification has been made while using Danvers material throughout this chapter.

of 'Abdullāh and surrender of Salsette and Bardes to the Portuguese; though such conditions were fixed in the previous treaties, formerly concluded. On the contrary, the Portuguese got ceded, as gift the territories of Salsette and Bardes and held the question of 'Abdullāh under suspense, till the embassy of 'Ādil Shah returned from Portugal with necessary orders. Obviously, the question of 'Abdullāh was left on the decision of the king of Portugal in order to gain time and occupy the territories and to exhort further benefit from 'Ādil Shah.

Even though 'Ādil Shah relinquished the territories of Salsette and Bardes, but he was still having an eye to acquire them. back. Opportunity came when the Portuguese did not fulfil the terms of the treaty. Taking advantage of the absence of the governor from Goa, the Bijapurīs captured the territories of Salsette and Bardes. Consequently, de Castro sent an army to drive out the Bijapurīs. On the approach of the large army, the Bijapurīs fled and the Portuguese recovered the territories without any hostility. 'Ādil Shah however, again sent troops to invade the same territory. But this time, the Bijapurīs won the battle and the Portuguese were forced to abandon the acquired territory. Thereupon, the governor de Melo accompanied by a large army came to the rescue of his men. On receipt of this information, the Bijapurīs retired to the fort of Ponda. The Portuguese pursuaded them; and after a stubborn fight the Bijapurīs were completely routed.[42]

---

42. Whiteway, 314. Danvers, I, 478. (Map No.7).

Anti-Bijapur Alliances of Portuguese with Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar (1547)

To check Bijapur's longing eyes on the Portuguese possessions (once of Bijapur) and in order to prevent any coalition between Bijapur, Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar against the Portuguese, de Castro concluded in 1547, separate treaties with Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar kingdoms, the two adversaries of Bijapur. This strategy maintained balance of power and forced 'Ādil Shah to be at peace and friendly with the Portuguese. For, any hostility with the Portuguese meant opening of hostilities on two other fronts, with Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar; and Bijapur could not fight at three fronts simultaneously with three powerful adversaries.

In the treaties which Portuguese made with Ahmadnagar and Vijayanagar, provision was made to check Bijapur's military power, in order to maintain the balance of power. The terms of the treaties,[43] relevant to and directly affecting Bijapur were:

"The Portuguese and Vijayanagara were to be friend of friends, and enemy of enemies of the other. And when called upon, to help the other, with their forces against all the rulers in India, the Nizam Shah always excepted.

"The Governor of Goa will allow all Arab and Persian horses that land at Goa to be purchased by the king of Vijayanagara on due notice and proper payment, none being permitted to be sent to Bijapur.

"The king of Vijayanagara will compel all merchants in his kingdom trading with the coast to send their goods through ports

---

43. H. Heras: Aravidu Dynasty, 62 f.; Mahalingam: Economic Life in Vijayanagara, 121 f.

where the Portuguese have factors permitting none to proceed to Bijapuri ports.

"The king of Vijayanagara will forbid the importation of saltpetre and iron into his kingdom and any Bijapuri port and will compel its purchase from Portuguese factor.

"The king of Vijayanagara will also allow no Moorish ship or fleet (obviously implying of Bijapur) to stop in his port and if any army should come, he will capture them and send them to Goa. Both parties agreed to wage war on 'Adil Shah, and the territories captured shall belong to Vijayanagar, except lands on the west of the ghats from Banda on the north to Cintacora, on the south which lands shall belong to the king of Portugal."

In the treaty with Ahmadnagar too, there were similar terms. Those relevant to and directly affecting Bijapur were:

"There were to be friendship between Ahmadnagar and the Portuguese, who were to help each other, when necessary against all the kings of India (obviously Bijapur was not mentioned specifically), with the exception of Vijayanagara.

"The Portuguese governor bound himself to not to make peace with the Adil Shah without previously giving notice of the same to Nizam Shah."

These two treaties signed almost simultaneously - with Vijayanagar on 19th September 1547 and with Ahmadnagar on 6th October 1547, resulted in a tripartite alliance against Bijapur. This triangular league was in contravention and in supersession of the peace treaty which the Portuguese signed on 26th February 1546 with Bijapur. Thus hardly after a year, the Portuguese failed to keep up the terms of the treaty and changed the whole

course of their relations with Bijapur.

Treaty of 1548

During the short tenure of governorship of Garcia de Sa (September 1554 to June 1555) he adopted a conciliatory policy towards Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah sent his envoy, Mu'tabar Khan to Goa. Gracia concluded a 'Contract' with 'Ādil Shah on 22nd August 1548.[44]

By this 'Contract' 'Ādil Shah agreed to release the Portuguese captives in Bijapur, renewed the declaration that the territories of Salsette and Bardes were to be the property of the king of Portugal for ever and he promised to help the Portuguese in the event of any naval attack on them by the Turkish fleet.[45]

'Abdullāh proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur by the Portuguese

The question of 'Abdullāh was still unsettled and there were still persons interested in his succession to the throne of Bijapur. Some of the nobles now made terms with the Portuguese Viceroy for the installation of 'Abdullāh as Sultan of Bijapur. In return for the Portuguese help they offered to make over to the crown of Portugal all the lands of the Konkan, yielding a revenue of about a million a year. The Viceroy attracted by the large accession of wealth assented to the proposal, without duly considering the consequences and breach of treaties with the 'Ādil Shah.

Accordingly, 'Abdullāh was proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur and was accompanied by three thousand Portuguese foot soldiers and two

---

44. Whiteway, 320; Danvers, I, 485.

45. Whiteway, 320.

hundred horses, besides a body of Bijapurī supporters, to establish him on the throne. After a slight resistance Ponda was taken. Here 'Abdullāh set up his government, supported by the Portuguese troops. However, the Portuguese detained the wife and children of 'Abdullāh at Goa as hostages. Obviously, to extract more benefits for the help rendered. The new governor Francisco Barreto went to Ponda to assist the installation of 'Abdullāh as Sultan of Bijapur. He also appointed officers for the collection of the revenues around Ponda, leaving Dom Fernando de Monroyo in that fort, and he sent de Noronha to receive the revenues of the Konkan. Salīm Āghā, who was collecting the same on behalf of 'Ādil Shah, opposed Noronha with a force. After a sharp fight in the night, between the Portuguese and the Bijapurīs at Achara, the latter were completely routed. Further up the river the Portuguese encountered another force commanded by the Āghā himself. Here again the Portuguese emerged victorious.[46]

In the meanwhile, 'Abdullāh was solemnly proclaimed Sultan of Bijapur. But he did not enjoy the title for a long; as the 'Ādil Shah, with the assistance of the large army of Vijayanagara, dethroned him and made him prisoner. 'Ādil Shah next sent a force to recover the lost territories. The Viceroy ordered Noronha to withdraw and similar orders were sent to de Monroyo, who was at Ponda.[47]

In consequence of the Portuguese support to 'Abdullāh the Bijapurī forces sought revenge in the Portuguese territories of

---

46. Danvers, I, 504 f.

47. idem.

Salsette and Bardes. Rodriques went to the rescue of the Portuguese and he destroyed all the Bijapurī sea ports with fire and sword and captured a large number of ships. He returned to Goa with a large booty and honours.

'Ādil Shah became so enraged at this misfortune that he sent another large army against the Portuguese. Whereupon the governor set out with a strong force to oppose him. The war lasted throughout the winter. Consequently, Barreto was ordered to proceed to Dabhol, for re-inforcement with those of Pereira, admiral of that coast, with a view of destroying that place, in revenge for the actions of the 'Ādil Shah. Having attacked Dahol, which was vigorously defended for some time, it was captured and reduced to a heap of ruins. Nadhr Khan, Bijapurī general, now invaded the territories of Salsette and Bardez with a large army. The governor met the Bijapurīs with a large army near Ponda and finally returned victorious to Goa. In an another encounter the Bijapurī suffered heavily. This induced 'Ādil Shah to sue for peace and a fresh treaty was signed.[48]

Bijapur's alliance against the Portuguese

Several rulers of southern India, perceiving the vast increase in power of the Portuguese, resolved to give a fatal blow to extirpate them from India. For this purpose, they entered into a secret league, and 'Ādil Shah was one of the ally along with Nizām Shah, Zamorin and ruler of Achin. They raised powerful armies and were so much confident of their success that they even

---

48. ibid., 507 ff.

agreed before hand to the division of the Portuguese territories, after its conquest. 'Ādil Shah's share was to be Goa, Onor, Barcelor. Further, 'Ādil Shah had even assigned offices at Goa for his chief men. When 'Ādil Shah marched to besiege Goa other members of the league too made simultaneous attacks.[49]

'Ādil Shah with his army marched to Ponda and encamped there till the end of December, 1570.

The Bijapurīs commenced attack on Goa by a furious bombardment with more concentration on the port of Goa and works of Banestarim, which suffered severely. The Portuguese, while defending Goa, sent de Vasconcellos, at the same time to Dabhol, to destroy the city. Two large Bijapurī ships were burnt, besides several other smaller ones damaged.

The Viceroy used every possible means of securing intelligence from the Bijapurī camp. He bribed some of the renegade Portuguese in the Bijapurī camp. He even corrupted 'Ādil Shah's favourite wife, and through her they succeeded in obtaining information regarding secret designs and intentions. When Bijapur's strategy was leaked out, 'Ādil Shah found it impossible to continue war. So he again made proposals for peace; but the siege was nevertheless continued. With the re-inforcement in the Portuguese army, the Bijapurīs retreated. 'Ādil Shah however resolved to make another vigorous attempt to invade the island. In spite of stiff resistance the Bijapurīs succeeded in crossing over the Mecantor pass. In a day long battle on 13th April, 1570, the forces of 'Ādil Shah utterly failed. 'Ādil Shah was furious at this defeat

---

49. ibid., 551.

and openly vowed that he would not stir from before Goa, until victory. Nevertheless he could not but recognise the difficulties of the situation and secretly desired for a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. At last 'Ādil Shah himself offered terms for the conclusion of a treaty. One of the terms was that the Portuguese should surrender Goa to 'Ādil Shah. Obviously, it was an impossible and unacceptable condition by the Portuguese and the offer failed. The Portuguese unable to check 'Ādil Shah unilaterally, conspired to murder 'Ādil Shah. As such Dom Luiz de Atayle entered into negotiations with Nūrī Khan for killing 'Ādil Shah. Atayle offered to Nūrī Khan, if successful, the crown of Bijapur or great power in the government. Nūrī Khan agreed willingly to these proposals. But as the conspiracy was about to materialise, it was discovered. Consequently Nūrī Khan was arrested and other conspirators abandon the enterprise. The proposed terms of the treaty of peace having failed, the siege of Goa continued, but not with the same vigour. The Bijapuris did great damage to the city buildings, but could make little advance.[50]

'Ādil Shah, in order to divide and weaken the Portuguese camp, again persuaded the Queen of Gersoppa to attack Onor. She did oblige 'Ādil Shah by collecting a large army and besieging the fort. With the re-inforcement coming from Goa, the besiegers were put to flight. In retaliation, the Viceroy endeavoured to create a diversion in his favour by secretly stirring up other neighbouring rulers to invade Bijapur and by that means he thought of compelling 'Ādil Shah to raise the siege. However, nothing appears to have come out of this project. Now, both the Viceroy and 'Ādil

---

50. ibid., 552 ff.

Shah were equally anxious for peace; but neither desired that the other should be aware of it. As such, to all outward appearances, the siege and defences were carried on, as before without any spirit or vigour. The siege prolonged for ten months and finally the Bijapurīs retreated without effecting any treaty or settlement.[51]

Implications of the Treaties of 1571, 1575 and 1576

On 6th September, 1571 when Dom Antonio de Noronha arrived at Goa as Viceroy, the Bijapurīs were pressing the siege of Goa. On Noronha's arrival, 'Ādil Shah raised the siege and returned to Bijapur, leaving behind his commissioners to make a peaceful settlement.[52] A treaty was concluded on 13th December, 1971. By this treaty 'Ādil Shah agreed to the possession of the territories of Salsatte and Bardes. It was agreed that 'Ādil Shah would be a sincere friend of the Portuguese and the king of Portugal and the enemies of the Portuguese shall be the enemies of 'Ādil Shah too. The treaty provided terms and conditions of several items of mutual interest for the better regulation of the Commerco-economic relations. The Portuguese due to their maritime supremacy, reserved the right to control the shipping of Bijapur. As such, the Viceroy granted to 'Ādil Shah a privilege of taking twenty five foreign horses annually, which were imported at Goa. The Viceroy granted six passes in addition to previous passes for the navigation of Bijapur's ships, sailing to Arabian and Persian gulfs. The Bijapurī ships importing horses from Ormuz were to pay duty to the Portuguese.[53]

---

51. ibid., 558 ff.
52. Livro de Pazes, 6 f.
53. Biker, I, 160 ff.

The treaty was evidently one sided one. The Portuguese commanding the Indian seas, dictated terms to 'Ādil Shah. The latter, due to weakness on the seas, was compelled to accept the illegal and unjust terms, dictated by the Portuguese, mainly to meet Bijapur's need of imported foreign horses.

But very soon, the Portuguese violated twice the treaty of peace of 1571. Early in 1572, Mathias de Albuquerque captured and demolished a fortress (built by a Nāyak subject of 'Ādil Shah). Again, Dom Diogo de Menezas captured two large vessels of 'Adil Shah near the islands of Vengurla. But a storm arose, which drove them all ashore. The Bijapurī vessels were then recaptured by the Malabaris and were returned to the rightful owner. 'Ādil Shah got furious over this violation by the Portuguese. He caused De Menezes and all the Portuguese then at his court to be incarcerated in the fort of Belgaum. When his anger was sufficiently appeased, he ordered for their release.[54]

'Ādil Shah soon realised the necessity of maintaining peaceful and friendly relations with the Portuguese. As such, he sent an ambassador to the Portuguese governor Antonio Monis Barreto, with a personal letter professing peace, friendship and amity. The ambassador was given full powers to settle a fresh treaty with the Portuguese. As such, to renew and establish friendly relations firmly, the Bijapur ambassador not only ratified the terms of the treaty of 1571 through the treaty of 30th May, 1575 but added certain new clauses to it.[55] Through this treaty 'Ādil Shah surrendered Bijapur's external relations into the hands of the Portuguese. Bijapur from now on lost its independent policy with respect to other states. The friends of Portuguese were to be friends of

54. Danvers, II, 2.
55. Archivo Portuguese Oriental V, 905 ff.; Livro Grande de Pazas, 5

Bijapur. The enemies of Portuguese were to be enemies of Bijapur also. Bijapur could not, without consulting the Portuguese governor or viceroy, take any action against its enemies. Thus from now on, Portuguese slowly began controlling, to a certain extent, the external relations of Bijapur.

In accordance with the provisions of the treaty of 13th December, 1571, an 'Ādil Shāhī ambassador visited Lisbon and met the king of Portugal. On his return from Lisbon, the ambassador Ẓahīr Bēg entered into a treaty with the Portuguese on 22nd October 1576.[56] Obviously, under instruction from the king of Portugal and the terms of the treaty having been approved by him. The terms of the treaty were more favourable to Bijapur as it made some concessions to Bijapur and facilitated normal trade relations.

The important feature of this treaty was that Bijapurīs were expected to provide military assistance to the Portuguese, whenever the latter needed it. Thus this treaty was more in the nature of a military alliance; though, it had the provisions of mutual commercial benefits. The previous treaty introduced the right of the Portuguese to investigate any action of 'Ādil Shah against his enemies but friends of the Portuguese. While this treaty made 'Ādil Shah to defend the Portuguese possession and provide military assistance, both by men and material.

Hostilities (1576-77)

Early in 1576 four Portuguese captains landed at Dabhol. They were well received by the Bijapurī Thanadar Malik Turkan. But later on, he got them assassinated, through a treachery, but some of them escaped. The governor De Tavora retaliated by sending Dom

56. idem.

Pedro de Menzes with a small fleet to avenge the treachery. They were ordered to lay in wait for the Mecca ships, and do all the mischief they could on the Bijapur coast. Menzes fell in with two large ships, which he destroyed. The hostilities continued when in August 1576, Dom Luiz de Ataide took over the government at Goa. He sent supplies and re-inforcements to De Menzes to enable him to act more vigorously against the Malik Turkan. He himself conducted the war against 'Ādil Shah, along the river of Goa. Unable to defend 'Ādil Shah had to sue for peace; promising to banish the traitor Malik Turkan not only from Dabhol, but from his kingdom for ever. Peace was accordingly concluded on these terms and the Portuguese forces then retired to their own territories.[57]

Not withstanding the terms of the treaty recently concluded 'Ādil Shah still permitted Malik Turkan to remain at Dabhol, where he not only publicly exercised his office as Thānadār, but built a great ship, which he intended for the Mecca trade. Consequently, the viceroy despatched de Lmia Pereira to Dabhol with ten sailors to enforce the terms of the treaty. But, as the fort was strongly fortified by cannons, Pereira could not effect his mission.[58]

According to Tuḥfat-al-Mujāhidīn, in consequence to the atrocities of the Portuguese, the Malik at the port of Dabhol captured one hundred and fifty Portuguese men, including their chief officers and brave soldiers. Then he put to death many of them; and sent some of them to 'Ādil Shah. While 'Ādil Shah took measures to blockade Goa he despatched in 1578 messenger with letters

---

57. Livro Grande de Pazes, op.cit., 7.

58. Danvers, II, 2, 23.

and presents to 'Alī Adhirājā of Malabar, the Samri of Calicut and the Kolattiri of Malabar, seeking their assistance against the Portuguese. But when the Bijapurī envoy arrived at Kutukulam, the ruler of that place, at the instigation of the Portuguese, imprisoned them; and only one messenger could escape secretly. The ruler Kutukulam seized all the goods and presents. Adhirājā and Kolattiri sent letters to him demanding return of the goods and presents but of no avail. If the messenger had not fled, he would have delivered him and his followers over to the Portuguese. Following this event the Bijapurīs sought the assistance of two Malābārī pirates. A fierce naval battle took place in which the Portuguese were sucess-successful.[59]

SEC. III: THIRD PHASE - PERIOD OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS (1579-95)

In 1581, King Philip II of Spain became king of Portugal, under the title of Philip I. The Portuguese and Portuguese

---

59. Tuhfat, op.cit., 91. From the above events for the years 1577-78, cited from Tuhfat-al-Mujāhidīn, a contemporary source, it is quite evident that hostilities and hostile diplomacy took place, and obviously there was no peace during these two years between Bijapur and Portuguese. Tuhfat is corroborated by Jesuit Letter who mentions "strained relations between the kingdom of Bijapur and the Portuguese of Goa in 1578" - "Jesuit Letters and Accounts" by H. Heras, I.H.R.C. XVIII, 1942, 16. Danvers' statement that there was peace for "eighty-seven years" (1577-1654) (Vol.II. 308) between Bijapur and the Portuguese is not tenable. Danvers does not mention these events; though he has mentioned other connected events in a different way.

possession in India owed allegiance to the King of Spain on 3rd September, 1581.[60]

On 29th January 1582, a treaty was concluded by which all the previous treaties between Bijapur and the Portuguese were renewed and affirmed. Consequently peace was established between the two states.

In 1584 'Ādil Shah sent an ambassador to Goa for negotiating an alliance and joint expedition against the Nāyak of Sanguicer to punish him for causing the death of Dom Giles Yanez, and to put down the piracy that existed on that coast. It was agreed that Rosti Khan, governor of Ponda to attack by land while De Mascarehans to attack by sea. The strategy worked successfully. The allied army attacked the town and laid waste the whole country. Then the Nāyak who had fled for the safety, sent an ambassador to implore mercy, promising to submit on any conditions, provided he was restored to his power and his territories spared. A settlement was accordingly effected to this effect and the allied armies retired.[61]

Eventhough there existed treaties of firm friendship and alliance, yet the governor and the king of Portugal were afraid of the growing power of 'Ādil Shah. They expressed grave concern and distress over the expansion of 'Ādil Shahi territory in the Kanara districts.[62] Thus in view of their existing treaties and alliance between Portuguese and 'Ādil Shah, this concern of the Viceroy and King Philip II apparently raises doubts over their true friendship and integrity towards 'Ādil Shah.

---

60. Danvers, II, 25.
61. Danvers, II, 56 f.
62. Letter of the King Philip II to the Viceroy Mathies de Albuquerque, from Lisbon, dated 12 January 1591 - Heras: Aravidu Dynasty, 417.

SEC. IV: FOURTH PHASE

PERIOD OF PORTUGUESE DOMINATION (1595-1655)

Triple alliance of 'Ādil Shah, Portuguese and Nizām Shah

In 1595 Maties de Albuquerque sent an embassy to the 'Ādil Shah with the intention of forming a triple alliance, between 'Ādil Shah, Malik 'Ambar of Ahmadnagar and himself, in order to defend the growing imperialism of the Mughals. The Viceroy pointed out the danger of inter-state wars among the Deccan states and the necessity of uniting against the Mughals.[63]

Approving this policy of Albuquerque, King Philip II of Spain wrote to the new Viceroy, Dom Francisco de Gama, on 25th February, 1596 to continue to adopt the policy of Albuquerque and to help in achieving the goal by way of persuading the rulers of the Deccan, one after the other, to form an alliance.[64]

'Ādil Shah realising the importance and necessity of an alliance tried to foster the triple alliance for his own benefit. King Philip II too continued to persuade, by recommending again on 5th February, 1597, the Viceroy to form an alliance. The King Philip III of Spain too wished to maintain cordial relations with Bijapur as is evident from his letter to the viceroy, dated 21st November 1598 from Lisbon. The king wrote - " I approve of your interest in keeping the king of Bijapur on good terms - although

---

63. Letter of Albuquerque to the King Philip II of Spain Monocoes de Reino No.4. 1595, 629; J.B.B.R.A.S., I (NS), 122.

64. Letter of King Philip of Spain dated 25 February 1596 from Lisbon - Monocoes de Reino, No.4, 1596, 629. H. Heras: "The Portuguese Alliance with the Muhammadan Kingdom of the Deccan"- J.B.B.R.A.S., I, (N.S.) 122f.

he ordered no visit to be paid to you until now, as is customary. Treat him always, remembering how necessary is the alliance with the neighbouring kings to defend us all against the Mughal (Emperor). Obviously the king of Spain wished to preserve the independence of the two barrier states - Bijapur and Ahmadnagar in order to prevent the direct onslaught of the Mughal imperialism on the Portuguese possessions on the west coast of India. This is evident from another letter of the King Philip III of Spain to the Viceroy, Ayres de Saldanha, dated 25th January, 1601. The King wrote: "--- since that king (Akbar) is very powerful and suspicious and desirous of approaching to that island of Goa, I recommend you to keep your eyes open on his designs and intentions to prevent them with the necessary remedies."[65]

In spite of seven years (1595-1601) of negotiations, the triple alliance did not materialise. This was partly due to the fading off of the danger for which the coalition was negotiated. However, alarmed at the defeat of Malik 'Ambar at the hands of the Mughals in 1615 the Portuguese once again, directed their efforts to bring about the alliance by initiating negotiations of peace with 'Ādil Shah and Niẓām Shah. For this purpose 'Ādil Shah had to play a major role; and it was due to 'Ādil Shah that cordial relations between the Portuguese and Niẓām Shah were established. Consequently, on 9th October 1615, at Nauraspur (near Bijapur) the Treaty of defensive alliance was signed between 'Ādil Shah, the Portuguese and the Niẓām Shah. Malik 'Ambar sent his ambassador Kāshī Paṇḍit

---

65. Moncoes de Reino No.2 1583-1601, 421; J.B.B.R.A.S., log.cit.

with the authorisation that - "Whatever agreement is entered into by Ibrahim 'Ādil Shah and Shāh Nawāz Khan of Bijapur with the viceroy shall be signed by our ambassador, Kāshī Pandit; this will be observed by us. Likewise Portuguese envoy Antoni Master had obtained authorisation to sign the treaty from king of the Portugal as early as 13 May, 1615."[66]

Slight modification was made in the above treaty by the addition of the condition for the institution of a Board of arbitration for disputes arising between the Portuguese ryots and the native ryots regarding the disputed ownership of coconut gardens and groves. The modified Treaty was signed at Goa on 1st January 1617 by the Viceroy.

In the meanwhile, during 1614, Sharīf Malik the commander of Ponda was making some opposition to the Portuguese. The Viceroy suspected, that 'Ādil Shah was supporting the Malik. Therefore, the Viceroy, Dom Hisrome sent Antonio, on arrival at Bijapur, requested 'Ādil Shah to imprison the Malik of Ponda and expell the Dutch, who were attempting to establish a factory at Bijapur. The 'Ādil Shah accepted these demands. For this purpose the Portuguese bribed a favourite courtier of Bijapur, through Vicente Ribeiro, who was residing at Bijapur and had close connection with the Bijapuri nobles.[67]

---

66. Danvers, II, 56 f.; D.V. Apte: "Shiva Charitra Sahita (Pt.IV)," B.I.S.M., XII (2), 25 ff.; B.G. Tamaskar: "Malik 'Ambar and the Portuguese" - J.B.R.S., XXXIII, 39 and H. Heras, (J.B.B.R.A.S., log.cit.) does not mention about the treaties of 1615 and 1617.

67. Danvers, II, 167 f.

Portuguese assistance to 'Ādil Shah against the Mughals

During the siege of Bijapur by Aṣaf Khan in 1631, the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Conde de Linhares, in spite of the advantageous terms offered to him by the Mughals, helped 'Ādil Shah secretly with bombardiers, powder and munitions. This assistance was in accordance with the order of the king of Portugal. However, Linhares was tempted by greedy offers of the Mughals and he soon changed his allegiance and thus wrote to the King of Portugal on 16 November 1632 that - "I was obliged to help him (Mughal General) to gain the kingdom of 'Ādil Shah and that they would give me as my share almost all the low lands (Konkan) of these surroundings."[68] Thus, the Portuguese adopted duel and flexible policy, to suit their own purpose and the exigencies of the time. As such they failed to keep up their treaties with Bijapur. They changed policy according to the times to achieve their own selfish motives. They even changed their own proposals and initial offers. The Viceroy, on the basis of the resolution passed by the Portuguese Council of State on 3rd April 1632, offered all help and favour to 'Ādil Shah against the Mughals. And this offer was made by virtue of a command of the king of Portugal. It was decided that "in case the Mughals pressed 'Ādil Shah too much, when his Excellency (Viceroy) would arrange to come to his help in order that the Mughals should not prevail in destroying him and taking from him his kingdom."[69]

---

68. Moncoes de Reino No.15, 5. Panduranga Pissurlencar: "The attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji during the campaign of Shāistā Khan and Jai Singh", I.H.R.C., IX, December 1926.

69. Livro dos Acts do Conselho do Estado (the Book of the Acts of the Council of the State) No.2; Moncoes de Reino, op.cit., I.H.R.C., IX, 109.

When Shāh Jahān invaded Deccan in 1635, the King of Spain sent orders to the Viceroy at Goa to help 'Adil Shah and Malik 'Ambar against the Mughals in the better interest of the Portuguese. The Viceroy expressed his pressing anxiety in a report to the king of Spain that "should 'Adil Shah lose his kingdom to the Mughals, then the Portuguese territories would be placed in a position of greater danger of the direct onslaught of the might Mughals."[70]

But before the Portuguese could render any help Shāh Jahān and Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah came to an understanding for the extinction of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar and division of its territories between them.

Naval Hostilities - 1636

Naval hostilities were committed by the Portuguese on some petty pretext or excuse. According to the Dutch records of 1636, during the monsoon, the Portuguese attacked an outgoing ship from the Bijapurī port of Dabhol on her way to Persia and Mecca and "shamefully murdered the Moors." Although the reigning Viceroy had tried to execute this attack and the massacre of the people, by sending an ambassador and giving a very big elephant as a present with an advice to punish the culprits. But in retaliation, the Bijapurīs attacked a Portuguese ship coming from Muscat to Rājāpūr, with a rich cargo. The goods amounting to about 6000 ducates were confiscated and the Portuguese were imprisoned. This action of the Portuguese was due to the violation of the terms of the treaty by the Bijapurīs. According to the treaty, the Bijapurīs and the 'Ādil Shah were bound to ship their pepper only to Portuguese

---

70. Danvers, II, 250, 252.

ports.[71] However, the massacre of the people boarding the Bijapurī ship by the Portuguese was not the justification.

Friendly attitude of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah towards Portuguese

Early in the year 1654, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, sent an ambassador, Malik Yaqūt, to Goa. The purpose of this embassy was to settle the old dispute about the territories of Bardez and Salsette. Malik Yāqūt carried a farmān of 'Ādil Shah in the name of the Portuguese Viceroy asking the latter to allow the Jesuits Fathers of the College of St. Paul or Goa, to reside at his court at Bijapur. The Viceroy De Castro did not object to this proposal. Accordingly, when Yāqūt returned to Bijapur, some weeks later, a Jesuit Father Antonio Betelho accompanied him. The Father brought a present for 'Ādil Shah on behalf of Viceroy and informed 'Ādil Shah of the favourable disposition of de Castro towards Bijapur. This pleased the 'Ādil Shah exceedingly. The Jesuit Father carried a letter of de Castro for 'Ādil Shah. Malik Yāqūt did his best to incline his sovereign to favour the Portuguese and he obtained from 'Ādil Shah two farmāns, favourable to the Portuguese. The first was addressed to Shivappa Nāyak, the chief of Ikkērī, commanding him to raise the siege of the fortress of Onor (Hanovar) at once and to retire to Ikkērī as 'Ādil Shah exercised the sovereignty of the whole Kanara. However, the Nayak defied the farmān and continued the siege. Another farmān issued by Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah was addressed to the

---

71. Monumenta - J.B.H.S., September 1928, 202, ff.

governor of Goa. 'Ādil Shah requested the governor to send to his Court a Jesuit Fr. Concalo Martins, who was known to him. 'Ādil Shah further requested the governor to send an expert in the Art to his court.[72]

Dom de Castro, on receiving the farmān of 'Ādil Shah, called the Council of State and informed the counsellors of its contents. They decided to send a present as a sign of their gratitude for his issuing the two farmāns. Fr. Martins was sent to Bijapur with the presents in April 1654; but, not as an official envoy. Yet, some secret instructions were given to him, to enable him to speak to 'Ādil Shah about some events in an unofficial capacity.[73]

Martins was given two documents by de Castro. One was the credential letter declaring him as the envoy of the governor to treat with 'Ādil Shah about the business and settlement of the Jesuit Mission at Bijapur Court. The other document contained the secret instructions suggested by the Portuguese Council of State. The letter of the viceroy to 'Ādil Shah contained the Counsel of States' decision, which expressed indebtedness to 'Ādil Shah and professed cordiality, and friendship. Gratefulness, for the issuance of the farmān to the Nāyak of Ikkērī, favouring the Portuguese was also acknowledged by the Counsel of State.[74]

---

72. H. Heras: "Some unknown dealings between Bijapur and Goa" I.H.R.C., VIII, November, 1925, 131 ff.

73. Letter of de Castro to the King of Portugal dated 7th February I.H.R.C., XVIII.

74. Instruc cao para OB do pe, Gon Calo Martins da companlia de Jesvs que Ora Passa a Corte de Rey Idalxa - I.H.R.C., VIII, log.cit.

War and Peace (1654-55)

One of the instructions given to Fr. Martins by de Castro was to prevent any war between the Bijapuris and Portuguese in the border provinces of Bardez and Salsette. In fact war broke out there even before Martins reached Bijapur. It seems that 'Ādil Shah without any sufficient cause declared War in August 1654 and marched against Bardez and Goa with a huge army. The Portuguese who were at Terim, in Bardez, surrendered. Then in October 1654 'Ādil Shah invaded Salsette and capture Sarzora and Cutuly.[75]

In the meanwhile Fr. Goncalo Martins arrived at Bijapur and by the favour he enjoyed in the royal palace he easily induced 'Ādil Shah to cease hostilities. Consequently, 'Ādil Shah ordered for the retreat of his troops from the Portuguese territory. The reply of 'Ādil Shah to de Castro throws light on the friendship and intimate relations between the two states. 'Ādil Shah explicitly declared that he does not want any war with the Portuguese. Subsequently, embassies were exchanged between Goa and Bijapur and from December 1654, trade was resumed between Bijapur and Goa. And to strengthen the bond of friendship, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah and de Castro entered into a new treaty. On 7th March, 1655, the treaty was signed by the Bijapurī ambassadors, the governor, other eminent persons. The Council of State decided upon ratifying the former treaties of peace with Bijapur viz., the treaty of 3rd April 1633, that of 1576 and that of 29th January 1582. Malik Yāqūt and Fr. Martins accepted the decision of the Council.[76]

---

75. I.H.R.C., VIII, op.cit., 137; Danvers, II, 308.

76. Moncoes do Reino, No.24, 25, 1654-55, 198; I.H.R.C., op.cit., 139 f. Fr. Goncalo Martins was nominated by Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah as his ambassador to Goa.

After the settlement of this peace the ambassadors returned to Bijapur and soon after their arrival Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah ratified the treaty in May 1655. When news of this reached Goa, de Castro sent another present to 'Ādil Shah. It was a beautiful ring enriched with a precious stone.[77]

Soon afterward, Dom Rodrigo Lobo da Silveira, Conde de Sarzedas landed at Goa, as new Viceroy of Portuguese India. He imprisoned de Castro and sent him to Portugal. The new viceroy in a letter of 15 December 1655 referring to de Castro's relations with Bijapur, wrote the King of Portugal that: "I found this business in such a state that the Dialxa ('Ādil Shah) seemed to wish to receive tribute from us and I feel sure this would have happened if my coming had been postponed." Probably this appreciation is an exaggeration. It was perhaps partly influenced by hatred towards de Castro and partly due to the letter of 'Ādil Shah, addressed to de Castro, but reached after his fall in the hands of de Sarzeda.[78] The letter of 'Ādil Shah contained proposal for help against his rebels in the form of duty and command to obey the Bijapurī ambassador. This annoyed the new viceroy de Sarzedes. The latter apparently smelled a sign of 'Ādil Shah's wishes of making the Portuguese a tributory to Bijapur. In fact, the tone of the letter itself shows that 'Ādil Shah considered the Portuguese as his tributory. However de Sarzedes misread the letter and arrived at a wrong and hasty conclusion. 'Ādil Shah wrote that letter on the basis of friendship and alliance that subsisted according to

---

77. idem.; Livro de Pazes, 44 ff.

78. Moncoes de Reino, log.cit.

the existing treaties. But since he was a sovereign head of the State, 'Ādil Shah's tone was slightly dictatorial. More so because the viceroy was not considered as equal to the Sultan, as the former was not the sovereign head of the State.

De Sarzedas was not on good terms with the Malik Yāqūt who was still at Goa. He desired to dispose him off.

SEC. V: FIFTH PHASE

PERIOD OF QUIET RELATIONS (1656-86)

After 1656, the Bijapurīs were busy in dealing with the Mughals and had therefore no opportunity to renew hostilities with the Portuguese. Hence from 1656 to 1686, for three decades nothing special happened to disturb the peaceful relations between the Portuguese and Bijapur.

SEC. VI: FACTORS THAT DETERMINED THE RELATIONS

Commercial factors, rather than political, determined the Bijapur - Portuguese relations. The Portuguese sovereignty of the seas compelled Bijapur to adopt always conciliatary policy; even, at the cost of territorial losses. Import of Persian, Arabian and 'Irāqī horses and foreign emigrants were the main cause which made Bijapur to yielded and adopt weak policy towards the Portuguese. These factors dictated Bijapur to put an end to the hostilities abruptly in peaceful settlements. The 'Cartaz System' also governed the Bijapur-Portuguese relations over the seas.

Portuguese Sovereinty of the Sea - 'The Cartaz System'

The Portuguese policy in the Indian Ocean aimed at a monopoly of the Eastern trade with Europe by exercising a command over the sea-routes so as to prohibit competitive navigation. As such the King Emmanual of Portugal offered his merchants the privilege of trading with India in their own ships, provided they paid a fourth of the profits to the King's treasury and undertook not to deal in spices, which remained a Crown monopoly.[79]

The Portuguese achieved their objective by the help of their powerful navy, which gave them overwhelming advantage over Bijapur, who were weak at sea. Their victory over the combined fleet of Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, Gujarat, Egypt etc., established their supremacy over the seas - Arabian sea and Indian oceans. Thus, they claimed the sovereignty of the sea and compelled all powers, friendly or otherwise to not to navigate the Arabian sea or Indian ocean without their express permission. And such a permission had to be purchased by every trading vessel. Even Indian sovereigns were not exempted from this acknowledgement of the Portuguese naval supremacy.[80]

---

79. Nambiar: Portuguese Pirates, 37; The king of Portugal was very particular of the spices trade. He could not tolerate any encroachment in this field e.g., in 1512, the King of Portugal complained to Albuquerque that according to reports received by him, 20 ships had in the previous year, gone from Calicut to Macca loaded with spices - Danvers, I, 254.

80. S.N. Sen: Military system of the Marathas, 153, 215.

The system of licencing the ships of all oriental trade was started by Almeida, and was perfected by Albuquerque and his successors. Bijapur was no exception. It too had to obtain Portuguese cartazes to a specified number by asking. But these permits were accompanied, in all cases, by vexatious conditions. Bijapur was not allowed to import or export specified articles mentioned in the cartaz. They were prohibited from visiting the port of Imām of Muscat and of other enemies of the Portuguese. They were not allowed to carry any Christians slaves. To ascertain the implementation of their conditions the Portuguese claimed and exercised the right to search. And in cases of any violation of the rules penalty was imposed by the Portuguese.[81]

Thus, the Portuguese assumed the right of exclusive possession of the trade initially of two essential commodities pepper and ginger. But gradually they added to the list Chinnaman, clove, spieces and several other articles which yielded large profits. The Muhammadans were forbidden business in all these articles and were not alloted to undertake sea voyages for trade to the neighbouring countries.[82]

Early in 1513 Albuquerque sent Gracia for the naval blockade of Dabhol. This strategy made Bijapur to come to a peaceful settlement with the Portuguese. Pending the negotiations of the treaty, Bijapurī ambassador requested Albuquerque to open or suspend blockade of Dabhol. This request Albuquerque complied immediately

---

81. S.N. Sen: Studies in Indian History; S.N. Sen: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa, 46 ff.

82. Mahalingam: "Economic Life in Vijayanagara Empire, 119.

under the following conditions - true ingress to the ships which were thither bound with merchandise and provisions; provided "no prohibited merchandise" were carried. For permission of free navigation of Bijapurī ships 'Ādil Shah had to apply for it to the viceroy or governor at Goa.[83]

The blockade of Dabhol and its opening by the Portuguese meant the destruction of Bijapur's sovereignty over the seas and their oceanic trade. From then, the Portuguese compelled Bijapur to obtain cartazes for their ship, under vexatious conditions, dictated by the Portuguese. They exercised the oceanic sovereignty in a high handed manner. They jealously guarded their interest, maintained the sovereignty, initially through mutual negotiations, by agreements and finally through specific clauses of treaties or 'Contracts'. Treaties signed between the Portuguese and Bijapur, had stringent clauses regulating the oceanic trade.[84]

Besides the terms and conditions in the treaties the Portuguese imposed a duty of one per cent on the mercandise carried by the Bijapurī ships. This was on the pretext of defraying the expenses of the fleets that were guarding the Bijapurī coast for the safety of Bijapurī ships.

A very peculiar feature of the terms of the Treaty of 1576 was that they were applicable to Bijapurī ships, originating from Bijapurī ports, and destined for non-Portuguese, as well as Portuguese ports. This reveals the magnitude of illegal sovereignty of the seas the Portuguese claimed and enjoyed. Even though the

---

83. Commentaries, II, 244; Danvers, I, 253, 255.

84. Danvers, log.cit.

Portuguese had no jurisdiction over the Bijapurī ports they exercised illegal sovereignty and guarded them in their own commercial interest but at the expense of Bijapur and also by exacting duty on the merchandise. Obviously this was due to their maritime supremacy. The number of Cartazas to be issued annually was regulated by the treaties. However, on special demand by 'Ādil Shah, additional cartazas were issued. The study of the system throws considerable light, as to how systematically the Portuguese destroyed Bijapur's oceanic trade and rights over the seas. The texts of the cartazas reveal the obligations to which the grantee was subjected.

The text of the various cartaz issued to Bijapur were almost identical.[85] The study of the numerous original cartazas[86] reveal the following features:

That all Bijapurī both, private and official ships had to obtain a cartazas before sailing - both on outward and inward voyages.

The ships had to anchor or touch only the ports specifically mentioned in the cartaz. Sailing to the ports not mentioned in the cartaz meant breach of rules and treaty.

The Cartaz specified the Nacoda (the Captain) of the ship, other persons, capacity, Cargo or merchandise being carried, and also the prohibited items which the ship could not carry. It also mentioned the specific nature of the arms carried by the persons on board, required for self-defence.

The Cartaz did not mention the duration of the sailing to and fro. But in some case it did.

The Portuguese, as the sovereigns of the seas, reserved the

85. Biker, IV, 181 ff.; Sen: Studies, 62 ff.
86. Olivro de Consulta, No.3, 8, (1618-1652), 105 f. Assento Do Conselho Do Estado; I Documento 28, 114.

right to search or inspect the ship, on suspicion.of prohibited merchandise being carried in it or on any grounds of violations of the conditions laid down in the cartaz.

Though no fee was charged for the cartazas issued for official purposes to Bijapur, but for private ships of the Bijapuris the Portuguese levied a fee of 20 parafins per hundred weights of the cargo for the issue of a cartaz; and if they failed to obtain the cartaz before venturing out in the seas, their ships and its cargo were liable for confiscation by the Portuguese, even through they were on a peaceful trade mission.[87]

Thus, by the Cartaz system the Portuguese entirely controlled Bijapur's oceanic trade and did not allow them to sail from Bijapurī ports (a non-Portuguese territory) to other ports, outside Portuguese territories. By a permanent resident factor at Bijapurī ports they had complete check on the shipping.

The number of horses to be imported which Bijapur imported was fixed by the Portuguese. Horses were the life-blood of the Bijapur army. Control over the shipping included the import of horses. And the existence of Bijapur kingdom meant regular supply of horses and foreign emmigrants. Thus, these factors, the dire necessities of Bijapur dictated and compelled them to maintain peaceful, if not friendly relations with the Portuguese. Enmity with Portuguese meant the destruction of Bijapur Kingdom.

SEC. VII: PORTUGUESE IMPACT ON BIJAPUR

Bijapur-Portuguese relations were not merely of wars and treaties. But were also several economic social and religious

---

87. Sen: Studies, op.cit., 70.

aspects. However, their relations were mainly commerco-economic.

Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah employed Jesuit Physicens for the treatments of himself and his family.[88] He had faith in the Portuguese doctors.

In 1654 Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah also showed interest in Jesuits and invited them to his court. But it seems it was purely for the purpose of recovery a large and costly diamond of 'Ādil Shah himself that found its way to Goa and was in the possession of Fr. Gonsollo Martine.[89]

Bijapur was not left unexplored by the enterprising Jesuit Fathers. In 1561, Fr. Gronzalo Rodriguese visited the court of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I. Several years later the missionaries secured a foot-hold in Bijapur, and favour of Muḥammad 'Adil Shah. Rāichūr, Kittur and Sondan were some of the stations of the mission which in time became the Vicariate Apostolic of the Kingdom of Bijapur.[90]

According to the letters of Jesuit Fathers, it seems that in 1561 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I, had requested the Archbishop of Goa, Dom Gaspar de Lea Perura, to send him a learned padri, as he was interested in knowing the texts of the Christian Faith. The Archbishop sent him three Father's - Fr. Gouzalo Rodriguese, a Jesuit; Fr. Antonio Pegado, a Dommican; and Fr. Francisco Lopes, perhaps a similar priest.[91]

---

88. Assentos, I, 238.

89. Manucci: Storio Do Mogor, III, 166

90. John Correa Affonso: Jesuit Letters and Indian History, 54.

91. H. Heras: "Three Catholic Padres at the Court of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I, J.B.H.S., September 1928, I (2), 158.

According to another letter of Fr. Rodriguese, 'Ādil Shah had called the padres and on account of his respect for the Archbishop, who was a person of great influence etc., 'Ādil Shah wanted to foster his friendship. In the writ, 'Ādil Shah showned great interest in the Bible, the discourse of the Father, and other tenets of the Christianity.[92] However this interest of 'Ādil Shahs in Christianity was only a fancy and on excuse to develop more cordial relations.

---

92. ibid., 160 ff.

Part 2

Bijapur-British Relations (1585-1686)

SEC. I: THE FIRST ENGLISHMEN IN BIJAPUR

The success of the Portuguese in establishing a lucrative commerce with the East naturally excited a desire among other nations of Western Europe to follow the tempting example.[1] England was not an exception. It too awakened and showed signs of inspired interest in the eastern trade. English merchants began to dream of wealth to be gathered in the East. A merchant adventurer named Ralph Fitch, carrying letters from Queen Elizabeth herself made a tour of enquiry in India, bringing home golden reports.[2]

During 1585, Ralph Fitch visited Bijapur and several places in the Kingdom of Bijapur.[3] He did some business in diamonds. Ralph Fitch was accompanied by John Newbery, William Leedes and James Storey. When they reached Bijapur in April 1585, they were cast into the prison on suspicion of being spies. They were examined before the justice and demanded for letters. They were in prison till 22 December 1585, when they were released on the surities of two thousand ducates, which Fr. Stevens paid. Fr. Stevens was an English-Jesuit already residing at Bijapur, before these English merchants visited Bijapur.[4]

---

1. Sir William Foster: The East India Company, CHI, V, 76.
2. Arthur D. Innes: A Short History of the British in India, 40.
3. J.C. Locke: First Englishmen in India, 99; H.G. Rawlinson: British Beginnings in Western India (1579-1657).
4. "Master Ralph Fitch, Merchant of London "Purchas His Pilgrims, X, 171; Locke, op.cit., 78; Sir William Foster (ed): Early Travels in India (1583-1619), 14.

SEC. II: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AND BIJAPUR

Ralph Fitch's report after the tour of Bijapur resulted in the founding in 1599, of an association in London for Eastern trade.[5] It was mainly an expression of the growing national desire in England for the trade with the east. The bells which rang out the year 1600 rang in the first East Indian Company. It was incorporated by a Royal Charter of 31 December 1600 from Queen Elizabeth, under the name of the "Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies."[6] The Charter granted the company "whole, entire and only trade and traffic to the East Indies for ever."[7] The foundation of the East India Company was due mainly to the national desire for participation in the spice trade of the East.

Unhappy Beginning in 1612

In February 1612, Sir Henry Middleton visited the Bijapuri port of Dabhol. Its governor, though promised friendly relations and help in trade, but secretly prevented the merchants from traffiking with the English. This action of the governor, Sir Thomas Roe interpreted as a mark of a sympathy with the Portuguese and a sufficient cause for the English to retaliate.[8] The English

---

5. Arthur Innes, op.cit., 40.
6. John W. Kaye: The Administration of the East Indian Company, 109.
7. Shafat Ahmad Khan: "East India Trade in the XVII Century", J.I.H., I, (1) 4.
8. W. Foster: Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of Great Mogul, II, 397, fn.2; Lanchester's Voyages, 197.

were waiting for an opportunity, which they got five years later in 1617. Writing to Pepwell on January, 1617, Roe advised him to endeavour to make prize of the Bijapurī vessel that yearly trade between Dabhol and the Red Sea. Roe warned Pepwell to ascertain, before proceeding to extremities, that the capture of the Bijapurī ship would not embroil the English at Masulipatam with the Sultan of Golkonda, owing to the close relations between the ruler of Golkonda and Bijapur. As a pretext for interfering with the vessel, Roe recalled the incident at Dabhol and 'made stay' of the ship of Bijapur; but the governor of the port, by purchasing some of his goods and making lavish promises of future trade, induced him tactfully to release the ship. These fresh overtures of friendship, league and a promise to procure a farmān from 'Ādil Shah in favour of the English, 'granting privileges to trade at Bijapurī ports, brought to nought the whole plan of Roe to avenge the governor's action of 1612. Subsequently, some correspondence ensued between Roe and the governor, on the subject of concessions to be granted for trade in Bijapur.[9]

Sir Thomas Roe, advised on 27 April, 1617, to the governor of Dabhol, apprehending the overtures made by him to trade and seeking further assurances, Further, Roe undertook "on behalf of the King of England a good and firme peace towards his master, his subjects free passage in the seas from any oppression by our fleets, and that yearly I would either send a ship to his port for trade or (if it so required) leave and establish a residence in his

---

9. Sir Thomas Roe's letter to Cap., H.Pepwell, 4 January 1617; W. Foster: Letters Received by the East India Company, V, (1617) 321, 204.

government."[10]

Establishment of Cordial Relations (1617-37)

The Bijapurī governor's reply was received by Roe in June, 1617. In this he reiterated the promises made to Pepwell; but, would not commit himself to buy any specified quantity of goods yearly. As for the desired farmān of 'Ādil Shah, the governor sent Roe's letter to the 'Ādil Shah; and said he would communicate the decision, in due course to the British ambassador. The governor's reply seemed to Roe, sufficiently encouraging, to follow up the matter; and he accordingly arranged in the following February (1618) for the 'Anne' to call at Dabhol, on her way to the Red Sea. This, however, was found to be impracticable and nothing more was done till the sailing of the fleet in 1619.[11] Contrary to this statement, according to the "Journal of Master Edward Heynes", it seems that 'Anne' under the captain Andrew Shilling, did sail to Dabhol in August, 1618. Edward Heynes was one of the Englishmen on board of 'Anne'. Heynes further informs that on 11th August, 1618, the captain of Dabhol, Malik 'Morvet' (Muhammad), sent to them his letter of recommendations to 'Ādil Shah, regarding the freedom of trade, friendly usage at Dabhol and promise to defend the ships homewards bound from pirates etc.[12]

Again, in 1619, Captain Bonner, at Roe's suggestion, called at Dabhol. No sales were effected. But the Bijapurī authorities

---

10. Roe (Embassy), op.cit., 362.
11. Roe's letter to Banghan, the chief factor at Burhānpūr, dated 21 June 1617. Roe (Embassy) op.cit., 363, fn.3.
12. Purchas, IV, 547, 566.

were so lavish in their promises that the English forebore to enforce a trade; and sent a word to Surat advising a further attempt in sending cargo to Dabhol in the following year.[13] With this beginning British ships started calling at Bijapurī port; and import of British goods and export of Bijapurī merchandise started.

In March 1623, Captain, Michael Green reported to President Rastell at Surat that they have received a letter from Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah. 'Ādil Shah desired firm friendship and amity with the English. He wished to conclude a peace treaty. He desired help and alliance of the English to drive out the Portuguese from his territories (both present and former lost territories of Bijapur Kingdom). 'Ādil Shah sought the assistance of the English by sea, while he himself wished to operate from land.[14]

To these desires and demands of 'Ādil Shah, captain Michael sent conciliatory and encouraging replies through the former's messenger. He pacified the Sultan to wait till the opportunity permits to execute the said desires and wished to continue and maintain the amity just began.[15]

This cold reply of Captain Michael for 'Ādil Shah's proposal of an alliance against the Portuguese was guided by the policy of non-interference formulated by Sir Thomas Roe for the East India Comapany. Sir Thomas Roe's policy was "unaggressive and wholly merchantile." Roe disliked the military-commercial policies of the Portuguese and the Dutch; which he believed to consume all their

---

13. Roe (Embassy), 363, fn.3. Vol 2

14. E.F.I., II, 214.

15. ibid., 215.

profits. This policy of Roe was adopted by the Company for about seventy years[16] (from 1615 onwards). But with an exception, when the British allied with Bijapur against the Portuguese in October, 1637.

By 1635, the English trade at Dabhol had increased considerably. This necessitated establishment of a factory at Dabhol. For this purpose, the Company requested 'Ādil Shah to grant a license to establish a factory at Dabhol. On 3rd December 1635, the President Methwold and Council at Surat passed instructions to William Pitt to proceed to Dabhol in 'Francis' and deliver letters to the Bijapurī governor of Dabhol. The governor was given other letters and presents for passing on to Aghā Rājā, at Bijapur, with a request for a speedy action for obtaining from Muḥammad 'Ādil 'Ādil Shah a farmān to establish a factory at Dabhol. The 'Ādil Shāhī farmān was so essential for the Britishers that William Pitt wrote from Dabhol to the President and Council at Surat on 17th April, 1636 that: "The King's farmān is expected daily."[17]

At last the long awaited farman was issued by 'Ādil Shah in August 1636. It was not very much to the liking of William Pitt; and he expressed his dissatisfaction over it.[18]

On 27th January, 1637 when Captain Weddell's fleet anchored at Bhatkal, a Bijapurī port, the Shāh Bandar and king's[19] merchant

---

16. P.E. Roberts: History of British India under the Company and the Crown, 36.
17. Rawlinson: British Beginnings in Western India, 103; E.F.I., V, 134, 193.
18. E.F.I., V, 282.
19. The 'King' here means Vīrabhadra Nāik king of Ikkērī who was tributary of Bijapur - H. Heras, op.cit., I.H.R.C., XI December 1928, 111. The king of Ikkērī being tributary of Bijapur his state was included in the kingdom of Bijapur.

came on board and assured the Englishmen of a welcome, offering to provide pepper and made an agreement for the barter deal of lead for pepper. They sent a letter and a present to 'Ādil Shah, who replied promising all reasonable concessions. The Englishmen also sought permission to establish a factory or a 'settled residence.'[20]

During February 1637, the Bijapurī governor of Rājāpūr very much desired Englishmen to trade there and promised all freedom and undertook to furnish 3000 candys of pepper yearly and buy large quantities of English commodities.[21]

Though the Englishmen shipped and traded at Dabhol and Rājāpūr, they travelled down to various places in the interior of Bijapur kingdom for the purchase of commodities and for selling English goods—coral, bread cloth, lead etc.[22] Because some of the ports viz., Rājāpūr had no goods or merchants; every thing had to be obtained from markets in the interior of the kingdom.[23]

Bijapur-British Alliance against the Portuguese

Contrary to Roe's non-aggressive policy and in furtherence to the reply of Captain, Michael to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II in 1623, the Englishmen did decide and take initial steps in 1638 to collaborate with 'Ādil Shah in a military expedition against the Portuguese. In October 1637, William Jacobszoon Kester left eleven vessels in Goa Road, where they were to remain throughout the monsoon to

---

20. E.F.I., VI, 4.
21. ibid., 12. Letter of Henry Born Ford from Rājāpūr to the President and Council at Surat, dated 21 February, 1637.
22. idem.
23. E.F.I., (Fawcett), I, XIX.

prevent the sailing of 'carracks' (of the Portuguese); and if possible, to make an attack on the city of Goa, in conjunction with 'Ādil Shah.[24]

Obviously, preceding to this naval action of the English there must have been some preliminary dealings leading to an understanding to collaborate. Further, it must have been under instruction from the President and the Council at Surat. Further though the English vessels got ready and waited to attack the Portuguese possession jointly with 'Ādil Shah's army, yet they were doubtful of 'Ādil Shah's coming to assist the English; as he was to stay at Bijapur due to march of Mughal army and its camping at Daulatabad.[25]

British Embassy to Bijapur

In 1639, the English sent a mission to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah, at Bijapur, with rich presents, consisting of several articles, valued at 2500 pagodas. In return for these, the English demanded a farmān for trading in his dominions.[26] However, the farmān did not come immediately. But permission was granted during the same year to trade at Karwar and Rājāpūr. Consequently, they built a house at Kārwār, to serve as a factory. But they were unable to carry on any business there. As such, they next contemplated building

---

24. E.F.I., VI, 41. William Fremlen at Gombroan to the company January 13, 1638.

25. idem.

26. H.G. Rawlinson, op.cit., 111.

houses or factories at Rājāpūr and Rāybāgh.[27] Besides, at Kārwār they stationed a few English factors to keep possession of the 'mock fort'.[28]

Misunderstanding and Reprisal by the British

In October, 1648, the governor of Rājāpūr, Muḥammad Qāsim, broke open the English Company's warehouse and carried away the cloth, under pretence that it belonged to Courteen, another Englishman who was operating in Bijapur, separately from the East India Company, and owed custom dues to the governor. The same governor imprisoned the Gowton and Oxidion and Captain Blackman, on their arrival at Rajapur. And he tried in vain to settle the matter and get release of the Englishmen.[29]

Later on, Blackman sailed for Khārēpaṭan (Carapatan), another Bijapūrī port. Here he was received well by the governor with promises of all possible assistance for the restitution of the cloth confiscated by the governor of Rājāpūr. Further, the governor of Khārēpaṭan granted a "cowle or warrant for free trade at that port;"

---

27. E.F.I., VI, 223, 237. Vithal Comti from Bijapur to the President at Surat dated 5 February, 1640. So far the English did not get permission to move throughout Bijapur kingdom; as such the President and Council of the English at Surat placed restriction, as per the commands of the King of England, on the Englishmen to visit only those ports which were specifically mentioned in the farmān of 'Ādil Shah. The Englishmen were not allowed to move freely to all the ports which were subsequently conquered by 'Ādil Shah and later became part of his dominions - E.F.I., VI, 236 f., President Fremlen and Council at Surat to Edward and John Smart at Rājāpūr, dated 3rd February, 1640.

28. E.F.I., VIII, 196.

29. E.F.I., VIII, 226, 251.

and gave a list for the payment of customs upon easy terms.[30] At Kharepaṭan, Blackman threatened the governor that the English would take their revenge of the actions of Rājāpūr's governor, upon the shipping of the port of Kharepaṭan; as, both the places were under the same ruler, 'Ādil Shah. This threat worked effectively. Alarmed at this, the governor wrote to the Court at Bijapur, urging that the English goods should be returned to the owners. ... Because the Rājāpūr merchants who certified in writing that the goods were Courteen's have now confessed that they did so under compulsion and that the statement was false.[31] Though the English threatened, yet they were unwilling to use force against Bijapur; as, this would hinder their investments on that coast. However, the English stopped issuing passes to the ships belonging to the port under 'Ādil Shah. This caused all the Bijapurī merchants of those ports to solicitate earnestly satisfaction in favour of the English.[32] Further, the English, in September, 1649 seized two Bijapurī junks and carried them to the bar at Goa; where they held them as security for the return of their men and goods by the Bijapur authorities.[33]

The Company's Agent Beni Das was deputed to the Court at Bijapur for pleading the cause of English for the release of the cloth, confiscated at Rājāpūr. Beni Das, on arrival at Bijapur,

---

30. ibid., 251. President Breton and M/s. Merry etc., at Swally Marine to the Adventurers on the second General Voyage, 31 January 1649.

31. ibid., 226, George Gawton at "Carapatan" to the President at Surat, dated 20 December, 1648.

32. E.F.I., VIII, 284. President Merry and others, at Swally Marine to the Co., dated January 25, 1650.

33. ibid., 328.

met the Queen-Mother of 'Ādil Shah, and other nobles, for influencing the Sultan to favour the Englishmen.[34]

By September 1649, the differences between the English and the Bijapur authorities were settled. And the new governor of Rājāpūr invited, with assurance of good relations, the English to resume their business at that port. This initiative of the governor was in accordance with the advice of 'Ādil Shah. The latter promised satisfaction for the cloth seized, by paying one-half of its worth in ready cash and the other half to be deducted in customs. The Sultan directed the governor to assure the English of "free and un-interrupted trade".

Accordingly, on 18th September, 1649, Beni Das was dispatched to Rājāpūr, carrying letters from the President in answer to those received from the governor of Rājāpūr. But nothing came out of this mission till 25th January, 1650.[35] In March 1650, Beni Das reported that 'Ādil Shah, while denying any liability, offered to compensate, through adjustments of customs. This, the English rejected as inadequate and ordered the broker to return to Surat, after intimating to the governor of Rājāpūr that the English will right themselves by seizing Bijapur ships.[36] Even till October, 1650, negotiations with 'Ādil Shah failed to secure the English any satisfaction. The English then contemplated to try to acquire their objective by seizing the vessels of 'Ādil Shah or his subjects.[37]

---

34. EFI., VIII, 252. President Breton's letter, op.cit.
35. E.F.I., VIII, 288 f. From President Marry and others to the Company dated 25 January, 1650.
36. ibid., 306. President Merry and M/s Pearce and Oxander at Swally Marine to the Co., dated 20th March, 1650.
37. ibid., 316 f.

However, still the English wished to settle peacefully, without resorting to reprisals; under orders of the Directors of the Company at England.[38]

The dispute was further widened by another incident, which took place in October, 1650, at Rājāpūr. On return of Morse from Gombroon to Rājāpūr, a dispute ensued. Whereupon Morse, with some of his crew assaulted merchants' house, killing three persons and wounding many others. The governor, thereupon, collected some men and intercepting Morse and his sailors, took away from them the money they were carrying off, and put them in irons. After this, he seized everything that was in Morse's house, in the town, to the value of 5000 pagodas and reported the whole matter to the Sultan of Bijapur. The latter directed that the money and goods should be sent to the Court and that the prisoners should be transferred to a fort. Here the purser and sailors remained in great misery; but Morse himself escaped, requitioned Surat to rescue his men. Morse took revenge by attacking and burning the Bijapurī junks, returning from the Red Sea.[39]

Bijapur grants privileges to the British

In March 1659, Revington came to Rājāpūr and from Rustum-i Zamān he obtained grant of the privileges.[40] Thus, on 24th July,

---

38. ibid., 298. The Company to the President and Council at Surat dated 13 February, 1650 - Letter Books, I, 183.
39. ibid., 324 f. President to the Co., dated 24th October, 1650.
40. E.F.I., X, 235 f. Letter from Surat to Rāybāgh dated 6th January, 1659.

1659, Āghā Murshid, governor of Kārwār, granted to Randolph Taylor and Philip Gifford, the following previleges, on behalf of the 'Alī 'Ādil Shah, for the port of Kārwār:[41]

guarantee to the English for free trade;

the customs dues were fixed at 1½% on imported goods;

treasure was exempted from duty;

the governor of Kārwār was to assist the English in the recovery of debts;

the English were permitted to administer justice to their own servants;

the English were permitted to built new house, with the permission of Rustum-i Zamān;

and other "usual privileges".

Later on, these privileges were confirmed by the Queen of Bijapur, who was holding power during the infancy of 'Alī Ādil Shah II.[42]

When the building formerly occupied by the English factors, fell down, they were granted by the governor, 25 pagodas to repair the house, this amount was to be deducted from the customs.[43]

Though lārī was in use along the Bijapurī Coast, but due to the absence of silver coinage in Bijapur, great inconvenience was caused to the traders. To get rid of this trouble, Revington proposed to Rustum-i Zamān to procure permission for the English to establish a mint at Rājāpūr, to struck silver coins, on parallel lines with the Mughal rupee. Rustum-i Zamān agreed and recommended,

---

41. E.F.I., XII, 208 f.
42. E.F.I., XII, 208 f.
43. E.F.I., XII, 209.

for a licence to the Queen for permitting such an undertaking. But the Surat Council took it scornfully. This proposal materialised thirteen years later. And a mint was established at Bombay. And these coins ruppe, pice and buzerooks, minted at Bombay were also intended partly for circulation in the Bijapur Kingdom.[44]

Revington then proceeded to Hukkeri, to meet Rustum-i Zamān; where, the latter had established his headquarters, ostensibly for a campaign against Shivaji. Revington negotiated regarding payment of customs on the portion of the pepper which had been sent down to Kārwār for shipment. After smoothing the way by the presentation of articles valued at a hundred pagodas, he obtained a grant, in accordance with his desires. The privileges which Rustum-i Zamān granted were: "The English could buy pepper at Hubbli; without paying any customs there. They were to pay the customs only at Rājāpūr, from where it was exported. Nor they were to pay at Kārwār; but only at Rājāpūr."[45]

Revington had ambitious scheme for the development of trade in the Bijapur Kingdom. In his dreams of the future, he saw Rājāpūr the centre of a large trade in saltpetre, pepper, calicoes, cotton yarn, etc., the site for mint providing coinage for use all

---

44. E.F.I., 235 f., 243 f., 246. Here the English factor writes: "We have procured Rustam Jamahs Phyramand (farmān)" (E.F.I., X, 246). The factor is mistaken about the farmān. Except the Sultan 'Ādil Shah no one could issue a farmān. It must have been simply a letter granting privileges, as Rustum had no authority to issue a farmān.

45. E.F.I., X, 246. Letter from Rajapur to Surat, date 30th November, 1659.

along the west coast, the headquarters of the Presidency, in place of Surat, during the war with the Mughals, which, he like Andrews, thought to be advisable, if not inevitable, with a plan to built a fort near the mouth of the river. To achieve this objective, he developed and maintained excellent terms with Rustum-i Zamān.[46]

Revington was awaiting an opportunity to oblige Bijapur and develop more closer contacts. This came in 1660 and Revington was quick to seize the opportunity of offering to sell his mortars and shell to Siddī Johar (Salābat Khan)[47] for the reduction of the fortress of Panhalla held by Shivaji.

During 1660, the President Andrews drew his attention towards the port of Danda-Rajpuri (Janjira) a Bijapurī port. He, with his colleagues, made a voyage down the coast to find out a new centre for the English trade. The Council decided to send Captain Roger Middleton, with a few attendants and a small present of five yards of Satin and three yards of scarlet to the governor of Danda-Rajapuri. A pretence and request was made to allow the English ships to shelter in his harbour whenever it was deemed necessary. But the real intention underlying this request of the English was to make a survey of the place to guage its strength and to discover a vulnerable port from where an attack could be directed with facility. However, as to the results of this interesting plan the records are silent.[48]

---

46. E.F.I., X, 352 f.

47. Shivaji, 344, E.F.I., X. 370 f; E.R.S., I, 13.

48. Banaji: Bombay and the Siddis, 7 f.

Consequences of British help to Bijapur against Shivaji

During the conquest of Rajapur by Shivaji, the English assisted Bijapur and supplied munitions of war. Later on, in 1661 Shivaji took revenge over the English by imprisoning their President, Revington and a few other Englishmen.[49] In retaliation to this action of Shivaji, the English quite unreasonably ordered for the seizure of Bijapuri ship along the Western Coast. This was the outcome of the consultations held by the President and the Council at Surat.[50] It was further decided, on the advice of Randolph Taylor of Rājāpūr, who was one of the captives, that for their release the Queen of Bijapur to be intercepted, as she returns from pilgrimage to Mecca, at the end of August, 1662. The Queen was to be brought to Swally, and to be held till the release of the Englishmen.[51] For their release, the President also wrote a letter to 'Ādil Shah to use his good offices; as the English wrongly believed Shivaji as 'Ādil Shah's "subject" and Rājāpūr still as port of Bijapur. And hence, they ordered for revenge on Bijapurī ships; a wrong conclusion and policy adopted by the English. In response to President's letter, 'Ādil Shah replied that it will be of no avail to write to Shivaji for releasing the Englishmen. However, 'Ādil Shah said that an army of his was proceeding against Shivaji, if successful, he hoped to accomplish his and their (Englishmen's) desires.[52] However, the English played mischief and they robbed

---

49. E.F.I., XI, 4 f. Letter from the President at Vengurla dated 29th July, 1661, E.R.S., I., 15 f.; Shivaji, 345.
50. E.R.S., 35; E.F.I., XI, 18.
51. E.F.I., XI, 87 f., 107.
52. E.F.I., XI, 90, 232.

and plundered a squadron of Bijapurī vessels, sent to the Red Sea, to fetch the dowager Queen of Bijapur.[53]

This conflict led to great loss of trade and the English could not buy any goods from Bijapur, during the period of conflict.[54] Rājāpūr factory was closed for a few years.[55]

Following the detention of Revington and his men by Shivaji at Rājāpūr, the English demanded a farmān from 'Ādil Shah providing security to the Englishmen and their goods in the Bijapur Kingdom.[56]

In 1663, there was a conflict between the governor of Kārwār and the English over the payment of custom duty at Shiveshwar port. The governor, due to the non-payment of customs, resorted to unfair means and seized the English goods. The conflict became serious; the English left the port of Kārwār and stopped all trade at that port. The matter coming to the notice of 'Ādil Shah, who in order to maintain cordial relations with the English, issued a farmān in July, 1663, in favour of the English. The 'Ādil Shah, assuring security, directed the English to return back to Kārwār to re-establish their trade, without fear of any molestation. The 'Ādil Shah likewise wrote to Rustum-i Zamān to give orders to his servants at Kārwār to use civility and be good in their relations with the English and not to trouble them. Through the above farmān and letter the English obtained the following privileges.[57]

---

53. E.F.I., XI, 190, 237.
54. Manumenta: J.B.H.S., II (2) September 1929, 252.
55. E.F.I., XI, 238.
56. E.F.I., XI, 232.
57. ibid., 240, 244 f.; E.R.S., No.68, 58.

The governor of Kārwār was directed to behave gently and to not to exact any unreasonable customs, besides what had been already agreed with the English;

the governor of Shivashwar was commanded to not to make any unjust claims from the English and not to levy any new customs;

the governor of Cuddera was commanded to maintain the previous abatement of the customs of two pagodas per 100 oxen from the English; and

the English were assured security for themselves and their estate, goods etc., whatever may be in their custody.

By August, 1663, the English factors started returning to Karwar.[58] The resumption of English trade at Kārwār was also later on confirmed by the orders of the Directors of the East India Company at London. They observed that "Trade should be maintained at Karwar and a 'faire correspondency' kept with the 'king of Decan' (Bijapur) by all possible means."[59]

With all the good gesture of 'Ādil Shah towards the English, the latter, at Kārwār declined the Bijapurī governor to issue a pass for the ship of the dowager Queen of Bijapur for Baṣra, Bughdad etc., The English demanded specific farmān from 'Ādil Shah himself for the issue of a pass.[60]

By 1665, Rājāpūr once again coming in the possession of 'Ādil Shah, the governor of Rajapur invited the English to re-establish their factory and trade there, which was closed down due to the capture of Rājāpūr and Englishmen by Shivaji.[61] However,

---

58. ibid., 244.
59. E.F.I., XI. 325. Letter of the Company from London dated 9th March 1664 - Instructions to the Council at Surat.
60. E.F.I., XI, 343.
61. E.R.S., I, 105; E.F.I., XII, 85.

the English were reluctant to return to Rājāpūr, due to the fear of the Bijapuris favouring the Dutch in establishing a factory there.[62] The policy of the English adopted in this regard was, in the words of the President and the Council:

"The factors were cautioned to beware of the malice of the Hollanders, 'whose losses make their feire as a bear bereaved of her whelps', and not to trust to the favour of Bijapur or Rustum-i Zamān, "for they are all the slaves of bribes, and money will incline them any way."[63]

However, contrary to the wrong expectations of the English, the Bijapuris had refused permission to the Dutch to establish a factory at Rājāpūr; on the grounds that "the place was at the English's refusal."[64] Implying that the place was at the disposal of the English and they (Bijapur) could not permit the Dutch to establish a factory there unless the English refused to re-establish it there.

Due to wars, the English factory at Kārwār was closed down temporarily from March 1666 and the factors escaped to Hubli for safety.[65]

Agreement of 1668

It was found on several occasions that differences and conflicts were arising between the English factors and the

---

62. E.F.I., XII, 86.
63. E.F.I., XX, 200. Letter to Robert Master at Kārwār from the President at Surat dated 10th January, 1666.
64. E.R.S., I, 105; E.F.I., XII, 85.
65. E.F.I., XII, 208.

Bijapurī governor of various ports, due to the non-fulfilment of trade rules. It was therefore, considered wise to make an agreement between the two parties, laying down specific terms and conditions for regulating the trade. Consequently, on 20th September, 1668, an Agreement was made between the English and the governor of Kārwār, Siddī 'Abdul Hasan and his majumdār.[66] The terms of the commerso-economic Agreement were:

"That the English should be well treated, and should be permitted to go up country or else where at their pleasure.

"That they might import and export all manner of goods paying 1½ percent for customs, except for treasurers, which was to be free of duty.

"That any goods not sold might be shipped off again without paying any duty at all.

"That no hinderance should be placed in their way in selling their goods.

"That if any merchant failed to pay for goods bought from the English, the governor should either force him to do so or allow him to be detained in the factory until payment was made.

"That where as the dwelling house that was formerly built at the charge of Rustam Zaman ('late owner of the town') and given to the English had partly fallen down, the factors should be allowed to rebuilt the same and to reimburse themselves out of the customs due from them, upto a limit of 250 pagodas.

"That no one should forcibly enter the factory; but that, if any difference of importance should arise, it should be settled

---

66. E.F.I., XIII, 107 f., 110.

by the Governor and the English chief.

"That disputes arising among the English should be decided by their chief; and that disputes between Englishmen and Muhammadens should be settled by the Governor and the Chief together; the culprit being punished by one or the other, according to his nationality.

"That if any servant of the English should abscond, the governor should do his best to secure his return.

"That, if an English ship be wrecked within the King's ('Adil Shah's) dominions, all possible assistance should be given.

"That the governor shall at all times and on all occasions protect and secure from any abuse or injury the persons of the said companies servants residing within his jurisdictions and also what goods and merchandize they have in their warehouse, and in case any violence or robbery shall happen to any of them or ought of theirs the governor shall cause reparation to be made, as in justice the cause doth meritt; but if the delinquent doth not appeare, the proto (port?) is to be answerable.

"That in the event of a controversy between the brokers or other servants of the English and any of the country people, the English chief should punish the former, if found culpable, or the governor the latter.

"The governor shall endeavour to procure a farman from the king of Bijapur confirming the Agreement."

The English insisted so much on getting the farmān from 'Ādil Shah that they prohibited Bijapurī (both official and private) ships from navigating the sea till the farmān, confirming the Agreement, was issued.[67]

67. ibid., 116.

However, in spite of the Agreement, differences and disputes did arise. In 1670, the Desai of Kārwār demanded half percent separate duty on goods. This claim he put forward after the factory was resettled by Randolph Taylor, under the agreement. The agreement provided a comprehensive duty of one and half per cent; and the Desai sought to get half-per cent either out of this, which the governor refused or from the factory. The English refused to comply the demand and the Desai caused some trouble to them by stopping boats and license to build the factory house. However, the Desai gave license and the building of new house, for which the governor of Kārwār laid the stone, came up. At the opening ceremony in 1674, the same Desai too was present, exhibiting good cordial relations[68]

In August, 1673, when some rebles of Bijapur were causing trouble, the English factors at Kārwār came to the rescue of the governor, Muzaffar Khan, and helped the cause of Bijapur by diverting the rebels into an attempt to take the castle. Later on, the rebels besieged the English factory itself.[69]

The British on the Bijapurī Coromandel Coast

Until 1673, Bijapur's relations with the English were restricted only to the factories and trade in the west coast. On 10th March, 1673, Nadhīr Muḥammad, Bijapurī governor of Ginji, in a letter to the English Agent and Council at Fort St. George, invited them to settle a factory, in the Bijapurī territory, on the

---

68. E.F.I. (Fawcett) II, 296 ff. Letter of Chamberlain from Kārwār dated 19 November 1670.
69. E.F.I. (Fawcett) I, 69, 318.

east coast, at or near Porto Novo and at Valudavur near Pondichery. The governor offered the English all possible facilities and suggested construction of forts for their own defence with promises of grant of privileges. Further, he extended a friendly invitation for the deputation of an English Agent to him and sent a present.[70]

The Agent and the Council considering the great trouble they were having for almost two years, and the dangers they were exposed to from the Dutch and the French, they did not want to neglect wholly the invitation of Nadhir Muhammad. The English sent a civil answer, with a handsome present through Elihu Yale to the Khan, to initiate negotiations for the acquisition of a port in his territory. The Khan advised the English to send their men to take up the possession of the port and set up the English flag there, in order to free him from the importunities of the Dutch and the French, who were continually soliciting him for the same, with great offers. The proposed project to acquire the port was confirmed by the Directors of Company at England, who instructed the Agent at Fort St. George that - "we approve of the settlement you have made in the Ginji country and would have you nourish it by all means possible."[71]

Bijapur's concessions to the British

During 1675, the English factor Child established good relations at Rāybagh, where he and Mitchel were welcomed by the

---

70. The Madras Diary and Consultation Book (1673-74) Record of Fort St. George cited by Srinivaschari: Ginjee and its Rulers, 207 ff.

71. idem.

governor and others and were entertained. From there they went to Miraj, to pay a visit to Bahlōl Khan, Commander-in-chief of Bijapur. The Khan granted some privileges to the English. From him Childe got a remission of half the customs duty usually charged at Rāybāgh.[72]

In April, 1678, the governor of Hubli, Antajī Pandit, forced the English to pay a part of the chauth, which he had to pay to Shivaji for the safety of that town. The English and their Agent was abused and affronted, continually craving money, they were threatened imprisonment. The governor, sent 20 peons and forced open the Company's warehouse at Hubli and took 25 per cent of broad cloth and put them to sale in the bazar to realise partly the wealth tax of 500 pagodas and partly contribution for chauth. For satisfaction and peaceful settlement, the English factor wrote to various nobles at Bijapur Court. They requested for the appointment of a new governor at that place and implementation of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah's former farmān which granted privileges to the English.[73] Pending the decision from Bijapur Court, the English factors were directed to sell the remaining goods at Hubli and then retire to Dhārwāṛ, another Bijapurī town of trade, where 'Ādil Shah granted them, through a farmān, exemption of two years customs and permission to build a warehouse. Further, they were advised to seize the two ships belonging to deceased Bahlōl Khan, at Bassalore, as retaliation.[74]

---

72. E.F.I. (Fawcett) I, 259, Childe's Letter from Rāybāgh to Surat dated 31st August, 1675.

73. E.R.S., II, 162 f.

74. ibid., 177. Surat to Kārwāṛ dated 24th August, 1678.

SEC. III: COURTEEN'S ASSOCIATION

Courteen's Factory at Kārwār

Sir William Courteen, a Cornish gentleman was the first Englishman to establish a factory at Kārwār, in Bijapur territory in the year 1639. 'Ādil Shah granted to him a piece of land, where Courteen established a factory and carried on the trade under the banner of Courteen's Association. Later on, this Association founded factories at Rājāpūr and Bathicola. The Association was afterwards styled as "The Assade Merchants".[75]

Earlier in 1636, Sir William Courteen had obtained from Charles I a license to engage in Indian Trade; and Mountney and Captain Weddel were despatched to Surat, on behalf of the new Company of Merchants Trading to the East.[76] And "the King (Charles I) received a share in the venture "of the Courteen's. This move affected through Endymion Portor, of bed-chamber, was a violation of the Charter, granted to the London Company. It was necessary to find a excuse; and therefore, it was duly set forth in the preamble of the grant, that "the East India Company had neglected to establish fortified factories, or seats of trade to which the King's subjects could resort with safety -- that they have consulted their own interests only, without any regard to the King's revenue -- and in general, that they had broken the conditions upon which their Charter and exclusive privileges had been granted

---

75. John Fryer: A New Account of East India and Persia (1672-1681) (ed.) W. Crooke, II, 3.

76. W.H. Carey: The Good Old days of Honourable John Company, 23.

to them."[77]

King Charles I somewhat illogically assured the East India Company, on the word of a 'Christian King', that the new Courteen's Association will not compete against the Company; and directed them to render assistance to the new Association.[78]

When in 1639 Sir William Courteen died, his license, for trade in Bijapur Kingdom was renewed in the name of his son and his associates.[79]

Courteen at Bijapur

In 1639-40, Leonard Woodman of the Courteen's Association, having procured permission of the Rājāpūr governor to land and trade there, proceeded to Bijapur. He presented to 'Ādil Shah costly articles of various description, valued at 2535 pagodas. With them, he presented to 'Adil Shah a petition, desiring freedom of trade throughout his Kingdom paying usual customs, as other merchants do. He further requested for a farmān for the recovery of 12000 pagodas, imprested in 1639 by Mountney to the chiefs of Kārwār on provision of pepper which was till then not delivered.[80] It appears that 'Ādil Shah granted his petition, as they established trade in his Kingdom.

---

77. Kaye: The Administration of East India Company, 113.

78. Rawlinson, op.cit., 104.

79. Hunter: History of British India, II, 37 f.

80. E.F.I., VI, 231. From President Fremlen and M/s Breton and Wylde at Swally Marine to the Company at England dated 28 January 1640.

By 1646 the Association sank into bankruptcy. Consequently, they submitted a piteous appeal to the East India Company to take over the Kārwār factory. The Company not unnaturally refused to do so. And in 1647, the House of Lords gave Courteen three years time to withdraw.[81]

Seizure of Kārwār Factory by Bijapur

On 13th January, 1649 the governor's brother sent for Lloyd to his house at Shiveshwar. Here, Lloyd and his companions Edward Adams were surrounded by soldiers, who robbed and imprisoned them. About 50 soldiers were sent to seize the factory; which act was accomplished without difficulty. Daniel Mason and others in the factory were taken by surprise. They never expected such an action by the Bijapuris. Daniel and other were brought as prisoners to Shiveshwar. Lloyd sought an interview with the governor, to why they had been thus treated. But his request was refused. He was told that the reason for his imprisonment was that four year's rent was due to the governor, under agreement made with Agent John Farren and Council, amounting to 800 pagodas principal, with compound interest at 25 %, making 1500 pagodas in all. Further, the governor complained that Captain Durson had given him no satisfaction for an adventure sent by him to Ormuz, for which 1700 pagodas were claimed, reckoning cent per cent gains at Ormuz and as much for the returns with interest at 25%. At last the matter was settled when they signed a declaration of owing large sum to the governor.[82]

---

81. Rawlinson, op.cit., 110 f.; Court Minutes of East India Co., (1644-9), XII, (Introduction).
82. E.F.I., VIII, 341 f.

The Association lingered on and some how managed to live till 1657, when Cromwell renewed the Charter, the East India Company absorbed Courteen's bankrupt Association and resumed its monopoly.[83]

SEC. IV: BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS BIJAPUR

During the 16th Century, the English were beginning to acquire a sense of place. Firstly, there had been trade. The original English settlements were merely emporia, bazars, places of commerce and no more. The original policy of the Company was to avoid acquiring real property, which could be taxed or which might have to be defended, but this was found to be inevitable. Then the element of security entered that the warehouse must be protected. The traders became armed traders. The next step was to employ soldiers to defend the settlement; and then to establish-'spheres of influence.'[84]

The year 1661 ushers in a new era in the relations of the British with Bijapur. By the Royal Charter, the East India Company's servants in India were authorized to make peace and war with any prince or people, not being Christian; and to administer justice for themselves and their dependants. These privileges

---

83. Sir John A.R. Marriot, The English in India, 61.

84. H.L. Hoskins: "The Growth of British Interest in the Route to India", J.I.H., II, 168. M. Edwards: Asia in the Age of Europe, 47

transformed a body of Ware House men into a political corporation, which might almost be called a Government.[85]

From the very beginning the Britishers adopted a policy of friendship and amity with Bijapur, non-interference in the affairs of Bijapur and a policy of non-alignment (with one or two exceptions) Roe adopted an "unaggressive wholly merchantile" policy. He disliked the military - commercial policies. Consequently, when in 1623, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II sought British alliance and collaboration against the Portuguese, the English gave a pacific cold reply to wait for appropriate time. Obviously with a view to divert and postpone the idea. However, in 1637, one exception to the non-alignment policy was made when the English took the initiative to make naval attack on the Portuguese, in favour of 'Ādil Shah.

It was their non-aligned and unaggressive policy which failed to appeal the English the invitation in 1659 of Rustum-i Zamān to assist Shivaji in taking the fort of Danda-Rājapurī and become partner in the share of rich treasure in that Bijapurī port.[86] Again, in 1674, when Rustam-i Zamān came back to Bijapurī service, he requested the English to spare him guns and 'bullions' in his conflict with Shivaji. The English factor at Kārwār, Bandish refused to comply; pointing out that it would entail serious risk to the new factory at Rājāpūr (under Shivaji) and that "they were merchants, who had come to Kārwār to trade and not to fight."[87] Though from the English records the English refused help

---

85. P. Anderson: English in the Western India, 97.
86. Banaji, op.cit., 6.
87. E.F.I. (Fawcett) I, 327.

to Bijapur, yet it seems that, they assisted them secretly, as is evident from the following passage in Dutch record: "They (the English) have not yet received refund for the ammunitions supplied to the king of Visiapore (Bijapur) for the war against the rebel Shivaji. But on the other hand, they have suffered a lot of inconvenience from this rebel."[88]

On several occasions, the English were unwilling to use force in order to safeguard their interests or in order to get satisfaction from Bijapur for the losses they incurred due to the misbehaviour or ill-treatment of the Bijapurī governors of various ports. Yet on occasions, they stopped passes to the Bijapurī ships and seized some of their ships, as a retaliatory measure to get satisfaction. Even, at times of great loss, they did not resort to force; as they were directed by their Directors at England to adopt peaceful and reconciliatory measures with Bijapur. Above all, the gestures of friendship, amity and help rendered by Bijapur and his governors etc., to the English, doubted their integrity, when the question of their favouring the Dutch along with the English came up. And on 10th January 1666, the President and Council at Surat advised the factor Robert at Kārwār to "not to trust to the favour of the king of Bijapur or Rustum-i Zamān, 'for they are all the slaves of bribes, and money will incline them any way."[89]

However, Bijapur-British relations paved the way for building up British Empire in South India.

---

88. Monumenta: J.B.H.S., September 1929, II (2), 253.

89. E.F.I., XII, 200.

Part 3

Bijapur-Dutch Relations -- (1637-1686)

SEC. I: BACKGROUND: PORTUGUESE-DUTCH RIVALRY

The Dutch came to trade with India towards the close of the sixteenth century. As long as they owed allegiance to Spain, Lisbon was the market from where they purchased Indian merchandise. In 1580, the Spanish and Portuguese dominions were united under the Spanish Crown.[1] Subsequently, in 1585, King Philip II closed the harbours of Spain and Portugal to the commerce of the Dutch; they were thus deprived of Indian goods. The Dutch decided to engage directly in the Indian trade. The conflict between Spain - Portugal and Holland grew. Dutch ships were confiscated and their owners were imprisoned.[2] This rivalry between the Dutch and the Portuguese continued between them and their possessions in India.

From the beginning of the seventeenth century the Hollanders had determined to take full advantage of the weakness of the Portuguese and oust them from their eastern trade; and this object was pursued with all the tenacity and thoroughness of the Dutch character. Thus, the Dutch having command of the seas in the East, hindered and interrupted communications between the Portuguese ports. They even prevented the sending of re-inforcements from the mother country. Their cause was further strengthened by the

---

1. B.D. Basu: Rise of the Christian Power in India, 22.
2. A. Vandenbosch: The Dutch East Indies, 51.

Agreemtnt between the English and the Dutch in 1619. The Dutch being fully aware of the chronic enmity between the Portuguese and Bijapur, took advantage of seeking an alliance with 'Ādil Shah against the Portuguese. They gained several other favours from 'Ādil Shah on the pretext of helping him against the Portuguese. Moreover, the Dutch wanted to have a port near Goa; obviously in Bijapurī territory to serve as a base for regular naval attacks on Goa. Thus in 1637, the Dutch adopted the policy of annually blockading the Portuguese capital, Goa. Consequently, they wanted to build a port and a fortified factory at Vengurla to serve as a point d' appui for blockading Portuguese fleets and as a port of observation during the months when they were not there.[3] To achieve their goal, the Dutch sent an embassy to 'Ādil Shah at Bijapur. The motives of the Dutch mission to Bijapur were correctly suspected by the English factors.

SEC. II: ESTABLISHMENT OF CORDIAL RELATIONS AND ALLIANCE

Dutch Embassy to Bijapur

With this background and motives, the Dutch Governor General and the Council of the Dutch sent Juan Van Twist as ambassador to 'Ādil Shah at Bijapur. In January, 1637, Van Twist, Chief Factor

---

3. C.H.I., V, 31, 49, 82 f.

for the Dutch at Surat landed at Dabhol, on his mission to 'Ādil Shah. The purpose of the mission was partly ascribed to procure trading at Dabhol, but chiefly to seek the assistance of Bijapur against the Portuguese at Goa.[4] This is evident from the letter of Commander Jacob Cooper, addressed to 'Ādil Shah which throws considerable light on the Dutch diplomacy. The letter dated 31 December, 1636 reads:[5] "Very mighty king, the much esteemed Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, Governor-General and the Councillors of India, who rule the United States in the East and the illustratious and very mighty members of the Privy Council of the free Netherlands and his Royal Grace Fredrik, Hendrick and Prince Orangie etc., and the rulers of the general East India Company have been pleased to send me with a big fleet of 14 well equiped warships to these districts, not only to do as much harm as possible by land and at sea to the Portuguese, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty (Adil Shah), but also to enter into a closer contact with your Majesty and other princes and friendly rulers, and to give them every help and assistance against the said Portuguese and their allies. For that purpose, we arrived about two months ago safely with our fleet on the Indian Coast and in the roadstead of Goa ....."

"With the remaining ten ships, we are lying in the bay and roadstead of Goa in the range of vision of the Portuguese castles and their galleons, which we expect at sea every day to give us battle..... And in order to show your Majesty the good intentions which the illustrious Governor-General and the Councillors of

---

4. E.F.I., VI, 23. The Agent and Factors in Persia to the Company, dated July, 18, 1637.
5. Monuments: J.B.H.S., September 1928, 200 f.

India, have always had to please and serve your Majesty, these gentlemen have ordered me to offer your Majesty their friendship and assistance as much as possible, not only to the glory and prosperity of His Majesty's kingdom and subjects, but also to the prosperity and rest of the whole coast of India against the insatiable imperialism of the Portuguese and their allies, our enemies and the enemies of His Majesty; and they promise that just as we have closed Goa now from the seaside with our fleet, they intend to continue this practice every year, so that we dare assure your Majesty that if your Majesty (who has got many soldiers) is willing to bring his land forces before Goa and to cut off the supply from that side, Goa will soon be forced to surrender to your Majesty.[6] For this purpose and in order to close a good treaty, of peace with your Majesty in the name of our principals, and to obtain free entrance in all the countries of your Majesty, we have agreed to send over special ambassador with proper orders and full authority to the court of your Royal Majesty, As per the instructions of the Governor General and the Council of India, we have therefore committed our brave and beloved Joan Van Twist, Fiscal of the fleet and the first man in our secret Council, to bring this letter. We respectfully request your Majesty to believe our said ambassador and brother in everything which we will propose in the name of us and our principals, and to let him enjoy the favour of your Majesty, in which we trust. Sire, we kiss the hands of your Majesty, and pray the Almighty to protect the throne of Your Majesty in happiness and beatitude for many years and also the person of your

---

6. Implying on alliance against the Portuguese.

Majesty."

On Van Twist's arrival at Bijapur, the above letter was read out to 'Ādil Shah by an interpreter. 'Ādil Shah, after hearing the contents of the letter and understanding the commission of the Prince of Orangil, he uttered "Bahot Khub"[7] 'Ādil Shah immediately granted permission for the Dutch for the free trade in his kingdom, and ordered his minister, Muṣṭafā Khan, to issue a farmān in favour of the Dutch.[8] 'Ādil Shah also agreed for joint attack on Goa. For the service and help of Dutch ships at sea, 'Ādil Shah granted the Dutch freedom from tolls; and promised to pay half the tribute of the "afandigos" and of the revenues of Goa and booty, after its conquest.[9]

Bijapur-Dutch Alliance

Van Twist's mission was successful and 'Ādil Shah issued a farmān granting the desires of the Dutch with the sole intention of meeting the challenge of the Portuguese on the seas. The farmān reads:[10]

"To the esteemed and highly respected lion of the sea, Mr. Antonio Van Diemen, viceroy of the Dutch in India. I should

---

7. Implying very good.

8. For the text of the two farmāns - Dr. P.M. Joshi: "John Van Twist's Mission to Bijapur, 1637", J.I.H., XXXIII, 1967, 134 f.

9. Monumenta: J.B.H.S., September 1928, 201. The English Factors considered that chiefly owing to the hopes of Dutch assistance against the Portuguese that 'Ādil Shah permitted them to settle a factory at Vengurla. E.F.I., X, 234. afandigos, here implies the lands expected to be conquered jointly by Bijapur and the Dutch.

10. Monumenta: J.B.H., September 1928, 193. The Caption "New Farman of the Sultan of Golconda to the Dutch" is wrongly given at p. 192 of J.B.H.S., it is of Bijapur and not of Golkonda.

like very much trust that during the September mansoon you will send a strong fleet before Goa. At the same time, I shall send support of horsemen and footmen from the land side, and I hope that they will fight with courage against the Portuguese and seize the town of Goa and the surrounding countries; and that they will deliver the town and countries to my governor and Captains.

"And I shall order to give a place in my country to the Dutch, where they may come and go for trade purposes without having anything to ask for any person when the Dutch arrive in my harbours, I shall order my governors and captain that they must favour them and help them and given them everything they want, viz., food stuffs, drinks and other things they want in connection with the War.

"And because the Portuguese have broken the peace contract and the old friendship we had with them, I give permission to the Dutch to come in all my countries and if the Dutch deliver to me the said town of Goa and the surrounding countries, I undertake to give them half of the revenues and of the tributes and also a place where they like to establish themselves either in Goa or in other ports of mine wherever they will like.

"They may be assured of this my promise and may trust me; and when they come next year before Goa, this contract, which I have made with them, will be in force just the same as the contract I made with King Sicander, I shall never act against it but always live up to it.

"Done in the month called Savval, 1046" (1637)

Bijapur-Dutch activities against the Portuguese

On the advice of Van Twist, Muṣṭafā Khan gave orders for the fortification of Vengurla, and for its reinforcement to help the Dutch. For the Dutch, Vengurla was of prime importance and they considered that "without it, it would be impossible to continue the siege before Goa."[11]

Muṣṭafā Khan insisted on Van Twist, to appoint at Bijapurī Court, a Dutch Agent. This was in order to prevent the Portuguese factions who were out to obstruct the Dutch-Bijapur alliance. Van Twist agreeing to the proposal, wished to send a qualified permanent ambassador to Bijapur. This proposal seems to have materialised; as in one of the despatches Van Twist writes on his arrival again at Dabhol, that he was "greeted by Mr. Ramadhan, ambassador of your Royal Majesty in the empire of Visiapour."[12] This person does not seem to be a Dutch national.

Now, in alliance with Bijapur, the Dutch continued the war with the Portuguese with increased vigour and almost with unvarying success. The blockade of Goa was resumed. Fierce naval fighting took place between the Dutch and the Portuguese at Sea, near Karli river, south of Malvar.[13]

After the war misunderstanding started between 'Ādil Shah and the Dutch. 'Ādil Shah demanded from the Dutch all the booty, especially the artillery. The Dutch failing to comply and refused

---

11. ibid., 203.

12. ibid., 197. Letter of Van Twist addressed to Governor-General dated 22nd April 1637.

13. E.F.I., VI, 229, fn.1. For more details of the conflict between these two European nations, see Danvers, II, 262.

to send the booty, 'Ādil Shah caused the Dutch factors at Vengurla to be apprehended and imprisoned. However, the chief of Dutch merchant, resident at Vengurla, Peter Paets, presented to 'Ādil Shah two very large pieces of brass ordinance and several other valuable things; and offered continued assistance of the Dutch at Sea, if 'Ādil Shah sent his forces by land. 'Ādil Shah for the present expressed his inability to send land forces, as they were busy in the Karnatak.[14] Consequently, Dutch designs on Goa in 1640 failed.

During the naval blockade of Goa by the Dutch in 1638-39, the Portuguese Viceroy, felt hopeless to compete with the Dutch single-handed; as such he despatched an embassy to 'Ādil Shah with a view of inducing him to help them to turn out the Dutch. Obviously, the Portuguese were unaware of the Bijapur-Dutch alliance. Portuguese ambassador, however, met with but little encouragement and entirely failed to accomplish his object.[15] Obviously the Portuguese were unaware of the Bijapur-Dutch alliance against them; and 'Ādil Shah kept up his promise to the Dutch.

During 1640-41, Bijapur-Dutch relations were friendly and peaceful. However, "The Portugals having bought an offensive and defensive league of amity of the King of Beejapore for 100,000 pago(das), the Dutch were thereupon excluded from Vengurla and other ports of the King's dominions."[16] This piece of information

---

14. ibid., 230 f, 238. Letter of Vittula Gomti at Bijapur to the President at Surat, dated 5th February, 1640.

15. Danvers, II, 267.

16. E.F.I., VII, 22. President Fremlen at Swally Marine to the Company at U.K, June 27, 1642.

seems to be rather doubtful.[17]

SEC. III: THE DUTCH ON BIJAPUR'S COROMONDEL COAST

By 1649, the whole of the district of Ginji, including the sea board Tegenapatam was conquered by Bijapur. As such, the Dutch promptly obtained from the Bijapurī Commander in charge of Ginji and Madura a reassuring 'Kaul'[18], for trade and other facilities in the Bijapur Kingdom. Again in 1650, the new governor of Bijapur gave further assurances that the trading rights of the Dutch in Ginji and further south would be duly respected. In August 1651, farmāns from 'Ādil Shah, formally guaranteed the Dutch trading rights at the Bijapurī ports, along with the Coromondel coast; and fixed the tolls for Tegenepatam at two and a half per cent, which was only about half the previous rate.[19]

Again, with Thanjavur Nāyak's acceptance of Bijapur's suzerainty, The Dutch factory at Karikal also came under Bijapurs suzerainty. The Bijapurī governor granted 'Kauls', to the Dutch in 1649 and 1652, with the same conditions, formerly granted in 'Ādil Shah's farmān of 1651.[20]

---

17. According to E.F.I., (VII, 22, fn.2) in the Hague Transcripts Series I, Vol. XII, No. 385; Dagh Register, 164-42), 208, there is a copy of the Bijapur-Portuguese treaty concluded on 4th June, 1641. However, Portuguese records do not mention it.

18. Kaul - Agreement

19. Tapan Ray Chaudry: Jan Company and the Coromandel, 55.

20. ibid., 56; I.H.R.C., January 1942, 25.

Though it was Khān-i Khānān, Commander-in-chief of the Bijapuri army who gave the 'Kaul' to the Dutch to trade and got them farmāns from 'Ādil Shah, yet in 1652, the Dutch refused the same person passes for his ship to proceed to Achin and Queda. Instead of these places, the Dutch offered him passes for Tenasserim and Pegu. This did not satisfy the Khan; and he decided to send one ship to Achin without a pass. Again in 1655, one of the Khan's ships, returning from Achin without a pass was attacked by a Dutch ship cruising in the Bay. Such incidents were source of continuous tension despite Khan's generally friendly and helpful attitude towards the Dutch Company.[21] It was due to the commercial ambitions of the great nobles of Bijapur who wanted to develop their trade with the eastern countries, as now Bijapur had direct access to the Bay of Bengal. This clashed with commercial interests of the Dutch.

During the Bijapur-Golkonda conflict from 1652 over the partition of the conquered territory in the south, the Dutch adopted a neutral policy and were endeavouring to live as peacefully as possible with both the contenting powers - Bijapur and Golkonda.[22] Consequently, in August, 1654, the Dutch obtained another farmān from of 'Ādil Shah, granting them privileges at Tegenapatem and neighbouring ports.[23]

Diplomatic endeavours and Peaceful Relations

By 1659, the Portuguese were successful, to a certain extent, in their endeavour of instigating the Queen of Bijapur against the

---

21. Tapan Ray Chaudhry, op.cit., 55.
22. I.H.R.C., January 1942, 26, opcit.
23. Bal Krishna, I (1) 144. Op.cit

Dutch. The Portuguese sent ambassador to Bijapur with very costly presents, valued at 100,000 pagodas; and with a further promise of offering 10,000 pagodas annually if amicable relations between Bijapur and the Portuguese were restored; and if the Dutch were expelled from the Bijapur territory. However, the Portuguese obtained nothing more than a renewal of former treaties.[24] This dealing obviously animated the Dutch. But for the diplomacy of the Dutch the relations would have strained. No sooner did the Portuguese ambassador left Bijapur, the Dutch supplanted favour of Bijapur by offering their 'peshkash' and got cancelled the Portuguese proposal of sending Bijapur's army against the Dutch. On the contrary, due to the cunning diplomacy of the Dutch, the Queen was induced to send an army against the Portuguese to claim Bijapur's rights over the territories of Bardes and Salsette. She demanded 20,000 pagodas as yearly payment for claim over these territories.[25]

In 1660, the young 'Adil Shah granted the Dutch exemption from tolls on the cows they use to purchase at Vengurla.[26] In the following year, the Dutch showed friendly gesture by providing a ship to the Queen-mother of Bijapur for her pilgrimage to Arabia. And they even carried her letters to Bijapur from Persia.[27] Further they loaned money to her in Persia, in need, while 'Adil Shah was directed to pay the amount to the Dutch Company at Golkonda.[28]

---

24. E.F.I., X, 247-48. Letter of Revington to Surat dated 10th December 1659.

25. ibid., 248, E.R.S., I, 1.

26. Monumenta: J.B.H.S., September 1929, II (2), 243.

27. ibid., 240 f. and Vol. III (3) 1930, 231.

28. ibid., March 1931, IV (1), 76.

In January, 1663, the Dutch solicitations for permission to establish a factory at Kārwār was granted by the Bijapurī governor of that place.[29]

In February 1661, Shivaji secured possession of Porto Novo and Tegenapatam. Then, in 1662, the Bijapurī commander Bahlōl Khan recaptured it. During the siege of the fort of Tegenapatam, Dutch trade was completely disturbed and all the merchants, in fear, flew to neighbouring towns. After the capture of the fort, the Dutch governor Pit sent Pieter de Lange and Francois Thivort, to the Bijapuri Commander, with the object of restoring normalcy in the town and settling the dispute with the merchants. It was agreed that the amount of 250 pagodas, which the Bijapuri soldiers had exacted from the Dutch, soon on their arrival at Tegenepatam, to be adjusted against future tolls they were paying. The Bijapurī commander, Shēr Khan Lōdī promised and assured the Dutch, that during the reign of his brother, Bahlōl Khan the fanams would never be exacted from the Dutch both, at the port of Porto Novo and Tegenapatam; except in extraordinary circumstances.[30]

In August, 1669, Shēr Khan, the Bijapurī governor of Ginji entered into an agreement with the Dutch at Tegenepatam to suppress the revolt of the craftsmen and weavers; and to make them manufacture for the chettis. Shēr Khan sided with the Dutch on account of heavy losses he was suffering in the revenue due to the revolt.[31]

The growing wealth and prosperity of Pondicherry, a French port, made the Dutch jealous of the French. The Dutch, in 1674,

---

29. E.F.I., XI, 238.
30. Monumenta: J.B.H.S., September 1930, III (1), 86.
31. Tapan Ray Chaudhry, op.cit., 64.

stationed a war-ship off San Thome to prevent the ingress of food-stuffs to Dela Haye. They also mobilised the garrisons at their factories at Porto Novoa, Devanampatnam (later Fort St. David) and Negapatnam for the purpose of attacking Pondicherry. Further, the Dutch intrigued with the Sultan of Bijapur and approached Nadhīr Muḥammad, the Bijapurī governor of Ginji. At this time the affairs of the Court were in disorder in the hands of one Siddī Darvēsh. He, being bribed by the Dutch, despatched a body of Cavalry to lay waste the region of Pondicherry, in favour of the Dutch.[32]

Bijapur-Dutch Treaty, 1676

Ekōjī, commander of Bijapur, conquered and occupied Thanjavur in 1675 and was ruling over it on behalf of the Sultan of Bijapur. Soon the Dutch approached him for confirmation of their trading rights on the Coromandel Coast. After negotiations between Ekōjī and Signor Peter Verwer, they agreed and signed a treaty in 1676. The text of the 'alliance' reads:[33]

"Firstly, that the enmity and war that has come about between the Honourable Company and Ekoji Maharaja shall cease, and

---

32. C.S. Srinivasa Chari: "The First Indian Courtiers of the French East India Company", I.H.R.C., XVII, December 1940, 23.

33. K.A. Nilakanta Sastri: "Two Nagapatam grants from the Batavia Museum", I.H.R.C., XIV, December 1937, 39 ff. Though Mr. Sastri has discussed the 'grant' and has given the original text of it in Telugu and Tamil along with their translations, yet he fails to give exact date nor year (in Christian era) of the signing of the Treaty. However, from a 'Topographical list of Inscriptions in the Madras Presidency (II) P.1347) by Rangacharya, it is noted that Ekōjī entered into this Treaty in 1676; Dr. B.A. Saletore: "Some unknown Events in Venkoji's Career; I.H.R.C., XVII, December, 1940, 42.

that from today they shall for ever be united in a steadfast friendship and alliance; that from the commencement of this contract, the subordinates on either side shall conduct themselves in accordance with the terms of this kaul and enjoy the benefits thereof; that in the name of the Saheb Padusa of Bijapur, Ekoji Maharaja allows and grants (the following) to the illustrious Dutch East India Company.

"Secondly, in the whole of the Tanjore country the Honourable Company had been enjoying without any hinderance the privilege of paying half tolls on all merchandise imported for sale and exported by their factors and merchants at their pleasure; this was allowed by the Mulla who was the agent of the Saheb Padusa of Bijapur afterwards the late Vijayaraghava Nayak of Tanjore agreed to this arrangement, and made a silver plate grant in the year 1661 A.D., and adhered to its terms; these privileges of unhindered trade and half toll are now accepted and confirmed on the same terms as before by Ekoji Maharaja by this kaul entered into with the Honourable Company; this will apply to all the merchants of the Honourable Company over all the lands which form the Tanjore territory as stated in the kaul in the possession of the Honourable Company and accordingly Ekoji Maharaja truly accepts, renews confirms and grants,(these privileges) to the Honourable Company.

"Thirdly, the ten old villages in the possession of the Honourable Company shall remain with them as before; further, the Poyyur garden to the south of the fort of Negapatam and the garden to the west of the new Veli-gopuram which had been granted to the Honourable Company by the kaul of Vijayaraghava Nayak of Tanjore, Ekoji Maharaja agrees to leave in their hands. For the ten old villages, the Honourable Company shall pay annually 1200 pon.

"Fourthly, in accordance with this agreement, all the claims of the Saheb Padusa of Bijapur and Ekoji maharaja upon Nagapatam and the old villages of the company for the present and for all future shall be surrendered and accordingly Ekoji maharaja shall hand over to the administration of the Company Negapatam, the ten old villages of the Company, Poyyur and the new Veli garden; on the 13th of the month of Purattasi in the Ananda year, A.D. 1674 the Honourable Signor Admiral Rijklof Van Goens, now Lieutenant-General of the Indian coast, entered into an agreement with Kavetti Nayaka, the agent of Cokkanatha Nayaka of Madura regarding the villages of Tirumalairaja's pattanam and Karaikai that they be handed over the Company's administration and these places have thus been under the Company's administration; Ekoji maharaja shall observe the same terms with the Company1 In return for this the Company now contract to give to Ekoji maharaja one tusker elephant and cash as detailed below, viz., 1200 pon per annum for the ten old villages of the Company, at 10 panams of 3½ mattu per pon; 3000 pon for Negapatam; making in all 4200 pon and one tusker elephant to be handed over by the Company at the end of the year to Ekoji maharaja or his authorised representative.

"Fifthly, Ekoji Maharaja approves and authorises the Honourable Company opening a mint at Negapatam for the minting of panam and varahan (pagoda), the panam being of 3½ mattu like that current in Tanjore and the varahan 85/8 mattu like that minted at Pulicat, and in accordance with the agreement made between Signor Admiral, Maharaja and Kavetti Nayaka, the profits of the Mint, that is to say, the profits remaining over after the expenses have been met shall be divided equally between the Honourable Company and Ekoji Maharaja; and one of Ekoji Maharaja's men may stay in the mint for

the purpose of writing accounts to ascertain the profits of the mint.

"Sixthly, Ekoji maharaja undertakes to offer protection to the places above mentioned whenever necessary, and if he fails to do so, and the Company has to defend them at its own cost, it may do so and deduct the expenses incurred from the pon to be paid at the end of the year.

"Seventhly, the devadaya, brahmadaya, manya and madappuram in Negapatam shall be continued as before.

"Eightly, in accordance with the agreement entered into in A.D. 1674, Ananda year, between the Hon'ble Signor Admiral maharaja and Cokkanatha Nayakkar of Madura, and as stated earlier in this agreement, the seaport towns of Karaikal and Tirumalai Raja's pattanam were in the hands of the company as their possessions; for the last nine months these two places have been occupied by Ekoji Maharaja, who thinks that they should also go to him on account of his occupation of the Thanjavurkingdom; on account of this difference, there has been a great fall till now in the trade both of the Honourable company and Ekoji maharaja therefore the following has been made with a view to put an end to the differences between the company and Ekoji maharaja and to conclude a treaty between them which will bind them together for all time in mutual friendship, and restore the conditions of peaceful trade; the dispute regarding the rights of the company over Karaikal and Tirumalaraja's pattanam will be reporte to the Signor governor, the ruler of Ceylon, who will thereupon come to Negapatam, and enter into friendly negotiations with Ekoji maharaja and reach a final settlement thereupon; till the arrival of the Signor governor; therefore, Ekoji maharaja will continue to hold Tirumalairaja's pattanam, and Karaikal as he has been holding them so far; when peace is condluded, and Ekoji

maharaja signs this agreement, the Honourable Company will be allowed the privilege of paying half tolls on all their merchandise throughout the kingdom of Ranjore as stated in section 2 of this agreement; as the factory house, at Karaikal built by the Hon'ble company before has fallen into ruin, the Hon'ble Company shall be free to reconstruct at their convenience the factory house and the godowns belonging to it within the old bounds, to post Europeans and other servants there and carry on trade as before without any hinderance, under the protection of Ekoji maharaja.

"Ninthly, after Ekoji maharaja accepts the terms of this agreement and signs it, the company undertake to pay in the following manner the sum of 6300 pon and give one tusker elephant due to him on Negapatam and the ten old villages in accordance with the terms herein above mentioned for the period of a year and a half from A.D. 1676 Raksasa year, Tai month, to A.D. 1677 a sum of 3150 pon and a tusker elephant and at the end of Ani in the year Pingala a sum of 3150; and the company will conform to the terms of this agreement."

From the study of the above Treaty the following facts emerge out:

that this Treaty was variedly called an 'alliance', 'contract', 'kaul', 'agreement' etc.

that the previous privileges enjoyed by the Dutch, unhindered trade and half toll on imports and exports were accepted and confirmed by Bijapur.

the ten old villages in the possession of the Dutch were to remain with them. Further, the Poyyur garden to the south of the fort of Negapatam and the garden to the West of the new Veligopuram were also to remain with the Dutch. However, the Dutch

were to pay annually 1200 pon as rent for the ten villages to Bijapur.

Bijapur agreed to surrender all claims upon Negapatam, ten old villages, Poyyur and Veli gardens. Accordingly, Ekōjī was to hand them over to the Dutch by the 13th of the month of Purattasi in the Ananda Year, (A.D. 1674). In return for territorial cessions, the Dutch Company agreed to give Ekoji one tusker elephant and cash as detailed below, viz., 1200 pon per annum for the ten old villages of the Company at 10 panams of 3½ mattu per pon; 300 pon for Negapatam; making in all 4200 pon and one tusker elephant to be handed over by the end of the year.

Ekōjī approved and authorised the Dutch to establish a mint at Negapatam for the minting of panam and varahan (pagoda). The profits earned after meeting the expenditure of the mints were to be divided equally between the Dutch Company and Ekōjī. Further, one of the representative of Ekōjī was to stay in the mint for the verifications of accounts and profits.

Ekōjī undertook to offer protection to the Dutch possessions (mentioned in the Treaty) wherever necessary. If he failed, then, the Dutch were to do themselves at the cost of Ekōjī.

The dēvadāya, brahmadāya, mānya and madappuram in Negapatan were to be continued as before.

Differences over the parts of Karikal and Tirumalai Rājā's pattanam, in the possession of the Dutch were to be settled through a treaty, on arrival of Signor Governor from Ceylon to Negapatam. Till final settlement, Ekōjī to continue to hold the two parts under him.

The sum (detailed above) which the Dutch Company had to pay to Ekōji for the period of a year and a half from A.D. 1676 Rakasa

year, Tai month to A.D. 1677, Pingala Year, Ani month viz., at the end of Tai, in year Nala, A.D. 1677 - a sum of 3150

The Company will conform to the terms of this agreement.

That this treaty was of purely friendly and peaceful nature safeguarding commercial interests of the Dutch and did not had any provision for military alliance nor did it involve other European Company's nor other Indian rulers. It was merely a treaty involving on the part of Bijapur cessions of its territory and claims to the Dutch. It was absolutely a unique treaty entered by Bijapur with any other power of India or Europe.

SEC. IV: DUTCH POLICY TOWARDS BIJAPUR

Though Bijapur-Dutch relations begin from 1637, but as early as 1615 they made an attempt to establish commercial ties with Bijapur. In September 1615, factor Leonard Wolff was sent to Bijapur to secure from the Sultan the right to trade in diamonds in Bijapur kingdom. But Wolff's mission proved to be expensive and failure. Consequently, Pieter Gilliaz, sent to replace Wolff, too did not achieve anything.[34]

The Dutch Company shifted involuntarily from a commercial to a territorial and political basis; as the Company had to compete with other European companies established in India. The first move was naturally to take the possessions - factories, forts etc., from their rivals. Thus they took interest in the affairs of Indian States; and this penetrated into native politics.[35] And since from

---

34. Tapan Roy Chaudhary, op.cit., 171.
35. Vandenbosch, opcit., 52.

its very foundation on 20 March, 1602, the States-General of Holland endowed the Dutch Company with a strong military power,[36] we find them seeking commercial ends through militant and diplomatic channels. And thus their relations with Bijapur were both militant and commercial.[37] Their militant policy with Bijapur was to gain alliance against the Portuguese and the French, to safeguard their commercial interest and to achieve monopoly. Thus, they approached 'Ādil Shah, in 1637, to form an alliance against the Portuguese. Obviously the Dutch were aware of the age long enmity between Bijapur and the Portuguese. Hence, they fully utilised the opportunity, on the one hand to gain favour of 'Ādil Shah and on the other to increase the animosity between the Portuguese and Bijapur. Throwing highly tempting offer of naval attacks on Goa, to enable 'Ādil Shah to regain Goa, they got sanctions for trade and establishment of Dutch factories in Bijapur kingdom. On the basis of military assistance, they sought exemptions and concessions from customs and tolls. The militant-relations with Bijapur were only restricted to the Portuguese and the French. In relation to other Indian powers, they did not side with or against Bijapur. This attitude is evident from an incident of 3rd Oct. 1664, when Rustum Zamān, a Bijapurī governor asked the Dutch resident Leendersz, where they(Dutch) were friends with Shivaji, to which the Dutch men replied "not only with him but also with all other Rajas there about it."[38]

---

36. K. Glamann: Dutch Asiatic Trade, (1620-1740), 257.

37. On the Malabar Coast, the Dutch Policy was governed by the simple consideration of maximum pepper trade at minimum expenses. The original idea with which the Dutch started was on monopoly in pepper trade - K.M. Pannikar: Malabar and the Dutch, 112.

38. Monumenta, J.B.H.S., 1930, III(3), 283.

Except with a few minor incidents, the Bijapur-Dutch relations throughout 1637-1686, were cordial and friendly. There was never any war or hostility between the two; as was the case between Bijapur-Portuguese relations.

—

CHAPTER VIII

BIJAPUR-FRENCH RELATIONS (1670-1678)

Shēr Khan grants Pondichery to the French — Helps them against Golkonda and the Dutch

In 1670, Shēr Khan Lodī, the Bijapurī Governor of Valikondapuram province of Ginji, sent to Francois Martin (one of the French Directors in India) a favourable proposal to settle a factory in his territory. To this proposal, Francois Caron, the misguided and treacherous adviser of de la Haye, prevented Martin from replying to Sher Khan.[1]

In 1672, the French had to seek assistance from Shēr Khan due to the conflict with Golkonda and the Dutch at St. Thome (near Madras). As such, Francois Baron and Francois Martin sent Bellangarde Lespinay, in November, 1672, on diplomatic mission to Shēr Khan, seeking from him the provisions needed by the defenders of St. Thome.[2] Now that Caron was not in India, Lespinay was free to act. Thus he obtained from Shēr Khan, not only munitions and victuals, but also a site for a factory at Pondichery. Just as Lespinay was about to take leave, on 2nd January, 1673, an agent of the

---

1. Memoires de Francois Martin (Eng. Trans.) by Dr. Lotika Varadarajan, I, 90 f., 337.
2. St. Thome was a Portuguese settlement near Madras. It was captured by Golkonda in 1662. Ten years later in 1672, the French captured it. But it was re-captured by Golkonda in 1673 with the assistance of the Dutch - CHI., V, 103 f.

Dutch Company arrived in order to prejudice Shēr Khan against the French. But he received a sharp reply. The Dutch Agent said proudly "that merchants were not soldiers, and that he knew the difference between the Dutch and the French." Shēr Khan concluded to the great surprise and joy of the Dutchman, by declaring that "as the Dutch and the French were neighbours in Europe, so they should be in India."[3] And therefore, Shēr Khan granted Pondicherry to the French to settle a factory. Thus the young Vendomois performed the first diplomatic mission of the French to Bijapur with much skill. And by the order of the French Directors in India, Lespinay established himself at Pondinherry on 4th February, 1673.[4]

Factors determining the Relations — French-Dutch-English rivalries

The French-Dutch rivalry on the Coromandel coast and the fear of the Dutch attacks and provocations made the French to establish relations with Bijapur, in order to secure a safe place. With a view, therefore, to provide themselves with a place of refuge in case of evil days, the two French Directors Baron and De La Haye ordered Francois Martins to place himself in communication with Shēr Khan Lōdī for the grant of a piece of land which they might

---

3. C.H.I., V, 70. Rāo Ṣāhib adds that Shēr Khan provided the French a body of horseman stationed at Cuddalore and gave them some financial assistance - "The First Courtier's of the French East India Company," I.H.R.C., XVII, December 1940, 23.

4. idem.

call their own. Martin obeyed; found Shēr Khan accessible and was allowed to purchase a plot of ground at Pondicherry. Consequently, in April, 1674, some sixty French men went to the site and took charge of the plot of the land, which later on became Pondicherry.[5]

Besides the French-Dutch rivalry, competition with the English was also one of the causes which led to the establishment of French factory at Pondicherry, and necessiated contacts with Bijapur.[6] As early as 1673, Nadhīr Muḥammad, Bijapurī governor of Ginji,[7] invited offered the English to establish factory and fortify it either near Porto Novo or at Valudavur near Pondicherry. The English, considering the dangers they were exposed to from the Dutch and the French and disturbances in the trade, wished to avail this golden offer; and the directors at England too approved the proposal. Consequently, Elihu Yale was sent to the Khan for further negotiations.[8]

Obviously, the French sensing the danger they would be exposed to, must have arranged to establish relations with Bijapur and a factory in the Bijapur Kingdom.

Founding of Pondicherry and Establishment of close Friendly Relations

At the beginning of 1674, Martin was sent to second Lespinay. From 21st September, 1674, Martin was left at Pondicherry with six Frenchmen.[9] Martin became founder of Pondicherry as he developed

---

5. G.B. Malleson: History of the French in India (1674-1761), 20 ff.; Dr. M. Arokiaswami: "The French Towns in India", J.I.H., XIII, (2), August 1965, 591.
6. C.S. Srinivasachari: A History of Ginjee and Its Rulers, 210.
7. Pondicherry was within the Bijapuri Karnatak, which was then ruled over by two rival governors, viz., Nadhir Muhammad and Shēr Khan, with their capitals at Ginji and Valikandapuram respectively - V.G. Hatalkar: Relations Between the French and the Marathas, 13.
8. Srinivasachari, op.cit., 208.
9. C.H.I., V, 71.

it, transformed and made it capital of the French settlements in India.[10] Besides, Lespinay and Martin, to whom the credit goes for establishing Pondicherry, much credit also goes to Shēr Khan who went even to the extent of advancing loan to the French to establish factory at Pondicherry.[11] Dueto the conflict between the French and the Dutch, the latter demanded in 1674, expulsion of some Frenchmen from Fort St. George. On refusal to do so by Sir W. Langhorne, the Dutch and Golkonda army laid siege to Fort St. George. Eventually, the Frenchmen (Peter Deltor and three others) were sent to Bijapur.[12]

On 26 February, 1675, Shēr Khan sent one of his cavalry captains at Pondicherry to Baron. The latter reciprocated the courtesy by sending Deltor to Shēr Khan. On the request of Shēr Khan, Baron sent some French soldiers, a sergent at the head of 20 soldiers and 50 lascars to join Shēr Khan's contingent at Cuddalore and to proceed to Porto Novo. This gesture was just for the show of friendship between Bijapur and the French.[13]

The accounts of the amount advanced by Shēr Khan to the French in 1673, were still unsettled and there was some mismanagement. On 17th April, 1675, Martin left Pondicherry to meet Shēr Khan to settle the account and the differences. Baron advised

---

10. In 1674, when Martin came to Pondicherry, there were only few fishermens' huts at the place, besides a stone-house built by the Danish King - M.V. Labernadie: Le Vieux Pondichery (1673-1815), 6 f.; C.S. Srinivasachari: "The First Indian Courtier's of the French East India Company," I.H.R.C., XVII, December 1940, 22.

11. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 3; Hatalker, op.cit., 13.

12. Bowery: A Geographical Account of Countries' Round the Bay of Bengal (1669-1679), 51, fn.1.

13. Martins' Memoires, op.cit., II, 11, 15.

Martin that "the settlement arrived at should be favourable to Shēr Khan" — "because of the services rendered" to the French by him."[14]

After the settlement of the accounts, Martin and Shēr Khan discussed "an enterprise" -- probably the conquest of the whole of Ginji and Golkonda kingdom; and in the words of Martin, it "had every chance of succeeding, provided, Sher Khan received assistance from the Court and the powers in France seconded our efforts by sending out troops and money to these quarters."[15]

Bijapur-French Alliance 1675

Martin writes that in April, 1675, Baron was very anxious to secure an interview with Sher Khan and the latter too appeared just as eager for the meeting. After envoys had been exchanged between them, it was decided that Baron was to go to Cuddalore to meet Sher Khan.[16] During the interview, great plans about the 'enterprise' were framed and discussed. Shēr Khan entered into 'a pact' with Baron, who in the first instance, was to produce for his ally five lakhs of pagodas and one hundred Frenchmen. With this French aid, the Khan wished to fulfil his ambition of becoming master of the whole of South India. After consolidating his authority, with newly acquired territory, his plan was to conquer the kingdom of Golkonda - 'an enterprise' for which Baron promised to obtain 5000 cavalry and 20,000 soldiers of French.[17]

Baron's correspondence with the French minister Cobert shows how very serious he was about the 'enterprise'. And for the

---

14. ibid., 17.
15. idem.
16. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 15.
17. Martin's Memoires, II, op.cit., 15 ff., Hatalkar, op.cit., 19.

success of his ambitions 'enterprise', Baron wanted de La Haye to come back to India. However, the project did not materialise. As unfortunately, for the French, Louis XIV was completely absorbed in continental wars and was temporarily disheartened by the failure of the French at St. Thome; they could not pay attention to the scheme. However, still Martin, considered that the plan would have surely materialized had Bijapur Court given a helping hand to Shēr Khan.[18] It implies Bijapur Court did not approve Shēr Khan's scheme, as they were very much occupied with internal serious problems.

In the meanwhile, Baron to achieve his ambitious project, was taping other sources. In 1675, when he was at Rajapur, he stayed there for some weeks and had several meetings with the Maratha Prime Minister. Baron tried unsuccessfully to forge an alliance between Shivaji, Bijapur and the French.[19]

Even as late as February 1676, Baron was busy still discussing the project with de La Haye. And even though his efforts as a whole, did not materialise; but, he was able to achieve part-fulfilment of the project. The French successfully helped during September-November, 1676, Shēr Khan in crushing Nadhir Muḥammad Bijapur governor of Gingi. It was the first stage of the grand project, which was achieved by Bijapur-French alliance.[20]

Shēr Khan called the French to capture Valudevur. On 9th September, 1676, Sher Khan sent a Brahmin, as his envoy to Martin with full credence to negotiate. The background is the mutual

---

18. ibid., 19 f., Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 17.
19. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 22; Hatalker: The Relations between Shivaji and the French, P.I.H.C., 1945, 327.
20. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 16 f.; Hatalker: log.cit.

conflict for supremacy between Shēr Khan and Nadhīr Muḥammad. The envoy told to Martin that Shēr Khan had appointed mediators to settle the differences between him and Nadhīr Muḥammad and the proceedings were going on very slowly. Shēr Khan was unable to take any action against Nadhīr Muḥammad. As such, he advised Martin to initiate hostilities with Nadhīr Muḥammad by attacking Valudevur. Again on the mid-night of 23rd-24th September, 1676, Martin received a letter from Shēr Khan, in which he requested him to siege Valudavour "on behalf of the king of Bijapur, for his rebellious subject" Nadhīr Muḥammad. Shēr Khan also assured Martin that he would send him reinforcement of troops. As such, on the morning of 24th September, Muḥammad Raḍā came from Shēr Khan to guard Pondicherry and were placed at the disposal of Martin.[21]

The whole affair was very delicate, Martin could not take up steps at his own responsibility. As such he convened a meeting of the French Council at Pondicherry to discuss the proposal of Shēr Khan. The Council considered that "Sher Khan had not only given us valuable assistance during the siege of St. Thome, but also without his support it would be impossible for us to maintain ourselves in Pondicherry. For our sake he was on the point of rapture with the Dutch, as they were refusing to provide passports to his ships ----." In view of these facts, the Council decided to help Shēr Khan by attacking Valadevur. Consequently, a French force under Martin stormed Valadavur. And by November 1676, Nadhīr Muḥammad was forced to make peace and ceded most of his territory to Shēr Khan.[22]

---

21. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 52, 55.
22. idem.

Sher Khan was very grateful to the French for this service, he promised them a large sum as the price of their help and kept up a close alliance with them thereafter. Probably, for these services rendered by the French and to keep them under friendly obligation, Sher Khan offered to cede the fortress of Devi Kottah, near Pondicherry. However, the French did not have sufficient resources at that time, to maintain a new possession, being disinterested, they did not take up any decision. Soon Sher Khan pressed them to take charge of the possession. Further, he, wrote a letter to the French to take up on 15th April, 1676; and post their own contingent of troops. As Martin was getting ready to start with 35 Frenchmen, he received another letter from Sher Khan, offering the French only the fort of Devi Kottah which he himself was to retain its surrounding territory. This condition was not favourable to the French; as such they did not avail the opportunity and allowed the proposal to lapse in course of time.[23]

Afraid of Shivaji's annexations and levying of contributions, Martin realised that a handful of Europeans in his contingent would not be able to meet any eventuality. As such, in 1676, he applied to his friend Sher Khan, for permission to entertain and recruit some Indian soldiers in his army, for defence purposes. Sher Khan willingly assented; and made over to Martin three hundred of his own men. Martin used them not only as soldiers but colonists. He gave each a piece of land and encouraged them to build houses, and to employ themselves profitable in the manufacture of tissues and other articles for export. Thus, Pondicherry grew to prosperity.[24]

---

23. ibid., 42 f.

24. Malleson, op.cit., 25.

French Neutrality in Shivaji's Campaign against Bijapur

The campaigns of Shivaji in the Madras-Karnatak placed the French in an embarrasing situation. Martin sent an envoy to Shēr Khan as Shivaji's campaign was directed against him to enquire about the measures he intended to take in order to defend himself. He also sought Shēr Khan's permission for the French to retire to Tegnapatam (Fort St. David) a place on the sea-board, from where they could only escape to their ships in case of an attack. Shēr Khan assured the French envoy that there was nothing to fear from Shivaji; since, he had sufficient forces to defend himself. He offered Palamcotta to the French, as a place of retreat instead of Tegnapatam. Further, Martin interviewed Ibrāhīm Khan, son of Shēr Khan on 22nd May, 1677 in regard to the measures to be taken to meet the situation. Martin also inspected the fort of Valdaour for retreat in case of emergency.[25]

Apprehending an attack by Shivaji, Shēr Khan appealed to Martin for help. But the latter "deserting the cause of Shēr Khan actually sent an ambassador to Shivaji." Moreover, in the belief, that the French were Shēr Khan's allies, Shivaji was hesitating to attack the Khan. The French envoy met Shivaji near the walls of Vellore fort; Shivaji was surprised, as well as happy, to learn the shift in French attitude towards Shēr Khan.[26]

After the fall of Ginji, (on 31st May, 1677) in June, Martin sent his agent Antonio to Shivaji with a letter to the following effect:

---

25. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., 91 f.; Hatalker, op.cit., 14 f.

26. Hatalker, op.cit., 16.

"Our Company is established in your territory at Rājāpūr and we beg of you to be protected in the same way on this Coast." The French envoy had three interviews with Shivaji. In the second audience, Shivaji espousing the casue of another Bijapurī governor, Nadhīr Muhammad, demanded from the French, the return of the fort of Valdaour to Nadhīr Muhammad.[27] To this, the French envoy replied that the French were under the obligation of Shēr Khan and therefore, would not and could not draw sword against him. To this, Shivaji assured safety of the French provided they maintained neutrality.[28] Thus, when Shivaji was "assured of the defection of the French" to Shēr Khan he turned to South to attack the Khan.[29]

On 22nd June, 1677, Shēr Khan communicated to Martin his arrival at Tiruwedi. The former owed money to the French Company. Now with the change in political situation and visualising the defeat of Shēr Khan at the hands of Shivaji, Martin became anxious to get back as much money as possible. For this purpose, he sought interview with the Khan. During the interview, Shēr Khan asked for French help. But in view of the assurance given to Shivaji, of maintaining neutrality, Martin diplomatically and tactfully avoided the issue.[30] This neutrality and attitude of the French changed the whole course of Bijapur-French relations and the politics of South India. Had the French allied with the Khan, Shivaji would not have attacked Shēr Khan.

---

27. Labernadie, op.cit., Sir Jadunath Sarkar: "Shivaji in the Madras Karnatak", M.R., February, 1924, 153.

28. Labernadie, op.cit., 24 f.; Hatalker, op.cit., 15 f.

29. Jouveau Dubreuil, op.cit., 72 f. Hatalkar, op.cit., 17.

30. Martins' Memoires, op.cit., II, 98ff.; Labernadie, op.cit.,26.

After Shēr Khan's rout at Tiruvadi, early in July, 1677 he sought refuge in the woods of Ariyalur. In this precarious situation, the French did not forgive him the money he took from them. Martin sent several times messengers to Shēr Khan, demanding repayment of money he owed to the Company. Each time he expressed his inability to pay. At last due to constant persuation he handed over to the French some emeralds, valued at 1000 'crowers'.[31]

With the signing of the Treaty on 17th July, 1677 between Shēr Khan and Shivaji, the French and Bijapur relations came to an end; as Pondicherry was now ceded by Bijapur to Shivaji.

French Desertion

Throughout the brief span of eight years of French-Bijapur relations, Shēr Khan proved to be friend, helper, financier and an ally of the French. He provided all he could when they were in need. French owed much to Shēr Khan or Bijapur than what Bijapur or he owed to the French. Shēr Khan helped and allied with the French at the cost of the enmity of the English, Dutch, Golkonda, Nadhīr Muhammad etc. At one time, in 1676, when the Dutch threatened Shēr Khan from issuing pass-ports to his ships, unless he expelled the French from Pondicherry. To this, Shēr Khan replied.

---

31. Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 166 f.;Labernadie, op.cit., 26. Malleson (26), on the contrary, states that Sher Khan unable to pay, granted him instead, the revenue of the lands in the district of Pondicherry and made the cession of that place itself, an arrangement very advantageous to French interest. This statement is not tenable, in view of the authentic entries in Martin's 'emoires' about his own dealings. Moreover, after Shēr Khan's defeat and signing of the treaty with Shivaji he had no authority to cede Pondicherry to the French. And Shivaji, while at Vellore, had already sent his 'Havaladār' for the administration of the French Settlement: Martin's Memoires, op.cit., II, 97.

that "he owed us (French) protection no less than the Dutch themselves. As for the navigation on the sea, he had no comments to make. He however, wrote to the French to not to provoke the Dutch as they were strong at sea. He also warned them to be on guard as a contingent of Golkonda horse was awaiting near Pondichery."[32]

However, in the time of need the French left their friend and benefactor in lurch and sided with his opponent Shivaji. Had French sided with Sher Khan, that would have changed the whole course of politics of South India. Finally, the French proved to be defectors and desertors.

---

32. Martin's Memoires, opcit., II, 45.

Appendix

Where is this document from?

Proceedings of ratification and guarantee of peace made with the Sultan Mamede Idalxa through his envoy, Melique Acute and Fr. Goncalo Moniz s.j. D. Bras de Castro being the governor of Goa, in the year 1655.

Let it be known to all who read these proceedings of the ratification of peace that there were present in the Royal Hall of the fort of this city of Goa His Excellency, D. Bras de Castro the Governor of India, Melique Acute, the envoy of the King of Sultan Mamede Idalxa, and Fr. Goncalo Moniz who arrived in his company from Bijapur where he had been at a request of Idalxa. There were also present D. Pedro Henrriques, captain of the city, and the fidalgos of His Majest's Council who assist the Governor, such as Gillanes de Noronha, D. Fernando Manoel, Chief captain of the ships of the Kingdom (capitaomor das naos do Reino), Ruy diaz da cupha, Dr. Luis Mergulhao Borges, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Martym Velho Barreto, the justices (Desembargadores da Relacao) Dr. Jorge d'Amaral e Vasconsellos, Chief Justice of Crime, and Sebastio Alurezmigos, Chief Justice of ..... Joao Aluarez Corrilho, the attorney of the Crown and its finance (procurador da corpe e faza) Francisco de figuered Cardoso, Chantre of the See Cathedral, Bras Henrriques da Veiga, the Dean of the See and Provedor-mor dos defuntos, and the Councillors of the Municipality; Luis Peres

Pacheuo, Pedro Home, Ferra Aires de sousa da Silva, Paschoal de torres, and Manoel Laureins, Franciso Soares de Castel Brance, and the attorneys for the professions (procuradores dos misteres) Lucas Fernandes Joao Goncalves, Mathias Mendez and Duarte Roiz, and the record-keeper, Manuel Soares de Goes, and the Secretary of the State, Joseph de Chaves Sotto Mayor with his interpreter, Chrisna Sinay, and Rama Sinay Cottary, who on this occasion also acted as interpreter after taking oath according to his rite. The Governor told Melique Acute that his Master had declared a State of war against this State without any provocation, thereby hampering all relations and trade with the land beyond ours; the ports had been closed and his commander Abdul Aquimo invaded Bardes and Salsete.. He had withdrawn from these lands when Idalxa realised the harm that resulted from the hostilities and the benefits that had accrued from the peace prior to the war. These considerations had also moved t he Idalxa to take the initiative of addressing a letter to the Governor (dated of 3 October, 1654), informing that he had ordered AbdulAQuimo and Mussuan, the captain of the horsemen, to withdraw so that things may return to normal.

It was in fact made known in the lands of Diucholim, Ponda and others of Konkan, with the arrival of Melique Acute and Fr. Gonealo Moniz, that the ports be opened and the merchants on both sides resume their trade as before. The Governor responded to this laudable action by issuing an Alvara on November, 30 1654, ordering that things return to normal and the passes be thrown open, and so it continued until Dec. 3, of the year in which Melique Acute arrived here with Fr. Goncalo Moniz, with a letter of Idalxa to the Governor. The letter was dated of Nov. 3, 1654, and made it clear that Melique Acute was a person of confidence of

Idalxa and whatever he might convey to the Governor should be taken as coming from Idalxa himself. The letter also expressed the wish that the friendship between the two States should go on strengthening day by day. After a long salutation to the Governor D. Bras de Castro, the letter said: I was given the letter sent by you and I understood the substance of its contents and decided to end to you Fr. Goncalo Moniz and my worthy man, Melique Acute. Moved by the advice of the said father, I chose to send him to you accompanied by my envoy Melique Acute, who will transmit to you my wish of cherishing my long standing friendship with the golden crown of the King of Portugal. I expect that your excy. will do all the needful to enable this friendship to grow steadily (faca muita diligencia com melhor cuidado de modo q a amizade q ha amizade q ha entre my e El Rey de Portugal q tem coroad' ouro .... q de dia em dia fique acrescentada com muita fortidao). I am sending with these envoys my royal gifts to you, including robes and other things. Written on 24th of gil heja of the year 1064 of the muslim era., i.e. November 3, 1654. considering these contents, I cam to the conclusion with the advice of my Council that it would be good to have the ratification of the past treaties of peace.

that were signed by Miguel de noronha, the count of Linhares, and the ambassador Mamedezaman in the year 1633, so also the one signed by Zaerbeque and the Governor, Antonio Moniz Castro in the year 1576, and its ratification on Jan. 29, 1582, by the Viceroy Conde de Vila dorta, D. Francisco Mascarenhas and Abdul Milique and Coje fatardirra. All these agreements have been recorded in this book of treaties of peace:the first one on p.13, the second on p.7 and its ratification proceedings on p.12.

Asked by the Governor whether he had necessary powers to ratify these past treaties, Melique Acute declared that he had them as it was clearly mentioned on the letter addressed to the Governor by the Sultan Idalxa. The same letter also empowered Fr. Goncalo to do the same. The Governor made it clear that the ratification should extend to all the clauses and the wording (todos os cap. os e palavras) of the above mentioned peace treaties. After agreeing to this, Melique Acute swore on the mossafo ( ), declaring that the treaties would be honoured by his master, Sultan Mamede Idalxa, and his successors, and that nothing would be said or done against them. Fr. Goncalo Moniz swore on the Missal. Next, it was the Governor, D. Braz de Castro, who promised in the name of the King of Portugal that the peace would be honoured on his part without doing dnything to violate it. He swore on the missal which was opened at the Gospels and offered to him by the Dean of the Se Primacial (Primate's See), D. Bras Henrriques da Veiga. Follàwing the ceremony of oath-taking, it was ordered that the proceedings be recorded on this book, containing all such treaties signed with our allies. Copies of the proceeding were to be made, and both the copies and the original were to be authenticated with signatures of the Governor Melique Acute, Fr. Goncalo Moniz and the witnesses, both on the side of the Governor and "elique Acute. The latter's witnesses were: ;Many haga sayd raja, Narsinga rao naicavary, and Ricossa Guzerate. To prevent any possible future misunderstanding it was ordered that melique Acute should be given two copies of the ratification treaty, containing all the texts of the above mentioned past treaties, both in Portuguese and Persian languages. These were to be kep in the Archives of the Secretariat of the King Sultan Idalxa, so that it might always be available to him and his succes-

sors, and thereby the peace between them and the king of Portugal remain inviolate.

Another copy of the ratification is to be given to the captain of this city, in order that he may respect all that in it relates to him. It was also to be made known to all the captains and factors of the forts around the lands of Idalxa, so that they may observe it and be punished, depending upon the seriousness of the breach.

After careful consideration of all the implications of the ratification, both Melique Acurte and the Governor, renewed their pledge to honour the peace just ratified. There were present Dr. Sebastiao Cardoso, attorney of the Crown and his finance, the Chancellor of the State, and Joseph de Chaves Sotto Mayorm the Secretary of State.

Signatures.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

SEC. I: THE FIVE PHASES OF BIJAPUR'S DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

In the preceding chapters a study of Bijapur's political and diplomatic relations with different individual States, both Indian and Foreign has been made. The study reveals that the relations were manifold and the diplomacy adopted by the 'Adil Shahs, towards the different States simultaneously, was heterogeneous.

The founding of an independent Bijapur Kingdom necessarily brought in new responsibilities to its founder. One of these was eternal vigilance for the security of the frontiers and inviolability of the territories. This involved, on the one hand, the establishment of strong and standing army and, on the other hand, the formulation of an external policy to suit its purpose.

But both these considerations for Bijapur were not unilateral. It had to base it on bilateral relations with its neighbouring States. And the environment, with the emergence of the five Sultanates, as succession to the Bahmanid empire, in the last quarter of the 15th century, created a new pattern of diplomatic and political relations in the Deccan. It was the most significant development in the history of the Deccan. Never before such a family of States arose in the Deccan during the decline and after

the extinction of the parent Kingdom. Being a family of states, of a common parent, their pattern of diplomacy was similar. Then with the gradual decline and fall of the Bahmanid empire, the centre of making policy transferred from Bidar to four other capitals — Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Berar and Golkonda, while Bidar continued to be the capital of Barīd Shāhī Kingdom. Though the centres of diplomacy has shifted and multiplied, but pattern of the diplomacy adopted by these five centres.

Yet it was obvious that the new States in formulating their external relations/policies were not operating in a vacuum. Their mutual hatred, conflicts and territorial disputes gave a new dimension to the Deccan Politics. The new family of States inherited the boundaries of the disintegrated Bahmanid provinces. Their virtual independence, meant in effect, the confirmation of the territorial base when the Bahmanid power ceased to be effective.

The developments in neighbouring States had a direct impact on the external policies of Bijapur. The latter was forced to adjust its policies not only to the happenings in the Deccan or India as a whole, but also to the world events. Thus, its strategic geographical position did not allow her to pursue a policy of rigid isolation.

In its struggle for existence and expansion, Bijapur came in contact with several diverse states; and towards each of them it had to adopt inevitable different policies. The study of the foregoing chapters reveals that the pattern of diplomacy adopted by Bijapur was complex and multiplex. This was mainly due to the impact of external forces / factors which compelled Bijapur to shape its relations with other States. These factors were both Indian as well as foreign. They played a major role in shaping the

destiny of Bijapur Kingdom.

The external Indian factors (i.e., States) which made the diplomatic history of Bijapur, were acting differently in five phases. While the foreign factors acted concurrently, almost through out its history. The entire study of Bijapur's diplomatic history can be classified into the following five phases:

First Phase (1489-1536)

During this phase the 'Ādil Shāhī Kingdom was evolving and the last of the Bahmanid rulers were nominal rulers. Though Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah assumed autonomous authority, but acknowledged the theoritical sovereignty of the Bahmanī Sultans. Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah considered the Bahmanī Sultan as his Khalīfah and himself as the latter's minister. Both Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and his successor obeyed the orders of the Bahmanī Sultan. Thus, the Bahmanids were a force to reckon, atleast in name, till the extinction of their rule.

At the same time, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and his successor owed ideological allegiance to the Iranian monarch Shāh Ismā'īl Ṣafawī, Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shah went even to the extreme of getting the Khuṭbah read at Bijapur in the name of the Ṣafawid monarch. Thus transfering the theoritical sovereignty of Bijapur to the Ṣafawid ruler and rendering the Bijapur Kingdom an extention of the Ṣafawid empire.

The last year of the first phase was marked by the extinction of the Bahmanī rule and emergence of the five sultanates as full fledged independent sovereign states. However from thence the Shī'ah rulers of Bijapur owed theoritical allegiance to the

Safawids. While the Sunnī rulers got the Khuṭbah read in the name of the immaculate Khalīfahs. During this period of Sunnī rule, the Bijapur may be said to have come within the jurisdiction of the caliphal sovereignty exercised first by al Mutawwakil of Egypt and then by the Ottoman Sultans. The latter claimed sovereignty of the entire Muslim world.

Another foreign factor which exerted its influence over Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah's external policy was the Porgutuese. The latter gained a foot-hold in India with the capture of Bijapurī port of Goa in 1510. 'Ādil Shah joined the alliance of the rulers of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmadnagar and Calicut to eject the Portuguese out of the Indian soil and seas. But, eventually the Portuguese established their naval supremacy and Bijapur had to act according to the dictates of the Portuguese for their external trade, navigation etc. Bijapur felt the impact of Portuguese throughout her existence.

Second Phase (1536-65)

It was a period marked with hectic inter-statal conflicts and wars among the Deccan States. The incessant wars amongst the family of the Deccan Sultanates weakened them considerably. Thus leading to the emergence of Vijayanagar as the balancing power. Ever growing power of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah I and 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and their expansionist policy, at the cost of weak neighbours necessiated the interference of Vijayanagar, at the request of either of the other three States - Ahmadnagar, Bidar or Golkonda. Vijayanagar was thus not only able to check the aggrandisement of 'Ādil Shah but also shaped the diplomatic relations of Bijapur. 'Ādil Shah too frequently allied with the Rāya of Vijayanagar to check the territorial encroachments of either Niẓām Shah or Quṭb Shah.

This phase was most memorable for the unique combination of the four Deccan Sultans in concert against Vijayanagar which successfully brought about the fall of the latter.

Third Phase (1566-90)

The unique confederacy of the four Deccan Sultans formed during the last phase broke up during the first year of this phase. The break-up was due to the mutual strife, vanity of 'Alī 'Ādil Shah I and Murtaḍā Niẓām Shah I and above all mutual jealousies. Thus, the period was marked by a complex of friendship, rivalry, and hostility.

The fall of Vijayanagar and transfer of its capital to Penukonda, gave Bijapur an opportunity to make rapid territorial expansion in the trans-Krishna region. These new conquests in the Konkan and Karnatak introduced new dimensions in Bijapur's external policy. In these new conquests Bijapur did not effect full conquests by consolidations and establishment of its authority. Instead, it forced the rulers - petty chiefs and Nāyaks, who were feudatories to the former Vijayanagar ruler, to acknowledge 'Ādil Shah's sovereignty and pay annual tribute to Bijapur. The administration of these parts was left to the local chiefs or the Nāyaks. By this mode of conquest, Bijapur established her sovereignty over almost the entire Konkan and northern Karnatak (during this phase).

Fourth Phase (1590-1644)

This phase was marked by the Mughal strategy at first verbal and then military, which compelled Bijapur to alter and reshape its diplomatic relations with other States, specially with Ahmadnagar and Golkonda. Mughal strategy introduced new dimensions in Bijapur's

diplomacy, which felt the brunt of the Mughal onslaught. Thus, Bijapur patched up its differences with Ahmadnagar and tried, in vain by all out efforts to maintain the buffer State of Ahmadnagar between her and the Mughal empire. But when all its efforts failed to save the buffer state from annihilation at the hands of the Mughals, Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah through cunning diplomacy, allied with Shāh Jahān for the extinction and mutual partition of Ahmadnagar. This was achieved through the memorable farmān of Shāh Jahān, the so-called Treaty of 1636. Through the same farmān Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah promised to be loyal to the Mughal Emperor and got assurance for the safety of Bijapur from the Mughal invasion.

With the elimination of the buffer State, Bijapur and the Mughal empire came face to face with each other. This later on, introduced new dimension in the Mughal-Bijapur relations. And Mughal invasion ever loomed large over Bijapur and the Mughal strategy of show of arms became more successful.

During this phase the British and the Dutch settled factories within Bijapur Kingdom: but the former adopted a neutral attitude in Bijapur's affairs while the latter, the Dutch in alliance with 'Ādil Shah, played a major role in reshaping Bijapur's diplomacy towards the Portuguese.

The Fifth Phase (1644-86)

This phase was marked by the rise of Marathas under Shivaji. The rise of the Maratha power within the jurisdiction of Bijapurī territory meant a corresponding decline of Bijapur's power. The rise of Marathas was the main factor which signalised the decline and fall of Bijapur. Bijapur's relations, throughout this phase with the Mughals, Golkonda and other South Indian States were

conditioned by the diplomacy of Shivaji and his successor. In fact the Marathas at times, dictated terms to the 'Ādil Shahs and compelled them to alter their diplomacy according to the whims and fancies of the Marathas.

In the course of time, both Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb forgot the assurance given to Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah for security from Mughal invasion. They changed their policy and were ever casting longing eyes to acquire as much as possible of the Bijapur's territory. On an occasion the Mughals allied with the Marathas for the conquest of Bijapur. The treaty of Purandar of 1665 is most memorable. However, 'Ādil Shah adopted dual diplomacy, and entered into secret alliances with the Marathas.

This period was glorious in the history of Bijapur. It made tremendous territorial expansion. Its dominions, during this phase, extended from the Arabian Sea in the west to the Bay of Bengal in the East. With the expansion of its dominions, Bijapur, adopted the policy of mere acknowledgement of its sovereignty by the South Indian rulers and the Nāyaks on payment of annual tribute. At the end of Muḥammad 'Ādil Shah's reign the annual tribute from Konkan and Karnatak alone amounted to 5,25,61,649 huns (or rupees, probably).

With the extension of Bijapurī territory on the Coromandel coast, the French established their factory in the Bijapuri port of Pondicherry. For all the goodwill, help, financial assistance the Bijapurī governor, Shēr Khan Lōdī gave to the French, the latter did not reciprocate a similar gesture when the Bijapurīs were in trouble and sought help against Shivaji. Thus leading to the fall of Shēr Khan Lōdī and loss of territory to Shivaji.

In 1680 Aurangzeb compelled Sikandar 'Ādil Shah, the last ruler of the tottering Bijapur Kingdom, to acknowledge Mughal

suzerainty. With this, the name of the Mughal emperor was introduced in the Khutbah at Bijapur. This, transferred the sovereign State of Bijapur into a vassal state of the Mughals, until it was annexed by Aurangzeb in 1686.

SEC. II: THE PATTERN OF BIJAPUR'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The pattern of Bijapur's diplomatic relations were complex and multiplex. At a time it pacified one State, reconciliated another, allied with the third and / or the fourth, in order to be offensive or defensive towards a fifth hostile State (or a group of States) and at the same time tried to exert diplomatic pressure through verbal strategy through a non-aligned state over another State.

The following symbolic representations of the diplomatic positions illustrate the pattern of Bijapur's diplomacy and the external relations at a specific time.

1507

In 1507 Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah maintained cordial relations with his nominal sovereign, the Bahmani Sultan and was related to him through the matrimonial alliance. He obeyed the Sultan and was thus under natural but not formal alliance. With Irān 'Ādil Shah maintained ideological allegiance. He was on friendly terms with the rulers of Ahmadnagar, Golkonda and Berar. With Vijayanagar, he was on hostile terms due to the conflict over the possession of Rāichūr Doāb.

Bijapur joined the unique alliance of Egypt, Gujarat, Ahmadnagar and Calicut to eject out the Portuguese from the Indian soil and Seas. In a concerted action the allies gave crushing naval battle to the Portuguese off Chaul.

1637

In 1637 Bijapur was on friendly terms with Iran, Melinde (an Arab State in East Africa), the British and the Dutch. Due to the matrimonial alliance between 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah, there existed friendly relations between the two States and they were formally committed to each other for mutual help.

With the extinction of Ahmadnagar, the Mughals and Bijapur came together through the so-called Treaty of 1636; and both were formally committed for mutual help.

In 1637, Bijapur and the Dutch allied together for a joint action against the Portuguese. Evidently, the hostile relations between the Portuguese and Bijapur still persisted and even after about 127 years of Portuguese occupation of Goa the 'Ādil Shahs still hoped to recover it.

With the rulers of the Āravīdu dynasty and South India, 'Ādil Shah maintained a mixed attitude of friendship, hostility and alliance; switching to any policy, to suit the exigencies of time and need.

1665

In 1665 the memorable treaty of Purander segregated Shivaji from 'Ādil Shah and the former allied with the Mughals for the invasion of Bijapur. Though there persisted hostile relations between the Marathas and Bijapur, but both were formally committed for

mutual help against the Mughals. With Golkonda there existed friendly relations with formal commitment of help, through secret understanding, against the Mughals and the Marathas.

Mixed attitude of friendliness, hostility and alliance fluctuated with the Rāya of Āravīdu dynasty and the Nāyaks of South India States, feudatories to Bijapur. With the British and the Portuguese quite friendly relations persisted, while with the Dutch a treaty was signed against the Portuguese, with whom Bijapur was never reconciled and was hostile at heart.

'Alī 'Ādil Shah II being Shī'ah the ideological bond with Irān was once again re-established.

1676-77

In 1676 Shivaji and Abul-Ḥasan Quṭb Shah of Golkonda came to an understanding for the invasion and division of the Bijapur's territory of the Coromandel. And when Shivaji actually conquerred Bijapurī territory, the French betraying the cause of their benefactor, first adopted neutrality, then allied with Shivaji. The relations with the South Indian States, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British continued to be same as in 1665. With British, a treaty was signed. With Irān friendly relations were maintained.

Besides the complex diplomatic relations of Bijapur, there were always underhand dealings.

Lastly, the dual diplomacy of 'Ādil Shah and underhand dealings with the Marathas and the Mughals, played false on Bijapur itself and was the cause of its fall in 1686.

The symbolic representation of diplomatic positions appended to this chapter would graphically explain the external

policy of Bijapur.

Sic Transit Gloria Mundi

Diplomatic Positions — Symbol Code

Treaties

Conflicts

Alliances

Formal but limited Commitments

Natural but not formal Commitments

Peaceful and friendly relations

Ideological allegiance

Secret Alliances

Hostile attitude

Matrimonial Alliances

plate I

THE PATTERN OF BIJAPUR'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DIPLOMATIC POSITIONS





Appendix

GLOSSARY

'Abūdiyat	Implying devoted slave
Āfāqī	Alien - Foreign immigrants from Central and Western Asia, but resident of Bijapur Kingdom
Aḥkām	Orders
Aḥednāmā	Agreement, treaty
'Alī Walī Allāh	'Alī is the friend of God
Amīn	A trust worthy person - an inspector for investigations
'Arḍdāsht	Petition or an appeal
'Arḍī	Petition
Adha'an	Call of Prayer
Bandegān-i ānḥaḍrat	Implying kind and generous ruler (Mughal Emperor)
Bande Fidwī	A devoted servant or friend or follower
Barīd-i Mamālik	the messenger of good news to the State - a Commissioner of intelligence and posts.
Chauth	One fourth of the revenue demanded by Marathas from the various rulers as the price of force bearing to ravage their territories.
Dalavay	In South India a Commander-in-Chief of an army.
Dara	Measure
Desagata	The territory over which the desai or deshmukh enjoyed hereditory rights - the Waṭan of desai
Dug dugī	A small drum with two strings having knots at the edge of them and it is played by one hand.
Dih 'aql	Ten intelligence

Dunyā dārān-i Dakan	Rulers of the Deccan Kingdoms - Niẓām Shah 'Ādil Shah and Quṭb Shah, as called by the Mughals.
Farzand	son
Farzand guftāim	Called son
Fidwī	a devotee or follower
Gurūbhāi	brother of a common Gurū or spiritual leader
Ḥabashīs	Natives of Abysinia but residents of Bijapur or the Deccan.
Ḥājib	An ambassador or an envoy
Ḥanafī	One of the four Sunnī School of Law interpretations founded by Abū Ḥanīfah.
Hud hud	A type of bird
Ḥaḍrat	An elderly respected person
Īlchī	An ambassador or an envoy
Ikhlāṣ	Faith
Ikrām-o 'izzām	Great, honourable noble
Inqiyād Nāmā	Deed of submission - the so-called treaty of 1636 between the Mughals and Quṭb Shah
Irshādāt	Orders
Iṭā'at	Obedience
Iyyama-i Ma'sūmīn	The Shī'ah followers of Ithna-i 'Ashrīyah - the Twelve Imāms, beginning with 'Alī, Successor to the Prophet Muḥammad
Kalīmah	The shortened form of the Muḥammadan Creed: "Lā Īlāhā illalāhu Muḥammadu'r Rasūl Allāh" (there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Apostle of God)
Khalīfa-i Zamān	Caliph of the time
Qāḍī	Qazi - A judge

Khilāfat	The office of the Khalīfah (Caliph), the Caliphate
Khuṭbah	'an address'. The sermon delivered on Fridays at the Mosque at the time of the Ẓuhar, or Mid-day prayers and on 'Īd days.
Khulfā-i 'Araba'	The four immaculate Caliphs
Ṭurrah	
Lārī	A silver coin, originating in the district of Lār at the head of the Persian Gulf and thence deriving its name, was adopted by the 'Ādil Shāhī Sulṭān. Ishaq?
Lawāzim	Implying "Peshkash" in the form of present to Shāh Jahān from 'Ādil Shah
Majlis-i Kingāsh	A Council of 'Ādil Shāhī ministers, high-ranking civil and military officers, jagirdar etc. A purely an advisory body.
Majlis-i Rafī'	Title of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah and later on of his successor granted by the Bahmanī Sulṭān - an honour for title implying high among the nobles.
Nadhar	A present, an offering
Malik al-Sharq	Title of Yūsuf 'Ādil Shah given by the Bahmanī Sulṭān - an honourific title implying ruler of the Orient East
Marzabān-i Bijapur	Ruler of Bijapur, 'Ādil Shah
Marthīyah	Elegy
Maṣleḥat	an affair, problem
Murīd	diciple
Mehrbān	Generous, kind
Marḥamat farmūdan	To favour
Mufsid	A seditious person
Muqāsa	Grant of villages for administration on temporary basis

Nūrjahānī Mohar	Gold coin of Nūrjahān's time
Niyogi	Representative, an envoy - in South India
Panam	In Tamil and Malayalam means money, also a small coin, both of silver and gold. Transformed by European pronunciation to Fānam. The gold Fānam was probably the sixteenth of a Hun, but the proportion varied from time to time.
Pēshkash	With reference to the Mughal (upto 1680) implies 'Present' sent by the 'Ādil Shah to Mughal Emperor, while with reference to the South Indian States of Nāyaks, etc., mean a tribute paid by them to the 'Ādil Shah.
Parafin	Originally a gold coin but later on a silver coin of the Portuguese, used at Goa.
Pon	In Kanarese, gold, money, a gold coin, perhaps for hun
Qarārdād	Agreement
Qaul	Grant or an agreement
Rasūlān	Ambassadors or envoys
Ṣadrul Jahān	Title - implying ruler of the world
Safīr	An ambassador or an envoy
Saranjām	Amongst the Marathas the term was applied especially to a temporary assignment of revenue from the villages or lands for the support of troops or personal military services.
Sarlashkar	Head of a contingent or an army
Sava (or Sawa)	Quarter or one fourth "Sawai" native of Sava in Persia
Shast	Meaning sixty - an emblem worn by the sixty followers of Akbar's spiritual leadership
Shast Murīd	One of the sixty followers of Akbar's spiritual leadership
Shī'ah	The followers of 'Alī, who, as first cousin of the Prophet, and husband of his daughter, Fāṭimah regard him as his heir, as the rightful successors of the Prophet.
Sunnī	A follower of the tradition (Ḥadith). A term usually applied to the Muḥammadan, who recognize

	the first four Khalīfahs as the rightful successors of Muḥammad
Sharā'iṭ	Conditions
Swarajya	implying Marathas own kingdom. A name given to the territory directly governed by Shivaji as distinguished from the Mughlāi
Ṣūfī	A person who professes the mystic doctrines known as Taṣawwuf, Islamic mysticism.
Ṭarafdār	Ṣubēdār or Governor of a Province
Taqsīrāt	misdeeds
Thulth wa thulthān	the ratio of one-third and two third
Tabraiyan	Persons who utters ill of the Caliphs or curse the Caliphs.
'Umdah	Good, high class.
Wakīl	An ambassador or an envoy
Varahan Varaha	In Tamil and Telugu, a gold coin, same as pagoda
Wilāyat	Province

Bibliography

I. Original Sources

(A) Persian Manuscripts

Beg, Asad: Waqai' Asad Beg (Asafia No.1016, Hyderabad; B.M., Add. 30, 776)

Effendi, 'Abdullāh: Munshā'at-i Fārsī (Istanbul, Turkey)

Fuzūnī, Astrābādī: Futūḥāt-i 'Ādil Shāhī (B.M., Add. No.27, 251)

Pīrzādā, Muḥīyuddīn: Aḥwāl-i Salāṭīn-i Bijapur (B.M., Add. No.26,270)

Qāsim, Abul: Jamī'ul-Murāsalat (B.M., Add. No.7688)

Rafī'uddīn, Mīr : Tadhkiratul Muluk (Salar Jung, No.His., 142).

Qazwīnī, Ḥasan: Pādshāh Nāmā (B.M., No.173).

Qazwīnī, Ḥasan: Shāhjahān Nāmā (Oriental Manuscript Library, Hyderabad No.85).

Tabrēzī, 'Abdul 'Alī: Golconda Letters (B.M., Add. No.6600)

Tāliqānī, 'Abdul 'Alī: Inshā-i Tāliqānī (Salar Jung No. A.N. 15)

Wahhāb, 'Abdul: Majmu'a Inshā 'Abdul Wahhāb (Salar Jung No. A.N. No.26)

Waḥid, Mīrzā Ṭāhir: Makātīb-i Shāhānā-i Ṣafawī Shāhāna-i Hind, (Salar Jung, A.N. No.296).

Ẓuhūr, Muḥammad: Muḥammad Nāmā (Bijapur Museum)

Collections

Guldastā (Salar Jung, No.2731)

Makātīb-i Zamāna Salāṭīn-i Ṣafawīyyah (Asafia No.1214, Hyderabad)

Makātīb-i Sulṭān 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah (Salar Jung No.A.N. 295).

(B) Persian Manuscripts cited from the Secondary Sources

Ḥaidar, Q.A.: Majmu'aul-Inshā

Mamuri, 'Abdul Wahhāb: Gulshan-i Balāghat

Ṣwaliḥ, Muḥammad: Majmu'a-i Maktab-i Muq Talife

Ṭūsī, A.H.N.: Munsha'at

Wālīḥ, Yūsuf: Khuld-i Barīn

(C) Persian Printed Books and their Translations

Aḥmad, Niẓāmuddīn: Tabaqāt-i Akbar Shāhī (English Translation, Elliot & Dowson, reprint 1952, two parts)

Badāonī, 'Abdul Qādir: Muntakhab-al-Tawārīkh (edited by Maulvī Aḥmad 'Alī, B.I., 1868, English Translation by W.H. Lowe, Vol. III, Calcutta, 1884).

Bēg, Munshī Iskandar: Tārīkh-i 'Ālam Ārā-i 'Abbāsī (Tehran 1314 H)

Bhimsen, Burhānpūr: Tārīkh-i Dilkushā (English Translation V.G. Khobrekar, Bombay, 1972).

Ferishta, Muḥammad Qāsim: Gulshan-i Ibrāhīmī (Text 2 Vols., Bombay, 1831-32, Translation by Briggs)

Falsafī, Nūrullāh: Zindegāni-i Shāh 'Abbās I, Tehrān 1955.

Faḍl, 'Abdul: Akbar Nāmā (English Translation, H. Beveridge, Vol. III, B.I., 1910).

Faḍl, 'Abdul: A'in-i Akbarī (English Translation, H. Blockman, Vol. I, B.I., 1873).

Jahāngīr: Tōzuk-i Jahāngīrī (English Translation Rodgers and H. Beveridge, 2 Vols., London, 1911)

Khān, Khāfī: Muntakhabal-Lubāb (Text B.I., 1869, English Translation, Elliot & Dowson, reprint 1952).

Khanbu, Muḥammad Ṣwaliḥ: 'Amal-i Ṣwāliḥ (Text, B.I., 1912-46, 3 Vols.).

Khān, Musta'id: Ma'āthir-i 'Alamgīrī (English Translation, Sir Jadunath Sarkar, 1947).

Khān, Mu'tamad: Iqbāl Nāmā-i Jahāngīrī (B.I., Calcutta, 1865, Urdu Translation by M. Zakaria, Hyderabad, 1928)

Khān, Shāh Nawāz: Ma'athirul Umarā, (English Translation, Dr. Beni Prasad, Vol.I, Calcutta, 1911, Text, Vol. II, B.I., 1911).

Lāhōrī, 'Abdul Ḥamīd: Pādshāh Nāmā (Text, B.I., 1866-68)

Nūrullāh, Qāḍī: Tārīkh-i 'Ālī 'Ādil Shahiyyah (Text. edited by Abul Naṣr Muḥammad Khālīdī, Hyderabad, 1964).

Kāẓim, Muḥammad: 'Ālamgīr Nāmā (Text. B.I., Calcutta, 1868).

Ṭabāṭabā, Syed 'Alī: Burhān-i Ma'āthir (Text Hyderabad, 1936).

Udairaj, Munshi: Haft Anjuman (English Translation by Dr. Jagadish Narayan Sarkar as The Military Despatches of 17th Century Indian General, Calcutta, 1966).

Anonymous: Tārīkh-i Quṭb Shāhī (English Translation in Briggs, III)

(D) Persian Archival Documents

Mughal Documents of Shāh Jahān's and Aurangzeb's reign at State Archives, Hyderabad. 'Ādil Shāhī farmāns at State Archives,

Hyderabad and Bharat Itihasa Shamshodaka Mandala, Poona.

Aḥmad, Bashīruddīn: Farāmīn-i Salāṭīn, Delhi, 1926.

Khān, Dr. Yūsuf Ḥusain: Selected Documents of Shāh Jahān's Reign, Hyderabad, 1950.

Khān, Dr. Yūsuf Ḥusain: Selected Documents of Aurangzeb's Reign, Hyderabad, 1958.

Khān, Dr. Yūsuf Ḥusain: Farmāns and Sanads of the Deccan Sulṭāns, Hyderabad, 1963.

(E) Arabic Sources

'Azīz, M. 'Abdul: al-Fatḥ-al Mubīyn lis Samari al-Ladhī Yaḥibbil Muslīmīyn (MS. Or. No.1044, India Office Library, London.

Ḍiauddīn, Shaikh: Tuḥfatul Mujāhidīn (English Translations, S.M. Husayn Nainar, Madras, 1942.

(F) Turkish Source:

Ibrāhīm, Muṣṭafā bin: 'Alī Akhar ul Yamanī (MS. Istanbul)

(G) Sanskrit Source

Paramanand, Kavindra: Shiva Bharat (Text edited by S.M. Divekar, 1927, English Translation, S.M.H.)

(H) Marathi

Chitnis: The Chitnis-Virachit Shri Shiva Chhatrapati (English Translation, S.M.H.).

Rajwade, V.K. (ed): Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhana (English Translation, S.M.H.).

Rajwade, V.K. (ed): Jedhe-yanchi Shakavali (Eng. Trans., Souvenir)

Rajwade, V.K. (ed): Jedhe Kareena (Eng. Trans., Sovenir).

Sabhasad, Krishnaji Anand: Siva-Chatrapati Che Charitra (Eng. Trans. by J.K. Mankar: Life and Exploits of Shivaji, Bombay, 1866 and by S.Sen: Shiva Chhatrapati, 1925)

Trimal, Dattaji: 91-Qalmi Bakhar (Eng. Trans., S.M.H.)

(I) Kanarese, Telugu and Tamil Sources:

K.A. Nilakanta Sastri and N. Venkataramanayya (eds): Further Sources of Vijayanagara History (3 Vols.) Madras, 1946.

(J) Dakhni-Urdu Source

Nusratī, M.: 'Alī Nāmā (Text ed. by Dr. A. Majeed Siddiqui, Hyderabad, 1959).

(K) European Sources

Portuguese

Pissurlencar, Panduranga S. (ed): Assentos do Conselho do Esta do (Goa, 1953).

Pissurlencar, Panduranga S. (ed): The Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguese na India (Goa 1952)

Livro de Pazes (MS., Goa Archives)

Archivo Portuguese Oriental (Vol.V, Nova Goa, 1860-61.

Bikar, J.: Colliccao de Tratados (Collection of Treaties etc., Lisbon, 1881-7. Vol 9

Bikar, J.: Moncoes De Reino (MS., Goa Archives)

Birch, Walter de Gray: The Commentaries of the Great Afonso D Albuquerque (English Translation 4 Vols. Hakluyt London, 1875-84).

English Record

Foster, Sir William: English Factories in India (1618-69) 13 Vols. (London 1908-27).

Fawcett, Sir Charles: English Factories in India (1670-77) I, New Series (London, 1936).

Dutch Record: The Dagh Register and the Dutch Records at the Hague and Batavia - (Eng. Trans. in J.B.H.S., 1928-34, Shivaji the Great by Dr. Balkrishna, Poona, 1932, and "Some unpublished Dutch Extracts from the Hague Colonial Archives by R.D. Vadekar in Shivaji Nibandavali, I.

French: Martineau, A: Francois Martnin's Memoires, Paris, 1934. (English Translation Dr. Lotika Varadarajan, MS. Bombay).

Jesuit Letters: Afonso, John Correa: Jesiut Letters and Indian History, Heras, Rev. F. "Jesiut Letters and Accounts", I.H.R.C., 1942; Bertrand, Fr. J.A.: "La Mission du Madure III" (Eng. Trans. by Aiyer: Nayaks of Madura)

Travel Accounts

Foster, William (ed): The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of Great Mogul (2 Vols. 2nd ed. London 1926)

Purchas, Samuel: Purchas - His Pilgrims (Hakluyt, London, 1905)

Sen, S.N. (ed): Indian Travels of Thevenot ed Careri (New Delhi, 1949)

Freyer, John: A New Account of East India and Persia (ed. by Crooks, 3 Vols. Hakluyt, 1909-15).

Clements and Markhen (eds.): The Voyages of Sir James Lancester to the East India (Hakluyt)

Mannucci, Nicoloi: Storio do Mogor (4 Vol. Trans. and ed. by W.I. Irvine) (London, 1908)

Bernier, Francois: Travels in the Mogul Empire (trans and ed. by A. Constable, London, 1891).

Bowrey, Thomas: A Geographical Accounts of the Countries Round the Bay of Bengal (1669-78) 2Vols.

Ball, V. (ed): Travels of Jean Baptiste Tavernier, London, 1889.

Epigraphic and Numismatic Sources

Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica, 1925-26, 1930-32, 1939-40.

Nazim, Dr. M. : Bijapur Inscriptions (Memoires of the Archaeological Survey of India, No.49, 1936, New Delhi)

Bird, James: "The Ruined City of Bijapur" - J.B.B.R.A.S., May, 1844.

Taylor, G.P.: "On Some Goper Coins of 'Adil Shahi Dynasty of Bijapur" J.A.S.B., VI (NS), December, 1910, June, 1912.

II. Secondary Sources

Ahmad, Aziz: Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment, Oxford, 1964.

Ahmad, Dr. Nazir: Kitab-i Nauras, Lucknow, 1955.

Aiyer, R.S.: Nayaks of Madura, Oxford, 1924.

Alderson, A.D.: The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty, Oxford, 1956.

Ali, Dr. Athur: Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb, Asia Pub., Aligarh, 1966.

Anderson, P. : The English in Western India, London, 2nd ed. 1856.

Arnold, T.W. - The Caliphate, London, 1924.

Bannaji, D.R.: Bombay and the Siddis, Bombay, 1932.

Basu, B.D.: Rise of the Christian Power in India, Calcutta, 1931.

Benerji, S.N. (and J.S. Hoyland): The Empire of the Great Mogul.

Boxer, C.R.: A Glimpse of Goa Archives, Goa, 1952.

Carey, W.H.: The Good Old Days of Honourable John Company, Calcutta, 1964.

Chaudhri, Tapan Ray: Jan Company in Coromandel, the Hague, 1962.

Childe, Gorden: "The Aryans" London, 1926.

Commissariat, MS.: History of Gujarat (1297-1573), Bombay, 1938.

Cousens, Henry: Bijapur and its Architectural Remains (with an Historical Outline of Adil Shahi Dynasty), Bombay, 1916.

Danvers, F.C.: The Portuguese in India (2 Vols.) London, 1894.

Devare, T.N.: A Short History of Persian Literature, Poona, 1960.

Duff, Grant: History of;the Marathas, (2 Vols.) Calcutta, 1921.

Edwards, M: Asia in the Age of Europe (1498-1955), Asia Pub.

Ertaylam, Ismā'īl Ḥikmat: Adil sahiler,(Turkish) Istanbul, 1953.

Letters received by the East India Company, V. (1617).

Fārūqī, Ẓahīruddīn: Aurangzeb and His Times, Bombay, 1935.

Fisher, W.B. (ed): The Cambridge History of Iran, Cambridge, 1968.

Foster, W.(ed): Early Travels in India (1583-1619), London, 1921.

Gasiogne, Bomber: The Great Mughals , London 1972.

Gorekar, N.S.: Indo-Iran Relations, Bombay, 1970.

Glamann, K.: Dutch Asiatic Trade, Copenhagan, 1958.

Gribble : A History of the Deccan, I, London, 1896.

Hatalkar, V.G.: The Relations Between the French and the Marathas, Bombay, 1958.

Hayavandana: History of Mysore, I, Mysore, 1953.

Heras, H.: The Aravidu Dynasty, Madras, 1927.

Dodwell, H.H. (ed.): The Cambridge History of India (V), Cambridge, 1929.

Hunter: History of British India, (Vol.II), 1900.

Haig, Sir Wolesly (ed): Cambridge History of India, III, Cambridge, 1937.

Ibn-i Khaldūn: The Muqaddimah(Eng. Trans. by Franz Rosenthal), London, 1958.

Innes, Arthur, D.: A Short History of the British India, London, 1919.

Islam, Dr. Riazul: Indo-Persian Relations, Tehran, 1970.

Kaye, John W: The Administration of the East India Company, 1966.

Khare, G.H.: Maharashtra Mahodayacha Purraranga (intro)(Marathi)

Khare, G.H.: Selected Articles, B.I.S.M., Poona, 1966.

Kulkarni, Dr. A.R.: Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji, Poona, 1969.

Kramrisch, Kt.: A Survey of Painting in the Deccan, Hyderabad, 1937.

Krishna, Dr. Bal: Shivaji the Great, 2 Vols. (4 pts), Bombay, 1932.

Livermore : A History of Portugal, Cambridge, 1947.

Locke, J.C.: First Englishmen in India

Labernadie, M.V.: Le Vieux Pondicherry (1673-1876) (French) Pondicherry, 1936.

Mahalingam: Economic Life in Vijayanagara Empire, Madras, 1951.

Mallesan, G.B.: History of the French in India (1674-1761) Edinburgh, 1909.

Marriot, Sir John A.R.: The English in India, Oxford, 1932.

Muir, Sir William: The Caliphate-Its Rise, Decline and Fall, 1915.

Muir Sir William: The Mamluke or Slave Dynasty of Egypt (1260-1517), London, 1896.

Muthanna, J.M.: History of Karnataka, Mysore 1965.

Nambiar: Portuguese Pirates, Bangalore, 1955.

Newton, Percival (ed.): Travel and Travellers of the Middle Ages, London, 1926.

Nizami, K.A.: Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century, Asia Pub. Aligarh, 1961.

Pannikkar, K.M.: Malabar and the Portuguese, Bombay, 1929.

Pannikkar, K.M.: Malabar and the Dutch, Bombay, 1929.

Pittard, Eugene: Race and History, London, 1927.

Prasad, Beni: A History of Jahangir, Allahabad, 1922.

Ranade, M.G.: Rise of the Maratha Power, Bombay, 1961.

Rawlinson, H.G.: Shivaji, the Maratha, Oxford, 1915.

Rawlinson, H.G.: British Beginnings in Western India (1579-1657), Oxford, 1920.

Roberts, P.E.: History of British Indian under the Company and the Crown, Oxford, 1952.

Sardesai, G.S.: New History of the Marathas, Bombay, 1946.

Sarwar, Ghulām: History of Shah Ismāīl Ṣafawī, Aligarh

Saxena, Dr. B.P.: The Shah Jahan of Dihli, Allahabad, 1932.

Sen, S.N.: Studies in Indian History, Calcutta, 1930.

Sen, S.N.: Shiva Chhatrapati

Sen, S.N.: The Military system of the Marathas, Calcutta, 1923.

Sen, S.N.: A Preliminary Report on the Historical Records at Goa. Calcutta, 1925.

Sewell, Robert: A Forgotten Empire, London, 1900.

Shyam, Radhey: The Kingdom of Ahmadnagar, Delhi, 1966.

Sherwani, H.K.: The Bahmanis of the Deccan, Hyderabad, 1953.

Shustery, A.M.A.: Outlines of Islamic Culture, I, Bangalore, 1938.

Siddiqui, Abdul Majeed: History of Golconda, Hyderabad, 1956

Smith, Vincent: Akbar the Great, Oxford, 1917.

Srinivasachari, C.S.: A History of Gingee and its Rulers, Annamalainagar, 1943.

Stephens, H. Morse: Albuquerque, Oxford, 1912.

Swaminathan K.D.: Nayaks of Ikkeri, Madras, 1957.

Sykes, Percy - A History of Persia (2 Vols.), London, 1951.

Tarachand, Dr.: Influence of Islam on Indian Culture, Allahabad, 1946.

Titus, M.T.: Indian Islam, Oxford, 1930.

Triparti, R.D.: Rise and Fall of Mughal Empire, Allahabad, 1966.

Tunssaint, Auguste: History of the Indian Ocean, London, 1966.

Vaidya: Shivaji - The Founder of the Maratha Swarai, Poona, 1931

Vandenbosch, Amry: The Dutch East Indies, California, 1944.

Vridhagirison, V.: The Nayaks of Tanjore, Madras, 1942.

White Way: The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550), Westminister, 1899.

Yazdani, Sir Ghulam: Bidar-its History and Monuments, Oxford, 1947.

III. Thesis (unpublished)

Joshi, Dr. P.M.: The Kingdom of Bijapur (University of London, 1936).

Sequera, A.J.A.: Relations between Portuguese and the Sultantes of Bijapur (University of Bombay No.221)

IV. Articles in Journals, Proceedings etc.

Ahmad, Khwaja Muhammad: "Inscriptions of Raichur in the Hyderabad Museum," Epigraphia, 1939-40.

Aiyangar, Dr. S.K.: "The Bakhair of Rama Raja", I.H.R.C., VIII, 1925.

Aiyangar, Dr. S.K. "Kanthirava Narasaraja Wodeyar of Mysore and the last Emperor of Vijayanagara" I.H.R.C., January, 1942.

'Ali, Mahmud: "Contribution of the Bahmani Kings to Indian Civilization, P.I.H.C., 1941.

Arokiaswami, Dr. M.: "The French Towns in India", J.I.H., August, 1965.

Askari, Syed H.: "Indo-Persian Relations with Special Reference to the Deccan"- Studies in Asian History, Delhi, 1961.

Basu, Dr. K.K.:"The Golkonda Court Letters," J.B.O.R.S., XXVI, (4, 5), 1940.

Basu, Dr. K.K.: "Bijapuri Court Letters", J.B.O.R.S., XXVII (2), 1939.

Benerji, S.N.(and J.S. Hoyland): "The Dutch Chronicle", J.B.O.R.S., 1946.

Creswell, K.A.C.: "Indian Domes of Persian Origin", Asiatic Review, V, 1914.

Dames, Longworth: "The Portuguese:and Turks in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century," J.R.A.S., January, 1921.

Foster, Sir, W.: The East India Company, C.H.I., V, Cambridge, 1929.

Ghauri, Dr. Iftekhar Ahmad: "Kingship in the Sultanates of Bijapur and Golkonda," Is.Cl., January, 1972.

Ghauri, Dr. Iftekhar Ahmad: "Central Structure of the Kingdom of Bijapur", Is.Cl., January 1970.

Goetz, H.: "Persia and India, After the conquest of Mahmud - The Legacy of Persia (ed. A.J. Arberry), Oxford, 1953

Gopal, Surendra: "Aspects of Indo-Persian Trade in the 17th Century" - I.H.R.C., 1969.

Hasan, K.N. (and Manşura Ḥaidar): "Letters of 'Azīz Kōkā to Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shah II - P.I.H.C., 1965.

Hatalkar, V.G.: "The Relations Between Shivaji and the French", P.I.H.C., 1945.

Heras, H.: "The Portuguese Alliance with the Muhammadan Kingdom of the Deccan" J.B.B.R.A.S., I (N.S.).

Heras, H.: "Some Unknown Dealings between Bijapur and Goa", I.H.R.C., VIII, November, 1925.

Heras, H.: "Three Catholic Padres at the Court of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I, J.B.H.S., September, 1928.

Heras, H.: "The Marathas in Southern India", (According to Jesuit Sources) - Historical Miscellany, B.I.S.M., Poona, 1928

Heras, H.: "Jesuit Letters and Accounts", I.H.R.C., XVIII, 1942.

Hoskins, H.L.: "The Growth of British Interest in the Route to India," J.I.H., II, 1922-23.

Joshi, Dr. P.M.: "Adil Shahi Administration", P.I.H.C., 1940.

Joshi, Dr. P.M.: "Asad Beg's Mission to Bijapur", Potdar Commemoration Volume, 1950

Joshi, Dr. P.M.:"The Bahmani Kingdom" - The Delhi Sultanate, VI, Bombay, 1960

Joshi, Dr. P.M.:"Relations between the 'Adil Shahi Kingdom of Bijapur and the Portuguese at Goa during the Sixteenth Century", I.A. (New Series) September, 1939.

Joshi, Dr. P.M.: "The Raichur Doab in the Deccan History, J.I.H., December, 1958.

Joshi, Dr. P.M.: "Position of Hindus in the Adil Shahi Kingdom of Bijapur, D.H.C., 1945.

Khan, Dr. Yusuf Husain: "The Deccan Policy and the Campaign of the Mughals", Is.Cl., July, 1944.

Kulkarni, Dr. A.R.: "Social Relations in the Maratha Country, Presidential Address, P.I.H.C. (Medieval Period) 1970.

Muhammad, Dr. Yar: "Was Shahjahan justified in ordering the annexation of Bijapur to the Mughal Empire and why did the campaign fail?". Pakistan History Conference, 1958

Pissurlancar, P.: "The Attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji During the campaign of Shaista Khan and Jai Singh, I.H.R.C., IX, December, 1926.

Potdar, D.V.,: "Afzal Khan's Invasion Affects Vishalgad", I.H.R.C., XVI, 1939.

Rahim, Dr. Abdur: "Mughal Relations with Persia", Is.Cl., October, 1934.

Ramamurti, P.: "Inter-State Relations in the Deccan" (1529-1707) P.I.H.C., 1945.

Ross, Denison: "The Portuguese in India and Arabia between 1507 and 1517", J.R.A.S., 1921.

Saletore, Dr. B.A.: "The English and the Indian Civil War in I.H.R.C., December, 1942.

Saletore, Dr. B.A.: "Some Unknown Events in Venkoji's Career", I.H.R.C., XVII, December, 1940.

Sarkar, Sir Jadunath: "Shivaji in the Madras Karnatak", M.R., 1924.

Sarkar, Dr. Jagadish Narayan: "A few Letters of Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla Relating to the Partition of the

Karnatak", I.H.R.C., January, 1942.

Sarkar, Dr. Jagadish Narayan: " Miro Jumla - Iran Correspondences", J.B.O.R.S., XXVII (Pt.1&2)

" " " A Few Letters of Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla Relating to Karnatak Affairs", J.B.R.S., XXX (Pt.2)

Sastri, K.A., Nilakanta: "Two Nagapatam Grants from the Batavia Museum", I.H.R.C., XIV, December, 1937.

Saulier, Fr. A.: "Madurai and Tanjore (1659-65)", J.I.H., December 1966.

Seth, Dr. D.: "The Origin of Akbar's Deccan Policy", Is.Cl., April, 1957.

Sherwani, H.K.: "Independence of the Bahmanī Governors", P.I.H.C., 1945.

Sherwani, H.K.: "Sultan-Qulī Quṭbul-Mulk, the First Ruler of Medieval Tilangana, J.I.H., 1955-56.

Sherwani, H.K.: "The Medieval State of Tilangana", J.I.H. 1957

Sherwani, H.K.: "The Reign of 'Abdullāh Quṭb Shah", J.I.H., 1966

Sherwani, H.K.: "Tilangana Under Ibrāhīm Quṭb Shah, J.I.H., 1958

Srinivasachari, C.S.: "Shahji and His Achievement in the Carnatic; A.I.O.C., 1937.

Srinivasachari, C.S.: The First Indian Courtiers of the French East India Company, I.H.R.C., XIV, December, 1940.

Tamaskar, B.G.: "Malik Ambar and the Portuguese" J.B.R.S., XXXIII, (1, 2), 1939.

Taylor, G.P.: "On the Bijapuri Lari or Larin" - J.A.S.B., December, 1910.

Walker, John: "The Arabian Larin", Is.Cl., January, 1936.

Yazdani, Sir G.: "Inscriptions of Shahpur, Gogi and Sagar - Gulbarga District", Epigraphia, 1931-2.

Yazdani, Sir G.: "The Date of Sultan-Quli Qutbul-Mulk's Assuming the Title of King", Journal of Hyderabad Archaeological Society, 1918.

Yazdani, Sir G.: Two Miniatures from Bijapur, Is.Cl., 1935.

V. Maps and Atlases

Joppen, Charles: Historical Atlas of India, 4th ed. Longmans Ltd., England, 1946.

Bartholomen, John: The Oxford School Atlas, 21st ed. Oxford, 1968.

School Atlas (Survey of India), 1st ed. 1961.

Kini and Rao: Oxford Pictorial Atlas of Indian History, 8th ed. Oxford, 1960.

Maps prepared by Dr. P.M. Joshi for the Medieval Deccan History (in Press)

Maps in the Aravidu Dynasty, by H. Heras, Madras, 1927.

Maps in the Cambridge History of India.

Maps in the Cambridge History of Iran, Cambridge.

Maps in the District Gazeteers (Imperial).

Map in A History of Persia by Sri Percy Sykes, II, London, 1951.

Map in Indo-Persian Relations by Dr. Riazul Islam, Tehran, 1970.

Map in the Maharashtra in the Age of Shivaji by Dr. A.R. Kulkarni, Poona, 1969.

Map in the Mysore Gazetteer by Lewis Rice, I, England, 1897.

Map in the New History of Marathas, I, by G.S. Sardesai.

Survey Maps of Government of India.

VI. Reference Books

The Encyclopaedia of Islam (Old ed. 1913-34 and new ed. 1960)

Steingass: Persian-English Dictionary, 1957.

Hopkins: A Vocabulary of Persian, Arabic, and English, London, 1880.

Yule, Col. Sir Henry and Burnell, A.C.: Hobson-Jobson (A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases, London, 1886).

Haim, S.: The Shorter Persian-English Dictionary, Tehran, 1970.

Wolleston, A.N.: An English-Persian Dictionary, London, 1922.

Ganguly, A.C. and Basu, N.D. (ed.): Wilson's Glossary, Calcutta, 1940.

Ethe: Catalogue of the Persian MSS in the Library of the India Office, Oxford, 1903.

Why not Rieu?

VII. Periodicals and Proceedings

Asiatic Quarterly Review, London.

All-India Oriental Conference (Proceedings and Transactions)

Bharat Itihasa Shanshodaka Mandala (Quarterly), Poona.

Indian Culture, Calcutta.

Indo-Iranica, Calcutta.

Indian Antiquery (Old and New) Calcutta.

Islamic Culture, Hyderabad.

The Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta.

Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta.

Journal of the Bihar Research Society, Patna.

Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay.

Journal of Bombay Historical Society, Bombay.

Journal of Bihar Orissa Research Society, Patna.

Journal of Indian History, Trivandrum

Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London

Proceedings of the Deccan History Conference, Hyderabad.

Proceedings of the Indian History Congress.

Proceedings of the Indian Historical Research Commission.

Proceedings of the Pakistan History Conference.

The Modern Review, Calcutta.